What is election fraud under Texas law?
Texas Election Code Chapter 276 contains the state's criminal election offenses — § 276.013 (election fraud and false statements), § 276.015 (vote harvesting, a 3rd-degree felony created by SB 1), and § 276.018 (illegal voting). Grading runs from Class A misdemeanor to 3rd-degree felony depending on the offense and aggravators.
- Section 276.013 — election fraud
- Reaches a person who knowingly or intentionally (1) makes a false statement about a candidate, public servant, public official, or measure on a ballot for the purpose of injuring the candidate or affecting the result of the election; (2) knowingly causes any voting record or voter-registration record to contain false information; (3) engages in conduct enumerated by statute as a deceptive practice in connection with an election. Punishment grades under § 276.013(b) range from Class A misdemeanor up to 3rd-degree felony, depending on the subsection violated and statutory aggravators. The "for the purpose of" intent requirement on the false-statement subsection is the central defense battleground — the State must prove specific intent to injure or affect, not merely careless commentary about a campaign.
- Section 276.015 — vote harvesting
- A 3rd-degree felony created by SB 1 (2021) reaching a person who, in exchange for compensation or other benefit, provides or offers to provide vote-harvesting services. "Vote-harvesting services" is defined as in-person interaction with one or more voters in the physical presence of an official ballot, ballot voted by mail, or application for ballot by mail intended to deliver votes for a specific candidate or measure. Statutory exceptions cover the voter's own family members and a limited set of authorized assistants. The constitutionality of § 276.015 has been litigated in La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott; portions of related SB 1 provisions have been enjoined, but the criminal offense itself remains enforceable.
- Section 276.018 — illegal voting
- Reaches a person who votes or attempts to vote in an election in which the person knows the person is not eligible to vote — including voting more than once in the same election, voting in an election held in a political subdivision in which the person does not reside, voting while ineligible by reason of felony conviction or felony community supervision/parole, or voting as a non-citizen. SB 1 (2021) reduced the offense from 2nd-degree felony to Class A misdemeanor for most subsections, retaining a 3rd-degree felony tier for certain repeat or aggravated conduct. The "knows" mental-state requirement is the contested element in many prosecutions — the State must prove actual subjective awareness of ineligibility, not merely that a reasonable person would have appreciated the disqualification.
- Federal overlay — 18 U.S.C. § 597 and 52 U.S.C. § 20511
- Where the underlying conduct touches a federal election, federal exposure attaches in parallel. Section 597 makes it an offense to make or offer an expenditure to any person to vote, withhold his vote, or vote for or against a federal candidate — a misdemeanor where the offense is not willful, a felony of up to 2 years where it is. Section 20511 reaches knowing and willful intimidation, threats, or coercion of voters; procuring or paying for voter registration, voting, or voting in connection with federal candidates; and false-information offenses connected to federal elections, carrying up to 5 years in BOP custody and a $10,000 fine per count. Dual-sovereign separate prosecutions are constitutionally permissible under Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019).
The structural complexity of Texas election-crime prosecution is that the relevant statutory regime sits in three places at once. The substantive offenses are in Election Code Chapter 276. The punishment ranges are imported from Penal Code Chapter 12 — generally Class A misdemeanors (up to one year in county jail and a fine up to $4,000 under § 12.21) and 3rd-degree felonies (2-10 years in TDCJ and a fine up to $10,000 under § 12.34). The federal overlay is found in Title 18 and Title 52 of the U.S. Code. A single course of conduct can therefore implicate concurrent state and federal exposure plus separate civil enforcement under the Help America Vote Act and federal civil-rights statutes — making early forum and jurisdictional analysis indispensable in any meaningful defense.
Beyond statutory grading, several procedural features make election-fraud cases structurally different from ordinary white-collar prosecutions. First, the political profile of these cases is unusually high — county and statewide media coverage often begins at the search-warrant stage and continues through trial, making pretrial publicity management a routine defense task. Second, the prosecuting authority is contested — after State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the Attorney General cannot unilaterally bring Election Code prosecutions; the local DA must agree. Third, the parallel professional-licensing impact is significant — election-fraud convictions can trigger State Bar discipline for lawyers, State Commission on Judicial Conduct review for judges, and SBEC/TEA action against educators. Fourth, the constitutional defenses are substantive — the First Amendment limits criminal regulation of political speech and election-related advocacy under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), and related decisions.
SB 1 (2021) — the Election Integrity Act criminal expansions
SB 1 (2021) substantially expanded the criminal triggers in the Election Code — creating the vote-harvesting offense under § 276.015 as a 3rd-degree felony, adding new election-fraud subsections under § 276.013, and reducing illegal-voting from a 2nd-degree to a Class A misdemeanor.
SB 1, the 2021 Texas Election Integrity Protection Act, is the single most consequential election-statute amendment in recent Texas history. The legislation responded to procedural innovations adopted in Harris County during the 2020 election cycle — drive-thru voting, 24-hour polling locations, mass distribution of unsolicited mail-ballot applications — and imposed new criminal triggers on conduct that had not previously been criminalized. The legislative debate over SB 1 was extensive, the federal litigation that followed was extensive, and the criminal-defense implications continue to shape the Election Fraud Unit's prosecution priorities through the 2024 and 2026 election cycles.
The vote-harvesting offense at § 276.015 is the new statute most likely to generate prosecution. The offense reaches paid or compensated ballot collection — but the term "vote-harvesting services" is defined broadly enough to potentially encompass non-profit voter-mobilization efforts, faith-community get-out-the-vote drives, and family-based ballot assistance that historically operated outside any formal compensation arrangement. The "in exchange for compensation or other benefit" element is the critical defense leverage point — the State must prove a quid pro quo connection between the alleged services and some form of consideration, not merely volunteer activity in coordination with a campaign. La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott generated extensive federal-court analysis of § 276.015's scope, applying overbreadth and vagueness doctrines from Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and other First Amendment authorities; portions of related SB 1 provisions were enjoined, but the § 276.015 criminal offense itself remains operative.
Section 276.013 was also restructured to add new subsections — particularly around unauthorized assistance to mail-in voters, unauthorized distribution of mail-ballot applications, and certain conduct by election officials. These additions captured several conduct categories that had been informally permitted under pre-SB 1 practice — county officials sending out unsolicited mail-ballot applications, for example. The amended statute targets the senders and distributors directly with criminal exposure, creating prosecution risk for county-employed officials who follow what had been understood as standard local practice. Defense arguments under reliance on existing local-official guidance and due-process notice principles are routinely raised in this context.
Section 276.018 — illegal voting — was actually reduced in severity by SB 1 for most subsections. Before SB 1, illegal voting was a 2nd-degree felony (2-20 years and up to $10,000 fine); SB 1 reduced it to Class A misdemeanor (up to one year and $4,000 fine) for most subsections, retaining a 3rd-degree felony tier only for certain repeat or aggravated conduct. The reduction was politically contested but legally significant — it reduced the stakes of most non-citizen voter, probationer-voter, and double-voter prosecutions from felony exposure to misdemeanor exposure, with corresponding collateral-consequence implications (no felony disenfranchisement, no automatic firearm-rights loss under federal law, no automatic immigration consequence beyond the underlying ineligibility itself). The amendment matters significantly for charge-bargaining negotiations in cases where the State has limited evidence of subjective awareness of ineligibility.
Illegal voting and the knows mental-state requirement
Section 276.018 illegal voting requires that the person "knows" he is not eligible to vote. Mistake-of-fact about citizenship status, probation eligibility, or jurisdictional residence is a recognized defense — and the State's burden to prove subjective awareness is the workhorse defense theory in this category of prosecution.
The most heavily litigated element in any illegal-voting prosecution under § 276.018 is the mental-state requirement. The statute reaches a person who votes or attempts to vote "in an election in which the person knows the person is not eligible to vote." The "knows" mental state is defined under Penal Code § 6.03(b): a person acts knowingly with respect to a circumstance when he is aware that the circumstance exists. The State must prove actual subjective awareness — not merely that a reasonable person would have appreciated the ineligibility, and not merely that the defendant was given notice of the rules at registration. Practitioners frequently confuse this with criminal negligence under § 6.03(d), which requires only that a reasonable person ought to have been aware. The statute is explicit: actual subjective knowledge is required.
Three recurring fact patterns generate the bulk of illegal-voting prosecutions, and the mens-rea defense plays out differently in each. First, the non-citizen voter cases — typically involving lawful permanent residents who voted in good-faith reliance on a county election worker's erroneous advice, or naturalization applicants who misunderstood the citizenship-status timing. The defense develops the record on what the defendant was told at registration, what training materials were provided, and what affirmative misrepresentations were made by election officials. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), and the federal Voting Rights Act provide procedural context, but the core defense is reliance and mistake-of-fact, not constitutional invalidity of the voter-ID regime.
Second, the probationer-voter cases — typically involving Texans on felony community supervision or parole who voted in good-faith belief that they had completed their disqualifying sentence, or who received conflicting information from probation officers, election officials, or attorneys about their voting eligibility. Texas Election Code § 11.002(a)(4) makes a person ineligible to register or vote while on felony community supervision, parole, or supervised release; the eligibility-restoration date is the official discharge date of the sentence, which is not always easily ascertainable from probation records. The defense develops the record on what the defendant was told about restoration of voting rights and when, with frequent emphasis on incomplete or conflicting guidance from CSCD officers and election registrars.
Third, the jurisdictional-mismatch cases — typically involving voters who moved between counties or precincts and voted at the wrong location or in the wrong election. These are often the lowest-mens-rea prosecutions, where the State's evidence of subjective awareness is weakest. The defense argument is straightforward: the voter did not know the move had invalidated their voter-registration certificate for the precinct in question, and absent specific notice from the county registrar, no subjective awareness can be inferred. Post-SB 1, most of these cases are Class A misdemeanors with limited collateral exposure — making them frequent candidates for pretrial diversion or dismissal where the local DA's office has resource constraints.
Vote harvesting under § 276.015 — the new 3rd-degree felony
Section 276.015 vote harvesting is the SB 1 creation that most directly criminalizes election-related conduct. The "in exchange for compensation or other benefit" element requires proof of a quid pro quo connection between the alleged services and consideration — pure volunteer activity is not enough.
Section 276.015 reaches a person who, in exchange for compensation or other benefit, provides or offers to provide vote-harvesting services. The statute defines "vote-harvesting services" as in-person interaction with one or more voters in the physical presence of an official ballot, ballot voted by mail, or application for ballot by mail intended to deliver votes for a specific candidate or measure. The structure is two-pronged: the actor must (1) interact in-person with voters in the physical presence of a ballot or application, and (2) do so for compensation in furtherance of a specific candidate or measure. Statutory exceptions cover the voter's own family members and a limited set of authorized assistants under Subchapter C of Chapter 64.
The "in exchange for compensation or other benefit" element is the principal defense leverage. The State must prove a quid pro quo — the actor must have received, or been promised, compensation or some other benefit connected to the vote-harvesting services. Volunteer get-out-the-vote efforts are not within the statute. Faith-community ballot assistance done without payment is not within the statute. Family-member assistance (statutorily exempted) is not within the statute. The defense focuses sharply on what consideration changed hands, when, and whether there is any documentary or testimonial evidence connecting the alleged services to the alleged compensation. Many § 276.015 investigations stall at this stage because the State cannot establish a clear consideration trail beyond circumstantial inferences.
The First Amendment defense is structurally available — political speech and election-related advocacy are core First Amendment activity, and any criminal regulation of those activities must satisfy strict scrutiny. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), recognized ripeness for pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges to election-speech crimes, and the underlying First Amendment analysis (decided on remand) addresses the substantive standards. Section 276.015 itself was challenged in La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott federal litigation, with overbreadth and vagueness arguments asserting that the statute reaches protected advocacy and is unconstitutionally vague about what conduct is criminalized. The criminal-offense provisions survived injunction at the federal-court level, but case-specific First Amendment as-applied challenges remain available — particularly in prosecutions where the alleged "harvesting" is essentially voter-education or voter-mobilization activity rather than coercive ballot-handling.
Practical defense strategy in § 276.015 cases turns on early identification of every alleged compensation transaction and every alleged interaction. The Election Fraud Unit's investigations typically build the case from campaign-finance records, witness interviews of voters who received assistance, and grand-jury subpoenas of political-organization records. The defense maps the State's timeline, identifies witnesses with credibility or recollection problems, and develops alternative narratives — was the alleged compensation actually unrelated to ballot-handling, was the in-person interaction outside the physical presence of a ballot, did the voter actually receive any ballot assistance, was the actor a statutorily authorized assistant or a family member. Many cases fall apart at the compensation-trail or in-person-interaction element, neither of which can be proven by political affiliation alone.
Federal overlay — 18 U.S.C. § 597 and 52 U.S.C. § 20511
Federal exposure attaches in parallel where the underlying conduct touches a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 597 reaches expenditure-for-vote conduct; 52 U.S.C. § 20511 reaches voter intimidation and false-registration conduct. Dual-sovereign separate prosecutions are constitutionally permissible.
Federal election-fraud exposure arises any time the alleged conduct touches a federal election — congressional, presidential, or any election where a federal candidate appears on the ballot. The two principal federal criminal statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 597 and 52 U.S.C. § 20511. Section 597 makes it an offense to make or offer to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate in a federal election. It is a misdemeanor where the conduct is not willful (up to one year in BOP custody) and a felony where the conduct is willful (up to two years). The "expenditure" element reaches direct payment, food, gifts, transportation, and other consideration of monetary value — though enforcement focuses on conduct involving recurring or organized payments rather than de minimis transactions.
Section 20511 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10) is a more comprehensive federal voting-crime statute, originally enacted as part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. It reaches three distinct categories of conduct: (1) knowing and willful intimidation, threats, or coercion of any person for voting, registering to vote, urging or aiding another to vote, or exercising any right under the NVRA; (2) knowing and willful procurement, providing for payment, accepting payment for, or knowingly providing false information about voter registration, voting, or registering to vote in connection with federal candidates; (3) knowing and willful submission of false-information voter registrations. Penalties run up to 5 years in BOP custody and a $10,000 fine per count. The U.S. Department of Justice Public Integrity Section's Election Crimes Branch coordinates federal prosecution with the U.S. Attorney's Office under Justice Manual § 9-85.210.
Forum considerations in dual-jurisdiction cases are substantial. Federal prosecutors generally have stronger discovery tools (grand-jury subpoenas, federal search warrants, DOJ investigative resources), longer statutes of limitation, and broader RICO/wire-fraud charging options. State prosecutors are constrained by the State v. Stephens referral framework and county-level resource limits. A federal investigation that begins as parallel to a state case can sometimes be redirected to a state-only resolution where the federal U.S. Attorney's Office declines prosecution — and conversely, a state-only investigation that develops federal evidence can be referred upward to federal prosecution. Early communication with both sets of prosecutors is the defense's primary forum-management tool.
Dual-sovereign separate prosecutions are constitutionally permissible under the Supreme Court's decision in Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019), which reaffirmed the dual-sovereignty doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause. A state acquittal does not preclude a subsequent federal prosecution for the same underlying conduct, and vice versa — provided each sovereign brings its own charges under its own laws. As a practical matter, the U.S. Attorney's Office Petite Policy (Justice Manual § 9-2.031) generally discourages successive federal prosecution after a state proceeding, but the policy contains substantial exceptions and is not constitutionally required. Defense strategy in dual-jurisdiction cases therefore must always account for the possibility that a state-court resolution will not foreclose federal exposure.
The Office of Attorney General Election Fraud Unit
The Texas AG's Election Fraud Unit is the primary state investigator and prosecutor of Election Code violations. After State v. Stephens (2021), the AG cannot unilaterally prosecute — referral from the local district or county attorney is required.
The Office of the Attorney General's Election Fraud Unit was reorganized in 2020-2021 as a specialized prosecuting unit dedicated to Election Code violations. The unit investigates referrals from county election registrars, the Secretary of State, political opponents, civic organizations, and individual voters; conducts witness interviews and document reviews; and historically brought direct prosecutions in district court. The unit's prosecuting authority was constitutionally limited by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), which held that under the Texas Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, the AG cannot unilaterally prosecute Election Code violations absent referral from the local district or county attorney with statutory prosecutorial authority for the venue in question.
Post-Stephens practice is a multi-stage process. The Election Fraud Unit investigates and prepares a case package; the unit refers the case to the local DA in the relevant county (Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant — or whichever county the alleged conduct occurred in); the local DA accepts or declines prosecution. The local DA's decision is heavily influenced by available evidence, local political dynamics, resource constraints, and competing priorities. Some local DAs are willing to accept AG-developed cases and prosecute them in-house; others request that the AG provide a special prosecutor (the local DA can designate the AG's office as a special prosecutor under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); still others decline the case entirely. The Texas Legislature has periodically considered amendments restoring direct AG prosecuting authority, but no statutory fix has been enacted.
For defense counsel, the post-Stephens framework is a significant strategic asset. Investigation-stage representation is critical — the AG's Election Fraud Unit conducts witness interviews and document reviews before any prosecution decision is made, and skilled early intervention can sometimes head off a referral entirely. Where a referral is made, defense counsel engages directly with the local DA — Collin County and Denton County have particularly engaged prosecutorial leadership, while Dallas and Tarrant maintain larger career units that handle elections cases in coordination with general public-integrity dockets. Negotiation with the local DA about whether to accept the case, whether to prosecute on reduced charges, or whether to refer back to the AG as a special prosecutor is a substantive strategic conversation that shapes the entire trajectory of the prosecution.
Defense response at the AG-interview stage requires careful Fifth Amendment and statutory-privilege analysis. The AG investigator has no power to compel testimony absent a grand-jury subpoena issued through a local DA, but voluntary cooperation is routinely sought. A subject who agrees to a "voluntary" interview risks creating admissions usable against him in any subsequent prosecution. Defense counsel's default posture is to decline a voluntary interview, assert Fifth Amendment rights through counsel, and require the AG to proceed through formal grand-jury process if the unit wishes to compel testimony. Where cooperation serves the client's interest — for example, where the client is genuinely peripheral and a cooperation agreement could foreclose charging — proffer-letter procedures are negotiated in advance to limit the use of statements made.
Professional licensing and collateral consequences
An election-fraud conviction triggers parallel professional-discipline exposure for lawyers (State Bar of Texas), judges (State Commission on Judicial Conduct), educators (SBEC/TEA), and other licensed professionals — independent of criminal sentencing.
Election-fraud convictions trigger collateral professional-licensing consequences that frequently exceed the criminal-sentencing impact in long-term significance. For attorneys, conviction of a Class A misdemeanor or felony triggers reporting obligations under Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(2) and may support disbarment, suspension, or probated discipline through the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude is grounds for automatic compulsory discipline under the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Election-fraud offenses involving knowing false statements (§ 276.013) generally meet the moral-turpitude threshold; vote-harvesting (§ 276.015) and illegal-voting (§ 276.018) cases are evaluated on their facts. The Compulsory Discipline Hearing process runs independently of the criminal case and can result in disbarment even after a probated sentence or pretrial diversion.
For sitting judges and judicial officers, conviction triggers review by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct under the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Judges holding office at the time of the offense face potential public reprimand, censure, suspension, or recommendation of removal. Even where a judge resigns before the proceeding is concluded, the SCJC retains jurisdiction to issue findings, and a finding of cause for removal can permanently bar future judicial office under the Texas Constitution. Election-related offenses are particularly sensitive in the judicial-discipline context because they implicate the judicial role as nonpartisan administrator of the legal system, and the standard of judicial integrity is set substantially above the general criminal-law threshold.
For Texas educators, conviction triggers reporting to the State Board for Educator Certification under the TEA's educator-misconduct framework. Felony convictions and convictions involving moral turpitude can result in suspension or permanent revocation of teaching certificates under 19 Tex. Admin. Code Ch. 249. The SBEC review process applies regardless of whether the educator continues to teach in the relevant district — a one-year deferred adjudication that is dismissed at completion may still trigger SBEC review and certificate consequences. Public-school district employees in the DFW metroplex frequently appear in election-fraud investigations as alleged paid canvassers or campaign workers, and the parallel SBEC exposure is a substantial collateral concern.
Beyond licensed professionals, election-fraud convictions can trigger federal immigration consequences, public-employment disqualification, and disqualification from holding state or local office under the Texas Election Code itself. A felony conviction permanently disqualifies the convicted person from voter eligibility until the discharge of the sentence under § 11.002(a)(4), and may permanently disqualify the convicted person from candidacy under Election Code § 141.001(a)(4) if the offense involves moral turpitude. For non-citizen defendants, certain election-fraud convictions can be classified as crimes involving moral turpitude or as aggravated felonies under federal immigration law, triggering deportation and inadmissibility consequences far exceeding the criminal sentencing exposure itself. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), requires defense counsel to advise non-citizen clients of immigration consequences before plea.
First Amendment limits on election-speech criminalization
The First Amendment imposes substantive limits on criminal regulation of political speech, voter education, and election-related advocacy. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus recognized standing and ripeness for pre-enforcement challenges; substantive overbreadth and vagueness defenses remain available as-applied.
Election-related conduct is at the core of the First Amendment's protection of political speech. Any criminal statute that reaches political advocacy, voter education, candidate criticism, or campaign communication must satisfy strict scrutiny — narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, with no available less-restrictive alternative. The Supreme Court's decision in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), established that pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges to election-speech crimes are ripe for federal-court review where the plaintiff demonstrates a credible threat of prosecution. On remand and in subsequent litigation, the Sixth Circuit applied substantive overbreadth and vagueness analysis to Ohio's false-statement election law and ultimately enjoined it.
In Texas, the principal First Amendment vulnerability of Election Code prosecutions is the breadth of the false-statement subsections in § 276.013. The statute reaches "false statements" about candidates or measures made "for the purpose of injuring the candidate or affecting the result of the election." That language is constitutionally suspect where it reaches matters of political opinion, hyperbole, sarcasm, satire, or contested factual assertions that cannot be definitively disproven. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), held that the Stolen Valor Act's criminalization of false statements about military honors was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and the analytical framework — rejection of any general "no value to false speech" categorical exclusion — applies with equal force to false-statement election laws. As-applied challenges are routinely available where the prosecution targets speech that is opinion, hyperbole, or contested factual claim rather than provably false statement of fact.
The vote-harvesting statute under § 276.015 faces parallel First Amendment exposure. Voter education, voter mobilization, candidate advocacy, and political-organization activity are all core First Amendment conduct, and criminalizing in-person interaction with voters in the presence of ballots risks chilling protected advocacy. The federal courts addressed these arguments in La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, applying overbreadth and vagueness standards to SB 1 provisions. The substantive analysis turns on whether the criminal provision reaches only narrowly defined unlawful conduct (paid coercive ballot handling) or whether it sweeps in protected political activity. As-applied First Amendment defenses are particularly available in cases where the alleged "vote-harvesting" amounts to voter outreach, community-organization activity, or candidate-advocacy work rather than ballot manipulation.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the line of campaign-finance jurisprudence is also relevant context, particularly where the allegedly fraudulent conduct involves payments or expenditures connected to electoral advocacy. The Supreme Court's protection of political-speech expenditures imposes substantial constraints on how compensation-based theories of liability can be framed in vote-harvesting cases. Defense counsel evaluating constitutional defenses in election-fraud cases should map the alleged conduct against both the Texas Constitution's free-speech protections (which the Texas Supreme Court has held provide independent and sometimes broader protection than the First Amendment) and the federal First Amendment jurisprudence. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), provides procedural-due-process context for voter-eligibility regimes but does not displace the substantive speech protections in the advocacy context.
