What is criminal mischief under PC § 28.03?
Texas Penal Code § 28.03 defines criminal mischief as intentionally or knowingly damaging, destroying, tampering with, or marking the tangible property of another without effective consent. The grade is set by dollar value of damage — Class C misdemeanor up to 1st-degree felony — with statutory enhancements for livestock fences and critical-infrastructure facilities.
- Class C misdemeanor — damage less than $100
- The lowest grade under § 28.03(b)(1) — punishable by a fine up to $500 and no jail time. Typical fact patterns include minor graffiti, broken windows, small dents to vehicles, scratched paint, and similar low-dollar damage. Although graded as a Class C, the offense is criminal and creates a record. Class C criminal-mischief cases are tried in justice or municipal court (depending on jurisdiction) and frequently resolve through restitution and deferred dispositions where statutory eligibility exists.
- Class B / Class A misdemeanor — $100 to under $2,500
- Section 28.03(b)(2) supplies the Class B grade for damage of $100 or more but less than $750 — up to 180 days in county jail and a fine up to $2,000. Section 28.03(b)(3) supplies the Class A grade for damage of $750 or more but less than $2,500 — up to one year in county jail and a fine up to $4,000. The dollar threshold determines the grade, and the State must prove the threshold beyond a reasonable doubt. Misdemeanor criminal-mischief cases are tried in county courts at law (Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant counties have dedicated misdemeanor benches).
- State-jail and 3rd-degree felony — $2,500 to under $150,000
- Section 28.03(b)(4) supplies the state-jail-felony grade for damage of $2,500 or more but less than $30,000 — 180 days to 2 years in a state jail facility plus a fine up to $10,000. Section 28.03(b)(5) supplies the 3rd-degree-felony grade for damage of $30,000 or more but less than $150,000 — 2 to 10 years in TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000. The state-jail tier is procedurally important because Article 12A.101 deferred adjudication and probation eligibility differ from higher felony grades, and state-jail-felony offenses are often candidates for "12.44(a)" or "12.44(b)" treatment as misdemeanors at the trial court's discretion.
- 2nd-degree and 1st-degree felony — $150,000 and above
- Section 28.03(b)(6) supplies the 2nd-degree-felony grade for damage of $150,000 or more but less than $300,000 — 2 to 20 years in TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000. Section 28.03(b)(7) supplies the 1st-degree-felony grade for damage of $300,000 or more — 5 to 99 years or life in TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000. These high-grade cases arise most commonly in commercial-property arson-adjacent fact patterns, large-scale vandalism of construction sites, or aggregated multi-incident damage prosecuted as a single offense under § 28.03(e). Restitution typically exceeds insurance recovery, which complicates plea-negotiation posture.
The structural simplicity of § 28.03 — three short acts (damages, tampers, marks), one common consent requirement, one mental state — disguises the analytical depth of the case. Nearly every contested criminal-mischief trial turns on one of three elements: lack of effective consent of the owner, the actor's mental state, or the pecuniary loss figure. Each is independently contestable, and each gives the defense room to argue for a reduction in grade, a § 28.04 reckless-damage alternative, or an outright acquittal.
The value-tier grading system is shared with several other Texas property offenses (theft under § 31.03, fraud under chapter 32, criminal mischief here under § 28.03), and the consistency in tier breakpoints reflects a deliberate legislative choice in the 1993-1994 Penal Code revisions. The breakpoint structure means that a defense focused on driving the proven dollar figure below a tier boundary — from $30,000 to $29,999, from $2,500 to $2,499, from $750 to $749 — can move the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor or from a higher-grade felony to a lower-grade felony. This is one of the most consequential defense strategies in any value-based property prosecution and applies with full force to § 28.03 criminal-mischief cases.
Elements and the intentional/knowing mens-rea requirement
The State must prove (1) no effective consent, (2) damage, destruction, or tampering with tangible property, and (3) intentional or knowing mental state. Recklessness falls under § 28.04 — a Class C misdemeanor with no jail exposure regardless of dollar value.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in McGee v. State, 681 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), set the foundational damage-element framework — the State must prove actual physical damage to tangible property, not merely a diminution in value or aesthetic alteration. Tampering under § 28.03(a)(2) requires both the tampering act and proof of pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to the owner or a third person. Marking under § 28.03(a)(3) — graffiti and similar inscriptions — has its own evidentiary track, and Magana v. State, 230 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007), confirmed that graffiti can be charged under either § 28.03 criminal mischief or § 28.08 graffiti depending on the facts. (Section 28.08 is a separate, dedicated graffiti statute with its own grading scheme; the prosecution's charging choice between the two statutes is reviewable but not commonly disturbed.)
The effective-consent element is a frequent battleground. Section 1.07(a)(19) of the Penal Code defines "effective consent" to include consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner, with specified exceptions for consent induced by force, threat, fraud, or given by a person known not to be legally authorized. The defense routinely investigates whether the defendant had express or implied authority to alter, move, or damage the property — co-tenant authority, employer-employee authority, prior-relationship authority, abandoned-property authority. A genuine consent dispute can move a case from prosecution to no-bill or to early dismissal; a manufactured consent defense rarely survives cross-examination.
The intentional or knowing mental state is the third independent battleground. Section 6.03(a) defines intentional as having the conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result; § 6.03(b) defines knowing as being aware of the nature of one's conduct or that one's conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Both higher mental states require subjective appreciation. Where the defense can show the damage was accidental, inadvertent, or the result of mistake — the defendant did not intend or know damage would result — the case falls outside § 28.03 entirely. The fallback is § 28.04 reckless damage or destruction, a Class C misdemeanor regardless of the value of damage caused. Lockett v. State, 874 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994), is the workhorse decision on accidental-damage and mens-rea sufficiency.
The mental-state distinction has dramatic exposure implications. A $50,000 commercial-property damage case prosecuted as § 28.03 is a 3rd-degree felony with 2-10 years exposure. The same $50,000 damage case re-characterized as § 28.04 reckless damage is a Class C misdemeanor — fine only, no jail. That difference makes the mens-rea investigation one of the most important pre-trial tasks in any contested criminal-mischief case.
Value determination — McGee, Day, Sowders
Pecuniary loss under § 28.06 is measured at the time and place of damage. For destruction, fair market value or replacement cost; for damage, cost of repair within a reasonable time. The owner's opinion of value is admissible — but the State must still meet the dollar threshold beyond a reasonable doubt.
Texas Penal Code § 28.06 supplies the pecuniary-loss measurement rules for any criminal-mischief prosecution. Under § 28.06(a)(1), where the property is destroyed, the amount of pecuniary loss is the fair market value of the property at the time and place of destruction. Where fair market value cannot reasonably be ascertained, § 28.06(a)(2) permits the State to prove the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the destruction. Under § 28.06(b), where the property is damaged rather than destroyed, the amount of pecuniary loss is the cost of repairing or restoring the damaged property within a reasonable time after the damage occurred. The "reasonable time" qualification is the practical defense leverage — repair estimates obtained well after the damage, in inflated markets, or using premium materials, can be challenged as exceeding what § 28.06(b) actually authorizes.
Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), is the foundational valuation-timing decision: pecuniary loss is measured at the time and place of the damage, not at the time of trial. This locks the date for value determination and excludes post-damage market shifts, inflation, or hindsight valuation. Sowders v. State, 693 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), permits replacement value where fair market value cannot reasonably be ascertained but does not authorize replacement as a fallback simply because it produces a higher figure. The State must show that fair market value was actually unascertainable before replacement value is admissible. McGee v. State, 681 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), confirmed that the damage element requires actual physical damage to tangible property — a precondition before any value-determination analysis becomes relevant.
The owner-opinion valuation rule is the State's most flexible evidentiary tool. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 701 and the long line of Texas owner-opinion decisions, the property owner is generally permitted to testify to the value of his or her own property without qualification as an expert. The owner does not have to be a professional appraiser, dealer, or industry insider — ordinary ownership is itself a qualifying basis for opinion testimony. The defense response is cross-examination directed at the basis for the opinion: was the owner familiar with the market for the type of property? Was the owner comparing the damaged item to genuinely comparable replacements? Was the owner considering depreciation? A well-developed cross can produce admissions that significantly reduce the proven value figure.
Defense-retained valuation experts add a layer of contrary evidence. In commercial-property cases, a licensed property appraiser can produce a competing valuation; in vehicle cases, a NADA or Kelly Blue Book valuation can rebut owner opinion. Insurance settlement values, when available through discovery, are admissible to challenge the State's damage figure and have produced significant value reductions in contested cases. The defense should be careful — a too-low valuation can backfire by suggesting the defense concedes the damage occurred but is haggling over price. The strongest valuation defense is one that establishes the actual cost of restoring the property within a reasonable time and excludes any inflated, premium, or speculative figures the State has introduced.
Aggregation under § 28.03(e) — the consolidation of multiple acts pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct into a single offense based on the aggregate value — is itself a contested area. Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), and the body of theft-aggregation case law it draws on, govern when separate acts may be combined and when they must be charged separately. The defense routinely challenges aggregation where the State has combined unrelated incidents, incidents separated in time, or incidents involving different victims or different properties — disaggregation can move the case from a single felony prosecution to a series of misdemeanor counts, each of which is independently defensible.
Critical infrastructure and livestock-fence enhancements
Two statutory enhancements layer on top of the value tier. Section 28.03(b)(3) jumps livestock-fence damage to a state-jail felony regardless of value; § 28.03(b)(4)(B) jumps critical-infrastructure damage to a 2nd-degree felony, including solar and wind farms after HB 2273.
Section 28.03(b)(3) creates a livestock-fence enhancement: damage or destruction of a fence containing cattle, horses, sheep, goats, or hogs is a state-jail felony (180 days to 2 years in state jail plus a fine up to $10,000) regardless of the dollar value of the damage to the fence itself. A $200 fence repair that would otherwise grade as a Class B misdemeanor is elevated to a state-jail felony — a several-thousand-percent increase in exposure — solely because the fence was containing the enumerated livestock at the time of the damage. Rural-county prosecutors apply the enhancement aggressively, and the case law confirms that the enhancement applies even where the actor did not know or intend that livestock were contained behind the fence. The defense focus is on whether the damaged structure qualifies as a "fence" within the meaning of the statute, whether livestock were actually present, and whether the defendant's conduct was knowing or intentional with respect to the damage itself (as opposed to the livestock-containing function).
Section 28.03(b)(4)(B) creates the critical-infrastructure-facility enhancement. The 2017 legislation that added this provision was responsive to protest-related and trespass-adjacent conduct at Texas energy infrastructure — petroleum and alumina refineries, electrical power generating facilities and substations, water intake structures, natural gas compressor stations, liquid natural gas terminals, telecommunications central offices, ports, trucking terminals, railroad facilities, and dams. HB 2273 expanded the definition to include renewable-energy facilities — solar generation facilities and wind farms — alongside the traditional fossil-fuel and grid-infrastructure categories. The enhancement elevates the offense to a 2nd-degree felony (2-20 years and a fine up to $10,000) regardless of the dollar value of damage caused.
The critical-infrastructure enhancement has produced a meaningful uptick in 2nd-degree felony filings since 2017, particularly in cases involving protest activity at pipeline construction sites, energy-facility access points, and renewable-energy installations. The defense strategy in these cases proceeds along several fronts: first, whether the property damaged is actually within the statutory "critical infrastructure facility" definition — the boundary lines around eligible facilities are sometimes ambiguous, and a perimeter fence damaged outside the facility footprint may not qualify; second, whether the defendant's conduct met the intentional or knowing mens-rea requirement with respect to the damage itself (as opposed to mere trespass or proximity); third, whether the underlying conduct is otherwise protected speech or assembly activity to which the criminal statute may be applied only consistent with the First Amendment and the Texas Constitution's free-expression provisions.
In aggregated multi-incident or multi-defendant cases at energy infrastructure, the State frequently pairs § 28.03(b)(4)(B) charges with conspiracy, terroristic-threat, or organized-criminal-activity allegations. The defense response addresses each charge independently and challenges aggregation where the State has improperly combined separate incidents or separate actors' conduct. Restitution exposure in these cases regularly exceeds the underlying repair cost, and pretrial plea negotiation typically involves both the criminal exposure and the parallel civil restitution and insurance posture.
Core defense strategies
Core defenses to a § 28.03 charge include value-determination challenges, mens-rea attacks driving the case to § 28.04 recklessness, effective-consent defenses, aggregation challenges, identification disputes, restitution-driven plea reductions, and Fourth Amendment suppression of admissions to property owners.
Value-determination attacks are the single most consequential defense tool because every grade boundary is a dollar threshold. A defense focused on driving the proven value figure below a tier boundary — from $30,000 to $29,999, from $2,500 to $2,499, from $750 to $749 — can move the offense from a 3rd-degree felony to a state-jail felony, from a state-jail felony to a Class A misdemeanor, from a Class A to a Class B. The State must prove the threshold beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense valuation experts, insurance documentation, NADA/KBB valuations for vehicles, professional repair estimates that exclude inflated or speculative components — all are part of the value-determination toolbox. Owner-opinion testimony is admissible but is also cross-examinable, and a well-prepared cross can produce admissions that significantly reduce the proven figure.
Mens-rea attacks aim to move the case from § 28.03 (intentional or knowing) to § 28.04 (reckless), or to defeat the mens-rea element entirely with an accidental-damage theory. Where the defense can establish that the damage resulted from inadvertence, mistake, or merely careless conduct — driving over a curb that struck a sprinkler head, breaking a window during a fall, dropping equipment on a vehicle — the case falls outside § 28.03's intentional/knowing scope. The fallback prosecution under § 28.04 is a Class C misdemeanor regardless of value, eliminating jail exposure entirely. Lockett v. State, 874 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994), addresses the accidental-damage and mens-rea sufficiency issues in detail.
Effective-consent defenses arise where the defendant had express or implied authority to alter, move, or damage the property. Co-tenant authority, employer-employee authority, prior-relationship authority, abandoned-property authority, repair authority — each can support a consent defense if the factual basis exists. The investigation tracks down the source of authority, the scope of the authority, the relationship between the parties, and the existence of any prior course of dealing. A genuine consent dispute can move a case from prosecution to no-bill or to dismissal at preliminary stages. A manufactured consent defense rarely survives cross-examination, and counsel screens these claims carefully before raising them.
Identification challenges are central to nearly all graffiti and night-time vandalism cases. Where the State relies on circumstantial evidence — surveillance footage of partial views, witness identification at distance or under poor lighting conditions, handwriting or signature-style "tagging" comparisons — the defense develops the contrary record. Expert testimony on identification reliability, surveillance-footage analysis, and (in graffiti cases) tag-comparison limitations can defeat the State's identification case. The Fourth Amendment also operates here — searches of the defendant's home, vehicle, or electronic devices for graffiti-related materials must rest on a warrant supported by probable cause, and suppression motions can eliminate the most damaging State evidence.
Aggregation challenges under § 28.03(e) attack the State's consolidation of multiple acts into a single high-grade offense. Where the State has combined unrelated incidents, incidents separated in time, or incidents involving different victims or different properties, disaggregation can move the case from a felony to a series of misdemeanors, each of which is independently defensible and which may resolve through restitution and deferred dispositions. Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), and the body of theft-aggregation case law it draws on supply the analytical framework. The "one scheme or continuing course of conduct" requirement is the contested element — gaps in time, changes in target or method, and the absence of a unifying plan all tend to defeat aggregation.
Restitution-driven plea reductions are a recurring resolution pathway in misdemeanor-grade and lower-felony criminal-mischief cases. Where the defendant can promptly pay restitution to the property owner, prosecutors will often accept a plea to a lower-grade offense, a deferred-adjudication arrangement, or a pretrial-diversion outcome — particularly in cases involving young defendants, first-time offenders, and damage to private property where the owner is willing to accept restitution as a substitute for criminal prosecution. The defense develops the restitution case early — accurate damage figures, proof of the defendant's ability to pay, victim-impact mitigation work, and a structured offer that the prosecutor can present credibly to the supervisor and the victim.
Penalty and restitution dynamics
The grade range runs from a Class C fine-only misdemeanor to a 1st-degree felony with 5-99 years exposure. Restitution under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.037 is a separate condition of any sentence — and is often the practical lever in pre-trial plea negotiation.
The § 28.03 grade ladder produces a punishment range from a Class C misdemeanor (fine only, up to $500, no jail) at the bottom to a 1st-degree felony (5-99 years or life in TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000) at the top. Community supervision and deferred adjudication are generally available subject to the defendant's record and the assessed punishment under Code Criminal Procedure ch. 42A. For state-jail-felony grades, the trial court has discretion under § 12.44(a) and (b) to treat the offense as a Class A misdemeanor for punishment purposes — a discretion the defense actively pursues in appropriate cases.
Restitution under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.037 is a separate component of any criminal-mischief sentence and is often the practical lever in pre-trial plea negotiation. The court may order the defendant to pay restitution to the victim for damages or losses incurred as a result of the offense; the restitution figure may exceed, equal, or fall below the value figure used for grade-determination depending on what damages the victim can document. In commercial-property cases, restitution often becomes the centerpiece of the resolution — prosecutors and victims are frequently willing to accept reduced criminal exposure in exchange for full and prompt restitution payment. The defense develops the restitution case as part of the plea-negotiation posture and integrates it with any parallel civil-side liability exposure.
Insurance interaction creates a recurring complication. Where the victim has been made whole by insurance, the restitution analysis shifts — the insurer becomes the practical claimant by subrogation, and the negotiation moves from victim-defendant to insurer-defendant. Defense counsel screens for insurance recovery early and develops the resolution accordingly. In some cases, the insurance settlement establishes a lower documented loss figure than the original repair estimate, and that settlement figure can be used to argue for a reduced grade as well as a reduced restitution obligation.
Deadly-weapon findings do not generally appear on a § 28.03 judgment because criminal mischief is a property offense without a personal-injury element. However, where the State has alleged that the defendant used a vehicle, firearm, or other weapon during the commission of the criminal mischief in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, an affirmative finding may be entered. The defense routinely challenges deadly-weapon allegations in § 28.03 cases where the fact basis is contested.
Probation eligibility for a § 28.03 conviction extends through the felony grades unless the offense is enhanced beyond the ordinary tier (a deadly-weapon finding, prior felony enhancements, etc.). Judge-ordered probation is generally available in state-jail and 3rd-degree felony cases; jury-recommended probation requires no prior felony and a sentence of 10 years or less. Deferred adjudication is available on a plea of guilty or no-contest where the defendant meets eligibility under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.101. For misdemeanor-grade cases, occupational and personal probation is broadly available, and pretrial diversion is sometimes offered in jurisdictions with active diversion programs.
Local DFW practice — graffiti, road rage, ex-relationship damage
In Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties, criminal-mischief filings cluster in four typical fact patterns: graffiti and night vandalism, road-rage damage, ex-relationship property damage, and renewable-energy infrastructure cases. Each pattern has its own evidentiary and resolution profile.
Graffiti and night-vandalism cases dominate the misdemeanor-grade § 28.03 caseload in DFW counties. The State's case typically rests on surveillance footage, neighborhood-witness identification, and (in tag-style graffiti cases) handwriting or style comparisons to prior known incidents. Defense investigations focus on the reliability of the identification evidence, alibi witnesses, and the boundary between § 28.03 criminal mischief and § 28.08 graffiti — the prosecution's charging choice between these two statutes affects available penalties and procedural options. Local jurisdictions with active graffiti-abatement programs (Frisco, Plano, McKinney, Dallas) frequently route Class B and Class A graffiti cases through pretrial diversion or restitution-based dispositions where the defendant has no prior record.
Road-rage damage cases — keying a vehicle, smashing a windshield, denting a panel during an altercation — are a steady source of § 28.03 misdemeanor and lower-felony filings. The fact patterns frequently include 911 calls and contemporaneous video from one or both parties' phones, dashcam recordings, and parking-lot or roadway surveillance. The mens-rea attack is harder in road-rage cases because the State frequently has direct evidence of an intentional act, but the value-determination contest is fully available — defense valuation experts and NADA/KBB documentation can move a borderline case from Class A misdemeanor to Class B or below. Restitution-based resolutions are routine where the defendant has no prior history and can promptly compensate the vehicle owner.
Ex-relationship property damage — damage to property belonging to a former spouse, partner, or co-resident — creates the most complex strategic environment. The State frequently pairs the § 28.03 charge with family-violence-related allegations (assault, terroristic threat, criminal trespass), and the consent and authority elements are sharply contested. Was the property jointly owned at the time of the damage? Was the defendant a co-tenant with implicit consent to alter the residence? Did the damage occur during an active separation or after a court-ordered exclusion? The defense investigates each element and integrates the § 28.03 defense with the broader family-violence and property-division posture. Pretrial protective orders frequently affect the available resolution pathways, and counsel coordinates with any parallel family-law representation.
Renewable-energy and pipeline-infrastructure cases under § 28.03(b)(4)(B) are a newer DFW practice area following the 2017 legislation and HB 2273 expansion. North Texas wind farm and solar installation footprints in West Texas (where many DFW-based defendants are arrested for travel-to-protest activity) have produced 2nd-degree felony filings against defendants whose underlying conduct would otherwise have been state-jail-felony or misdemeanor in grade. The defense strategy combines traditional criminal-mischief defenses (value determination, mens-rea attacks, identification challenges) with constitutional protections for expressive and assembly activity and with statutory interpretation challenges to the boundaries of the "critical infrastructure facility" definition.
Construction-site and commercial-property damage cases — vandalism at active construction sites, damage to commercial fixtures, multi-incident damage to a single property — frequently reach the state-jail and 3rd-degree felony tiers because of the dollar exposure. The aggregation analysis under § 28.03(e) is central in these cases, and disaggregation can move the case from a single felony prosecution to a series of misdemeanors. The defense also coordinates with the property owner's civil counsel where parallel civil restitution and insurance posture is in play, and that coordination frequently produces a resolution that satisfies both the criminal exposure and the civil-side recovery.
When to retain counsel
Retain experienced criminal-defense counsel before the first interview, before consenting to any property-owner restitution discussion, and before any statement to law enforcement. Early counsel produces the strongest value-determination posture, the cleanest mens-rea record, and the highest-leverage resolution.
The first interaction with a criminal-mischief investigation often involves either a police officer's on-scene questioning or a property owner's direct contact with the defendant. Both are high-risk encounters. Statements to law enforcement are routinely admissible as party admissions; statements to property owners are admissible as well, and even apologetic or restitution-offering statements have been used against defendants at trial as acknowledgments of guilt. The Fourth Amendment governs searches; the Fifth Amendment governs custodial interrogation. The defendant's safest posture in any contact is to invoke the right to counsel and refuse further substantive discussion until counsel arrives.
Retention of experienced counsel before the first interview produces several immediate benefits. Counsel can communicate directly with the investigating officer or prosecutor, negotiate the scope of any voluntary cooperation, and preserve the defendant's fundamental constitutional protections. Counsel can also engage immediately with the property owner — in misdemeanor and lower-felony cases, a structured restitution offer presented through counsel often resolves the case before formal charges are filed. The early-counsel posture also locks in the mens-rea record — counsel screens for and develops any accidental-damage, mistake-of-fact, or consent-based defense before law enforcement narratives harden.
Value-determination work begins in the first 30 days of representation. Independent valuation experts, NADA/KBB documentation, insurance settlement information, and professional repair estimates are all developed early. The State's value-determination posture frequently relies on the property owner's opinion testimony — a robust defense valuation file gives counsel leverage in plea negotiations and creates trial-ready evidence for grade-determination disputes. In felony-grade cases, the value-determination work is often dispositive of whether the case resolves at the state-jail tier, the 3rd-degree tier, or higher.
Aggregation analysis is best performed early as well. Where the State is investigating multiple potentially related incidents, the defense must assess whether aggregation is statutorily proper and whether disaggregation arguments are available. Documentary discovery of the timing, locations, methods, and target characteristics of each alleged incident provides the disaggregation predicate. The earlier this analysis is performed, the more likely the State can be persuaded to file separately graded charges rather than a single aggregated high-grade prosecution.
L and L Law Group represents criminal-mischief defendants throughout Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties — from misdemeanor graffiti cases through 2nd-degree felony critical-infrastructure prosecutions. Co-founding partners Reggie London (Bar No. 24043514) and Njeri London (Bar No. 24043266) handle the full range of property-offense work, with attention to the value-determination, mens-rea, consent, and aggregation issues that drive the offense grade and the achievable resolution. Initial consultations are conducted in person at the Frisco office, by phone, or via secure video conference, and counsel engages with prosecutors immediately upon retention.
