Texas aggravated assault defense

What is aggravated assault under PC § 22.02?

Texas Penal Code § 22.02 requires the State to prove the elements of simple assault under § 22.01 PLUS one of two aggravators: (a) serious bodily injury, or (b) use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. 2nd-degree felony by default; 1st-degree under § 22.02(b) enhancements.

Underlying assault (§ 22.01)

The State must first prove an assault — intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury; intentionally or knowingly threatening another with imminent bodily injury; or intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact known or reasonably believed to be offensive or provocative. Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), confirms that aggravated assault is a result-of-conduct offense as to bodily-injury theories — the mens rea attaches to the result, not the act.

Aggravator A — serious bodily injury

Where the State proceeds on the SBI prong of § 22.02(a)(1), the bodily injury must rise to one of the four statutory categories in § 1.07(a)(46): substantial risk of death, death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ. Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), and Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), distinguish ordinary bodily injury from SBI on these factors — temporary impairment alone is not enough.

Aggravator B — deadly weapon use or exhibition

Where the State proceeds on the deadly-weapon prong of § 22.02(a)(2), it must prove the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. The weapon may be a firearm or any object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or SBI under § 1.07(a)(17). The "use" prong requires the weapon facilitate the offense; "exhibit" requires only conscious display. See Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

Enhancement aggravators (§ 22.02(b))

The base 2nd-degree offense elevates to a 1st-degree felony when (1) committed against a public servant in lawful discharge, (2) committed in retaliation against a witness, informant, or person who reported a crime, (3) committed against a family or household member with SBI, (4) committed against a security officer, or (5) committed by drive-by shooting causing SBI. These § 22.02(b) enhancements must be pled in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The two aggravators in § 22.02(a) are pled in the alternative — the State can charge either or both as separate paragraphs, and the jury can convict on either theory. This dual-theory structure has major consequences for defense work: even if you defeat the SBI element by undermining medical evidence, the State may still secure a conviction on the deadly-weapon prong. Conversely, even where the medical proof of SBI is clean, the deadly-weapon prong remains contestable when the object is an ordinary one (hands, feet, a household item) and the manner-of-use evidence is thin. A complete aggravated-assault defense plan must address both prongs simultaneously and triage based on the State's evidentiary posture in each.

The Texas deadly-weapon doctrine in detail

Texas case law on deadly weapons under § 1.07(a)(17)(B) — the "manner of use" prong — turns on whether the object was actually capable of causing death or SBI in the way it was used. Hands and feet can qualify; not every object does. This is where most aggravated-assault defense work happens.

Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17) divides deadly weapons into two categories: subsection (A) covers firearms and "anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury"; subsection (B) covers "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." The (A) prong is rarely contested where a firearm is used. The (B) prong is the appellate battleground — and the highest-leverage defense surface in most non-firearm aggravated-assault cases.

The leading Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion on hands and feet is Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), which confirmed that hands and feet can be deadly weapons under § 1.07(a)(17)(B) — but only on evidence-specific findings about the manner of use and the resulting capacity to cause death or SBI. Tucker did not establish a categorical rule that hands are always deadly weapons; the State still must prove the manner-of-use element. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), held that fists used in a sustained beating that produced SBI qualified, but the court emphasized the cumulative impact of repeated blows over time. Hill v. State, 913 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), affirmed a deadly-weapon finding where the defendant kicked a downed victim in the head — manner-of-use evidence was specific.

For ordinary objects, the case law is even more fact-bound. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), reversed an aggravated-assault conviction where the State relied on a "pocketknife" deadly-weapon theory but the evidence was insufficient to establish manner-of-use capacity. The CCA emphasized that the object's physical characteristics plus the actual manner of use must together support a rational finding that the object was capable of causing death or SBI. Conclusory testimony — "the knife was a deadly weapon" — does not suffice; the State must develop the factual record. Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), addressed a beer bottle and required similar manner-of-use specificity.

The "exhibit" prong of § 22.02(a)(2) — distinct from "use" — has its own doctrine. Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), defined "use" as employing the weapon to facilitate the offense and "exhibit" as conscious display. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), held that a weapon need not be brandished or displayed in a threatening way to be "used or exhibited" — mere presence and accessibility during the offense may suffice. This expansive reading is itself contestable in aggravated-assault prosecutions where the weapon was holstered or never drawn — defense counsel argues the "exhibit" element fails where the weapon was not consciously displayed.

Penalty range and collateral consequences

Texas aggravated assault is a 2nd-degree felony (2–20 years + $10K) by default; 1st-degree (5–99 years or life + $10K) under the § 22.02(b) enhancements. Probation is restricted as a 3g aggravated offense; deadly-weapon findings trigger 50% parole eligibility.

A base 2nd-degree felony aggravated assault under § 22.02(a) carries 2 to 20 years in TDCJ and a fine up to $10,000 under § 12.33.^[1] A 1st-degree enhancement under § 22.02(b) raises the range to 5 to 99 years or life and a $10,000 fine under § 12.32 — a roughly five-fold increase in maximum exposure.^[2] The § 22.02(b) enhancements include public-servant victims, family-violence with SBI, retaliation against witnesses or informants, security-officer victims, and drive-by shootings causing SBI. Each must be specifically pled in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase.

Aggravated assault appears on the "3g" list at Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054 — formerly art. 42.12 § 3g — which restricts community supervision.^[3] For 3g offenses, the trial judge cannot grant straight (judge-ordered) probation. Probation is available only on a jury recommendation, and only if the assessed sentence is 10 years or less under art. 42A.055. Deferred adjudication is statutorily available under art. 42A.101 but is not a 3g restriction — it requires a separate plea posture and judicial acceptance, and on aggravated-assault cases is far less common than on misdemeanor assaults.

An affirmative deadly-weapon finding entered on the judgment under art. 42A.054(b)–(d) triggers the 50% parole-eligibility rule under Government Code § 508.145(d).^[4] The defendant must serve one-half of the sentence (or 30 years, whichever is less) calendar time before parole consideration — not credited with good-conduct time. On a 20-year 2nd-degree aggravated assault with a deadly-weapon finding, that is 10 years flat before first parole eligibility. On a 1st-degree 99-year sentence with a finding, 30 years flat. The deadly-weapon finding is a separate factual determination, and the jury verdict or court judgment must expressly include it — defense counsel should request a special-issue submission on aggravated-assault SBI cases where the State has not separately pled the deadly-weapon theory.

Collateral consequences extend well beyond TDCJ time. Aggravated assault is a federal "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which can trigger federal sentencing enhancements if the defendant later faces federal charges. It is a disqualifying offense for firearms possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) and under Texas Penal Code § 46.04. Professional licensing — Texas Medical Board, State Bar, Texas Real Estate Commission, TEA/SBEC — typically results in license action on a violent felony conviction. For non-citizens, aggravated assault is a categorical "crime of violence" aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) when the sentence imposed is one year or longer — generating mandatory removal exposure with no immigration-relief eligibility. Family-violence assault aggravation under § 22.02(b)(3) also triggers a federal firearm prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Lautenberg Amendment) even where the state classification might allow possession.

Defenses we evaluate first

Six defense doctrines do the heavy lifting: deadly-weapon element challenges, SBI element challenges, self-defense, defense of others, identification, and intoxication-as-mitigation. Each is fact-specific and tied to specific Texas Court of Criminal Appeals precedent.

The single highest-leverage defense in most aggravated-assault prosecutions is the deadly weapon element challenge under § 1.07(a)(17)(B). The State must prove the object — whether hands, feet, a household item, a vehicle, a beer bottle, or a knife — was actually capable of causing death or SBI in the manner of its use during the offense. Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), and Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), are the controlling decisions. Defense counsel attacks the manner-of-use evidence with the same rigor a DWI defense attacks SFST evidence — examining medical records for actual injury severity, scene photos for object characteristics, witness testimony for descriptions of the specific use. A successful element challenge reduces aggravated assault to simple assault (Class A misdemeanor under § 22.01), which collapses the entire 2nd-degree felony exposure.

The serious bodily injury element under § 1.07(a)(46) is the second-highest leverage point. SBI requires substantial risk of death, death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ. Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), and Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), distinguish ordinary bodily injury from SBI on these factors. Defense counsel orders the complete medical records, hospital admission notes, treating-physician records, follow-up records, and any imaging — looking for diagnoses that do not rise to SBI categories. Bruising, swelling, a chipped tooth, a sprained limb, or minor lacerations rarely qualify. Permanence and severity must be supported with affirmative medical testimony, not officer conclusions. Where the State's SBI evidence is conclusory, an early Article 39.14 discovery push and an independent medical expert reading the records can build a directed-verdict argument or a strong reduction posture.

Self-defense under Penal Code § 9.31 and § 9.32 is available in aggravated-assault cases on the same framework as other Texas violent offenses. § 9.31 authorizes force in self-defense when reasonably necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. § 9.32 authorizes deadly force when reasonably necessary to protect against the other's use of unlawful deadly force or to prevent imminent commission of certain enumerated offenses. Texas has no general duty to retreat under § 9.32(c) where the actor has a right to be present and did not provoke the encounter. Once the defendant produces some evidence of self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt — Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The Saxton burden-shift makes self-defense particularly powerful in two-party altercation cases where eyewitness accounts diverge.

Defense of third persons under § 9.33 mirrors § 9.31/§ 9.32 but for the protection of another. The actor must reasonably believe the third person would be justified in using force or deadly force in self-defense. Defense-of-others fits family altercations where the defendant intervened to protect a relative, and bar/parking-lot incidents where the defendant intervened on behalf of a friend. The same Saxton burden-shift applies. Identification challenges arise in cases where the State's witnesses had limited opportunity to observe — low light, brief encounter, intoxication, partial view. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and the Texas application in Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), supply the framework for challenging unreliable identifications. Video evidence, photo arrays, and witness-statement reconstructions are litigated with the same intensity as DWI dash-cam evidence.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the offense under Penal Code § 8.04(a) — "voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime." But under § 8.04(b), temporary insanity from intoxication may be introduced in mitigation of penalty. Defense counsel develops the intoxication record (BAC at time of arrest, witness accounts, history of substance use) to support a mitigation case at punishment phase — particularly where the defendant has no significant prior record and the offense is out of character. This is not an acquittal strategy; it is a sentencing strategy that can move a 1st-degree sentence from 30+ years toward the bottom of the range, or convert a deadly-weapon-finding case into a no-finding plea posture.

Common prosecution errors in aggravated-assault cases

The State's typical errors are predictable: over-charging ordinary objects as deadly weapons, weak SBI proof from incomplete medical records, defective special-issue submissions, broken weapon-evidence chains, and conclusory officer testimony on injury severity.

A pattern emerges across DFW felony dockets — prosecutors err in five reliable categories on aggravated-assault cases. First, over-charging on the deadly-weapon prong. Police and intake prosecutors frequently treat every object used in a fight as a deadly weapon — beer bottles, kitchen knives, fists, feet, parking-lot pavement — without developing the manner-of-use evidence that Patrick, Tucker, and Thomas require. Counsel orders the offense report, witness statements, scene photos, and video evidence at the first Article 39.14 setting, then audits the State's manner-of-use proof for sufficiency. Where the proof is conclusory ("the knife was a deadly weapon" without testimony on length, blade type, or how it was used), an early motion for directed verdict on the aggravator becomes credible at the close of the State's case.

Second, weak SBI proof from incomplete medical records. The State frequently relies on hospital triage notes, ER discharge summaries, and officer descriptions ("victim was bleeding heavily; appeared seriously injured") without follow-up medical documentation showing permanent disfigurement or protracted impairment under § 1.07(a)(46). Stuhler and Moore require concrete medical evidence of the SBI categories — substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment. Defense counsel subpoenas the complete medical file, including follow-up appointments, imaging, and specialist consultations. Where the records show full recovery, no permanent disfigurement, and no protracted impairment, the SBI element fails and the case drops to Class A simple assault.

Third, defective deadly-weapon special-issue submission. Where the State pleads both prongs of § 22.02(a) and the jury convicts, a separate special-issue submission on deadly-weapon finding is required to enter the affirmative finding on the judgment under art. 42A.054(b)–(d). Many State submissions are technically defective — they merge the deadly-weapon finding into the verdict form without a separate special-issue question. Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and progeny require explicit jury determination. A defective submission means no finding can be entered, which preserves judge-ordered probation eligibility and avoids the 50% parole rule. This is a post-conviction issue counsel watches at the verdict stage and preserves for appeal.

Fourth, broken chain of custody on weapon evidence. Where the State recovers a physical weapon, the evidentiary foundation must establish unbroken custody from seizure through trial under Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Many DFW agencies have documented chain-of-custody gaps — officers logging evidence into intake without intermediate documentation, weapons sitting in property rooms with imprecise tagging, missing transfer logs between agencies and crime labs. Defense counsel subpoenas the property-room log, evidence-transfer slips, lab intake records, and analyst chain documentation. Gaps support an exclusion argument or a sufficiency argument on the weapon's identity.

Fifth, conclusory officer testimony on injury severity. Police officers are not medical experts under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. Officer testimony that "the victim suffered serious bodily injury" is generally not competent SBI evidence absent medical foundation. Carter v. State, 678 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1984), and similar appellate decisions limit officer testimony to lay observations. Defense counsel objects to SBI conclusions from officer witnesses and forces the State to call treating providers — who frequently produce more measured testimony than the officer's offense report. This converts a "clean" SBI case into a contested one in front of the jury.

What to do if you're charged with aggravated assault

Felony aggravated assault is not misdemeanor assault — the first 15 days look different. Grand jury indictment runs 60–90 days; bond posture is critical; do NOT contact the complainant; preserve scene evidence; identify witnesses now.

Felony aggravated assault is procedurally and strategically distinct from misdemeanor assault. The State proceeds by grand jury indictment rather than information, typically within 60–90 days of arrest, and the case is filed in a district court (not a county court at law). Bond at magistration is typically much higher — $25,000–$100,000+ on a 2nd-degree felony depending on prior history and the alleged facts, and frequently into the six figures on 1st-degree cases. The first 15 days nonetheless do most of the strategic work, and the moves are different than they would be on a Class A simple assault.

First, engage felony counsel immediately and address bond. A bond-reduction hearing under Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.40 can be filed within days of magistration, and the standard under art. 17.15 weighs (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the defendant's ability to pay, (3) flight risk, (4) future safety, and (5) prior history. On aggravated-assault cases without prior violent history, art. 17.15 routinely supports reductions from initial bond to manageable levels. Conditions of bond — GPS monitoring, no-contact orders, weapons surrender, alcohol monitoring — can be challenged or modified at the same hearing. Pretrial detention on the original bond often persists for months if counsel does not move early; on a 1st-degree case it can persist for the duration of the case.

Second, preserve scene evidence. Photograph the scene if it remains accessible, document weather and lighting, identify any physical evidence still in place. Save clothing worn at the scene — both the defendant's and any items recovered. Identify all potential witnesses immediately and obtain their contact information before memories degrade or witnesses disappear. Surveillance video at nearby businesses, traffic cameras, and ring/doorbell cameras has typical retention windows of 7–30 days — counsel sends preservation letters to each within the first weeks of representation. Without these letters, the most exonerating video may be permanently lost.

Third, do NOT contact the complainant. This is the single most damaging move a defendant can make. Most aggravated-assault bond conditions include a no-contact order under Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.292; violation is a separate offense under § 25.07 and frequently results in bond revocation. Even where no no-contact order is in place, any communication with the alleged victim — direct, through family, through social media, through third parties — risks witness-tampering charges under § 36.05 and undermines defense credibility before the prosecutor. All complainant communication routes through counsel; defendants should not even respond to outreach initiated by the complainant.

Fourth, do not give a statement. All Texas county jails record outgoing calls and admit them as party-opponent admissions under Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2). Post-arrest interviews, booking-room comments, and casual statements to jail staff routinely supply the State's strongest evidence on intent and identification elements. The Fifth Amendment privilege applies from arrest forward; invoke it explicitly ("I want to speak with a lawyer") and stay silent thereafter. Family calls in which the defendant acknowledges presence, identity, or the encounter — even framed as denial — frequently end up in the State's case-in-chief. Counsel will reconstruct events through investigation; the defendant's own statements rarely help.

DFW-specific context (Collin, Denton, Dallas, Tarrant)

Each DFW district court handles aggravated-assault cases differently. Specialized felony prosecutors, district-court plea patterns, and county-specific bond practices all matter. The aggravator-reduction posture varies most by county.

Collin County aggravated-assault cases are filed in the 366th, 380th, 416th, 417th, 429th, 470th, or 471st Judicial District Courts in McKinney. Felony intake runs through specialized assault prosecutors at the Collin County District Attorney's office, with a separate family-violence division for § 22.02(b)(3) cases. Plea patterns historically favor probation on first-time non-deadly-weapon cases where the aggravator is contestable; deadly-weapon findings reduce probation availability and produce TDCJ-tier offers. Bond practices are conservative — initial bonds on 2nd-degree cases routinely run $35,000–$75,000, with reductions available on art. 17.15 motions where counsel develops the record. Trial-ready posture moves cases toward better resolution; State offers improve significantly when defense counsel has filed substantive motions and demonstrated readiness.

Denton County cases run through the 16th, 158th, 211th, 362nd, 367th, or 431st Judicial District Courts. Denton's District Attorney's office handles aggravated assaults in a felony trial division with rotating prosecutor assignments. Plea patterns are slightly more flexible than Collin on first-time non-deadly-weapon cases — reduction-to-simple-assault offers occur where the deadly-weapon prong is genuinely contestable. Bond practices are similar to Collin; the Denton County Jail in Denton handles the magistration and pretrial detention. The Lewisville Justice Center handles a portion of the docket. Defense counsel filing early bond-reduction motions and Article 39.14 discovery requests routinely produces better outcomes than waiting for the first regular setting.

Dallas County aggravated assaults are filed in the Frank Crowley Courts Building, distributed across the 194th, 195th, 203rd, 204th, 282nd, 283rd, 291st, 292nd, 363rd, or other Judicial District Courts. The Dallas County District Attorney's office runs a felony trial division with specialized family-violence prosecutors handling § 22.02(b)(3) cases. Dallas operates the highest-volume aggravated-assault docket in DFW, and plea patterns reflect that volume — first-time non-deadly-weapon cases with credible aggravator challenges resolve at probation-tier offers more frequently than in Collin. Dallas County bond practices vary significantly by individual magistrate; initial bonds run a wider range than the suburban counties.

Tarrant County aggravated-assault cases run through the Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center in Fort Worth, in the 213th, 297th, 371st, 372nd, 396th, 432nd, or 485th Judicial District Courts. The Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's office runs a felony division with specialized assault prosecutors. Tarrant's plea patterns combine elements of the other three counties — firmer initial offers (similar to Collin) but significantly improved offers where defense has built a substantive record (similar to Dallas). The Tarrant County Jail handles magistration; the Bond Office has a robust pretrial services division that conducts intake assessments for art. 17.15 risk-of-flight and risk-of-future-safety analysis. Across all four counties, the ALR-equivalent procedural leverage for aggravated assault is the bond hearing — the moment where defense counsel locks in the State's narrative under cross-examination and obtains discovery on the offense facts before the State has finalized its trial position.

Cost and outcome expectations

Felony aggravated-assault defense costs $10,000–$30,000+ in attorney fees, plus $2,500–$5,000 for expert witnesses. Timeline runs 8–18 months. Plea-to-lesser-included simple assault is common where the deadly-weapon prong is genuinely contestable.

Defense fees on aggravated-assault cases run substantially higher than misdemeanor assault. A straightforward 2nd-degree case with a clean record, contestable aggravator, and a likely plea-to-lesser-included resolution typically runs $10,000–$15,000 flat-fee for trial counsel through disposition. Cases with serious medical evidence to challenge (independent medical expert review, treating-provider depositions, imaging analysis) add $2,500–$5,000 in expert witness costs. Deadly-weapon cases involving firearm or trajectory analysis can add $3,000–$7,000 for a ballistics or use-of-force expert. 1st-degree aggravated assaults (§ 22.02(b) enhancements — public servant, family-violence SBI, retaliation) run $15,000–$25,000 for trial counsel given the higher exposure and increased motion practice. Trial-ready posture on either level — meaning prepared to actually try the case with all motion practice and expert work complete — runs $20,000–$30,000+.

Court costs in a Texas felony conviction run $400–$700 plus statutory fees. On probation outcomes, supervision fees add $60–$80/month for the probation term (typically 2–10 years on aggravated-assault probation, though 3g restrictions limit availability). Programs frequently required as probation conditions — Batterer's Intervention Prevention Program (BIPP) on family-violence cases, anger management, substance-abuse evaluation and treatment, restitution, community service hours — add ongoing costs. Many DFW counties impose a no-contact order with the complainant for the duration of probation; violation is a Class A misdemeanor offense under § 25.07 and a grounds for revocation.

Timeline expectations: most aggravated-assault cases resolve in 8–18 months from arrest to disposition when contested with substantive motion practice. Grand jury indictment typically issues 60–90 days post-arrest; Article 39.14 discovery and pretrial motion practice runs through months 3–9; plea negotiations or trial setting occur in months 9–18. Trial-set cases can extend into year two, particularly where expert testimony, suppression issues, or interlocutory appeals are involved. Most resolutions occur at the third or fourth pretrial setting once the State has assessed its evidentiary position against defense investigation and motion practice. Speedy-trial demands under Code Crim. Proc. art. 32A.02 and constitutional analysis under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), are available where the State has caused unjustified delay.

Outcome distribution is hard to generalize because every case is fact-specific, but typical aggravated-assault defense outcomes in DFW counties cluster as follows: a meaningful share resolve by plea to lesser-included Class A simple assault under § 22.01 (a Class A misdemeanor) when the deadly-weapon prong is genuinely contestable — particularly common in two-party altercations involving hands/feet, ordinary objects, or limited injury; another share resolve by plea to the 2nd-degree felony with probation (where 3g restrictions allow), with a no-deadly-weapon-finding posture and probation conditions; a smaller share resolve by plea or jury verdict to the original charge with TDCJ time, particularly on 1st-degree enhancements; and a fraction resolve by outright dismissal (typically driven by complainant non-cooperation, suppression of physical evidence, or directed verdict on aggravator-element insufficiency). Trial outcomes vary widely with jury composition, the strength of self-defense evidence, and the credibility of medical proof of SBI.

The single largest financial lever in aggravated-assault defense is the aggravator-reduction decision — converting a 2nd-degree felony into a Class A misdemeanor saves an order-of-magnitude in TDCJ exposure, preserves firearm rights, eliminates the 3g restriction on probation, prevents the deadly-weapon finding and its parole-eligibility consequences, and avoids the federal aggravated-felony classification for immigration purposes. The reduction question is decided early in the case based on the strength of the aggravator evidence and the defense investigation. Cases where defense counsel develops the manner-of-use record on the deadly-weapon prong (or the medical record on the SBI prong) within the first 90 days produce reduction offers significantly more often than cases where the defense waits for the State to lead.