Suppression Issue Spotter

Run the Suppression Issue Spotter

Choose the option that fits each stage of the encounter — the stop, any search, any custodial questioning, and any eyewitness identification. The spotter returns the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment grounds those facts implicate, each with a one-line reason and a link to the motion that raises it. It runs entirely in your browser; nothing you enter leaves the page.

The Exclusionary Rule and Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

A motion to suppress asks the court to keep evidence out of the prosecution’s case because the government obtained it in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The remedy is the exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure is inadmissible in state prosecutions, not just federal ones. Its stated purpose is deterrence — to remove the incentive for officers to disregard constitutional limits.

The rule is not limited to the item seized in the illegal act. Under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), it also reaches indirect products of the violation — the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” A confession or a piece of physical evidence that the police found only because of an unlawful stop, entry, or arrest can be suppressed along with the primary evidence.

The doctrine has limits. Evidence is not suppressed where the government learned of it from an independent source, where it would have been discovered inevitably, or where the connection between the illegality and the evidence has become so attenuated that the taint is dissipated. Wong Sun itself admitted a statement a defendant gave voluntarily days after his release. These questions — primary violation, derivative taint, and whether any exception restores admissibility — are what a suppression hearing decides.

Stops, Searches, and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment measures every stop and search against a standard of reasonableness. A brief investigative detention — a Terry stop — requires reasonable suspicion: specific, articulable facts, together with rational inferences, that criminal activity may be afoot. A hunch is not enough. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An arrest requires the higher showing of probable cause. When the spotter asks whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, a “no” flags a detention that may have been unlawful from the outset — which can taint everything that followed.

A full search generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause. A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, and the government bears the burden of proving a recognized exception: consent, exigent circumstances, a search incident to a lawful arrest, the automobile exception, or plain view. When the spotter records a warrantless search with no exception identified, that presumption is the issue to litigate.

Consent is the exception the State invokes most often, and it is frequently the weakest. Consent must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and free of duress or coercion, express or implied. The government need not prove the person knew of the right to refuse, but pressured, ambiguous, or disputed consent will not carry the burden. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Contested consent is therefore a distinct ground the spotter surfaces on its own.

Statements: Miranda Custody, Interrogation, and Voluntariness

Two separate doctrines can suppress a statement, and a strong challenge often raises both. The first is Miranda. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that the prosecution may not use a statement from custodial interrogation unless the person first received the familiar warnings — the right to remain silent, that anything said can be used, and the right to counsel — and knowingly waived them. Both triggers must be present: the person must be in custody, and the person must be interrogated.

“Interrogation” is broader than direct questioning. Under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), it includes any words or actions the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. A volunteered statement, by contrast, is not barred. When the spotter records custodial questioning with no warnings, the un-warned statement is the flag.

The second doctrine is voluntariness, which applies even when warnings were given. A statement produced by coercion, threats, or improper inducement violates due process and is inadmissible; the classic case is Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), where confessions extracted by violence could not support a conviction. Voluntariness turns on the totality of the circumstances. Texas adds a statutory layer: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.22 governs when a custodial statement is admissible, including warning and electronic-recording requirements for oral statements. A “coerced” answer in the spotter points to that voluntariness challenge.

Eyewitness Identifications: Suggestiveness and the Right to Counsel

Eyewitness identifications raise two constitutional questions, and the spotter checks each. The first is due process reliability. A showup — presenting a single suspect — or a lineup or photo array built to point at one person can be impermissibly suggestive. But suggestiveness alone does not require exclusion. Under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), reliability is the linchpin: courts weigh the witness’s opportunity to view the offender, the degree of attention, the accuracy of any prior description, the level of certainty, and the time between the crime and the confrontation against the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure.

The second question is the right to counsel. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court held that a live lineup conducted after adversarial judicial proceedings have begun is a critical stage at which the accused is entitled to counsel. If counsel was absent from a post-charge lineup, the lineup identification may be barred, and the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that any in-court identification rests on an independent source.

The two grounds are independent: an identification can be attacked as suggestive, as taken without counsel, or as both. Either way, the vehicle is a motion to suppress the identification, litigated before the witness ever points across the courtroom.

The Texas Statutory Exclusionary Rule (Article 38.23)

Texas defendants have a second, often broader, tool than the federal exclusionary rule. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(a) provides that no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of the Constitution or laws of Texas or of the United States shall be admitted in evidence against the accused in any criminal case.

Two features make it powerful. First, it reaches violations by private parties, not just state actors, so an unlawful search by a non-officer can still trigger exclusion. Second, when the evidence raises a fact issue about how it was obtained, the statute requires the jury to be instructed to disregard the evidence if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained unlawfully — a protection with no direct federal equivalent.

Texas courts have also declined to read a broad good-faith exception into the statute; the narrow statutory exception in art. 38.23(b) is limited to evidence obtained by an officer acting in objective good-faith reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on probable cause. Because art. 38.23 is the engine behind the Texas motion to suppress physical evidence and reinforces the identification motion, the spotter cites it alongside the federal constitutional grounds.

From the Spotter to the Right Motion

Each ground the spotter lists is tied to the motion that raises it, so the output doubles as a routing map.

• Fourth Amendment stop and search grounds — an unlawful stop, a warrantless search with no exception, or invalid consent — are raised by the Texas Motion to Suppress Evidence under art. 38.23, or, in a federal case, the Federal Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C).
• Fifth Amendment and voluntariness grounds — an un-warned custodial statement or a coerced one — are raised by the Texas Motion to Suppress a Statement under arts. 38.22 and 38.21 and Miranda.
• Identification grounds — a suggestive procedure or a post-charge lineup without counsel — are raised by the Texas Motion to Suppress Identification under the Due Process Clause and art. 38.23.

Most suppression motions are litigated before trial; in Texas they are commonly heard under art. 28.01, and in federal court under Rule 12. Because timing rules are strict and an untimely motion can be waived, the spotter is a starting point for a conversation with counsel, not a substitute for one.

The Case Law Behind This Tool

The controlling decisions this tool is built on—each verified against the published opinion. Holdings are neutral summaries of the law, not predictions about any case.