The Texas carry landscape after HB 1927 (Constitutional Carry)
HB 1927 (effective September 1, 2021) permits adults 21+ to carry a handgun without an LTC unless otherwise disqualified. UCW prosecutions now focus on minors, prohibited persons, intoxicated carriers, prohibited places, and § 46.02(a-1) ineligibility cases.
Before September 1, 2021, Texas required a License to Carry for any concealed or open handgun carry off one's own premises or vehicle. The Texas Firearm Carry Act of 2021 — codified at HB 1927 and amending Penal Code § 46.02 — eliminated that licensing requirement for most adult handgun carry. The amendment did not repeal § 46.02; it carved out a new affirmative entitlement to carry for adults 21 or older who are not otherwise prohibited. The statutory text retains the prohibition on intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carrying a handgun on or about the person, but adds the qualifying language that the offense does not apply to a person who is at least 21 years of age and is not otherwise disqualified.
The practical effect on Texas UCW prosecutions has been substantial but not total. Texas DPS data and county-court dockets show that handgun-on-person UCW filings against eligible adults dropped sharply after September 2021, while filings under § 46.02(a-1) (carry by a person ineligible for an LTC) and § 46.03 (prohibited places) became the primary remaining state-court weapons carry charges. Many older "going armed" prosecutions — particularly those built on a stop for a traffic infraction followed by a Terry frisk that produced a handgun — would not be viable today against an eligible adult carrier.
The eligibility carve-out under Constitutional Carry turns on a list of disqualifying conditions: minority (under 21), prior felony conviction, certain misdemeanor family violence convictions, active protective orders, intoxication, criminal-street-gang activity, and presence in a prohibited place. Each disqualifier maps to a different statute (§ 46.02(a-1), § 46.04, § 46.06, etc.) and each is a separate proof problem for the State. Counsel reviewing a post-2021 UCW arrest must work through the disqualifier matrix before assuming the case is properly charged.
The License to Carry remains relevant despite Constitutional Carry. LTC holders benefit from reciprocity with most other states for out-of-state carry, exemption from the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii), the ability to carry on certain LTC-only premises, and a reduced standard of officer interaction at vehicle stops. Texas DPS continued issuing LTCs after HB 1927 — annual issuances dropped from roughly 200,000+ in the years before Constitutional Carry to lower but still significant numbers afterward. For 18-to-20-year-olds and others outside the Constitutional Carry carve-out, the LTC remains the controlling path to lawful handgun carry under Government Code Chapter 411 Subchapter H.
Section 46.02 elements after Constitutional Carry
Post-HB 1927, § 46.02(a) reaches handgun, club, or illegal-knife carry by ineligible persons; § 46.02(a-1) is the felony version for persons ineligible for an LTC; § 46.02(a-5) bars plain-view vehicle carry of an unholstered handgun; § 46.02(b) sets the Class A baseline.
- Knowing carry on or about the person
- The State must prove the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carried a handgun, club, or illegal knife on or about the person. "Knowingly" is the floor — accidental, unknowing possession (the firearm-in-the-passenger's-purse problem, the borrowed-vehicle problem) defeats the element. See Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), reaffirming the implicit knowledge requirement for UCW.
- A "handgun," "club," or "illegal knife"
- Section 46.01 defines each term. "Handgun" means any firearm designed to be fired by use of a single hand; "club" includes instrumentalities designed for use in inflicting serious injury; "illegal knife" was historically defined narrowly but was modified by HB 446 (2017) and HB 1099 (2017) — repeal of the location-based knife restrictions limited but did not eliminate prosecutions. The current illegal-knife definitions are tied to § 46.01 and overlap with § 46.03 location restrictions.
- Public place / not under exempt circumstance
- Section 46.15 lists statutory exemptions — premises under one's own control, the actor's own motor vehicle, certain law-enforcement or military activities, and others. § 46.02(a-5) addresses the plain-view-in-vehicle problem separately. The exemption analysis is highly fact-specific and is one of the most-litigated parts of a UCW defense.
- Not otherwise eligible under § 46.02(a)(2)(A)–(B)
- After HB 1927, § 46.02(a) does not apply if the defendant is at least 21, not otherwise disqualified, and either (i) carrying on the defendant's own premises or vehicle or (ii) carrying a handgun in a holster on or about the person in a place not prohibited under § 46.03. The State carries the burden of proving the carrier falls outside this carve-out — a posture shift that has changed how DFW prosecutors charge marginal cases.
The threshold defense in any post-2021 UCW arrest is the eligibility audit. Was the defendant 21 or older? Did the defendant have a prior felony conviction or qualifying misdemeanor family violence conviction? Was the defendant subject to an active protective order? Was the defendant intoxicated at the time of carry? Was the carry in a § 46.03 prohibited place? Was the handgun holstered (or, in a vehicle, holstered and not in plain view)? If the answers exit the disqualifier matrix, the underlying § 46.02 charge often cannot proceed against an adult carrier and the case becomes a dismissal-track matter.
Where the eligibility audit places the case within the disqualifier matrix, the next question is which sub-section applies. Section 46.02(a-1) — carry by a person ineligible for an LTC — is the most common felony UCW theory after Constitutional Carry. The "ineligible for an LTC" standard is defined by reference to Government Code § 411.171 et seq., which incorporates federal and state firearm-disability definitions. Successful defense at this layer often turns on the predicate-conviction analysis (was the prior actually a felony? was it final? was it the defendant's conviction?) and the timing problem (did the disability still attach at the moment of carry?).
Section 46.02(a-5) — plain view of an unholstered handgun while in a vehicle or watercraft — is the post-HB 1927 vehicle-carry trap. Even an eligible adult carrier loses the Constitutional Carry shield if the handgun is in plain view in the vehicle and is not in a holster. Body-cam and dash-cam footage of the actual position and condition of the firearm in the vehicle becomes decisive. Officers occasionally arrest on (a-5) where the firearm was, in fact, holstered but visible — the holster element is dispositive and is litigated on the video record.
Buchanan v. State, 553 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), and the older Sanchez v. State, 600 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), anchor the doctrinal background — Sanchez articulated the historical "going armed" rationale, and Buchanan addressed the evidentiary posture for § 46.02 carry-with-criminal-purpose theories. Birdo v. State, 105 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003), and Cortez, 469 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), supply the knowledge framework. Rodriguez v. State, 366 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012), addresses the pre-HB 1927 vehicle-carry exception that informed the post-2021 statutory carve-out. Newer post-HB 1927 construction questions are still working through the Texas appellate courts, with Ex parte Cleveland, 681 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023), providing one of the early authoritative statements on the amended statute.
Section 46.03 prohibited places — the locational trap
Section 46.03 bars weapons in schools, polling places, courts, racetracks, secured airport areas, and certain government meetings — regardless of Constitutional Carry eligibility or LTC status. Most violations are third-degree felonies with 2-to-10-year exposure.
Constitutional Carry did not amend § 46.03. The prohibited-places statute remains in force and applies to LTC holders, non-LTC carriers, and Constitutional Carry-eligible adults alike. The covered locations include premises of schools (K-12 and higher education), polling places on election days, courthouses and court premises, racetracks, secured airport areas, places where execution of a sentencing or commitment is occurring, and certain hospital and nursing-home premises with proper notice. Each location has its own statutory and case-law gloss on what counts as "premises" and how notice operates.
Tovar v. State, 165 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005), is one of the leading cases on the premises element under § 46.03 — the State must prove the location actually qualified under the statute, which is not always straightforward when the firearm is in a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a school, or near but not on courthouse premises. Parking-lot carve-outs under § 46.035(f) for LTC holders, and the analogous private-vehicle protections under § 46.02 for eligible carriers, can complicate the premises analysis.
Notice signage is a recurring defense issue under § 46.03. For certain location types (notably § 46.03(c) hospital and nursing-home premises, and the LTC-specific § 30.06 and § 30.07 sign requirements), the State must prove proper notice was given. Sign content, size, language (English and Spanish), and placement are all statutorily prescribed. A non-compliant sign defeats the notice element. Counsel should always inspect the actual signage and photograph dimensions, language, and placement during early case investigation.
Section 46.03(g) sets the default penalty at a third-degree felony — 2 to 10 years in prison and up to $10,000 in fines. Certain sub-locations carry different grades; carry on K-12 school premises with intent to disrupt or interfere is its own offense under separate statutes; carry by an LTC holder in a § 30.06/30.07-posted premises is generally a Class A misdemeanor under § 46.035. The grade matrix is non-uniform across the statute and requires case-specific analysis.
Penalty grades across § 46.02 to § 46.04
UCW grading scales from Class A misdemeanor (basic § 46.02(b)) up to third-degree felony for prohibited-person carry (§ 46.02(a-1)), prohibited-place carry (§ 46.03), or felon-in-possession within 5 years (§ 46.04(a)). Federal § 922(g) parallels add 10-year federal exposure.
The chart of UCW-family penalty grades works like this. Section 46.02(b) sets the baseline UCW offense at a Class A misdemeanor — up to 1 year in county jail and a $4,000 fine under § 12.21. Section 46.02(a-1) elevates handgun carry by a person ineligible for an LTC to a third-degree felony — 2 to 10 years in prison and up to $10,000 in fines under § 12.34. Section 46.02(a-5), the plain-view-in-vehicle variant, defaults to a Class A misdemeanor. Section 46.03 prohibited-places offenses are third-degree felonies under § 46.03(g) for most location types.
Section 46.035, the LTC-holder unlawful-carry statute, sets a Class A misdemeanor for most violations (intoxicated carry by LTC holder, concealed where prohibited, etc.) with elevation to third-degree felony for certain aggravated circumstances. Section 46.04(a) — Texas felon-in-possession — is a third-degree felony within 5 years after release from confinement, community supervision, mandatory supervision, or parole, whichever is latest. After that 5-year window, possession at the felon's residence drops to a state-jail felony under § 46.04(a)(2) — but possession away from the residence remains a third-degree felony.
Section 46.04(b) — possession by a person convicted of misdemeanor family violence within 5 years — is a Class A misdemeanor under § 46.04(d). Section 46.04(c) — possession by a person subject to certain active protective orders — is a Class A misdemeanor. Section 46.041 — body armor possession by a felon — is a third-degree felony. Section 46.05 — prohibited weapons (machineguns, short-barreled firearms, silencers/suppressors unless registered, explosives, etc.) — is generally a third-degree felony, with some sub-categories elevating.
The federal parallel under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is the most consequential collateral exposure in any Texas felon-in-possession or domestic-violence-firearm case. Federal § 922(g)(1) reaches felons; § 922(g)(8) reaches active protective-order subjects (upheld in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)); § 922(g)(9) reaches misdemeanor crime of domestic violence convictions. Federal exposure under § 924(a)(8) is up to 10 years in federal prison, with the Armed Career Criminal Act under § 924(e) imposing a 15-year mandatory minimum if the defendant has three or more qualifying violent-felony or serious-drug-felony predicates. Texas felon-in-possession cases are routinely picked up for federal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Texas, particularly post-arrest cooperation breakdowns and cases involving stolen or trafficked firearms. State counsel must coordinate with federal counsel from the first interview onward.
Defenses we evaluate first
The strongest UCW defenses are post-HB 1927 statutory eligibility, knowledge/mens rea, Fourth Amendment suppression of the stop or frisk, prohibited-person predicate challenges, and § 46.03 premises/notice attacks. Each is fact-specific and time-sensitive.
The first move in any post-2021 UCW case is the eligibility audit under Constitutional Carry. Was the carrier 21 or older, not a prohibited person, not intoxicated, not in a § 46.03 prohibited place, and was the handgun in a holster (and, if in a vehicle, not in plain view unholstered)? If all answers favor the defense, the underlying § 46.02 prosecution often cannot proceed against an adult carrier. The State faces a posture problem in these cases — the eligibility carve-out shifts the analytical burden and many such cases are dismissed pre-trial when defense counsel raises the issue early through a § 31.01 motion or pretrial conference.
The second move is the knowledge/mens rea attack. Section 46.02 requires intentional, knowing, or reckless carry. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), confirms that an implicit knowledge element governs UCW prosecutions. Cases involving a firearm in a passenger's purse without the driver's knowledge, a firearm in a borrowed or rented vehicle, a firearm in a shared residence used by multiple persons, or a firearm placed in luggage by another all raise viable knowledge challenges. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), supplies the constructive possession "affirmative links" framework — the State must show specific links connecting the defendant to the firearm beyond mere presence.
The third move is Fourth Amendment suppression. Many UCW arrests originate in vehicle stops based on traffic infractions, and the firearm is discovered during a Terry frisk, vehicle search, or post-arrest inventory. The validity of the initial stop, the basis for the frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the scope of the vehicle search under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), and the Carroll automobile-exception application under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), all become attack surfaces. Drug-overlap UCW cases (the most common DFW pattern) often turn on Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and the unconstitutional-prolongation framework — a stop that is extended beyond its mission for an unsupported drug-dog sniff is suppressible, and the firearm discovered during the prolonged stop falls with it under Article 38.23.
The fourth move attacks the prohibited-person predicate in § 46.02(a-1) and § 46.04 cases. The State must prove the prior felony with admissible evidence — typically a certified copy of the judgment under Garcia v. State, 296 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009). Successful predicate challenges target: (a) whether the prior was actually a final conviction; (b) whether the prior was actually the defendant's (identity); (c) whether the prior qualifies under § 46.04(a) (some out-of-state and federal priors require separate analysis); and (d) whether the disability still attached at the time of the carry (5-year rule under § 46.04(a)(2)). For § 46.04(c)(2) protective-order cases, the State must prove the order was active, served, and contained the qualifying findings.
The fifth move is the § 46.03 premises and notice attack. As discussed above, the premises element under Tovar and the notice requirements under §§ 46.03(c), 30.06, and 30.07 are recurring defense issues. Polling-place definitions get litigated during election cycles; school-zone disputes turn on the precise location of the carry vs. the school premises boundary; secured-airport-area cases turn on whether the carrier was actually in the TSA-controlled zone or merely in a public terminal area. Each location type has its own statutory definition and its own case-law gloss.
The sixth move, less common but live in some cases, is the Bruen/Second Amendment as-applied challenge. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), introduced the historical-analogue test for firearm regulations, and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), upheld § 922(g)(8) (protective-order disarmament) against a Second Amendment challenge while leaving open as-applied challenges to other categorical disqualifications. Some non-violent felon-in-possession cases and certain misdemeanor-family-violence § 922(g)(9) cases continue to be litigated on as-applied grounds in federal court. State-court § 46.04 cases are rarely receptive, but counsel should preserve the issue for appeal.
The seventh move is the possession-element attack in multi-occupant scenarios. Vehicles with multiple occupants where the firearm is found in a shared space, residences with multiple residents where the firearm is found in a common area, and joint-passenger luggage scenarios all raise Evans "affirmative links" issues. Factors include: defendant's ownership or right of control over the place; defendant's presence at the time of search; firearm in plain view to defendant; defendant's proximity to the firearm; whether the firearm was conveniently accessible to defendant; defendant's statements connecting him to the firearm; furtive gestures; and prior history. The cumulative-link analysis means a single weak link does not defeat the State; counsel must dismantle the linkage on multiple fronts.
Common prosecution errors in UCW cases
The State's typical errors in post-2021 UCW prosecutions: charging eligible adults under § 46.02, treating "knowingly" as automatic, prosecuting § 46.03 cases without premises proof, and pursuing § 46.04 cases without valid predicate-conviction proof.
A pattern of post-2021 UCW prosecution errors has emerged in DFW dockets. The most common error is charging UCW against an eligible adult under the pre-HB 1927 framework — the prosecutor pleads § 46.02 in conclusory terms without addressing the Constitutional Carry carve-out. Counsel's response is a § 31.01 motion or a written pretrial conference posture letter walking the prosecutor through the eligibility audit on the specific facts. Many such cases resolve at the pretrial-conference stage without a contested hearing once the analytical posture is documented.
The second prosecution error is treating the § 46.02 knowledge element as automatic. The State frequently relies on mere presence in the vehicle or proximity to the firearm without articulating affirmative knowledge evidence. Defense counsel forces the issue early — a motion to quash under Code Crim. Proc. art. 27.08 for an indictment that fails to allege knowledge, or a motion in limine excluding the State from inviting a knowledge inference without evidentiary predicate. The Cortez implicit-knowledge framework supports both motions.
The third prosecution error is § 46.03 prohibited-place prosecution without the premises and notice predicate. The State frequently fails to prove the location actually qualified as a prohibited place under the controlling sub-section, or fails to introduce the required signage with the statutorily mandated content/language/placement. Counsel's response is a sufficiency motion at the close of the State's case and, for signage cases, pretrial discovery of the actual signs and on-site investigation by an investigator.
The fourth prosecution error is § 46.04 felon-in-possession prosecution without proper predicate-conviction proof. The State must introduce a certified judgment of conviction and tie it to the defendant. Errors include relying on uncertified printouts, failing to tie the prior to the defendant's identity (fingerprint or photograph matching), prosecuting on a non-qualifying prior (some out-of-state convictions that are felonies in the rendering state but not in Texas), and prosecuting after the 5-year residence-possession window without proving the carry was away from the residence. Garcia v. State, 296 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009), and its progeny supply the framework.
The fifth prosecution error is Fourth Amendment-blind charging. Officers and prosecutors sometimes proceed on a vehicle-stop UCW where the underlying stop was based on a paid-time-out radio tip, a hunch, or a pretextual basis that does not withstand Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), scrutiny when the actual facts emerge in discovery. Drug-overlap UCW cases — where the stop was prolonged for a drug-dog sniff that produced no drugs but uncovered the firearm — frequently fail on Rodriguez unconstitutional-prolongation grounds. Counsel's first discovery target in any vehicle-stop UCW is the dash-cam, body-cam, dispatch audio, and CAD report — the four-corners of the stop analysis.
What to do if you're charged with UCW
The first 30 days are decisive: engage counsel, preserve dash-cam and body-cam evidence, document carry circumstances (holster, vehicle position), avoid statements, and audit the eligibility carve-out under HB 1927.
Engage counsel before the first court setting. A UCW case is not a self-representation matter, even at the Class A misdemeanor level. The interplay among § 46.02 sub-sections, § 46.03 prohibited-place elevators, § 46.04 felon-in-possession exposure, and the federal § 922(g) parallel risk is too dense for non-lawyer navigation. The single most damaging mistake is to accept a plea offer at first appearance without the eligibility audit, the predicate-conviction analysis, and the Fourth Amendment review done first.
Send a body-cam and dash-cam preservation letter to the arresting agency immediately. Frisco PD, Plano PD, McKinney PD, Dallas PD, and most other DFW agencies overwrite footage on 30-to-90-day cycles. The footage is often dispositive on the eligibility analysis (was the firearm holstered? was it in plain view in the vehicle? was the defendant intoxicated?), the knowledge analysis (where was the firearm? did the defendant react? did the defendant make admissions?), and the Fourth Amendment analysis (what was the actual basis for the stop and frisk? was the stop prolonged?). A one-page preservation demand citing Trombetta/Youngblood locks the footage in retention pending litigation.
Document the carry circumstances in writing while the memory is fresh — but only to counsel, never to investigators or family on a recorded line. Was the firearm in a holster? Where was the holster (inside-waistband, outside-waistband, ankle, in the vehicle's center console, in the glove box, etc.)? Was the firearm in plain view from outside the vehicle? Was anyone else in the vehicle who might claim the firearm? How long had the defendant been driving? Was the defendant on the way to or from a shooting range, gun store, or other lawful-carry destination? Each fact maps to a specific defense element.
Do not give a statement. Recorded jail-cell calls (all Texas county jails record outgoing calls and admit them as party-opponent admissions under TRE 801(e)(2)), post-arrest interviews, and casual booking-room conversations routinely supply the State's strongest evidence on the knowledge and possession elements. The Fifth Amendment privilege applies from the moment of arrest forward — invoke it explicitly ("I want to speak with a lawyer") and stay silent thereafter. Family-call statements ("yes, that's my gun, but...") have lost more UCW cases than weak Fourth Amendment posture.
For § 46.02(a-1) and § 46.04 cases, gather every document related to the prior conviction immediately. Was the prior actually a final conviction or a deferred-adjudication or pretrial-diversion completion? Is the actual judgment available? Was the defendant the person convicted (identity)? Has the disability been lifted by pardon, set-aside, or expunction? Has the federal restoration path been pursued? Texas restoration under § 46.04(a)(2)'s 5-year rule does not restore federal § 922(g) eligibility — that gap is a recurring confusion that has produced federal prosecutions of defendants who believed they were restored.
Audit the federal exposure from day one. If the case involves a felon-in-possession theory, stolen or trafficked firearms, an interstate-nexus issue, a drug-trafficking parallel, or active protective-order subject status, federal pickup by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Texas is a live risk. Federal § 922(g) exposure is up to 10 years per count, with ACCA imposing a 15-year mandatory minimum on three-strike defendants. State and federal counsel should coordinate from the first interview onward — what is said to state investigators can be used in federal proceedings, and vice versa.
DFW-specific context — Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant
DFW counties differ on UCW posture: Collin and Denton firmer on felony UCW, Dallas and Tarrant more open to diversion. Class A UCW typical retainer $2,500–$7,500; felony UCW (§ 46.02(a-1), § 46.03, § 46.04) $5,000–$15,000+. Resolution timelines 4–10 months.
Collin County prosecutors take a firm posture on felony UCW under § 46.02(a-1), § 46.03, and § 46.04, with limited diversion availability for felony-level cases. The McKinney County Court at Law and District Court dockets handle the bulk of Collin UCW cases, with Frisco and Plano PD producing the majority of arrests. Class A misdemeanor UCW (§ 46.02(b), § 46.02(a-5), § 46.035) is more frequently amenable to pretrial diversion or deferred adjudication, particularly for first offenders with no aggravators. The Collin County DA's gun-court diversion track, where available, requires no prior arrests, no aggravators, and clean post-arrest conduct.
Denton County mirrors Collin's posture on felony UCW with slightly more flexibility on diversion. The Denton County Court at Law and District Court dockets handle UCW cases; the Justice Center in Lewisville covers the southern county. Denton prosecutors have shown more receptiveness to dismissal of borderline post-HB 1927 cases where the eligibility audit favors the defense and the suppression record is credible. The county's pretrial-services division handles bond-condition modification petitions efficiently.
Dallas County prosecutors are more open to diversion, reductions to non-firearm offenses, and dismissal of marginal § 46.02 cases. The Dallas County DA operates specialized intake review and a diversion track for first-offense weapons misdemeanors. Felony UCW under § 46.04 receives more aggressive prosecution, particularly where the firearm is stolen, trafficked, or tied to a drug-trafficking parallel. Federal pickup by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Dallas is a live consideration in any Dallas County felon-in-possession case.
Tarrant County's posture combines aspects of Collin and Dallas — firm on first-pass plea offers but willing to negotiate substantively when defense counsel has built a record. The Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's office runs intake-review on weapons cases; the Mansfield, Hurst-Euless-Bedford, Arlington, and Fort Worth municipal courts handle the early stages with bind-overs to the County Criminal Courts at Law and District Courts. The Tarrant gun-court diversion program, where available, parallels the Collin and Dallas tracks but with its own eligibility criteria.
Defense fees vary by case complexity. Class A misdemeanor UCW (basic § 46.02(b), § 46.02(a-5) vehicle, § 46.035 LTC-holder, § 46.04(b)/(c) misdemeanor) typically runs $2,500–$7,500 flat-fee for a complete representation including discovery, motion practice, and plea or diversion resolution. Felony UCW — § 46.02(a-1) ineligible-LTC carry, § 46.03 prohibited place, § 46.04(a) felon-in-possession, § 46.05 prohibited weapons — runs $5,000–$15,000+ depending on case complexity, predicate-conviction issues, and trial readiness. Federal § 922(g) parallel exposure can add $15,000–$40,000+ in federal-defense fees on top of the state matter.
Resolution timelines for UCW cases in DFW are 4–6 months for Class A misdemeanor matters with substantive motion practice, and 6–10 months for felony UCW with contested suppression hearings or predicate-conviction challenges. Trial-ready felony UCW with full motion practice can extend to 12–18 months. The federal § 922(g) parallel runs its own timeline — federal indictment typically issues 30–120 days after arrest in pickup cases, with federal trial readiness at 9–18 months under the Speedy Trial Act framework. State and federal counsel must coordinate calendar and discovery from the outset to preserve cross-jurisdictional defenses.
