What is public lewdness under PC § 21.07?
Texas Penal Code § 21.07 defines public lewdness as knowingly engaging in one of four enumerated sexual acts in a public place, or being reckless about whether an offended observer is present if not in a public place. It is a Class A misdemeanor — up to 1 year county jail and a $4,000 fine — without sex-offender registration consequences.
- Knowingly — § 6.03(b)
- A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. The "knowingly" mens rea applies to the enumerated act element — the State must prove the defendant was aware he was engaging in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse. Casual or inadvertent touching is therefore outside the statute. Murray v. State, 804 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref'd), addresses the knowing element in similar sex-offense contexts.
- One of four enumerated acts — § 21.07(a)
- The actus reus requires that the defendant engage in one of four statutorily enumerated acts: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual intercourse; (3) deviate sexual intercourse with an animal or fowl; or (4) sexual contact. The definitions in § 21.01 supply the operative content — sexual contact requires touching of the anus, breast, or genitals of another with intent to arouse or gratify; sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse have the meanings supplied in § 21.01(1) and (3). Conduct outside these four categories — exposure without contact, masturbation without contact with another, etc. — falls under § 21.08 indecent exposure or § 42.01(a)(10) disorderly conduct rather than § 21.07.
- Public place OR reckless about offended observer — § 21.07(a)(1)-(4)
- The location/observer element supplies the second axis of the offense. Either (A) the act occurs in a "public place" as defined by § 1.07(40), or (B) if not in a public place, the actor is reckless about whether another person who would be offended or alarmed by his act is present. Both alternatives are independent grounds for liability. The "public place" inquiry is the more common battleground — what counts as a public place under Eichelberger and State v. Edmond is regularly contested in motions and at trial. The reckless-observer inquiry imports § 6.03(c) recklessness — subjective awareness of and conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
- Penalty under § 12.21 — Class A misdemeanor range
- Conviction carries a punishment range of confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year and a fine not to exceed $4,000. Community supervision (probation) and deferred adjudication are both available. The offense is NOT enumerated under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054 as a 3g aggravated offense, and a conviction does NOT trigger sex-offender registration under Code Crim. Proc. ch. 62. Despite the lack of registration consequence, the misdemeanor conviction produces real collateral fallout — employment background checks, professional-licensing reviews, immigration impact for non-citizens, and reputational damage particularly in education, healthcare, military, and government-clearance contexts.
The structural simplicity of § 21.07 — one mens rea, four possible acts, two alternative location/observer theories — masks the analytical depth of most contested prosecutions. The State frequently overcharges on one of two axes: (1) treating a marginal location as a "public place" when the § 1.07(40) accessibility standard is not actually met, or (2) reaching for the reckless-presence-of-others theory when the asserted observer is implausible, fabricated, or themselves the complainant who entered private space without invitation. Each of these is a fact-bound jury question, and each gives the defense room to argue for acquittal, for plea reduction to § 21.08 indecent exposure (Class B) or § 42.01(a)(10) disorderly conduct (Class C), or for outright dismissal where the constitutional limits in Lawrence v. Texas apply.
A § 21.07 prosecution is not a sex-offender-registration case — but the misdemeanor label still produces consequences that demand careful representation. Educators face DPS background-check reporting and SBEC certification review; healthcare professionals face board reporting under Tex. Occ. Code; non-citizens face immigration consequences that vary by visa status and may include inadmissibility findings under INA § 212(a)(2)(A); government-cleared employees face adjudicative-action procedures; and any defendant faces years of background-check follow-on damage even where employment law would technically prohibit consideration of a 5-year-old misdemeanor. The case has to be fought on the merits, defended through plea or trial, and resolved with collateral-consequence analysis built into every strategic decision from the moment of retention.
The four enumerated acts under § 21.07(a)
Section 21.07(a) enumerates four sexual acts that satisfy the actus reus element: sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse with an animal or fowl, and sexual contact. Conduct outside these four categories — exposure without contact, masturbation alone — falls under § 21.08 indecent exposure or § 42.01 disorderly conduct.
The four enumerated acts under § 21.07(a) define the universe of conduct that the statute reaches. Subsection (a)(1) covers sexual intercourse as defined in § 21.01(3) — penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. Subsection (a)(2) covers deviate sexual intercourse as defined in § 21.01(1) — any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. Subsection (a)(3) covers deviate sexual intercourse with an animal or fowl — a category distinct from § 21.09 bestiality and historically separately graded. Subsection (a)(4) covers sexual contact as defined in § 21.01(2) — any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
The "intent to arouse or gratify" element built into the sexual-contact definition is the inferential battleground in most § 21.07(a)(4) prosecutions. The State proves the intent through circumstantial evidence — the location of the touching, the duration, the position of the parties, contemporaneous statements, post-conduct behavior, and any explanatory narrative the defendant offers in custody or at trial. McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), is the foundational decision on inferring sexual intent from circumstantial evidence in Texas sex-offense practice. The defense routinely develops alternative narratives — accidental contact, medical-care contact, supervisory or parental contact, athletic or training contact — that supply non-sexual explanations for the touching and undermine the State's intent inference.
Conduct outside the four enumerated acts is not § 21.07. Exposure of the genitals without contact with another person falls under § 21.08 indecent exposure (Class B) or § 42.01(a)(10) disorderly conduct (Class C) — not § 21.07 public lewdness. Masturbation in a public place where no contact with another person occurs is similarly outside § 21.07 — it reaches § 21.08 if the State proves intent to arouse or gratify and the actor was reckless about whether another would be offended, or § 42.01(a)(10) on the lesser disorderly-conduct theory. This distinction matters strategically because a § 21.07 indictment that should have been charged as § 21.08 or § 42.01 is vulnerable to a motion to quash, an evidentiary insufficiency challenge, or plea negotiation downward to the correct offense. The defense audits the indictment against the proven conduct at the earliest stage of the case.
The animal-or-fowl provision of § 21.07(a)(3) is structurally distinct and survives Lawrence v. Texas as a valid exercise of state police power. The State has a legitimate interest in regulating sexual conduct with animals — animal welfare, public morality, and disease control all supply traditional police-power justifications. Even after Lawrence, no Texas appellate court has invalidated § 21.07(a)(3), and any defense argument that the provision is unconstitutional must contend with the substantial police-power interest identified in pre- and post-Lawrence cases. § 21.09 bestiality, enacted later, supplies a separate prosecutorial vehicle for the same conduct and is graded as a state-jail felony — the two offenses can overlap, and prosecutors may choose between them depending on the facts.
The "public place" definition under § 1.07(40)
The "public place" definition under PC § 1.07(40) is the central contested element in most § 21.07 prosecutions. Accessibility to the public — not ownership — is the touchstone. Eichelberger v. State and State v. Edmond establish the workhorse interpretive framework.
Texas Penal Code § 1.07(40) defines "public place" as "any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops." The defining test is accessibility — does the public, or a substantial group of the public, actually have access to the location at the relevant time? Ownership is not dispositive; private property can be a public place if the public has access at the time of the conduct. Public ownership is not sufficient; a locked, restricted government facility may not be a public place even though the State owns it.
Eichelberger v. State, 525 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), is the workhorse case interpreting § 1.07(40) in the § 21.07 context. The court held that the determinative inquiry is whether the location was, at the time of the conduct, accessible to a substantial group of the public — not whether it was a "public" location in some abstract sense. State v. Edmond, 933 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), extended the framework to private property accessible to the public during business or visitation hours — a private apartment building with common areas accessible to residents and visitors qualified as a public place under the statute. Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.), addressed the "in public view" alternative theory — conduct visible from a public place, even if conducted in a private location, can satisfy the public-place element where the proof shows actual observation or genuine likelihood of observation.
Common contested locations in DFW practice include: parked cars in public parking lots (generally public unless the car itself supplies sufficient privacy — fact-bound); restrooms in commercial establishments (generally public if accessible to patrons, even if individual stalls supply some expectation of privacy); apartment-complex common areas (public under Edmond); parks and trails (public); private residences (not public unless accessible to a substantial group); locked private offices (not public); hotel rooms (not public to the general public; may be public as to housekeeping staff under certain theories); back patios visible from public sidewalk (the "in public view" alternative under Reece). The defense audits the location element at the earliest stage and develops fact testimony — photographs, diagrams, sight-line analysis, business-hours testimony — to challenge the State's characterization.
The "in public view" theory under Reece creates a fact-bound expansion of the public-place element. Conduct in an arguably private location — a fenced back yard, a parked car with tinted windows, an apartment with open curtains — can satisfy the public-place requirement if the conduct was visible from a public place. The State must prove either actual observation by a member of the public or genuine likelihood of observation, and the defense routinely contests both. Did the observer actually see what the State alleges, or is the testimony reconstructed and unreliable? Was the conduct genuinely visible from the public place, or was the angle, lighting, or distance such that visibility was implausible? These are sight-line questions that defense investigators and, in some cases, defense-retained visibility experts develop pretrial.
Constitutional limits — Lawrence v. Texas
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), struck down Texas's same-sex sodomy statute and established a constitutional limit on state regulation of private consensual sexual conduct between adults. The decision constrains § 21.07 prosecutions where the asserted "public place" theory reaches private consensual conduct.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), is the foundational constitutional decision on Texas sex-offense law. The United States Supreme Court struck down Texas Penal Code § 21.06 — the "Homosexual Conduct" statute prohibiting same-sex deviate sexual intercourse — as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy's opinion held that the State could not criminalize private consensual sexual conduct between adults; the liberty interest protected by substantive due process extended to "adults engaging in consensual sexual relations in the privacy of their home." The decision overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence did not directly invalidate § 21.07, which by its terms reaches conduct in a public place or conduct reckless about an offended observer — both squarely outside the private-consensual zone protected by the decision. But Lawrence supplies a constitutional ceiling on prosecutions that stretch the public-place or reckless-observer theory to reach what is in substance private consensual conduct. Defense motions to dismiss or for directed verdict regularly invoke Lawrence where the prosecution's theory of "public place" is strained — for example, a parked car in a remote area with no member of the public reasonably likely to observe, an arguably-private back yard with no genuine sight-line from a public location, or a hotel room where the asserted observer is a member of housekeeping staff entering uninvited.
Lawrence also informs the State's charging discretion. A prosecution that the State could win on the technicalities of § 1.07(40) but that fundamentally reaches private consensual conduct between adults invites constitutional challenge — and prosecutors with discretion routinely decline to bring those cases or accept reduction pleas to § 21.08 indecent exposure or § 42.01 disorderly conduct (or outright dismissal) when the constitutional posture is unfavorable. The defense's job is to develop the constitutional record from the first interaction with the prosecution — to articulate the private consensual character of the conduct, to identify the constitutional vulnerability of the State's theory, and to make clear that the case will be defended on Lawrence grounds if it goes to trial.
Post-Lawrence cases applying the framework in Texas remain limited but instructive. The Fifth Circuit and various state appellate courts have addressed the constitutional limits in the context of related sex-offense prosecutions, sex-offender registration challenges, and First Amendment expression cases. The defense should be familiar with the post-2003 case law in the relevant jurisdiction and prepared to invoke the framework in pretrial motion practice, evidentiary objections, jury argument, and appellate briefing where the case proceeds beyond plea. The Lawrence framework is not a get-out-of-jail-free card for any § 21.07 prosecution, but it is a meaningful constraint on prosecutorial overreach and a substantial defense lever in cases where the State has stretched the public-place or reckless-observer theory.
Defense strategies
Public-lewdness defense at the Class A misdemeanor level turns on negating the public-place element, negating the reckless-observer alternative, identification challenges, constitutional limits under Lawrence, sting-operation entrapment defenses, and mistake-of-fact about location.
Negating the public-place element is the most common and most successful defense in § 21.07 practice. The defense develops the facts of the location — photographs, diagrams, business-hours testimony, sight-line analysis, security-camera footage — to show that the location was not accessible to the public or a substantial group of the public at the time of the conduct. A locked private office after business hours, a private residential back yard with no public sight-line, a hotel room with no uninvited entry, a private car on private property — each of these supplies a basis for arguing that the § 1.07(40) accessibility standard was not met. The argument is fact-bound and benefits from detailed pretrial investigation. Where the State's public-place theory is genuinely weak, motions to quash or for directed verdict can dispose of the case before trial.
Negating the reckless-observer alternative is the parallel defense where the State proceeds on the "if not in a public place, reckless about presence of an offended observer" theory under § 21.07(a)(1)-(2). The State must prove subjective awareness of and conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk that an offended observer was present — not just the post-hoc fact that an observer happened to appear. The defense develops evidence about what the defendant actually knew at the time — testimony about expected privacy, evidence about how the observer came to be present (uninvited entry, surprise arrival, etc.), expert testimony where psychological or perceptual issues are present. Many "reckless observer" cases are weak on subjective awareness — the defendant genuinely believed he was alone, and the State's recklessness theory is overreach.
Identification challenges arise in restroom, park, and parking-lot cases where the State's witness is a non-victim observer who reports a sexual act and identifies a defendant who may or may not be the person involved. Eyewitness identification science — distance, lighting, duration of observation, suggestiveness of identification procedures — produces grounds for suppression motions under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and Texas authority addressing improper identification procedures. The defense routinely retains eyewitness-identification experts in contested identification cases and challenges showup procedures, photo arrays with biased construction, and any identification testimony where the underlying procedure was suggestive or unreliable.
Constitutional defense under Lawrence v. Texas applies where the State's prosecution stretches the public-place or reckless-observer theory to reach what is in substance private consensual adult conduct. The motion to dismiss invokes the substantive-due-process liberty interest identified in Lawrence and argues that the State cannot constitutionally criminalize the underlying conduct. Where the constitutional posture is favorable — a remote location, no actual observer, private consensual conduct between adults, no business-hours public access — the motion can produce dismissal or significant plea-bargain leverage. The argument is briefed pretrial and preserved for appellate review where the trial court denies relief.
Sting-operation entrapment defense applies in cases arising from undercover stings — typically restroom or park sting operations targeting alleged "cruising" behavior, online-meet stings that produce in-person encounters in public locations, or vice-related operations. The entrapment defense under Texas Penal Code § 8.06 requires that the defendant was induced to engage in the conduct by a law-enforcement agent using persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense — methods of persuasion that the defense develops through discovery of the operation's playbook, training materials, and the specific conduct of the undercover officer. The defense also challenges the public-place element of the sting context — was the location actually a public place during the operation, or did the law enforcement presence transform what would otherwise be a private encounter into one with a "public" component?
Mistake-of-fact about location supplies a defense under Texas Penal Code § 8.02 where the defendant reasonably believed the location was not a public place and was not visible from a public place. The defense develops evidence about what the defendant reasonably believed — security indicators, signage, business-hours expectations, prior occupancy patterns, the time of day, the apparent isolation of the location. A reasonable mistake of fact that negates the public-place or reckless-observer element is a complete defense to the charge. The mistake must be reasonable; a wildly implausible belief in privacy is not protected. The reasonableness question is fact-bound and ordinarily presented to the jury under a § 8.02 mistake-of-fact instruction.
Insufficient mens rea on the "knowingly engages" element supplies a defense where the conduct was accidental, inadvertent, or non-sexual in character. The defense argues that the underlying touching, contact, or proximity was not knowing sexual conduct — it was accidental brushing, medical examination, supervisory contact, parental contact, or athletic contact. McKenzie governs the inferential analysis. Where the underlying conduct is genuinely ambiguous on the intent-to-arouse element of sexual contact, the defense produces alternative narratives — medical records, parental-care testimony, athletic-training context — that supply non-sexual explanations and undermine the State's inference of sexual intent.
Penalty and collateral consequences
Section 21.07 is a Class A misdemeanor — up to 1 year county jail and a $4,000 fine — but does NOT trigger sex-offender registration. The collateral consequences are nonetheless real: employment, professional licensing, immigration, and reputational impact persist even after the criminal case ends.
Conviction of public lewdness under § 21.07 produces a Class A misdemeanor sentence under § 12.21 — up to one year in county jail and a fine not to exceed $4,000. Community supervision (probation) and deferred adjudication are both generally available. A deferred-adjudication outcome is particularly attractive for first-offense § 21.07 cases because successful completion produces no formal conviction on the defendant's record — though the record remains visible in subsequent background checks and the Texas Department of Public Safety database, and the underlying allegations remain reportable in many professional-licensing and immigration contexts.
Critically, § 21.07 is NOT enumerated as a reportable conviction or adjudication under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 62.001(5) — the sex-offender registration statute. A conviction under § 21.07 does NOT require the defendant to register as a sex offender. This is a substantial differentiator from § 21.11 indecency with a child, § 22.011 sexual assault, § 22.021 aggravated sexual assault, and most other Chapter 21 sex offenses, all of which trigger lifetime or extended-duration registration obligations. The non-registration consequence is a frequent point of confusion for defendants and even for some general-practice defense lawyers — the case must be defended with clear understanding that registration is off the table, both as a leverage point in plea negotiation and as a reassurance to a defendant making decisions about trial-versus-plea posture.
Despite the absence of registration, the collateral consequences of a § 21.07 conviction are real and material. Employment background checks routinely identify sex-related misdemeanors and produce adverse employment action — even where Texas labor law would technically protect older convictions. The defense should counsel the client about the visibility of the conviction in commercial background-check databases and the realistic expectations for employment-disclosure obligations going forward. Professional licensing boards — SBEC for educators, the Texas Medical Board for physicians, the Board of Nursing, the State Bar, military boards of inquiry, government clearance adjudication — all have separate disciplinary frameworks that may produce adverse action even after the criminal case is resolved.
Immigration consequences for non-citizens are jurisdiction- and visa-specific. A § 21.07 conviction is not categorically a "crime involving moral turpitude" under INA § 212(a)(2)(A), but the categorical-approach analysis under Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), and the underlying Board of Immigration Appeals case law produces case-by-case results. Some immigration courts have treated § 21.07 convictions as CIMTs based on the moral component of the public-decency interest; others have not. The defense should consult an immigration specialist before any plea, particularly for green-card holders, employment-visa holders, and asylum applicants, and should consider Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), advisory obligations as part of the representation. Padilla requires defense counsel to advise non-citizen clients of the immigration consequences of a plea, and the advice must be specific to the actual offense and the client's actual status.
Deferred adjudication and non-disclosure are the standard tools for mitigating collateral consequences. Deferred adjudication under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.101 produces no formal conviction on successful completion of the deferred period. Order of non-disclosure under Tex. Govt. Code § 411.072 — available for many misdemeanors including § 21.07 — restricts public access to the record after the waiting period and seals it from general background-check exposure (though law enforcement, professional licensing boards, and some other agencies retain access). The defense should plan for non-disclosure as part of any deferred-adjudication plea structure and counsel the client about timing, eligibility, and ongoing background-check residual risk even after the order issues.
Local DFW practice
Public-lewdness prosecutions in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties most commonly arise from park, restroom, and parking-lot arrests; undercover sting operations; and mistaken-identity scenarios. Local case-management practices vary by county court at law.
Public-lewdness prosecutions in the four-county DFW area — Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant — most commonly arise from three operational patterns. First, patrol-officer arrests in public parks, public restrooms, and parking lots where a member of the public or an undercover officer observes alleged sexual conduct. Second, undercover sting operations targeting alleged "cruising" behavior in known meet-up locations, including coordinated multi-officer operations with backup units making the arrest. Third, mistaken-identity scenarios where the complainant reports activity and identifies a defendant who may or may not have been the person actually involved.
Park, restroom, and parking-lot cases turn on the public-place element under Eichelberger and Edmond and on the credibility of the observer. Public parks are clearly public places — but the defense routinely contests whether the alleged conduct actually occurred where the observer claims and whether the observer's identification of the defendant is reliable. Public restrooms are clearly public places — but the privacy of individual stalls, the lighting, the angle of observation, and the credibility of the reporting observer all become contested issues. Public parking lots can be more contested — accessibility during business hours typically supplies the public-place element, but after-hours, gated, or restricted lots may not qualify.
Sting operations produce a distinctive defense posture. The defense develops the operation's playbook through discovery — what training materials guided the officers, what conversational scripts they used, what the operation's success metrics were, how many other arrests came out of the same operation. Entrapment under Tex. Penal Code § 8.06 is the principal defense, supported by the specific conduct of the undercover officer in the case. Was the officer the first to introduce sexual content into the conversation? Did the officer escalate or de-escalate in response to defendant signals? Were there repeated invitations after initial refusal? These are fact-development questions that drive both the entrapment defense and the broader credibility challenge.
Mistaken-identity scenarios produce identification-suppression motions and eyewitness-credibility challenges. The defense audits the identification procedure — was it a showup conducted within minutes of the alleged conduct, a photo array conducted hours or days later, or an in-court identification with no pretrial procedure at all? Each procedure has known reliability concerns under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and Texas authority on eyewitness-identification suppression. Where the procedure was suggestive — single-suspect showup with no fillers, biased photo array construction, in-court identification preceded by a non-blind procedure — the defense moves to suppress and, where successful, can eliminate the State's only identifying witness.
County-court-at-law practice in the DFW area varies meaningfully by jurisdiction. Collin County's county courts at law tend toward formal motion practice and contested-hearing schedules. Dallas County's misdemeanor courts have more compressed plea-bargaining patterns and a heavier reliance on early dismissal and pretrial-diversion options for first-offense § 21.07 cases. Denton County's county courts at law approach is similar to Collin but with somewhat shorter trial dockets. Tarrant County's misdemeanor courts have heavier dockets, more rapid plea-bargaining timing, and a higher reliance on deferred adjudication as the standard non-conviction outcome. The defense should be familiar with the practices of the specific county court at law where the case is pending and tailor strategy accordingly.
When to retain counsel
Retain counsel at the moment of arrest or summons — before the first court appearance, before any custodial interview, and before any statement to law enforcement. Early retention produces better discovery, better witness preservation, and a meaningfully different posture in plea negotiation.
The right time to retain counsel in a public-lewdness case is at the moment of arrest or summons — before the first court appearance, before any custodial interview, and before any statement to law enforcement. Early retention produces three substantial advantages. First, the defense can invoke the right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the earliest opportunity, preventing the kinds of statements that supply the State with confession evidence, intent-to-arouse evidence, or location-knowledge evidence that the prosecution then uses at trial. Second, the defense can preserve scene, sight-line, and witness evidence at a stage when memories are fresh, security cameras still have footage, and physical evidence remains available. Third, the defense can develop the case theory — public-place challenge, reckless-observer challenge, identification challenge, constitutional posture, sting-operation entrapment, mistake-of-fact, insufficient mens rea — at a stage when the strategy can shape every subsequent decision.
The wrong time to retain counsel is at the eve of trial — after custodial statements have been given, after plea offers have been declined without strategic basis, after witness memories have faded, and after physical and documentary evidence has been lost. Some defendants approach § 21.07 cases as "just a misdemeanor" and proceed pro se or with under-resourced representation; the consequences are often a conviction or deferred-adjudication plea that produces collateral fallout the defendant did not anticipate. The case is a Class A misdemeanor — not a felony — but the misdemeanor framework still demands serious defense work, particularly for clients whose employment, professional licensing, immigration status, or public reputation is meaningfully exposed by the prosecution.
L and L Law Group represents clients facing § 21.07 public lewdness charges across Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties. Co-founding partners Reggie London and Njeri London handle both the criminal-defense and collateral-consequence components of these cases — defending the criminal charge through plea or trial, structuring deferred adjudication and non-disclosure outcomes where appropriate, advising non-citizen clients on the immigration implications under Padilla, and coordinating with professional-licensing boards where the client's career is at risk. Free initial consultations are available; contact the firm at (972) 370-5060 or info@landllawgroup.com to schedule.
