Texas Criminal-Motions Statute & Case-Law Update
This living digest tracks how recent appellate decisions and the January 2025 recodification of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are reshaping the pretrial motions covered in this compendium. It flags new Court of Criminal Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court rulings, plus quiet statutory renumbering, so motion practice rests on current authority.
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Key moves, effective January 1, 2025: change of venue is now Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 31A.004 (formerly art. 31.03), and the custodial electronic-recording rule is now art. 2B.0202 (formerly art. 38.22, sec. 3). Discovery (art. 39.14) and the statutory exclusionary rule (art. 38.23) kept their numbers.
How to Use This Page
This page is a living Statute & Case-Law Update for the Texas pretrial motions covered in this compendium, from suppression of evidence, statements, and identifications to discovery, competency, change of venue, expert challenges, and post-trial motions. It collects appellate decisions and statutory or rule changes that alter how those motions are drafted, argued, and preserved.
It is organized around the motions this compendium already explains. Each entry links back to the underlying motion page so you can read the mechanics in full. The goal is not to restate black-letter law but to surface movement: a new holding, a sharpened standard of review, a renumbered statute, or a preservation trap that has caught practitioners off guard.
This digest was last reviewed in July 2026. It is refreshed periodically as the Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Supreme Court hand down decisions and as the Legislature amends the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Evidence and Appellate Procedure. Even so, the law changes constantly, opinions are sometimes withdrawn or granted rehearing, and effective dates vary. Treat every item here as a research starting point, not a substitute for pulling the current statute and confirming a case through a citator before you rely on it.
Nothing on this page is legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you are facing charges, the timing rules discussed below can be unforgiving, because several motions carry deadlines measured from arraignment, indictment, or trial setting, so consult a licensed Texas attorney about your specific case.
Recent Statutory & Rule Changes
The single most important quiet change is structural. Effective January 1, 2025, House Bill 4504 recodified large portions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, renumbering some articles while leaving others in place. Because the reorganization was styled as nonsubstantive, the underlying rules mostly survive, but citations to the old article numbers are now wrong for the provisions that moved. The crosswalk below separates what changed from what did not.
| Provision | Old cite | New cite / amendment | Effective date | What changed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change of venue on the defendant's motion | art. 31.03 | art. 31A.004 (new Chapter 31A) | Jan. 1, 2025 | Renumbered; substance carried forward, including the defendant's affidavit plus two credible county residents and the fair-and-impartial-trial standard. Companion articles 31A.001 (judge's own motion) and 31A.003 (State's motion) are new numbers too. |
| Electronic recording of custodial interrogation | art. 38.22, sec. 3 | art. 2B.0202 (new Chapter 2B) | Jan. 1, 2025 | Recording mandate relocated to the new law-enforcement chapter. The warnings (sec. 2(a)) and voluntariness provisions remain in art. 38.22, which art. 2B.0202 still cross-references. |
| Discovery / exculpatory disclosure (Michael Morton Act) | art. 39.14 | art. 39.14 (unchanged) | — | Number did not move. Still governs, including the sec. (h) free-standing duty to disclose exculpatory, impeachment, and mitigating evidence. |
| Texas statutory exclusionary rule | art. 38.23 | art. 38.23 (unchanged) | — | Number did not move. Still supplies the exclusionary rule and the jury-instruction remedy on a contested fact issue. |
| Examining trial | art. 16.01 | art. 16.01 (unchanged) | — | Number did not move. The felony right to a pre-indictment probable-cause hearing survives and is lost on indictment. |
| Notice of intent to raise the insanity defense | art. 46C.051 | art. 46C.051 (unchanged) | — | Number did not move. The 20-day pretrial notice requirement remains in force. |
Two practice points follow. First, do not cite repealed article 31.03 as current venue law; a motion or affidavit built on the old number invites a needless fight over form, so use article 31A.004 and its affidavit requirements. Second, the recording rule that suppression practitioners long cited as art. 38.22, sec. 3 now lives at art. 2B.0202, even though the warnings themselves remain in art. 38.22. When you brief a motion to suppress a statement or a change of venue, confirm the article number against the live statute before filing.
New & Notable Decisions
The decisions below are grouped by the motion they most affect. Each notes the holding, the subtle shift, and a link to the motion page it touches. Holdings are paraphrased; pull the opinion for exact language and subsequent history before citing.
Search, seizure, and suppression of evidence
Baldwin v. State, 664 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Boilerplate 'training and experience' language about how people use phones cannot, standing alone, establish probable cause to search a cell phone; the affidavit must couple it with specific facts and reasonable inferences showing a nexus between the device and the offense. For a motion to suppress evidence, this is a concrete new line of attack on digital-search warrants, and the Court reinforced the nexus requirement two years later in Stocker v. State, 693 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021). Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically justify a warrantless entry into a home; officers must show a case-specific exigency. The flight itself is a factor, not a trump card, and entries for minor offenses should rarely be sanctioned. This reopens suppression arguments whenever police follow a suspected misdemeanant across the threshold.
Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021). The 'community caretaking' exception recognized for impounded vehicles is not a standalone doctrine authorizing warrantless entry into a home or seizure of firearms found there. Welfare-check entries must now rest on a genuine emergency-aid or other recognized exigency, giving the defense a cleaner suppression theory when officers rely on a caretaking label.
Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020). When an officer learns that a vehicle's registered owner has a revoked license and has no information negating the inference that the owner is driving, the stop is reasonable. Suppression of a traffic-stop then turns on 'negating' facts, such as an obvious mismatch in the driver's apparent age or sex, known before the stop.
Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021). Applying physical force to a person's body with intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure even if the person does not submit and gets away. The holding fixes when a seizure begins, which can matter when a suppression motion depends on identifying the precise moment Fourth Amendment scrutiny attached.
Statements, confessions, and Miranda
Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022). A Miranda violation is the breach of a prophylactic rule, not itself a constitutional injury, and cannot support a civil damages claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. For a motion to suppress a statement, the practical takeaway is unchanged—suppression remains the courtroom remedy—but the opinion reframes how courts describe Miranda, which can shape fruits and impeachment arguments.
Discovery and Brady
Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Under the Michael Morton Act, evidence is 'material' under article 39.14(a) if it has any logical connection to a consequential fact, a standard synonymous with relevance and far broader than Brady's outcome-focused materiality. Paired with the article 39.14(h) free-standing disclosure duty, this makes the Michael Morton discovery motion a broader tool than a constitutional Brady demand.
Experts and competency
Allison v. State, 666 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Experience-based 'soft science' testimony, such as an officer interpreting coded slang, is measured by the three-part Nenno reliability test rather than the hard-science Kelly factors, and the witness need not run scientific tests first. A Kelly-Daubert challenge to such an expert should therefore attack the legitimacy of the field and the fit of the testimony, not demand lab validation.
Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). At the informal-inquiry stage, a low 'some evidence' threshold, more than a scintilla, triggers a formal competency trial, and the court must consider only evidence of incompetency without weighing competing proof of competency. Courts of appeals have applied this two-step framework repeatedly through 2024 and 2025, making it the touchstone for a motion suggesting incompetency.
Subtle Shifts Worth Knowing
Some of the most consequential movement is not a dramatic new rule but a quiet shift in how a familiar rule is applied. These are easy to miss and expensive to overlook.
Materiality is measured prospectively, not by hindsight
Before Watkins, courts often blurred discovery 'materiality' with the Brady harm question—whether the undisclosed item would have changed the verdict. Watkins holds that article 39.14 materiality is judged by an item's logical relation to a subject in the case, assessed prospectively when the request is made, not by its retrospective impact after trial. A discovery motion should frame relevance to a consequential fact rather than argue outcome-determinative prejudice.
Deference still protects warrants, so build the record early
Baldwin rejects boilerplate, but it also restates the strong deference magistrates receive; reviewing courts read affidavits in a commonsense, non-hypertechnical way and resolve doubt in favor of probable cause. The practical lesson is that a suppression win on a digital-search warrant usually depends on isolating the specific missing nexus fact, not on a generic complaint about conclusory language.
Preservation and timing traps
Several covered motions rise or fall on timing. The insanity defense requires written notice at least 20 days before trial under article 46C.051. Extraneous-offense notice under Rule 404(b) and article 37.07 must follow a timely defense request. A motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days of sentence under Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.4. And a competency suggestion can arise at any time, including mid-trial, so a Boyett-style informal inquiry is not a one-time gate. Calendar these deadlines from the triggering event, because a late or unpreserved motion forfeits even a meritorious argument.
What This Means for Motion Practice
Read together, these developments push Texas pretrial motion practice in a few consistent directions.
Discovery leverage has grown. Watkins and the article 39.14(h) disclosure duty mean the defense can demand a wide swath of relevant material without meeting Brady's high materiality bar, and the State's duty is continuing. A well-drafted discovery motion now frames requests around logical relevance to defined issues.
Digital and home-entry suppression theories are stronger. Baldwin, Lange, and Caniglia each narrow a path the State once used to justify a search or seizure. A suppression motion should pin down exactly which justification the State invokes—warrant nexus, hot pursuit, or caretaking—and test it against these decisions.
Expert challenges must fit the science. After Allison, a Kelly-Daubert challenge should match its attack to whether the testimony is hard or soft science; the wrong framework wastes the hearing.
Cite the current statute. The 2025 recodification means a change-of-venue motion, a statement-suppression motion, or any filing that quotes a moved article should verify the number against the live code. The substance usually survives, but the citation must be right.
None of this guarantees any particular result. Whether a motion succeeds depends on the facts, the record, and the discretion of the trial court. These updates simply help ensure the argument is built on current law.
Verify Currency Before You Rely on This
This digest is general legal information about Texas criminal-motion practice, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. It reflects authority the authors reviewed as of July 2026.
Appellate law is a moving target. Opinions can be granted rehearing, withdrawn, or overruled; the Legislature amends the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Evidence and Appellate Procedure on a regular cycle; and effective dates differ from provision to provision. Before you cite anything here, pull the current statute from the Texas Legislature's official site and confirm the case's subsequent history through a citator.
If you have questions about a pending charge or a specific motion, speak with a licensed Texas criminal-defense attorney about the facts of your case. L and L Law Group, PLLC can be reached at (972) 370-5060 or info@landllawgroup.com, and the office is at 5899 Preston Rd, Suite 101, Frisco, TX 75034. Reggie London (Bar No. 24043514) and Njeri London (Bar No. 24043266) are the firm's Co-Founding Partners.
New & Notable Decisions at a Glance
Recent and still-controlling decisions that shape how these motions are litigated—each verified against the published opinion. Holdings are general summaries, not predictions about any case.
| Decision | Holding | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (2021) | Under the Michael Morton Act, evidence is 'material' under Article 39.14(a) if it has any logical connection to a consequential fact, a standard synonymous with relevance. | Discovery 'materiality' is now mere relevance, far broader than Brady's outcome-based test, and the State's disclosure duty is proactive and continuing. |
| Baldwin v. State, 664 S.W.3d 122 (2022) | Boilerplate 'training and experience' language cannot alone establish probable cause to search a cell phone; the affidavit must show a factual nexus between the device and the offense. | Generic cell-phone boilerplate no longer suffices; suppression motions can attack warrants that lack specific facts tying the phone to the crime. |
| Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021) | Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically justify a warrantless home entry; courts must assess exigency case-by-case under the totality of circumstances. | No bright-line 'hot pursuit of a misdemeanant' rule; opens suppression challenges to warrantless entries that follow minor-offense flight. |
| Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021) | The vehicle-based 'community caretaking' exception is not a standalone doctrine authorizing warrantless entry into a home or seizure of its occupants or firearms. | Welfare-check and caretaking entries into homes must now rest on a recognized exigency such as emergency aid, giving the defense a cleaner suppression theory. |
| Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022) | A Miranda violation is the breach of a prophylactic rule, not itself a constitutional injury, and cannot support a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 damages claim. | Reframes Miranda as prophylactic; the courtroom remedy is still suppression under art. 38.22 and Miranda, but the violation is not a freestanding constitutional tort. |
| Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020) | When an officer knows a vehicle's registered owner has a revoked license and nothing negates the inference the owner is driving, the stop is reasonable. | Owner-with-revoked-license alone supports a stop; suppression turns on 'negating' facts, such as an obvious driver age or sex mismatch, known before the stop. |
| Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) | Applying physical force to a person's body with intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure even if the person does not submit and escapes. | Fixes the seizure's start at the moment force is applied, sharpening when Fourth Amendment scrutiny and any suppression remedy attach during stops and arrests. |
| Allison v. State, 666 S.W.3d 750 (2023) | Soft-science expert testimony, such as slang interpretation, is judged by Nenno's three-part reliability test, not Kelly's hard-science factors, and need not rest on scientific testing. | Sharpens the hard-versus-soft science divide; a Kelly-Daubert challenge to an experience-based expert must engage Nenno's legitimacy-of-field standard, not demand lab validation. |
| Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556 (2018) | At the informal competency inquiry the court weighs only evidence of incompetency; more than a scintilla triggers a formal trial, without offsetting it against competency evidence. | Bedrock two-step framework now routinely applied through 2024-2025; the 'some evidence' threshold is low and courts err by balancing competency at the inquiry stage. |
Frequently Asked Questions
Did the January 2025 recodification change Texas criminal-motion law?
What did Watkins v. State change about discovery?
Can police search a cell phone on boilerplate warrant language in Texas?
Does Lange v. California affect warrantless entries into Texas homes?
Does Vega v. Tekoh mean suppression is no longer available for Miranda violations?
What standard governs a challenge to a soft-science expert?
How little evidence triggers a competency inquiry in Texas?
Which motion deadlines should I calendar first?
Is this page legal advice I can rely on for my case?
Sources & Authorities
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 31A.004 (change of venue, eff. 1/1/2025)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2B.0202 (recording of custodial interrogation, eff. 1/1/2025)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14 (discovery / Michael Morton Act)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23 (statutory exclusionary rule)
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46C.051 (insanity-defense notice)
- Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021)
- Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021)
- Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022)
- Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020)
- Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021)
- Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 (2021)
- Baldwin v. State, 664 S.W.3d 122 (2022)
- Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021)
- Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021)
- Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022)
- Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020)
- Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021)
- Allison v. State, 666 S.W.3d 750 (2023)
- Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556 (2018)
About the Authors
Reggie London
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043514
Reggie London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC, defending clients across the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex in Texas state and federal criminal matters, including pretrial motion practice, suppression hearings, and trial.
Njeri London
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043266
Njeri London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC. She represents clients throughout North Texas in criminal defense, from pre-charge investigation through appeal, with a focus on motion strategy and courtroom advocacy.
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