The federal firearms framework — Title 18 and the NFA
Federal weapons prosecutions in N.D. and E.D. Texas rest on three statutory frameworks: 18 U.S.C. § 922 (prohibited-person and false-statement offenses), 18 U.S.C. § 924 (penalty enhancements, including the § 924(c) consecutive stack and the § 924(e) ACCA), and the National Firearms Act at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841–5872 (registration of machineguns, silencers, SBR/SBS, and destructive devices).
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — Prohibited persons in possession
- Section 922(g) criminalizes firearm or ammunition possession by nine enumerated categories: (1) convicted felons; (2) fugitives from justice; (3) unlawful drug users or addicts; (4) adjudicated mental defectives or those committed to a mental institution; (5) undocumented aliens; (6) those dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; (7) those who have renounced U.S. citizenship; (8) those subject to a qualifying domestic-violence protective order; and (9) those convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor. The (g)(1) felon-in-possession subsection is the most common federal weapons charge in TXND and TXED, followed by (g)(3) drug-user, (g)(8) protective-order, and (g)(9) DV-misdemeanor cases.
- 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) — Firearm in furtherance
- Section 924(c) imposes a consecutive mandatory minimum for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence (5 years base; 7 years if brandished; 10 years if discharged; 25 years for a second or subsequent conviction within the same indictment after Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993), as modified by First Step Act § 403 for new prosecutions; 30 years if the firearm is a machinegun or destructive device). The § 924(c) sentence is stacked on top of the predicate sentence under USSG § 5G1.2 and cannot be reduced by safety valve, concurrent service, or earned time. After United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutional — meaning the "crime of violence" predicate must be analyzed under the categorical-elements clause alone.
- 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) — Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)
- Section 924(e) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum (and a maximum of life) on a § 922(g)(1) defendant with three prior convictions for "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses" committed on different occasions. The categorical approach controls whether a state-court prior qualifies. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), governs divisible-statute analysis; Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), held that purely reckless offenses cannot qualify as ACCA "violent felonies"; Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), addressed the "different occasions" element; and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), held the different-occasions finding must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Successful ACCA categorical challenges drop the floor from 15 years mandatory to the unenhanced § 924(a)(8) 15-year maximum.
- NFA at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841–5872 — Registered NFA items
- The National Firearms Act regulates machineguns, silencers (suppressors), short-barrel rifles (barrel under 16 inches), short-barrel shotguns (barrel under 18 inches), destructive devices (bombs, grenades, missiles), and "any other weapons" (AOWs). Possession of an unregistered NFA item violates § 5861(d); transfer without registration violates § 5861(f); making without payment of the tax violates § 5861(e); each carries a 10-year statutory maximum under § 5871. Civilian possession of a machinegun made after May 19, 1986, is independently prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which carries a 10-year maximum. After Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406 (2024), bump stocks are NOT "machineguns" under the federal definition — invalidating the 2018 ATF rule.
These four pillars — § 922(g), § 924(c), § 924(e) ACCA, and the NFA — fit together in a tiered exposure structure. A "clean" § 922(g)(1) case with no ACCA priors and no drug or violent-crime predicate exposes the defendant to up to 15 years under § 924(a)(8) (raised from 10 years by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022). Add a § 924(c) count (firearm in furtherance of a separate drug or violent-crime predicate) and a consecutive 5–30 years stacks on top. Layer in ACCA priors and the floor jumps to 15 years mandatory under § 924(e). Add the NFA — for instance, possession of a homemade silencer or an SBR built without ATF approval — and another 10-year exposure attaches. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 added § 932 (straw purchase) and § 933 (firearm trafficking) as additional 15-year-maximum offenses, and expanded the "engaged in the business" definition under § 922(a) to capture broader unlicensed-dealing conduct. The total exposure on a multi-count weapons indictment routinely runs 20–40 years before the Sentencing Guidelines analysis even begins.
§ 922(g) felon-in-possession and the Rehaif knowledge element
The most common federal weapons charge is felon-in-possession under § 922(g)(1) — but post-Rehaif, the government must prove the defendant knew of the prohibited-person status, not merely that the status existed. Rehaif knowledge challenges remain a meaningful attack surface in TXND and TXED dockets.
A § 922(g)(1) prosecution requires the government to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knew of the conviction; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce. Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), added the second element — knowledge of the prohibited-person status — and the change applies to every § 922(g) subsection, not just (g)(1). The Rehaif knowledge element is contestable in three recurring fact patterns: defendants who pleaded to deferred adjudication or "no jail" sentences and reasonably believed they were not "felons"; defendants whose prior convictions were sealed, expunged, or pardoned and who reasonably believed their gun rights had been restored; and defendants with foreign-conviction priors or out-of-state priors whose status under federal law was genuinely unclear.
The possession element supports both actual and constructive theories. Actual possession requires direct, immediate control — the firearm was in the defendant's hand, waistband, or other immediate dominion. Constructive possession requires (i) knowledge of the firearm's presence and (ii) the power and intent to exercise dominion or control. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998), and the Fifth Circuit's line of constructive-possession cases govern the analysis. The most contested fact patterns involve joint-residence cases (defendant lives with a non-prohibited person who owns the firearm), vehicle cases (firearm found in a glove box or trunk during a stop with multiple occupants), and shared-storage cases (firearm in a family member's safe at the defendant's residence). Defense counsel attacks the constructive-possession theory through cross-examination on access, knowledge, ownership documentation, and the absence of fingerprints or DNA linking the defendant to the firearm.
The interstate-commerce element is typically satisfied through proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of arrest — virtually all firearms are, because firearm manufacturing concentrates in a handful of states (Smith & Wesson in Massachusetts, Glock in Georgia, Sig Sauer in New Hampshire, Ruger in Connecticut, etc.). Defense counsel rarely litigates this element because the proof is well-developed, but the element must still be charged and proved. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that the interstate-commerce element of § 922(g) is satisfied by minimal proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at any time — a rule that survived the Supreme Court's narrowing decisions on the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Other prohibited-person subsections raise distinct doctrinal issues. Section 922(g)(3) — unlawful drug user — was held unconstitutional as applied in United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023), based on the Bruen historical-analogue test; the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in light of Rahimi, and the Fifth Circuit is reconsidering on remand. Section 922(g)(8) — subject to a domestic-violence protective order — was upheld in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), against a facial Second Amendment challenge. Section 922(g)(9) — DV-misdemeanor — requires a qualifying predicate misdemeanor under United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), and reckless misdemeanors can qualify under Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016). The Bruen-era circuit splits on facial and as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges (compare Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023), permitting an as-applied challenge by a defendant with a non-violent prior) make the constitutional landscape genuinely uncertain and worth preserving in every § 922(g) defense.
§ 924(c) and § 924(e) ACCA — the two mandatory-minimum engines
Two penalty enhancements dominate federal weapons exposure. Section 924(c) stacks consecutive 5–30-year mandatory minimums for firearms in furtherance of drug-trafficking or crimes of violence. Section 924(e) ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory floor on § 922(g)(1) defendants with three qualifying priors.
Section 924(c) is the single largest exposure multiplier in federal weapons practice. The statute requires the government to prove (i) commission of a predicate drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence and (ii) use, carry, or possession of a firearm in furtherance of that predicate. The "in furtherance" element requires a specific nexus — the firearm must have advanced, protected, or otherwise furthered the predicate offense. The Ceballos-Torres multi-factor test from the Fifth Circuit asks: (1) the type of weapon; (2) whether it was loaded; (3) whether stolen; (4) its proximity to the drugs; (5) its accessibility; (6) the type of drug activity; (7) the time of day; and (8) the surrounding circumstances. A handgun in a bedside drawer alongside small quantities of drugs may not satisfy the standard; an assault rifle next to a kilogram of cocaine in an active stash house likely will. Defense counsel attacks the nexus element through specific jury instructions, Rule 29 motions, and post-trial briefing.
The § 924(c) consecutive sentence schedule is unforgiving. The base 5-year consecutive sentence applies to possession in furtherance; brandishing the firearm during the predicate raises the floor to 7 years; discharge raises it to 10 years; a machinegun, destructive device, or silencer raises it to 30 years. A second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction adds 25 years (down from 25 years stacked-on-stacked under the pre-First-Step-Act regime — § 403 of the FSA eliminated "stacking" for first-time-offender same-indictment cases but preserved it for true repeat offenders). Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), held that the brandishing and discharge facts are elements that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt — a frequent attack surface where the government attempts to prove brandishing or discharge by a preponderance at sentencing. After United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutional — meaning predicate "crime of violence" offenses must satisfy the categorical-elements clause alone, and many older convictions for "crime of violence" predicates have been vacated.
Section 924(e) ACCA is the second mandatory-minimum engine. The statute imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on a § 922(g)(1) defendant with three prior convictions for "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses" committed on different occasions. The categorical approach controls whether a state prior qualifies: the court compares the elements of the state offense to the federal "violent felony" definition (an offense with an element of "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another," or an enumerated burglary, arson, or extortion offense, or one involving explosives) or the federal "serious drug offense" definition. Where the state statute reaches more conduct than the federal definition — the "categorically overbroad" doctrine — the prior cannot qualify. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), refined the analysis for divisible statutes (statutes setting out multiple alternative elements vs. multiple alternative means).
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), eliminated reckless offenses as ACCA "violent felonies" — the mens rea must be at least knowing or intentional with respect to the use of force. Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), addressed when multiple offenses occurred on "different occasions" — the Court adopted a multi-factor approach considering timing, location, and the offender's state of mind, rather than the mechanical "one moment after the other" test the government had urged. Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), held that the different-occasions finding is an Apprendi/Alleyne-element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt — meaning a defendant cannot be sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal based on judge-found facts about whether the priors arose on different occasions. The Erlinger ruling has produced a wave of § 2255 collateral-attack motions in TXND and TXED on previously imposed ACCA sentences. Successful ACCA categorical challenges (defeating any one of the three required predicates) drop the floor from 15 years mandatory to the § 924(a)(8) 15-year maximum without a floor — a 15-year reduction in the mandatory minimum.
NFA and machinegun prosecutions — §§ 5861 and 922(o)
The National Firearms Act registration regime regulates machineguns, silencers, short-barrel rifles, short-barrel shotguns, and destructive devices. Unregistered possession violates § 5861(d); civilian post-1986 machinegun possession is independently prohibited under § 922(o). Cargill voided the bump-stock rule, but homemade silencers, illegal conversion devices ("Glock switches"), and Solvent Trap-derived silencers remain active prosecution priorities.
The NFA registration regime under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841–5872 governs six categories of "firearms" as the NFA defines them: machineguns, silencers (suppressors), short-barrel rifles (rifle with a barrel under 16 inches or overall length under 26 inches), short-barrel shotguns (shotgun with a barrel under 18 inches or overall length under 26 inches), destructive devices (bombs, grenades, missiles, and certain large-bore weapons over .50 caliber), and "any other weapons" (AOW) — a catchall covering concealable firearms and certain disguised weapons. Lawful possession of an NFA item requires ATF approval through a Form 4 transfer (or Form 1 manufacture), payment of the $200 transfer tax, and registration in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. Possession of an unregistered NFA item violates § 5861(d), and possession with intent to transfer without registration violates § 5861(f). Both carry a 10-year statutory maximum under § 5871.
Machineguns occupy a unique position in the federal weapons framework. Civilian possession of a machinegun manufactured after May 19, 1986, is independently prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), with a separate 10-year maximum penalty. Pre-1986 machineguns can be lawfully transferred to civilians with ATF approval, but the post-1986 ban created a closed "registry" — no new civilian-transferable machineguns can be added. The ATF position is that an "auto sear" — a small device that converts a semi-automatic AR-15 or Glock pistol into a fully automatic weapon — is itself a "machinegun" under the National Firearms Act definition. The proliferation of 3D-printed "Glock switches" (auto sears designed for the Glock pistol) has produced a wave of federal prosecutions in TXND and TXED. ATF Dallas Field Division investigators frequently work with local Frisco, Plano, McKinney, Dallas, and Fort Worth police to identify Glock switches recovered during routine traffic stops or drug investigations.
Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406 (2024), invalidated the 2018 ATF rule classifying bump stocks as "machineguns." The Supreme Court held that a bump stock does not enable a single "function of the trigger" to fire more than one shot — the trigger must reset between each shot, and the bump stock merely accelerates the manual re-engagement of the trigger. Cargill is an important precedent for the broader question of what counts as a "machinegun" under the NFA definition (a weapon that fires automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger). Forced-reset triggers (FRTs), which use a different mechanical action than bump stocks, are still being litigated — the ATF position is that FRTs are machineguns, but the Cargill analysis raises serious questions about that classification.
Silencer prosecutions are concentrated in the DFW region. The most common fact patterns involve homemade silencers (often manufactured from "Solvent Trap" kits sold online as ostensibly legitimate firearm-cleaning equipment), unregistered transfers between private parties, and silencers brought across state lines or imported without ATF approval. The legal element is straightforward: possession of any "silencer" (defined at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24) as any device or combination of devices designed to silence, muffle, or diminish the report of a portable firearm) without NFA registration violates § 5861(d). Defense work centers on (i) the "designed" element — whether the device at issue was actually designed to silence a firearm; (ii) the knowledge element — Rehaif-style analysis of whether the defendant knew the device was a silencer subject to NFA registration; and (iii) Fourth Amendment suppression of the seizure. Solvent Trap kits typically include a baffled tube and a thread adapter — components which, when assembled, can function as a silencer. Whether the kit components, before assembly, constitute a "silencer" under § 921(a)(24) remains contested in some jurisdictions.
Defenses we evaluate first
Federal weapons defense engages eight core doctrines: Rehaif knowledge attacks, ACCA categorical-approach challenges, § 924(c) "in furtherance" nexus attacks, Bruen-based as-applied Second Amendment challenges, Fourth Amendment suppression, possession-element attacks in joint-residence cases, NICS Form 4473 materiality challenges, and BSCA § 932 straw-purchase "primarily intended" element challenges.
The single highest-leverage move in any § 922(g) prosecution is a Rehaif knowledge attack. Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), requires the government to prove the defendant knew of the prohibited-person status at the time of the firearm possession. Defense counsel investigates the circumstances of the predicate conviction (or other prohibited-person trigger) for evidence supporting reasonable doubt about knowledge: deferred-adjudication dispositions where the defendant reasonably understood he was not a "felon"; sealed, expunged, or set-aside convictions that the defendant reasonably believed had removed his prohibited-person status; civil-rights restoration confusion (some states restore firearm rights automatically upon completion of sentence; others require an affirmative restoration order); pardons; old foreign-conviction priors; out-of-state priors with unclear federal effect; and (g)(3) drug-user cases where the defendant disputes that his drug use was "current and ongoing" at the time of possession. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021), held that defendants raising Rehaif claims on appeal must show plain error affecting substantial rights — narrowing collateral relief but not preventing well-developed trial-level Rehaif challenges.
ACCA categorical-approach attacks under Mathis, Borden, Wooden, and Erlinger are the single highest-leverage move in a § 924(e) case. Defense counsel obtains certified judgment-and-sentence records for every alleged predicate, analyzes the state statute under which each prior was imposed, and identifies categorical-overbreadth issues. Texas drug-trafficking priors often present categorical-overbreadth problems: Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.112 covers substances no longer (or never) on the federal schedules; certain Texas controlled-substance offenses have a lower mens rea than the federal "serious drug offense" definition; and Texas's pre-2017 amphetamine and methamphetamine isomer definitions reached substances broader than the federal definition. Texas assault priors face Borden-style mens rea challenges — purely reckless assault offenses cannot qualify as ACCA "violent felonies." Texas burglary priors face Mathis divisible-statute analysis where the Texas statute reaches more conduct than the generic federal burglary definition. Wooden different-occasions challenges arise where two priors arose from a single drug transaction or a single criminal episode, and Erlinger requires that the different-occasions finding be made by a jury, not a judge.
Section 924(c) "in furtherance" attacks target the firearm-predicate nexus. Defense counsel emphasizes the Fifth Circuit's multi-factor test from Ceballos-Torres: type of weapon, whether loaded, accessibility, proximity to drugs, type of drug activity, time of day, and surrounding circumstances. A handgun stored unloaded in a closet, separated from any drugs, in a residence where the defendant lived with family members, does not satisfy the in-furtherance standard even where small quantities of drugs were also found at the residence. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), narrowed the § 924(c) "use" element to active employment — and although Congress responded by adding "possession in furtherance," the Bailey line of cases continues to inform what the government must prove. Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017), authorized district courts to consider the § 924(c) consecutive sentence when calculating the predicate sentence — a narrow but useful form of mitigation. After Davis, the residual clause is unconstitutional, and predicate "crime of violence" charges must be analyzed under the categorical-elements clause alone.
Post-Bruen Second Amendment challenges are a developing and uncertain area. Bruen adopted the historical-analogue test, and Rahimi refined it by holding that the historical analogue need not be a "dead ringer" for the modern regulation. As-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges by non-violent-felony defendants have produced sharply different outcomes across circuits: the Third Circuit in Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023), allowed an as-applied challenge by a defendant whose only prior was a non-violent food-stamp fraud; the Fifth Circuit has been more conservative but has not categorically foreclosed as-applied challenges. The Fifth Circuit's United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023), held § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to a marijuana user — vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Rahimi, with the Fifth Circuit reconsidering on remand. The defense posture is to preserve facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges in every § 922(g) case while not relying on them as the primary defense theory — the doctrinal landscape is too uncertain for that.
Fourth Amendment suppression in federal weapons cases follows the same doctrines as in federal drug cases — there is no Article 38.23 analogue, the good-faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applies, and the federal exclusionary rule is narrower than Texas's. But several doctrines produce regular suppression wins: Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), stop-prolongation; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), anonymous-tip rules; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), frisk analysis for weapons-bulge cases; vehicle-search incident-to-arrest under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); and the "knock and announce" requirements for warrant execution under Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (though Hudson generally precludes suppression for knock-and-announce violations standing alone). Possession-element attacks in joint-residence and vehicle cases routinely succeed where the government's constructive-possession theory cannot connect the defendant to the firearm beyond mere presence.
Common prosecution errors in federal weapons cases
The government's typical errors in federal weapons cases are predictable: Rehaif knowledge treated as automatic, ACCA categorical-approach overreach, § 924(c) "in furtherance" treated as proven by mere presence, constructive-possession overreach in joint-residence cases, post-Bruen Second Amendment challenges not preserved at trial, and suppression motions not litigated.
A consistent pattern emerges across N.D. and E.D. Texas weapons dockets. First, the Rehaif knowledge element is treated as automatic. The government often relies on the bare fact of a prior felony conviction to establish that the defendant "knew" of the prohibited-person status, without proving the defendant subjectively understood that the prior was a felony or that he was prohibited from firearm possession. Defense counsel attacks the knowledge element through cross-examination of the booking officer (what was the defendant told?), the probation officer (did the defendant's exit conditions explicitly identify the felony status?), and the defendant's own conduct (did the defendant attempt to purchase a firearm at a licensed dealer, suggesting genuine belief in non-prohibition?). The Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021), plain-error standard on appeal does not bar well-developed trial-level Rehaif challenges, and the Fifth Circuit has reversed convictions where the trial record was insufficient on the knowledge element.
Second, ACCA categorical-approach overreach. The government routinely identifies three priors and assumes they qualify as ACCA predicates without rigorous categorical-approach analysis. Defense counsel obtains certified judgment-and-sentence records for every alleged predicate and applies the Mathis/Borden/Wooden/Erlinger framework. A frequent error: the government treats a Texas state assault prior under PC § 22.01 as a "violent felony" without analyzing whether the specific subsection of § 22.01 under which the defendant was convicted requires knowing or intentional use of force (per Borden, recklessness is not enough). Another frequent error: the government treats a Texas state burglary prior as an ACCA "violent felony" without analyzing whether the Texas burglary statute (Penal Code § 30.02) reaches conduct broader than the generic federal burglary definition under Mathis. Defeating any one of the three priors drops the floor from 15 years ACCA to the unenhanced § 924(a)(8) ceiling — a meaningful exposure reduction.
Third, § 924(c) "in furtherance" treated as proven by mere presence. The government often charges a § 924(c) count based on the bare fact that a firearm was found in the same residence or vehicle as drugs. The Ceballos-Torres multi-factor test requires more — type of weapon, accessibility, loaded status, proximity, type of drug activity, time of day, and surrounding circumstances. Defense counsel litigates the in-furtherance element through specific jury instructions, Rule 29 motions, and post-trial briefing. The Fifth Circuit has reversed § 924(c) convictions where the government's proof failed the multi-factor test — for example, where the firearm was stored disassembled, separated from any drugs, in a residence shared with non-defendant family members. After Davis, predicate "crime of violence" charges must be analyzed under the categorical-elements clause alone, and many older § 924(c) convictions have been vacated on collateral review.
Fourth, constructive-possession overreach in joint-residence and vehicle cases. The government routinely argues that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm based on mere presence in the residence or vehicle where the firearm was found. The constructive-possession doctrine requires (i) knowledge of the firearm's presence and (ii) the power and intent to exercise dominion or control. Mere presence is not enough. Defense counsel litigates the absence of fingerprints, the absence of DNA, the presence of other occupants with ready access, ownership documentation pointing to another person, and the defendant's lack of access to the specific area (locked room, locked safe, vehicle owner's separate compartment). Joint-residence cases with non-defendant gun-owning roommates or family members frequently fail on constructive-possession grounds.
Fifth, post-Bruen Second Amendment challenges not preserved at trial. The Bruen historical-analogue test produces an uncertain and developing constitutional landscape, but the failure to preserve a Bruen challenge at trial generally forecloses appellate review. Defense counsel preserves both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges in every § 922(g) case, regardless of whether the challenge is likely to succeed in the present circuit. The Fifth Circuit's position on as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges (and on the post-remand status of § 922(g)(3) after Daniels) is in flux, and preserving the issue protects the defendant against any future Supreme Court decision narrowing § 922(g).
Sixth, suppression motions not litigated. Federal weapons cases frequently involve Fourth Amendment issues that are not adequately litigated — Rodriguez stop-prolongation, Florida v. J.L. anonymous-tip stops, Terry frisk analysis for weapons-bulge cases, vehicle search analysis under Arizona v. Gant, and "knock and announce" issues. The federal good-faith exception narrows suppression relief but does not eliminate it, and the Rodriguez stop-prolongation doctrine in particular continues to produce suppression wins in TXND and TXED dockets. Defense counsel orders dash-cam and body-cam footage at first opportunity and analyzes the precise sequence of events leading to the firearm seizure.
Seventh, the BSCA § 932 straw-purchase "primarily intended" element treated as proven by the transfer alone. Section 932 — created by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 — requires the government to prove the defendant knowingly purchased or transferred the firearm primarily for a prohibited person, for someone who intended to use it in a felony or drug-trafficking offense, or for terrorism purposes. The "primarily intended" element is contestable: a sibling who purchases a firearm at the request of a sister with a previously sealed misdemeanor DV conviction may not have known the sister was a prohibited person, and the transfer may not have been "primarily intended" for an unlawful purpose. Section 932 prosecutions are relatively new (the statute took effect in June 2022) and the Fifth Circuit case law is still developing.
What to do if you're facing a federal weapons indictment in N.D. or E.D. Texas
The pre-indictment window is the highest-leverage period in any federal weapons case. After indictment, the first 30 days are decisive for detention-hearing posture, ACCA-prior research, and the cooperation decision. Federal weapons defense engaged from day one produces measurably better outcomes.
The first signal of a federal weapons investigation is often an ATF or FBI agent visit — typically a "knock and talk" at the residence or workplace — or a target letter from the U.S. Attorney. Where a § 922(g) or § 924(c) prosecution is being built, the investigation may begin with an ATF firearm trace following a recovery from a crime scene, a NICS denial after a § 922(a)(6) false-statement attempt at a licensed dealer, an OCDETF or DEA-coordinated drug investigation that develops firearm evidence, or a state-federal partnership through Project Safe Neighborhoods that has identified the defendant as a violent-crime priority. In the pre-indictment window, defense counsel can sometimes obtain a pre-indictment meeting with the AUSA, present mitigating information, advocate for declination, advocate for state-court referral (Texas state-court felon-in-possession exposure is dramatically lower than federal), or negotiate the structure of a future plea before charges are filed. Federal weapons indictments returned in TXND and TXED are typically the product of months of investigation, and the pre-indictment window can be the most valuable period in the entire case.
Detention hearings under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 are decisive. Most § 922(g) and § 924(c) indictments are subject to a rebuttable presumption of detention under § 3142(e)(3): subsection (B) applies to § 924(c) charges, and case-by-case analysis applies to § 922(g) charges based on flight risk and dangerousness. Defense counsel prepares for the detention hearing immediately, gathering documentary evidence of community ties, employment, family responsibilities, mental health and substance-use treatment options, third-party custodian arrangements, and any specific factors rebutting the presumption (e.g., the firearm was inherited, the defendant did not know of the prohibited status, the defendant has been compliant with all prior probation conditions). Magistrate practice on weapons-case detention varies across N.D. Texas (Dallas, Fort Worth, Plano, Sherman) and E.D. Texas (Sherman, Plano, Marshall, Tyler) divisions — counsel's familiarity with the assigned magistrate is significant.
Do not give a post-arrest statement without counsel. Federal weapons investigations live on the defendant's own statements — particularly Rehaif knowledge admissions ("I knew I couldn't have a gun"), constructive-possession admissions ("I knew the gun was there"), and § 924(c) admissions ("I had the gun in case of trouble"). The FBI and ATF agents who conduct post-arrest interviews are skilled at developing these admissions in casual-seeming conversations. Recorded jail-cell calls are routinely admitted at trial under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Statements to cellmates can become cooperator testimony. Invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege explicitly and maintain silence thereafter. Family-call admissions in the first 24 hours after arrest have lost more federal weapons cases than any single defense error.
Research the predicate-conviction record immediately. The single most important pre-trial investigative task in any § 922(g)(1) case (and any case with potential ACCA exposure) is obtaining certified judgment-and-sentence records for every prior conviction. The categorical-approach analysis under Mathis/Borden requires the specific statute under which the defendant was convicted, the specific subsection (for divisible statutes), and (where the modified categorical approach applies) the specific underlying conduct charged. Texas state-court priors require requests to the relevant county clerk and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for sentence documentation. Out-of-state priors require requests to the relevant state's repositories. This research often produces decisive evidence — a prior previously believed to be an ACCA predicate is actually overbroad under Mathis, dropping the case from a 15-year mandatory minimum to the § 924(a)(8) range.
Consider the safety-valve and cooperation landscape carefully. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve is NOT available in federal weapons cases — it applies only to drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. and a small set of other specific offenses. The only mechanism to reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum in a federal weapons case is the government's 5K1.1 motion for substantial assistance (under USSG § 5K1.1) combined with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Cooperation in weapons cases carries the same risks as in drug cases — retaliation, family safety, testimony requirements — and the value of cooperation is highly fact-specific. Defense counsel evaluates the cooperation opportunity with each client through a structured framework, never as a default. In ACCA cases, the magnitude of the mandatory minimum (15 years) makes cooperation a more frequently rational choice; in clean § 922(g) cases without ACCA exposure, cooperation is less often productive.
DFW-specific context (N.D. Texas, E.D. Texas, ATF Dallas, BOP, and cost)
N.D. Texas (Dallas, Fort Worth, Plano, Sherman, Amarillo, Lubbock, San Angelo, Wichita Falls, Abilene) and E.D. Texas (Sherman, Plano, Marshall, Tyler, Beaumont, Lufkin, Texarkana) handle every federal weapons indictment in DFW. The ATF Dallas Field Division, FBI Dallas, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and OCDETF joint task forces drive most prosecutions.
The Northern District of Texas covers the Dallas, Fort Worth, Plano, Sherman, Amarillo, Lubbock, San Angelo, Wichita Falls, and Abilene divisions. Federal weapons prosecutions for Frisco, Plano, McKinney, and the Collin County area generally proceed in the Plano or Sherman division of N.D. Texas. Federal prosecutions for Dallas, Garland, Irving, and the Dallas County area proceed in the Dallas division. Federal prosecutions for Fort Worth, Arlington, and the Tarrant County area proceed in the Fort Worth division. Each division has its own assigned U.S. District Judges and U.S. Magistrate Judges. The N.D. Texas U.S. Attorney's Office operates a Violent Crime Unit that prosecutes most § 922(g), § 924(c), and § 924(e) ACCA cases. Federal weapons indictments out of the Sherman division (covering parts of Collin, Grayson, and Fannin counties) are often coordinated with the Frisco and Plano police departments through Project Safe Neighborhoods.
The Eastern District of Texas covers the Sherman, Plano, Marshall, Tyler, Beaumont, Lufkin, and Texarkana divisions. Plano and Sherman divisions of E.D. Texas geographically overlap with the Plano and Sherman divisions of N.D. Texas, creating jurisdictional choices that sometimes drive forum-selection negotiation. The E.D. Texas U.S. Attorney's Office in Plano and Tyler prosecutes federal weapons cases, with substantial focus on multi-defendant conspiracies involving felons-in-possession associated with drug-trafficking organizations. Federal weapons cases involving conduct that crossed county or district lines may be subject to venue motions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 18, with the choice of venue affecting judge assignment, jury pool, and the AUSA team handling the case.
The ATF Dallas Field Division is the primary federal investigative agency for weapons offenses in the DFW region. The Field Division operates investigative groups focused on trafficking, NFA violations (including the proliferation of Glock-switch auto sears and homemade silencers), straw purchases at licensed dealers, and federal felon-in-possession cases. The FBI Dallas Field Office handles violent-crime weapons cases, particularly those involving organized criminal enterprises. OCDETF joint operations coordinate ATF, FBI, DEA, and HSI investigations of multi-defendant cases involving drug-trafficking organizations with firearm exposure. Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) — a federal-local partnership prosecutorial initiative — drives many DFW felon-in-possession prosecutions, particularly cases originating from Frisco, Plano, McKinney, Dallas, and Fort Worth police agencies. PSN cases typically present strong investigative records but limited cooperation incentives because the prior offense profile is often categorically established before indictment.
Federal sentences are served in Bureau of Prisons facilities. The BOP designation analysis for armed-felon defendants considers Public Safety Factors (PSFs), security level (low, medium, high, administrative), and program needs. A § 922(g)(1) defendant without ACCA priors and without violence in the offense conduct may be designated to a low-security facility (FCI Seagoville, FCI Texarkana, FCI Bastrop). A § 924(c) defendant or ACCA defendant typically receives a medium- or high-security designation (FCI Three Rivers, USP Pollock, USP Beaumont). Designation requests under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) can identify a preferred facility — and defense counsel routinely includes BOP-designation advocacy in the sentencing-mitigation package. Federal good-time credit is approximately 54 days per year served (about 15%), and First Step Act earned-time credits can further reduce time served through programming participation — though FSA credits are unavailable for some § 924(c) and § 924(e) ACCA defendants under the disqualifying-offense list in 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).
Federal weapons defense in N.D./E.D. Texas runs $20,000–$60,000 in attorney fees for a typical single-defendant § 922(g) prosecution through trial, with significant variation based on ACCA exposure, § 924(c) stacking, and forum. A clean § 922(g)(1) case without ACCA exposure may run $20,000–$40,000 through structured plea. A § 924(c) stacking case or an ACCA case with extensive categorical-approach analysis may run $60,000–$150,000+. Pre-indictment representation that resolves with declination or state-court referral may run substantially less ($10,000–$25,000). Expert costs (firearm-trace experts, NICS investigators, mitigation specialists $5,000–$15,000) add materially. Cooperation incentives in federal weapons cases are narrower than in drug cases — the safety valve is unavailable, and the only path below a mandatory minimum is the government's 5K1.1 motion. Post-conviction relief options include § 2255 collateral attack on Rehaif grounds (where the prior plea did not include a knowledge admission), post-Borden ACCA challenges, post-Wooden/Erlinger different-occasions challenges, post-Davis § 924(c) residual-clause challenges, and post-Cargill bump-stock-conviction challenges. The First Step Act's compassionate-release provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provides another avenue for sentence reduction in extraordinary cases. Collateral consequences are severe: lifetime firearm prohibition (the federal conviction itself triggers § 922(g)(1) for any future firearm possession), immigration removal (firearm offenses are deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)), and employment, housing, and voting consequences that follow any federal felony conviction.
