Texas robbery defense

What is robbery under PC § 29.02?

Texas Penal Code § 29.02 defines robbery as theft accomplished by force or threat: in the course of committing theft, the actor either causes bodily injury or threatens imminent bodily injury or death. Robbery is a second-degree felony — aggravated under § 29.03 when a deadly weapon is involved, serious bodily injury results, or the complainant is 65+ or disabled.

Theft predicate — "in the course of committing theft"

The State must prove an underlying theft under § 31.03 — or attempt, or immediate flight after attempt — as the predicate for robbery liability. PC § 29.01(1) defines "in the course of committing theft" broadly to include any conduct in attempting, committing, or fleeing after theft. Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), confirms the theft need not be completed: an aborted attempt followed by force still grounds robbery liability. Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), holds that the theft predicate requires proof of all theft elements (unlawful appropriation + intent to deprive) beyond reasonable doubt.

Conduct — bodily injury OR threat

Pathway 1 (§ 29.02(a)(1)): the actor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Pathway 2 (§ 29.02(a)(2)): the actor intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Each pathway is independently sufficient — the State frequently pleads both in the alternative. Threat-based robbery does not require any physical contact, but it does require imminence — vague or conditional threats that do not place the complainant in fear of immediate harm fail the element.

Intent — to obtain or maintain control of property

The State must prove that the force or threat was used with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property — connecting the violence to the theft. Force unconnected to the theft (a fight that happens to occur near a robbery scene; assault followed by an opportunistic property taking) may support theft and assault charges but not robbery. The intent element is often the cleanest defense angle in cases where the State stretches to combine separate incidents into a single robbery indictment.

Complainant — "to another"

The conduct must be directed at "another" — a person other than the actor. Robbery against a person 65 or older, or against a disabled individual as defined in PC § 22.04, automatically elevates to aggravated robbery under § 29.03(a)(3) regardless of whether a deadly weapon was used or serious bodily injury resulted. Counsel must confirm complainant identity at intake — the difference between robbery and aggravated robbery on this single fact alone is the difference between a 2-20 year second-degree felony and a 5-99 or life first-degree felony.

Beyond the four elements, prosecutors typically structure robbery indictments to keep aggravated-robbery exposure open even when the underlying evidence is thin. A charge initially pleaded as robbery can be enhanced to aggravated robbery if discovery later reveals a weapon was visible on surveillance video, if the complainant's post-incident statement describes serious bodily injury, or if subsequent investigation identifies the complainant as a protected person under § 29.03(a)(3). Defense counsel must monitor charging decisions at every setting because the grade difference — second-degree versus first-degree felony — is enormous, and the 3g aggravated offense designation under art. 42A.054 applies to both, eliminating straight community supervision as an option after conviction at either level.

The theft predicate — two cases in one

Robbery is theft accomplished by force or threat. Without proof of an underlying theft (or attempt, or immediate flight after attempt), the State cannot sustain a robbery conviction. The theft predicate is one of the most underestimated defense angles in Texas violent-crime practice.

Every Texas robbery prosecution is two cases in one — a theft case and a force-or-threat case. The State must prove both independently and beyond reasonable doubt. Theft (§ 31.03) requires unlawful appropriation of property with intent to deprive the owner. The "unlawful appropriation" element fails where the actor had a colorable claim of right to the property (return of property previously taken from the actor; collection on a debt; recovery of property from a thief). The "intent to deprive" element fails where the actor intended only to use the property temporarily and return it. Both failures defeat the theft predicate — and without the theft predicate, robbery collapses to assault under PC § 22.01 or terroristic threat under § 22.07.

The "in the course of committing theft" (§ 29.01(1)) phrase is statutorily broad but factually contested. Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), confirms that robbery liability attaches during attempt, commission, or immediate flight. But the temporal scope is not infinite — force or threat that occurs after the actor has reached a place of temporary safety with the property is no longer "in the course of committing theft." White v. State, 671 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), holds that the inquiry is whether the force and the theft are part of a continuous transaction. Force used to obtain the property is plainly in the course; force used hours later after the actor has escaped, hidden the property, and confronted a third party is not.

The State proves the theft predicate through (1) the complainant's testimony that property was taken without consent, (2) physical inventory or surveillance video showing the property was present before the incident and absent after, and (3) the defendant's subsequent possession of the property (or proceeds from its sale or use). Defense counsel attacks each evidentiary pillar. Where the complainant cannot identify specific items taken, where the inventory or video is ambiguous or unavailable, and where the defendant was not in possession of any traceable property, the theft predicate is vulnerable. Eyewitness identification of "someone running from the store with property" — without identification of the property and without recovery of the items — is one of the weakest theft predicates and frequently produces State concessions on charge level.

A successful attack on the theft predicate either dismisses the robbery charge entirely or forces a State election to lesser-included offenses. If the State cannot prove theft, it cannot prove robbery — but it may still prove assault under PC § 22.01 (if force caused bodily injury) or terroristic threat under § 22.07 (if threats placed the complainant in fear). The grade drop is substantial: from a second-degree felony (or first-degree aggravated robbery) to a Class A misdemeanor assault, or to a Class B misdemeanor terroristic threat. The 3g aggravated offense designation disappears, eliminating the community-supervision restriction. The deadly-weapon parole rule disappears. For the defendant, the difference between losing the theft predicate and losing the entire robbery prosecution is the difference between a 2-20 year felony and a misdemeanor.

Penalty range by grade and circumstance

Texas robbery is a second-degree felony (2-20 years + $10,000). Aggravated robbery is a first-degree felony (5-99 or life + $10,000). Both are 3g aggravated offenses under art. 42A.054 — no straight community supervision. A deadly-weapon finding triggers the 50% parole rule under Government Code § 508.145(d).

Second-degree felony robbery under § 29.02(b) carries 2 to 20 years in TDCJ and a fine up to $10,000 under § 12.33.^[1] Probation is theoretically possible but practically restricted — robbery is listed as a 3g aggravated offense (art. 42A.054), meaning the trial judge cannot grant straight community supervision after conviction. Probation in a robbery case must come from the jury (under art. 42A.055) and requires the defendant to be eligible (no prior felony conviction). Even where a jury grants probation, the conditions are typically aggressive — extended supervision periods, intensive supervision, restitution, and substantial community-service hours are common. A bench plea to robbery with judge-ordered supervision is foreclosed entirely.

First-degree felony aggravated robbery under § 29.03(b) carries 5 years to 99 years or life imprisonment and a fine up to $10,000 under § 12.32.^[2] The three statutory aggravators are (1) serious bodily injury to another, (2) use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, or (3) the complainant being 65 or older or disabled. Any one aggravator is sufficient. The deadly-weapon aggravator under § 29.03(a)(2) is the most commonly charged — and importantly, "exhibition" does not require the weapon to be discharged or even pointed at the complainant. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), holds that a visible bulge under clothing combined with a verbal threat of "I have a gun" can support a deadly-weapon finding even where no weapon is ever recovered.

3g aggravated offense status applies to both robbery and aggravated robbery and produces cascading restrictions on sentencing and parole. First, no straight community supervision from the judge — only jury-recommended probation under art. 42A.055. Second, a defendant convicted of either offense is statutorily ineligible for shock probation under art. 42A.202 if the underlying conviction includes a deadly-weapon finding. Third, the deadly-weapon finding triggers the 50% parole rule under Government Code § 508.145(d) — the defendant must serve half the sentence (or 30 years, whichever is less) in TDCJ before parole eligibility.^[3] For a 20-year aggravated robbery sentence, that is 10 years served before the first parole hearing. For a 30-year sentence, it is 15 years. The deadly-weapon finding therefore frequently doubles the practical time served — which is why fighting the affirmative finding (separate from fighting the underlying charge) is a discrete defense objective.

Beyond the formal sentence, robbery convictions trigger a sprawling collateral-consequences cascade. The Texas Department of Public Safety reports the conviction to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and to all 50 states under the Interstate Identification Index. A felony conviction strips firearm rights under PC § 46.04 for 5 years after release from confinement, parole, or community supervision — restoration is partial only (firearm possession at the residence is permitted; firearm transport in public remains prohibited). Federal firearm rights are stripped permanently under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Voting rights are suspended during incarceration, parole, or community supervision. Licensing-board reporting obligations apply to nearly every regulated profession. Immigration consequences for non-citizens are severe: robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) if the sentence imposed is one year or more — triggering mandatory deportation regardless of family ties or length of residence.

Defenses we evaluate first

Five defense doctrines do most of the work in Texas robbery cases: theft-predicate challenges, identification suppression, deadly-weapon element challenges, no-imminent-injury defenses, and accomplice-liability limits. Each is fact-specific and supported by Texas and federal case law.

The single highest-leverage move in many robbery cases is a theft (§ 31.03) predicate challenge. As discussed above, robbery requires an underlying theft — and a successful attack on the theft predicate either dismisses the robbery charge entirely or forces reduction to lesser-included offenses (assault, terroristic threat). Defense counsel attacks the theft predicate through (1) claim-of-right defenses where the actor had a colorable claim to the property, (2) intent-to-deprive challenges where the conduct was a temporary taking, (3) consent defenses where the complainant had previously given access to the property, and (4) chain-of-custody attacks on the State's evidence that the specific property allegedly taken was in fact present and absent at the relevant times. Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), confirms the theft predicate must be proven independently with all elements beyond reasonable doubt.

Identification challenges are the workhorse defense in robbery cases. Most robbery prosecutions rest on (1) the complainant's eyewitness identification, (2) surveillance video of an unknown person, and (3) some combination of forensic evidence linking the defendant to the scene. Each is attackable. Eyewitness identification under stress is notoriously unreliable — the U.S. Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), set the reliability framework requiring courts to consider (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description, (4) the level of certainty at the identification, and (5) the time between crime and identification. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), confirms the Texas application — suggestive lineup procedures (single-photo show-ups, suggestive lineup composition, suggestive comments during identification) support suppression of the identification and any subsequent in-court identification under the totality-of-circumstances test. The defense files Wade motions to suppress and Daubert motions challenging the State's identification methodology.

Surveillance video identification is increasingly contested as facial-recognition technology and image-enhancement tools spread. Defense counsel pursues (1) the chain of custody for the video, (2) the methodology of any image-enhancement performed, (3) the qualifications of any analyst who reviewed the video, and (4) the comparability of video stills to known photographs of the defendant. Where the video shows a person of similar build and clothing but no clearly identifiable face — the most common scenario in convenience-store and gas-station robberies — the defense produces alibi evidence, alternative-suspect evidence, and challenges the State's reliance on circumstantial identification. Frame-by-frame video review at the defense expert level frequently reveals features (height, gait, distinctive markings, clothing details) that exclude the defendant or undermine the State's identification narrative.

For aggravated robbery, the deadly-weapon element is a discrete attack surface. Under PC § 1.07(a)(17), "deadly weapon" means (A) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, or (B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), broadens this — a verbal threat plus a visible bulge can support a deadly-weapon finding even without recovery of the weapon. But the State still bears the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where no weapon is recovered, where the complainant's description is inconsistent, where surveillance video does not show a weapon, and where the only proof of the weapon is the complainant's post-incident testimony, the deadly-weapon finding is vulnerable. A successful defense on this point reduces the charge from first-degree aggravated robbery to second-degree robbery — eliminating the 50% parole rule and dramatically reducing the practical sentence exposure.

No-imminent-injury defenses target the threat-based robbery pathway under § 29.02(a)(2). The State must prove that the threat placed the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury or death — vague threats, conditional threats, and threats unconnected to the property taking fail the element. Olivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), confirms that the imminence requirement is strict — a generalized threat of future harm does not suffice. Where the State alleges robbery by threat but the complainant's contemporaneous statements (911 audio, scene interviews) describe non-imminent or ambiguous threats, the defense moves to dismiss the robbery charge or to reduce to terroristic threat under § 22.07.

Accomplice-liability defenses target the State's reliance on party liability under PC § 7.02. Mere presence at the scene is insufficient — the State must prove affirmative encouragement or assistance with intent to promote or assist commission of the offense. Ruiz v. State, 579 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), confirms this rule. Accomplice liability (PC § 7.02) defenses are particularly viable in (1) cases where the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle without prior knowledge of the planned robbery, (2) cases where the defendant arrived at the scene after the robbery had been committed, and (3) cases where the defendant's presence was incidental and the State's case rests on guilt by association. The anti-merger doctrine under § 7.02(b) — limiting conspirator liability to offenses reasonably foreseeable as a result of the unlawful purpose — provides additional defense leverage where a co-defendant's actions exceeded the scope of any joint plan.

Common prosecution errors in robbery cases

The State's typical errors in robbery prosecutions are predictable: weak eyewitness identification, suggestive lineup procedures, missing video clarity, conclusory deadly-weapon proof, charging robbery without complete theft, and broken chain of custody on physical evidence.

A pattern emerges across DFW robbery dockets — prosecutors err in five reliable categories. First, weak eyewitness identification. Robbery occurs in conditions notoriously hostile to accurate identification: brief duration, high stress, weapon focus (the complainant's attention naturally fixates on the weapon rather than the actor's face), poor lighting, and disguise (masks, hoods, sunglasses). The U.S. Supreme Court framework in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and the Texas application in Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), require courts to assess identification reliability under a totality-of-circumstances test. Defense counsel files Wade motions to suppress the identification, Daubert motions challenging methodology, and motions for expert testimony on eyewitness reliability under Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A successful suppression collapses the State's identification case.

Second, suggestive lineup procedures. The single-photo show-up — where police present the complainant with one photograph and ask "is this the person?" — is impermissibly suggestive under Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), unless there are exigent circumstances. Six-pack lineups with the defendant prominently featured (different clothing, different background, distinctive markings) are similarly attackable. The defense obtains the lineup procedure documentation under Article 39.14 discovery, identifies any departures from departmental policy, and litigates the suggestiveness in a pretrial suppression hearing. Where the lineup is found suggestive and unreliable, both the out-of-court identification and any in-court identification are excluded.

Third, missing or unclear video evidence. Most robbery prosecutions rely on surveillance video — convenience stores, gas stations, ATM cameras, residential doorbells. Defense counsel orders the video at first opportunity (often before the State has fully analyzed it) and examines (1) video quality (resolution, frame rate, compression artifacts), (2) chain of custody (who copied the video, when, and to what storage medium), (3) integrity (any signs of editing, time-stamp manipulation, or missing footage), and (4) identification value (does the video actually show a clearly identifiable face, or only a person of similar build and clothing). Frame-by-frame review by a defense forensic-video expert frequently reveals features (height inconsistent with the defendant, distinctive gait, clothing details, distinctive markings) that exclude the defendant or undermine the State's identification narrative.

Fourth, conclusory deadly-weapon proof. The State frequently charges aggravated robbery on minimal weapon evidence — the complainant's testimony that "he had a gun" without any weapon recovery, no clear video of the weapon, and no other corroboration. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), permits a deadly-weapon finding without weapon recovery, but the State still bears the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Defense counsel attacks the weapon evidence through (1) cross-examination of the complainant on the description of the weapon (caliber, color, distinguishing features), (2) consistency analysis of the complainant's descriptions across 911 call, scene interview, hospital interview, and police interview, (3) absence of physical evidence (no weapon recovered, no shell casings, no ballistic evidence), and (4) surveillance video that does not clearly show a weapon. A successful attack on the deadly-weapon element reduces aggravated robbery to robbery — eliminating the 50% parole rule.

Fifth, charging robbery without complete theft proof. The theft predicate is sometimes the weakest part of the State's case — particularly where (1) no property is recovered from the defendant, (2) the complainant cannot specifically identify what was taken, (3) the inventory of the store or location is ambiguous about pre-incident versus post-incident counts, and (4) the State's theory of theft rests on inference rather than direct evidence. Defense counsel motions for production of all inventory records under Article 39.14, examines the State's evidence on the theft elements, and where the predicate is weak, moves for instructed verdict on the theft element. If the State cannot prove theft beyond reasonable doubt, the robbery charge fails, leaving only assault or terroristic threat as lesser-included offenses. Broken chain of custody on physical evidence (recovered property, photographs of the scene, recovered cash) is a separate attack surface — gaps in the chain support exclusion or weight reduction.

What to do if you're charged with robbery

The first 15 days are decisive for felony robbery: bond posture is critical, do NOT contact the complainant, preserve alibi evidence (timestamps, witnesses), avoid all statements to police, and lock down social media. Most defense leverage is built before the first court setting.

Five things matter in the opening 15-day window for a felony robbery case. First, bond posture is critical. Robbery and aggravated robbery bond amounts in DFW counties typically start at $25,000-$75,000 for second-degree robbery and $75,000-$250,000+ for aggravated robbery — and bond conditions often include GPS monitoring, surrender of passport, no-contact orders with the complainant, curfew restrictions, and travel limitations. Counsel engaged immediately can move for bond reduction under Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.40 at the magistration stage or at a contested bond hearing within the first 10 days. Bond reduction at this stage is far easier than after indictment — courts are more receptive when defense counsel presents employment, community ties, no prior felony record, and absence of flight risk before the State has built its evidentiary record.

Second, do not contact the complainant directly. Most robbery cases produce no-contact orders at magistration, and violation is a separate offense under PC § 25.07 — typically a Class A misdemeanor, but elevated to a third-degree felony where the underlying offense is a felony and the contact involves threats or violence. Even where no formal no-contact order has issued, direct contact with the complainant in a felony case frequently produces witness-tampering allegations under PC § 36.05 — a third-degree felony in its own right. Witness tampering allegations stack on top of the existing robbery charges and dramatically harden the State's posture. All communication with the complainant — and with any State's witness — goes through counsel.

Third, preserve alibi evidence immediately. Robbery prosecutions are identification-driven; alibi evidence is the most powerful defense. Counsel works with the client to identify (1) cellular-tower location data and Google Maps timeline records that place the client elsewhere during the incident, (2) credit-card transactions, ATM withdrawals, and electronic-payment records with timestamps, (3) surveillance video at the client's actual location (workplace, residence, gym, restaurant) for the relevant time window, (4) witnesses who were with the client during the incident, and (5) social-media posts, messages, and check-ins with timestamps. The State will subpoena cellular records and may attempt to argue the records do not exclude the defendant — defense counsel preserves the records independently and produces them at the appropriate strategic moment, often during plea negotiation or at a Daubert hearing on State expert testimony.

Fourth, do not give any statement to police. This rule is universal across criminal defense but is particularly important in robbery cases for two reasons. First, the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the moment of arrest forward; invoke it explicitly ("I want to speak with a lawyer") and stay silent thereafter. Second, recorded statements at the scene, in the patrol car, at the police station, and on jail-cell phones routinely supply the State's strongest evidence on identification ("yeah I was in that area but..."), on consciousness of guilt ("I didn't do that one, that was last week..."), and on accomplice involvement ("I was just with him, I didn't know what he was going to do..."). Texas county jails record all outgoing calls and admit them as party-opponent admissions under Rule 801(e)(2)(A). Family-call admissions, codefendant conversations, and casual booking-room statements have lost more robbery cases than weak State evidence.

Fifth, lock down social media immediately. Robbery investigations routinely include social-media analysis — Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, X. Photos showing the defendant in clothing similar to the robber's, check-ins near the robbery location, posts referencing money or property acquired around the time of the robbery, and direct messages to associates have all become State evidence in DFW robbery prosecutions. Counsel directs the client to (1) stop posting immediately, (2) preserve existing accounts (do not delete — deletion can support obstruction or spoliation arguments), (3) set all accounts to private, (4) save full account exports (Facebook Download Your Information, Google Takeout) for defense use, and (5) avoid all messaging about the case on any electronic platform. The State will subpoena social-media records; the defense will rely on the same records for alibi and impeachment work.

DFW-specific context (Collin, Denton, Dallas, Tarrant)

Each DFW county handles robbery and aggravated robbery prosecutions differently. All four counties run dedicated felony divisions with specialized prosecutors. Collin is firmest on pleas; Dallas more willing to negotiate where identification is weak; Denton mixed; Tarrant case-by-case on injury severity and weapon involvement.

Collin County prosecutors take a firm position on robbery and aggravated robbery prosecutions — the Collin County District Attorney's office runs a dedicated violent-crimes prosecution division out of the McKinney courthouse, with specialized prosecutors who handle the docket. First-pass plea offers in robbery cases typically range from 8-15 years on second-degree robbery and 15-30 years on aggravated robbery, with deadly-weapon-finding stipulations standard. Substantive motion practice — Wade suppression motions, Daubert challenges to identification methodology, theft-predicate motions for instructed verdict — filed before the first plea offer reliably draws better counter-offers. The McKinney courts are responsive to well-prepared defense files, particularly where the eyewitness identification is suggestive or the surveillance video is ambiguous.

Denton County follows a similar pattern with somewhat more flexibility on bond conditions and a notable willingness to negotiate where the identification record is credibly challenged. Denton's robbery docket runs out of the felony district courts in the Denton County Courthouse and the Justice Center in Lewisville. Prosecutors here historically have been more open to charge reductions (aggravated robbery to robbery, where the deadly-weapon element is weak; robbery to theft, where the force element is weak) than Collin. Pretrial diversion is rarely available for robbery cases, but reduction to lesser charges and plea-with-jury-probation are both viable paths. Denton judges are generally receptive to bond reduction motions filed within the first 30 days of arrest.

Dallas County prosecutors more readily accept reductions and dismissals where the identification record is weak, the surveillance video is ambiguous, or the theft predicate is contested. Dallas operates the largest specialized violent-crimes division in DFW under the Dallas County District Attorney's office. The county's pretrial services division handles bond-condition modification petitions efficiently. Dallas judges are generally receptive to defense motions on bond reduction, GPS-monitoring modification, and suppression of identification evidence. The county's use of Brady-disclosure procedures is more developed than in surrounding counties, and defense counsel can frequently obtain useful exculpatory material — prior false accusations by the complainant, alternative-suspect leads pursued and abandoned by police, and inconsistencies in the State's investigation — that supports plea negotiation or trial.

Tarrant County combines aspects of all three — firm on first-pass plea offers (similar to Collin) but willing to negotiate significantly when defense counsel has built a record (similar to Dallas). The Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's office runs a dedicated violent-crimes prosecution division. The Fort Worth Criminal District Courts handle felony robbery cases, with magistration and early-stage matters running through the Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center. Tarrant judges are case-by-case in their analysis — identification credibility, weapon-evidence strength, prior history, and the quality of the defense record all matter. The most important leverage point in Tarrant is the pretrial Wade and Daubert motion practice — well-litigated identification motions reliably produce charge reductions or pretrial dismissal where the State's identification case is weak.

Cost and outcome expectations

A realistic Texas robbery defense costs $10,000–$30,000+ for second-degree robbery and $15,000–$50,000+ for aggravated robbery. Cases resolve in 8-18 months on average with substantive motion practice. Outcomes vary widely based on identification strength, weapon evidence, and theft-predicate posture.

Defense fees vary significantly by grade level and complexity. A second-degree robbery defense with no aggravators, a single complainant, and a relatively clear path to plea or reduction typically runs $10,000–$15,000 flat-fee. Add contested suppression hearings, expert witness costs ($3,000-$7,500 for an eyewitness-identification expert, forensic-video analyst, or use-of-force expert), and the range moves to $15,000–$25,000. Trial-ready second-degree robbery defense — fully prepared for jury trial with all motion practice and expert work done — runs $20,000–$30,000+. Aggravated robbery defense is substantially more expensive: a contested first-degree felony with deadly-weapon and identification disputes typically runs $20,000–$35,000 baseline, and trial-ready aggravated robbery defense runs $35,000–$50,000+ because of the felony-level discovery, expert work, and trial-preparation burden.

Court costs in a Texas robbery conviction run $400-$1,000 in standard fees. Where probation is granted (jury-recommended only, given the 3g aggravated offense restriction), supervision fees add $60-$100/month for the term of supervision (typically 5-10 years for a felony). Anger-management or behavioral-intervention programs, where ordered, run $30-$60 per session over 12-24 weeks — total program cost $400-$1,500. Restitution to the complainant for stolen property and any documented bodily-injury treatment costs is mandatory under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.037 — typical restitution in DFW robbery cases ranges from $500 to $25,000 depending on what was taken and the medical treatment required. Restitution is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).

Timeline expectations: most second-degree robbery cases resolve in 8-12 months from arrest to disposition when contested with substantive motion practice. Aggravated robbery cases typically take 10-18 months from indictment to disposition because of the higher stakes, more complex discovery, and more aggressive motion practice. Trial cases extend the timeline by 4-8 months. Most plea or reduction resolutions happen at the third or fourth pretrial setting once Article 39.14 discovery is complete, suppression motions are heard, and the State has assessed its evidentiary position post-Wade hearing. Cases with weak identification frequently resolve faster — the State recognizes the trial risk and offers reduction or dismissal earlier. Cases with strong State evidence (clear video, weapon recovery, multiple corroborating witnesses) take longer because defense work is focused on minimizing exposure rather than achieving outright dismissal.

Outcome distribution is hard to generalize because every robbery case is fact-specific, but typical DFW outcomes cluster as follows: roughly 10-15% of robbery cases resolve by outright dismissal (typically driven by successful identification suppression or theft-predicate collapse); roughly a third resolve by reduction to lesser-included offenses (assault, theft, terroristic threat); roughly a third resolve by plea to the original charge with jury-recommended probation where eligible; and roughly 15-20% resolve by plea to the original charge with TDCJ time. The remainder go to trial. Aggravated robbery outcomes skew more toward TDCJ time given the first-degree felony grade and the deadly-weapon parole rule — but reduction to second-degree robbery (eliminating the 50% parole rule) is a common defense objective and frequently achievable where the deadly-weapon element is weak.

The single most important financial lever in robbery defense is the conviction-vs-reduction decision when aggravators are charged. An aggravated robbery conviction with a deadly-weapon finding under § 12.32 carries 5-99 years or life, plus the 50% parole rule under Government Code § 508.145(d). A reduction to second-degree robbery under § 12.33 carries 2-20 years, with parole eligibility at 25% of the sentence (no deadly-weapon finding). For a 20-year sentence, the difference between aggravated and reduced robbery is 10 years served versus 5 years served before first parole consideration. For non-citizen clients, the difference is even more stark: aggravated robbery is categorically a "crime of violence" and an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law, triggering mandatory deportation; reduction to second-degree robbery does not change the basic deportation analysis but creates additional procedural defense opportunities. The strategic question of whether to accept a reduction-to-robbery plea or to fight for full dismissal therefore depends heavily on the client's immigration status, citizenship plans, and tolerance for trial risk.