The burglary statutory framework and grade tiers
Texas Penal Code § 30.02 grades burglary by the structure entered and the intent at entry. Habitation burglary is a 2nd-degree felony at minimum and a 1st-degree felony when the intent is any felony other than theft. Building burglary is a state-jail felony; coin-machine burglary is a Class A misdemeanor.
- Burglary of habitation with intent to commit theft — § 30.02(c)(1)
- A 2nd-degree felony under § 12.33: 2 to 20 years in TDCJ plus an optional fine up to $10,000. This is the "default" habitation burglary — the State proves entry of a habitation without effective consent with intent to commit theft. Community supervision is generally available because this tier is NOT enumerated as a 3g aggravated offense (the 3g designation reaches only § 30.02(c)(2)). Parole eligibility runs under Government Code § 508.145(f) — the lesser of one-quarter the sentence or 15 calendar years with good-conduct credit applied.
- Burglary of habitation with intent to commit any felony OTHER than theft — § 30.02(c)(2)
- A 1st-degree felony under § 12.32: 5 to 99 years or life in TDCJ plus an optional fine up to $10,000. The elevating fact is the intended felony — sexual assault, aggravated assault, kidnapping, murder, robbery, or any other felony that is NOT theft triggers § 30.02(c)(2). The designation is also a 3g aggravated offense under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b)(4) — restricting probation and lengthening parole eligibility under § 508.145(d) to the lesser of one-half the sentence or 30 calendar years actual time, with no good-conduct credit.
- Burglary of a building (not a habitation) — § 30.02(d)(1)
- A state-jail felony under § 12.35: 180 days to 2 years in state jail plus a fine up to $10,000. The structural difference is the definition under § 30.01 — a "building" is any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use, but is NOT adapted for overnight accommodation. Storage units, retail stores, offices, and warehouses are paradigmatic "buildings." The state-jail-felony floor materially reduces exposure compared with habitation burglary — a difference frequently dispositive on plea negotiation.
- Burglary of a coin-operated or coin-collection machine — § 30.02(d)(2)
- A Class A misdemeanor under § 12.21: up to 1 year in county jail and a fine up to $4,000. Vending machines, parking meters, pay telephones, and similar dispensing machines fall in this tier. The misdemeanor classification is significantly more favorable than even the state-jail-felony tier for building burglary; charging-document precision on what was entered (the machine itself, versus a building containing the machine) is a recurring battleground.
The grade hierarchy in § 30.02 is among the steepest in the Texas Penal Code. The same actus reus — entry without consent — produces punishment ranges that span from a Class A misdemeanor (1 year max) to a 1st-degree felony (99 years or life), depending entirely on what was entered and what the defendant intended. The 200-fold exposure differential between the bottom tier and the top tier explains why every aspect of the charging analysis matters: was the structure a habitation, a building, or a coin-operated machine? Was the intended offense a felony other than theft, or only theft? Did the defendant enter, or remain concealed, or enter and commit? Each answer moves the case across grade tiers with profound consequences for the defendant's exposure and the available resolution pathways.
The State frequently overcharges in § 30.02 cases. Where the underlying facts genuinely involve theft from a habitation, the prosecution sometimes alleges intent to commit a felony other than theft — a second, weapons-related offense found inside, an additional drug or assault allegation — to elevate the charge to § 30.02(c)(2) and gain leverage on plea negotiation. The defense rebuts the elevation by showing that the intended felony was only theft (the additional offense was situational, not part of the entry intent) or by negotiating the elevated allegation away in exchange for a guilty plea on the underlying § 30.02(c)(1) charge. This negotiation move — eliminating the "felony other than theft" element — drops the case from a 1st-degree 3g aggravated offense to a 2nd-degree non-3g felony, materially restoring the probation pathway and accelerating parole eligibility.
Elements — entry , consent, and intent at the moment of entry
The State must prove entry of a habitation without effective consent and a specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the moment of entry. Intent formed after entry does not satisfy § 30.02(a)(1) — though § 30.02(a)(3) collapses the temporal element.
The § 30.02(a) statutory framework offers the State three alternative methods of proof, each with different temporal requirements for the intent element. Subsection (a)(1) — entry with intent — requires that the defendant entered the habitation with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the moment of entry. Subsection (a)(2) — remaining concealed — requires that the defendant remained concealed in the habitation with the same intent. Subsection (a)(3) — entry and commission — requires that the defendant entered the habitation and committed or attempted to commit a felony, theft, or assault, without requiring proof that the intent existed at the moment of entry. The State typically pleads alternative theories under all three subsections in the same indictment, leaving the jury to convict on any theory supported by the evidence.
"Entry" under § 30.02(b) means the intrusion of any part of the body or any physical object connected with the body — a single arm reaching through a window suffices, as does a tool inserted through a doorway. Devalle v. State, 626 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, no pet.), addresses the breadth of the entry concept and the related habitation question. The State need not prove that the defendant fully entered the structure — partial entry, even momentary, satisfies the actus reus. This breadth produces frequent disputes about videos showing brief intrusions, tool insertions during attempted entries, and the application of § 30.02 to "tailgating" or piggyback entries at gated communities and apartment complexes.
"Without effective consent" under § 1.07(a)(19) means the State must negate consent — an essential element, not an affirmative defense. The defense routinely develops apparent-authority and consent-scope evidence: the defendant was a houseguest, was a former resident with continuing key access, had been invited but allegedly exceeded the invitation's scope, or had implicit consent based on past pattern of access. Stowe v. State, 745 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), held that the State's proof must establish lack of effective consent at the moment of entry — consent revoked after entry does not retroactively render an earlier entry unauthorized for § 30.02(a)(1) purposes.
The intent-at-entry element under § 30.02(a)(1) is the most heavily-litigated mens-rea question in Texas burglary practice. Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence (defendants seldom announce their criminal purpose at the threshold); the State relies on circumstantial inferences from forced-entry evidence (broken windows, pried locks), tools carried (crowbars, screwdrivers, lock picks), time of entry (3 a.m. entries support inference of unlawful purpose), the defendant's conduct inside (rifling drawers, taking valuables), the defendant's flight upon detection, and any post-arrest statements. Lopez v. State, 884 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref'd), affirmed circumstantial intent on facts including forced entry, the absence of any innocent purpose explanation, and the defendant's flight. The defense develops counter-narratives: the defendant entered to find a friend, to retrieve property believed to be his, to seek shelter, or under any other innocent purpose that negates the burglary mens rea.
"Habitation" under § 30.01(1) — adapted for overnight accommodation, including appurtenant structures
Penal Code § 30.01(1) defines habitation broadly — any structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation, including appurtenant garages, sheds, and connected outbuildings. The definitional fight frequently determines whether the case is a 2nd-degree felony habitation or a state-jail-felony building.
The grade boundary between 2nd-degree felony habitation burglary and state-jail-felony building burglary turns on the definitional question — was the structure entered a "habitation" or merely a "building"? Penal Code § 30.01(1) defines habitation as "a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons" and expressly includes (A) "each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle" and (B) "each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle." Apartments, single-family homes, hotel rooms, mobile homes, and RVs adapted for overnight use are paradigmatic habitations. The contested zone is everything else — detached garages, sheds, barns, guest houses, storage rooms attached to a residence, RVs not currently in use for overnight stay, and similar structures.
Aguirre v. State, 22 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), is the foundational decision extending "habitation" to include attached and detached garages and similar appurtenant structures. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statutory phrase "each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure" sweeps in physically separated outbuildings on the same residential parcel — sheds, detached garages, workshops, and even certain barns where they form part of the residential premises. The decision substantially broadened the practical reach of habitation burglary, moving many cases that under earlier law would have been building burglaries into the more severely-penalized habitation tier.
Black v. State, 183 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd), refined the appurtenant-structure analysis. The Houston court held that an outbuilding need not be physically connected to the main residence to qualify as "appurtenant" — functional and locational appurtenance suffice. A detached garage 30 feet behind the home, used regularly by the residents, is appurtenant. A wholly separate commercial structure on the same lot, even if owned by the same person, may not be. The fact-bound nature of the appurtenance question opens significant defense leverage in cases involving outbuildings, particularly older properties with multiple structures and rural parcels with barns and equipment buildings on the same deed.
The "adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons" prong is the second definitional battleground. A structure unfit for overnight use — no beds, no climate control, no plumbing, no electricity — is not a habitation regardless of nominal classification. Conversely, a vehicle (an RV, a camper, a converted bus) that is adapted for overnight use IS a habitation even though it is mobile. The "adapted" language is forward-looking — actual current use for overnight accommodation is not strictly required if the structure or vehicle was adapted for such use. Devalle v. State, 626 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, no pet.), addresses early habitation-definition analysis. The defense routinely challenges the adaptation evidence in cases involving older outbuildings, garages without sleeping facilities, and abandoned structures that the State seeks to charge as habitation burglary based on past residential use.
The § 30.02(c)(2) elevation — felony other than theft and 3g status
The 1st-degree felony elevation under § 30.02(c)(2) requires intent at entry to commit any felony other than theft. The elevated charge is also a 3g aggravated offense — restricting probation, lengthening parole eligibility, and changing the entire negotiation posture.
Texas Penal Code § 30.02(c)(2) provides that habitation burglary is a 1st-degree felony if the defendant entered the habitation with intent to commit a felony other than felony theft. The intended felony does not need to have been completed — the intent at the moment of entry suffices. Sexual assault, aggravated assault, kidnapping, murder, aggravated robbery, certain drug offenses, certain firearms offenses, and any other felony aside from theft all qualify. The proof typically focuses on circumstantial evidence of the intended offense — the defendant's weapons (a firearm or knife suggests aggravated-assault or robbery intent), prior statements (a threatening text message to the resident), the defendant's relationship with the resident (an estranged spouse suggests domestic-violence-related intent), and the defendant's conduct upon entry (immediately attacking the resident rather than searching for valuables).
The 3g aggravated-offense designation under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b)(4) attaches to § 30.02(c)(2) but not to § 30.02(c)(1). The designation produces three immediate consequences. First, judge-ordered community supervision is not available — the trial court cannot place the defendant on probation as part of an initial sentence. Second, jury-recommended community supervision requires both no prior felony conviction and an assessed sentence of 10 years or less; even where eligible, the jury must affirmatively recommend probation and the defendant must satisfy the conditions. Third, parole eligibility under Government Code § 508.145(d) is restricted to the lesser of one-half the sentence or 30 calendar years actual time, with no good-conduct credit applied to the eligibility calculation. A 50-year sentence on a § 30.02(c)(2) conviction does not reach parole consideration until 25 years actual time — compared with roughly 12.5 years on a non-3g § 30.02(c)(1) conviction of the same nominal length.
The negotiation leverage produced by the § 30.02(c)(1)-versus-§ 30.02(c)(2) distinction is enormous. A defendant facing a 1st-degree 3g aggravated offense (5-99 or life, no probation, half-time parole) has fundamentally different exposure than the same defendant facing a 2nd-degree non-3g felony (2-20, probation available, quarter-time parole). Plea negotiations regularly involve "negotiating away" the felony-other-than-theft element — the State agrees to charge under § 30.02(c)(1) only, in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea on the underlying habitation burglary. The exchange is sometimes formalized as a reduction during pretrial; sometimes the State simply elects to abandon the (c)(2) theory at jury selection. Either way, defense counsel's preparation to contest the felony-other-than-theft theory at trial is what creates the leverage to obtain the reduction.
Stowe v. State, 745 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), and Lopez v. State, 884 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref'd), are the workhorse decisions on proof of the elevating felony intent. The State carries the burden of proving the specific non-theft felony intent at the moment of entry — not merely that some non-theft offense occurred during the burglary. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), governs the sufficiency-of-evidence framework that applies on appellate review. Defense strategy concentrates on disrupting the circumstantial chain that the State uses to prove specific elevated intent — alternative-purpose evidence, contextual explanations for the weapons or statements, and rebuttal of the inference that the defendant intended any felony beyond the underlying theft.
Defense strategies — negating intent, contesting habitation, and Hall/Royster step-downs
Burglary defense in Texas focuses on negating intent at the moment of entry, asserting effective consent or apparent authority, challenging the habitation classification, identification challenges via DNA and print analysis, Fourth Amendment suppression, and charge reduction from § 30.02(c)(2) to § 30.02(c)(1).
Intent-at-entry rebuttal is the foundational defense move in any § 30.02(a)(1) prosecution. The State must prove that the defendant intended to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the precise moment of entry. The defense develops the alternative-purpose narrative — the defendant entered to find a friend, to retrieve his own property, to seek shelter, to use a bathroom, to confront the resident about a non-criminal dispute, or under any other innocent purpose. Where intent was formed only after entry — for example, where the defendant entered for an innocent purpose and then opportunistically took an item upon seeing it — the § 30.02(a)(1) theory fails, though the State can still pursue § 30.02(a)(3) (enters and commits). A successful intent-at-entry defense on the (a)(1) theory limits the State to the (a)(3) theory and, more importantly, often opens the door to reduction or plea on the underlying theft offense alone.
Effective-consent and lawful-presence defenses target the second essential element. A defendant who was lawfully on the premises with apparent authority — a houseguest, a current or former roommate, an employee with key access, a tenant who has not been formally evicted, a former partner with continuing access — generally has a complete defense to burglary, even if the eventual conduct inside was criminal. The "without effective consent" requirement is an element the State must affirmatively negate; the defense need not prove consent existed, only that the State has not proved its absence beyond a reasonable doubt. Houseguest-overstayed cases, intimate-partner separation cases, and roommate-departure cases regularly turn on the consent analysis.
Habitation-classification challenges target the grade tier directly. Where the structure entered was an outbuilding, a detached garage with no sleeping accommodations, a shed, or other appurtenant structure of questionable habitation status, the defense pushes for a building-burglary instruction under § 30.02(d)(1) instead of a habitation-burglary instruction. The reduction from a 2nd-degree felony (2-20) to a state-jail felony (180 days to 2 years) is among the largest single-element grade swings in the Texas Penal Code. Aguirre and Black set the appurtenant-structure framework, but each case is fact-bound and the defense develops the no-adaptation, no-functional-residential-use evidence as the case requires.
Identification defenses are the third major axis. Burglary is frequently a "no eyewitness" offense — the resident discovers the burglary after the fact and never sees the perpetrator. The State relies on circumstantial identification evidence: DNA from skin cells or sweat, fingerprints inside or on point-of-entry surfaces, video surveillance, mobile-device GPS data placing the defendant in the vicinity, vehicle ownership and location records, and witness statements about who was seen in the area. Defense counsel develops alternative-perpetrator evidence (other suspects with motive or opportunity), challenges the chain-of-custody on biological evidence, contests the reliability of latent-print and DNA matching where the underlying technique is contested, and attacks the time-window evidence (placing the defendant in the area before or after — but not during — the offense).
Fourth Amendment suppression is the fourth axis. Burglary investigations frequently involve warrantless searches of the suspect's home, vehicle, or person; consent-based searches of doubtful voluntariness; cell-phone search incident to arrest issues under Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); and Article 38.23 challenges to evidence obtained in violation of Texas law. A successful suppression motion that excludes the stolen property recovered from the defendant's home, the GPS data from his cell phone, or the inculpatory statements he made to police can collapse the State's identification or possession theory entirely.
The Hall/Royster lesser-included framework offers the fifth defense axis — pursuing a lesser-included instruction on Penal Code § 31.03 theft. Where the State indicts on § 30.02 habitation burglary, the defense can develop record evidence supporting a finding that the defendant did not have intent to commit theft at the moment of entry (defeating § 30.02(a)(1)) and did not actually commit or attempt theft inside (defeating § 30.02(a)(3)) — pushing the jury to a straight theft conviction on whatever underlying property crime is supported by the evidence. Even if the entry-without-consent element is established, conviction on theft alone (rather than burglary) may carry exposure as low as Class B misdemeanor (180 days, $2,000) if the value taken is under $750, or no exposure at all if the State cannot meet the theft elements.
The sixth axis is charge reduction from § 30.02(c)(2) to § 30.02(c)(1) on the elevation question. The defense develops the alternative-purpose narrative for the entry — the defendant intended only to commit theft, not the alleged other felony — and negotiates the elimination of the (c)(2) charge in exchange for guilty plea on the (c)(1) charge. The negotiation move shifts the case from a 1st-degree 3g aggravated offense to a 2nd-degree non-3g felony, restoring the probation pathway and accelerating parole eligibility. This is among the most consequential negotiation outcomes available in any habitation-burglary prosecution.
Penalty range and collateral consequences — parole, probation, immigration, and beyond
Habitation burglary under § 30.02(c)(1) carries 2-20 years; the (c)(2) elevation triggers 5-99 or life plus 3g aggravated-offense status. Collateral consequences include parole-eligibility restrictions, probation limits, immigration removal exposure, firearm-rights loss, and registration in certain elevated-intent cases.
Sentencing exposure under § 30.02(c)(1) is the 2nd-degree felony range under § 12.33 — 2 to 20 years in TDCJ plus an optional fine up to $10,000. Community supervision is generally available because § 30.02(c)(1) is not enumerated as a 3g aggravated offense under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054. Judge-ordered probation is available, jury-recommended probation requires no prior felony and an assessed sentence of 10 years or less, and deferred adjudication is available under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.101. Parole eligibility runs under Government Code § 508.145(f) — the lesser of one-quarter the sentence or 15 calendar years, with good-conduct credit applied. A 20-year sentence reaches parole consideration in roughly 5 years actual time with good-conduct credit.
Sentencing exposure under § 30.02(c)(2) is the 1st-degree felony range under § 12.32 — 5 to 99 years or life plus a fine up to $10,000. The 3g aggravated-offense designation under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b)(4) restricts community supervision (judge-ordered probation unavailable; jury-recommended probation requires no prior felony and a sentence of 10 years or less). Parole eligibility runs under Government Code § 508.145(d) — the lesser of one-half the sentence or 30 calendar years actual time, with NO good-conduct credit applied. A 50-year sentence on § 30.02(c)(2) does not reach parole consideration until 25 years actual time, versus roughly 12.5 years on a non-3g sentence of the same length.
Immigration collateral consequences are severe. Burglary of habitation is generally treated as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and may also be classified as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes — particularly where the intended offense is a crime of violence or where the sentence exceeds one year. Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), defense counsel must advise non-citizen clients of the deportation consequences of a § 30.02 plea. For lawful permanent residents, a burglary-of-habitation conviction frequently triggers removal proceedings; for non-LPR non-citizens, the conviction can preclude relief from removal and bar adjustment of status. Specialty defense work in cases involving non-citizen defendants frequently involves negotiation toward non-CIMT, non-aggravated-felony alternative dispositions where the underlying facts permit.
Firearms-rights consequences attach to any felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A § 30.02(c)(1) or (c)(2) conviction permanently disqualifies the defendant from firearm possession under federal law unless a presidential pardon or other federal restoration mechanism intervenes. Texas state-law firearms restrictions under Penal Code § 46.04 follow the federal framework. Civic-rights consequences include loss of voting rights during the term of confinement and supervision, jury-service disqualification, and disqualification from certain professional licenses (medical, legal, education, financial-services, and others).
Where the § 30.02(c)(2) elevation involves intent to commit a sex offense — sexual assault, indecency with a child, or related conduct — the defendant's registration obligations under Code Crim. Proc. ch. 62 may attach based on the predicate offense intent. The collateral consequences in those cases extend well beyond ordinary § 30.02 exposure to include residency restrictions, employment restrictions, public registration, and substantial lifetime restrictions on activities involving minors. The defense in these cases routinely seeks to negotiate away the sex-offense intent element specifically to prevent the registration trigger, even where the underlying habitation-burglary conviction is otherwise unavoidable.
Local DFW practice — Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant Counties
Burglary cases in the DFW criminal-district courts of Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant Counties follow predictable procedural patterns — fast-track grand jury, contested bond hearings, intensive discovery on identification evidence, and structured plea-negotiation timelines.
Collin County criminal-district courts in McKinney handle habitation-burglary indictments through the regular felony grand jury cycle, with grand jury presentment typically within 60-90 days of arrest. The District Attorney's office maintains a property-crimes division that handles § 30.02 prosecutions; plea-negotiation posture in Collin County tends toward firmer terms on residential burglary than on commercial property crimes, reflecting county-level prosecutor priorities. Bond amounts on first-time habitation burglary defendants typically run $25,000-$75,000; bond on § 30.02(c)(2) charges runs significantly higher and frequently includes conditions like GPS monitoring, no-contact orders, and curfew restrictions.
Dallas County criminal-district courts in downtown Dallas process the highest volume of burglary cases in the DFW area, with a corresponding range of plea-negotiation outcomes. The Dallas County District Attorney's office operates specialized property-crimes units and frequently uses pretrial diversion programs for first-time, non-violent burglary defendants where the underlying facts support reduced charging. Specialty courts, including the Mental Health Court Program, the Veterans Treatment Court, and various drug-court diversion programs, accept burglary defendants in appropriate circumstances and produce non-conviction outcomes in cases the State might otherwise prosecute aggressively.
Denton County criminal-district courts in Denton handle a mixed urban/suburban/rural caseload that produces variable plea-negotiation patterns depending on the underlying facts. Bond amounts in Denton County tend slightly lower than in Collin County for comparable habitation-burglary facts; the Denton County DA maintains active relationships with defense counsel and engages substantively in pretrial negotiation. Trial settings typically occur within 12-18 months of indictment, with substantial pretrial motion practice on Fourth Amendment, identification, and intent-at-entry questions.
Tarrant County criminal-district courts in Fort Worth represent the largest volume in the DFW area after Dallas, with a District Attorney's office that has traditionally been firm on residential burglary plea positions. Bond patterns and trial timelines mirror Dallas County in many respects. The geographic spread of Tarrant County — encompassing both urban Fort Worth and a substantial suburban perimeter — means that § 30.02 prosecutions arise from a wide variety of fact patterns, and defense counsel must tailor strategy to the specific division and county-court setting where the case is pending.
When to retain counsel — pre-arrest investigation through post-conviction
Retain experienced felony defense counsel as soon as a burglary investigation surfaces — ideally before formal arrest. Pre-arrest representation preserves Fifth Amendment rights, secures alibi and scene evidence, and shapes the charging decision before grand jury presentment.
Pre-arrest representation in a burglary investigation is among the highest-leverage moments in any § 30.02 case. Where law enforcement has identified a suspect but has not yet executed an arrest warrant — for example, where DNA or print evidence is being analyzed, where surveillance video has been collected but not yet analyzed, or where a witness identification is pending — retained counsel can advise the client to invoke Fifth Amendment protections, decline interviews, and avoid the post-Miranda statement that frequently provides the most damaging evidence at trial. Pre-arrest counsel also preserves alibi evidence, contacts potential witnesses before memories fade, and secures point-of-entry photography and physical evidence before scene cleanup destroys it.
Post-arrest, pre-indictment representation is the second high-leverage window. The grand jury typically meets within 60-90 days of arrest; counsel's engagement with the prosecutor during this period can sometimes produce no-bill outcomes (where the grand jury declines to indict) or strategic charging adjustments before indictment is filed. Counsel's submission of evidence to the prosecutor — alibi witnesses, expert reports, exculpatory statements — and presentation of the defense's view of the evidence can sometimes shift the charging decision from § 30.02(c)(2) to § 30.02(c)(1), or from felony burglary to misdemeanor theft, where the underlying facts support reduction.
Post-indictment representation is the standard engagement window and follows the predictable procedural arc — Article 39.14 discovery, motion practice on Fourth Amendment and identification questions, expert development, plea negotiation, trial preparation, and trial. The 12-24 month timeline from arrest to disposition produces multiple decision points where counsel's strategic positioning materially affects the outcome. Coordination with forensic experts, private investigators, and mitigation specialists must begin early — the punishment-phase mitigation record on a 2nd- or 1st-degree felony conviction is built throughout the representation, not assembled at the last minute.
Appellate and post-conviction representation completes the engagement scope where a conviction occurs. Direct appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26 must be perfected within 30 days of judgment; motions for new trial under Rule 21 must be filed within 30 days. Habeas relief under Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is available for collateral attack on convictions where ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression of exculpatory evidence, or other constitutional violations are identified. Many post-conviction § 30.02 cases involve Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), challenges based on undisclosed identification evidence or witness statements; some involve Padilla v. Kentucky ineffectiveness claims related to immigration-consequence advice. Engagement of post-conviction counsel within the appellate window preserves the maximum range of available remedies.
