Motion to Suppress a Statement or Confession in Texas
A motion to suppress a statement or confession asks a Texas criminal court to exclude what a defendant told police. It applies when officers took a custodial statement without the required warnings, without a valid waiver, without the recording the law demands, or through coercion that made the statement involuntary.
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What a Motion to Suppress a Statement Is
A motion to suppress a statement or confession is a written pretrial request asking the court to keep out something the accused said to law enforcement. In Texas it rests on two statutes and one constitutional rule: the statement must satisfy the warning and recording requirements of article 38.22, and it must have been made voluntarily under article 38.21 and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Article 38.21 sets the baseline in a single sentence:
A statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion.
Every suppression argument flows from that sentence. If the statement was not free and voluntary, or if the government skipped the safeguards the Legislature attached to custodial questioning, it does not come in. Article 38.22, the Texas confession statute, then layers procedural protections on top of the federal floor set by Miranda. Those protections apply most strictly to custodial interrogation - questioning by officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in a significant way.
The motion is filed before trial so the judge can rule on admissibility outside the jury's hearing. A confession is often the most damaging evidence in a criminal case, so removing it can reshape the entire prosecution. Because the stakes are high, Texas law does not leave voluntariness to the trial jury alone; it requires the judge to decide the question first, on the record, under the procedures described below.
The Warnings and Recording Rules Under Article 38.22
Article 38.22 makes a custodial statement admissible only if the suspect first received the statutory warnings and then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights those warnings describe. The warnings track Miranda but add a distinctly Texas protection: the right to end the interview at any time.
The five warnings an officer must give before a custodial statement are:
- the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all;
- that any statement made may be used against the person at trial;
- the right to have a lawyer present to advise the person before and during any questioning;
- the right to have a lawyer appointed if the person cannot afford one; and
- the right to terminate the interview at any time.
How the statement was taken matters, because written and oral statements are treated differently:
| Type of custodial statement | Core requirement under Texas law |
|---|---|
| Written statement | Must show the warnings on its face and a knowing, voluntary waiver before the statement was made (art. 38.22, sec. 2). |
| Oral or sign-language statement | Generally inadmissible unless it was electronically recorded, the warnings were given on the recording, and the accused waived them (art. 38.22; recording rule now at art. 2B.0202). |
| Res gestae / non-custodial statement | The warning and recording rules do not bar a statement that was not the product of custodial interrogation, such as a spontaneous, volunteered remark. |
The electronic-recording requirement for custodial interrogations was moved by a January 1, 2025 nonsubstantive recodification into article 2B.0202, which directs that, absent good cause making recording infeasible, law enforcement must make a complete and contemporaneous electronic recording of any custodial interrogation. Narrow exceptions survive - for example, statements containing facts later found to be true that tend to establish guilt - but the default rule is simple: an unrecorded custodial oral confession is usually not admissible.
When and Why the Motion Is Filed
The motion is appropriate whenever the record suggests the statement was taken in a way the law does not allow. Defense counsel reviews the offense reports, the recording, and the timeline to decide whether one or more grounds apply. Common grounds include:
- No warnings. The suspect was in custody and interrogated, but officers never gave the article 38.22 warnings.
- No valid waiver. Warnings were read, but the suspect did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily give up those rights.
- Unrecorded oral statement. A custodial oral confession was not electronically recorded and no statutory exception applies.
- Invoked rights ignored. The suspect asked for a lawyer or said he wished to remain silent, yet questioning continued.
- Coercion or overreaching. Threats, promises, deprivation, or deception rendered the statement involuntary.
- Vulnerability. Illness, intoxication, youth, mental impairment, or medication undermined the suspect's ability to speak freely.
These grounds are not mutually exclusive. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), a single statement may be attacked under more than one theory at the same time. A defendant might argue, for instance, that officers ignored a request for counsel (a Miranda and article 38.22 problem) and that the interrogation tactics also made the statement involuntary (a due-process and section 6 problem). Filing early preserves each of these arguments and gives the court a clear record to review.
The Governing Standard and Who Carries the Burden
At a suppression hearing the burden is on the State, not the defendant. Once the accused shows the statement was the product of custodial interrogation, the prosecution must prove that the warnings were given, that any waiver was valid, and that the statement was voluntary. The State carries that burden by a preponderance of the evidence - the same standard that governs voluntariness as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Oursbourn organizes the voluntariness question into three separate theories, each with its own source of law and its own focus:
| Theory | Source | What it requires |
|---|---|---|
| General voluntariness | Art. 38.22, sec. 6; art. 38.21 | Whether the statement was freely and voluntarily made; can reach a statement made involuntary by illness, medication, or a private threat, even without police misconduct. |
| Miranda / confession statute | Art. 38.22, secs. 2 & 3; Miranda | Whether the warnings were given and the rights were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived during custodial interrogation. |
| Due process | U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV | Whether coercive police conduct overbore the suspect's will; requires official overreaching causally linked to the statement. |
The distinction matters. Under the Due Process Clause, a confession is involuntary only when coercive police activity caused it; absent official overreaching there is no due-process violation, even if the suspect was gravely impaired. Article 38.22 section 6 is broader. As Oursbourn put it, that section can protect people from themselves, because its focus is simply whether the defendant voluntarily made the statement - so a confession driven by hallucinations, sickness, or medication may be involuntary under Texas statute even where no officer did anything wrong.
The Suppression Hearing and the Section 6 Determination
The hearing itself is a creature of both constitutional and statutory law. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Supreme Court held that due process entitles a defendant to a fair hearing and a reliable determination of voluntariness - one made by a body other than the jury that decides guilt. A jury that hears a confession it believes is true cannot be trusted to set it aside as coerced, so the judge must resolve the question first, in isolation.
Article 38.22, section 6 codifies that protection for Texas courts. When voluntariness is contested, the trial judge must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury and make an independent finding on whether the statement was voluntarily made. At that hearing the court typically:
- hears testimony from the interrogating officers and, where relevant, the defendant;
- reviews the electronic recording of the interrogation, if one exists;
- considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the suspect's condition and the officers' conduct; and
- decides each disputed factual question - who said what, and when - before applying the law.
The totality-of-the-circumstances lens is central. No single factor decides voluntariness; the judge weighs the length and setting of the questioning, the warnings given, the suspect's age, health, and sobriety, and any promises or threats. Because the judge sits as the sole judge of witness credibility at this stage, the hearing is often where a statement lives or dies.
The Court's Written Findings of Fact
Article 38.22, section 6 does more than require a hearing - it requires the judge to enter an order stating a conclusion on voluntariness together with the specific findings of fact on which that conclusion rests. These findings are mandatory whenever voluntariness is litigated, and they are not a formality.
Written findings serve two purposes. First, they force the trial court to resolve the disputed facts openly rather than announce a bare ruling, which sharpens the analysis and protects the defendant's right to a reliable determination. Second, they give the appellate court something concrete to review. Without findings, a reviewing court cannot tell which version of events the trial judge believed, and the case may be sent back for the findings to be made.
For the defense, the findings are a strategic checkpoint. If the judge denies suppression, the written findings reveal exactly how the court resolved credibility and which legal standard it applied, framing the issues that can be raised on appeal. Counsel should make sure the record is complete - recordings admitted, objections stated, and testimony developed - so that the section 6 findings capture every contested point.
What Happens If the Motion Is Granted or Denied
If the motion is granted, the statement is excluded and the prosecution cannot use it in its case-in-chief. That can also reach evidence discovered because of the statement, since a suppressed confession may taint the leads that flowed from it. Losing a confession frequently changes the State's leverage in plea discussions and, in some cases, the viability of the charge itself.
If the motion is denied, preserving the issue is essential. Counsel typically secures a running objection so the statement's admission is protected for appeal, and the section 6 findings of fact become the backbone of the appellate record. Even a denied motion has value: it locks in officer testimony under oath, exposes weaknesses in the State's proof, and can support later arguments about the weight the jury should give the statement.
On appeal, Texas applies the bifurcated standard set out in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The reviewing court gives almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact and its credibility determinations, especially those that turn on demeanor, while reviewing the application of law to those facts de novo. In practice, this means the factual record built at the hearing is very hard to disturb, but a legal error in applying article 38.22, Miranda, or the Due Process Clause can still be corrected.
Where This Motion Fits in a Texas Defense
A motion to suppress a statement is one part of a broader pretrial strategy. It often runs alongside a separate motion to suppress physical evidence under the Fourth Amendment and article 38.23, and the two can reinforce each other when a stop, an arrest, and an interrogation are all challenged as unlawful. Deciding which grounds to raise, and in what order, depends on the specific facts of the interrogation.
Because a confession is so often the centerpiece of the State's case, evaluating how it was obtained is one of the first steps in reviewing a criminal charge. That review looks at custody, the warnings, the recording, any invocation of rights, and the suspect's condition - the same factors the judge will weigh at a section 6 hearing.
L and L Law Group, PLLC handles Texas criminal defense from its Frisco office at 5899 Preston Road, Suite 101, and can be reached at (972) 370-5060 or info@landllawgroup.com. Co-Founding Partners Reggie London (Bar No. 24043514) and Njeri London (Bar No. 24043266) represent people accused of crimes across the Dallas-Fort Worth area. This page is general information about Texas law and procedure, not legal advice; every case turns on its own facts, and you should consult a licensed attorney about your situation.
Common Situations & Variations
This motion comes up in several recurring situations. Each guide below walks through a specific fact pattern, the governing standard, and how Texas courts have handled it.
Miranda Violations: Custodial Interrogation Without WarningsCoerced or Involuntary Confessions (Art. 38.22 §6 / Jackson v. Denno Hearing)Suppressing an Un-Recorded Oral Statement (Art. 38.22 §3)Statements Taken After Invoking Counsel or the Right to SilenceWhat the Case Law Says
These decisions—verified against primary sources—control how this motion is litigated. Every case still turns on its own facts.
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) — Statements from custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless police gave the required warnings and the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights.
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) — Due process entitles a defendant to a fair, reliable voluntariness determination made by a body other than the jury that decides guilt.
- Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) — A statement's voluntariness may be challenged under three theories: article 38.22 section 6, Miranda as expanded in article 38.22, and due process.
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) — Suppression rulings receive almost total deference on historical facts and credibility, but the application of law to those facts is reviewed de novo.
General summaries of published opinions for information only — not predictions about any specific case.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a motion to suppress a statement or confession?
What is the difference between article 38.22 and article 38.21?
Do the police always have to read Miranda warnings?
Are unrecorded oral confessions admissible in Texas?
What are the warnings required under article 38.22?
Who has the burden of proof at a suppression hearing?
What is a Jackson v. Denno hearing?
Can a confession be involuntary even if the police did nothing wrong?
What happens to evidence found because of a suppressed statement?
Does the judge have to make written findings?
What standard does an appeals court use to review the ruling?
Can I file this motion if I asked for a lawyer and was questioned anyway?
Sources & Authorities
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.22 (Statement of Accused)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.21 (When Statement May Be Used as Evidence)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2B.0202 (Recording of Custodial Interrogation Required)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
- Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
- Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
About the Authors
Reggie London
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043514
Reggie London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC, defending clients across the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex in Texas state and federal criminal matters, including pretrial motion practice, suppression hearings, and trial.
Njeri London
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043266
Njeri London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC. She represents clients throughout North Texas in criminal defense, from pre-charge investigation through appeal, with a focus on motion strategy and courtroom advocacy.
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