Automatic sealing under § 58.253 — who qualifies without a petition
Family Code § 58.253 (added by SB 1304, 2017) requires automatic sealing of most juvenile records at age 19 — no petition, no hearing, no court fees. The Department of Public Safety and the juvenile court take affirmative steps to implement sealing. The catch: several statutory disqualifiers exclude many cases.
- Age trigger
- Section 58.253(a) is triggered when the former respondent turns 19. Before September 1, 2017, juvenile records were sealed only on application under former § 58.003; SB 1304 inverted that default — sealing now happens automatically unless a disqualifier applies. The age-19 trigger applies whether the case was adjudicated, dismissed, deferred, or resolved at intake under § 53.03 deferred prosecution. A misdemeanor case resolved more than two years after the petitioner's 17th birthday triggers earlier under § 58.253(a)(3).
- Conviction-free requirement
- The petitioner must not have a final adult felony conviction at the time of automatic sealing, and must not have a pending adult felony or misdemeanor charge (other than a Class C traffic offense). Cases pending in juvenile court at the time of the 19th birthday also defeat automatic sealing — the trigger waits until those cases resolve. A felony conviction that occurs after sealing does not reopen the juvenile record; the sealing once accomplished is permanent absent court order.
- Excluded offenses
- Section 58.253(b)(2) excludes from automatic sealing any case in which the petitioner was adjudicated for a violent or habitual felony under § 58.003(c) — a list that includes capital murder, murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated robbery, indecency with a child, and certain controlled-substance felonies. Sex offenses requiring registration under Code Crim. Proc. Chapter 62 are separately excluded. These excluded cases require certified record application under § 58.256 instead.
- DPS and court duty
- Section 58.253(c) places the implementation burden on the Department of Public Safety, which maintains the Texas Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system, and on the juvenile court of original jurisdiction. DPS must identify eligible records and execute sealing without action by the former respondent; the juvenile court must coordinate with school districts, juvenile probation, and other record-holders to ensure complete sealing. In practice, the system has implementation gaps — counsel often verifies that sealing actually occurred rather than assuming.
Senate Bill 1304 (2017) was the largest reform of Texas juvenile records law in two decades. The bill flipped the default — from "records remain visible unless the petitioner applies for sealing" to "records seal automatically unless excluded by the prosecution-history or excluded-offense filters." The driver was a Texas Sunset Advisory Commission finding that the application-based regime under former § 58.003 reached a small minority of eligible petitioners, because most people did not know they could apply, lacked counsel, or could not afford filing fees. Automatic sealing solved the awareness and access problem at one stroke.
But the reform did not eliminate the need for legal analysis. The exclusion list under § 58.253(b) is substantial — most juvenile adjudications involving violence, weapons, or sex offenses fall outside automatic sealing — and the prosecution-history exception (pending charges or adult convictions) catches petitioners with continued involvement in the criminal-legal system. For these cases, § 58.256 application-based sealing remains the operative pathway, and the strategic question for counsel is when and how to file the petition to maximize the chance of approval.
Verification matters. DPS and the courts implement § 58.253 through internal data-flagging systems that depend on accurate record-classification. Records misclassified as ineligible (or simply overlooked because the offense was charged at a different grade than the adjudication) may not seal automatically. Counsel handling adult cases that involve a prior juvenile history routinely audit DPS records to confirm that age-19 sealing actually occurred — and file a § 58.256 petition if it did not. The audit is particularly important for petitioners now in their early 20s whose age-19 trigger fell in the 2018–2022 implementation window when the new system was still being calibrated.
Petitioned sealing under § 58.256 — the certified-record process
Section 58.256 provides application-based sealing for cases that did not qualify under § 58.253. The petition is filed in the juvenile court of original jurisdiction, served on the prosecutor, and may be set for hearing. The court issues a sealing order if the statutory criteria are met.
The Section 58.256 petition is a written application filed in the juvenile court that had original jurisdiction over the case. The petition must include the petitioner's identifying information, the case file number(s) of every juvenile matter to be sealed, a statement of the offense(s) adjudicated, the disposition entered, and a statement that the petitioner satisfies the eligibility criteria under § 58.256(a) — typically that two years have passed since final disposition, the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor of moral turpitude during the waiting period, and the petitioner has no pending felony or misdemeanor charges. The two-year waiting period runs from the date of the last act under the disposition (release from TJJD, termination of probation, completion of community-service hours, full payment of restitution), not from the date of the underlying adjudication.
Notice to the State is required under § 58.256(c). The prosecuting attorney receives notice and may file a response objecting to sealing — typically on grounds that the petitioner has had subsequent involvement with law enforcement (even without conviction), that the waiting period has not run from the proper date, or that an excluded offense disqualifies the petition. The prosecutor's objection triggers a hearing under § 58.256(d). Without objection, many courts will sign a sealing order on the petition papers alone, particularly in counties with high petition volume and limited judicial resources.
The hearing under § 58.256(d) is non-jury and conducted by the juvenile court of original jurisdiction. The petitioner bears the burden of persuasion. Evidence typically includes the petitioner's rehabilitation record (employment history, education accomplishments, community involvement, family responsibility), any continuing professional or educational reasons the sealing is needed, and any specific incident reports or arrests during the waiting period (if any) that should be explained or contextualized. The court considers whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated within the meaning of § 58.256 and whether sealing would frustrate the public interest. In re J.W.W., 507 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016), addressed the equivalent factors under former § 58.003 and remains influential on the rehabilitation-and-public-interest analysis under § 58.256.
The court enters a written order under § 58.256(e). On denial, the petitioner may appeal under § 58.256(f); In re A.M., 333 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011), confirms the abuse-of-discretion review standard applied to sealing denials. On grant, the order is transmitted to DPS, the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile probation department, and any other agencies known to hold the record. Counsel follows through on transmission and verifies execution across DPS's Texas Computerized Criminal History, county juvenile-court records, school-district records (if the case originated from school-based conduct), and any federal database entries (NCIC entries for serious felony adjudications). The order itself is the trigger; implementation is the work product.
Section § 58.260 restricted access — protection without formal sealing
Senate Bill 1304 created a parallel framework at § 58.260 that limits agency access to juvenile records before formal sealing under § 58.253 or § 58.256. Records on the restricted access list are functionally protected from most disclosure while the petitioner moves toward formal sealing eligibility.
Section 58.260 is the often-overlooked third leg of the SB 1304 framework. It does not seal records — it restricts agency disclosure of records that are not yet eligible for formal sealing. The result is a middle ground: the records technically remain in the system and accessible to law enforcement, but most non-law-enforcement queries (employers, landlords, schools, most licensing boards) return either a "no record" response or a "record restricted" response that does not disclose the underlying matter. Functionally, a juvenile record on the restricted access list looks almost identical to a sealed record from the petitioner's perspective in most day-to-day disclosure contexts.
The framework also imposes destruction obligations on specific agencies. Section 58.260(d) requires school districts to destroy juvenile-justice-related records after a defined retention period — typically tied to the petitioner's 18th or 19th birthday. Section 58.260(e) imposes similar obligations on county juvenile boards and probation departments for records that no longer serve an active supervisory purpose. The destruction obligations are uneven in practice — small counties may comply faithfully, larger counties with more legacy paper records may have backlogs — but the statutory framework supports counsel's efforts to compel destruction where compliance has lagged.
The strategic implication of § 58.260: a petitioner who has not yet reached the § 58.253 trigger age (under 19) or the § 58.256 waiting-period completion (less than two years post-disposition) is still substantially protected from most disclosure-driven harms. The restricted access framework operates from the date of disposition forward, regardless of whether sealing eligibility has matured. Counsel advising a petitioner pre-sealing should explain the § 58.260 protection alongside the future sealing trigger — because most college applications, most job applications, and most landlord inquiries will not see the record even before formal sealing is in place.
There are still gaps. Federal law-enforcement databases (NCIC for serious offenses), federal background-check systems (FBI fingerprint checks for federal employment, security clearances, federal professional licensure), and certain professional licensing boards (medicine, nursing, law enforcement, education) retain access notwithstanding § 58.260. For petitioners pursuing careers in those fields, counsel must explain the distinction — § 58.260 protection is broad for ordinary employment and housing but does not cover the full federal-disclosure exposure. The same gaps exist after formal § 58.253 or § 58.256 sealing because § 58.255 retains the same enumerated-party access.
Who can still see sealed records (and who cannot)
Sealed juvenile records are not destroyed — they are inaccessible to most third parties but remain available to enumerated entities under § 58.255: law enforcement for criminal-justice purposes, the juvenile court, the prosecuting attorney for later sentencing, and certain licensing boards for specific inquiries.
Section 58.255 defines the universe of post-sealing access. Law enforcement agencies retain access for criminal-justice purposes — meaning investigation of new offenses, identification of suspects, intelligence-driven policing, and parole supervision. The juvenile court of original jurisdiction (and any successor juvenile court if the original is consolidated) retains access for subsequent juvenile-court proceedings — meaning a second juvenile referral on the same petitioner can take the prior adjudication into account at intake, adjudication, and disposition. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services retains access for CPS-related determinations involving the petitioner as a parent. Certain professional licensing boards (Texas Medical Board, State Bar of Texas, Texas Education Agency / SBEC, Texas Commission on Law Enforcement) retain access for fitness-to-license inquiries.
The prosecuting attorney retains access for sentencing in any later criminal case under § 58.255(b)(3). This is the most consequential exception for many petitioners. A juvenile adjudication for a felony-grade offense is admissible at adult sentencing under Penal Code § 12.42(f) — that is, it can enhance an adult sentence even though it never was a "conviction," and even though it has been sealed. Counsel handling an adult case with a prior sealed juvenile adjudication must address this exposure during plea negotiations and at sentencing; the State will know about the adjudication even when employers and the general public cannot.
Federal agencies operate outside § 58.255 entirely. The FBI's Interstate Identification Index (III) and the NCIC retain federal access to juvenile records that were entered into federal databases — typically for serious-felony adjudications, sex-offense adjudications, and adjudications involving interstate or federal-jurisdiction conduct. State sealing does not reach federal databases. For federal employment, security clearance applications, immigration matters, and federal professional licensure, the juvenile record remains visible to the federal decisionmaker. Counsel advising on careers in federal employment, military service, or federal licensing must be explicit that state sealing does not provide the full disclosure protection most petitioners assume.
Immigration consequences are nuanced. Under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000), a juvenile adjudication is generally not a "conviction" for Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) purposes, which is a strong defense for non-citizens with juvenile records. But the underlying conduct may still trigger immigration consequences through other pathways — admissions in immigration proceedings, federal database access under § 58.255 carve-outs, and the limited civil-determination exceptions in INA § 101(a)(48). Immigration counsel works in coordination with juvenile-defense counsel where the petitioner is not a U.S. citizen.
The civil-denial protection under § 58.258 is the petitioner's most powerful tool against the access exceptions. Even where § 58.255 grants access to an enumerated party, the petitioner is not legally obligated to disclose the sealed adjudication on most employment, school, and housing applications. Section 58.258 makes the denial truthful as a matter of law. The exceptions to denial are narrow — primarily applications for the same categories of licensing or employment where the enumerated party has access (e.g., a petitioner applying for a law-enforcement position must disclose; a petitioner applying for a sales-clerk position does not). Counsel walks petitioners through the denial rules carefully because the wrong answer to an employer inquiry can create perjury exposure that the sealing was supposed to prevent.
Defending the sealing petition — responses to State objections
Common State objections under § 58.256: petitioner had subsequent law-enforcement contact (without conviction); excluded offense at original adjudication; waiting period not run from proper date; rehabilitation evidence insufficient; agency notice missed. Each has a doctrinal response.
First, subsequent law-enforcement contact without conviction. The State sometimes objects because the petitioner has been arrested or investigated during the waiting period even though no charges resulted or charges were dismissed. The doctrinal response: § 58.256(a) requires the absence of a conviction during the waiting period, not the absence of any law-enforcement contact. Arrests without conviction, dismissed cases, no-billed grand-jury referrals, and Class C citations (with limited exceptions) do not disqualify the petition. Counsel documents the disposition of each post-disposition law-enforcement contact and presents the dispositions as evidence of clean status — frequently turning the State's objection into supporting evidence of rehabilitation under In re J.W.W., 507 S.W.3d 408.
Second, excluded-offense objections. The State sometimes objects because the adjudication was for an offense the State characterizes as excluded under § 58.253(b)(2) or § 58.256(a)(2). The doctrinal response: the exclusion lists are statutory, narrow, and specifically enumerated. Many offenses that prosecutors casually describe as "violent" or "serious" do not actually appear on the exclusion lists, and a literal-text comparison resolves the dispute. Where the adjudication was for a lesser-included offense after a higher charge was initially filed, the adjudicated offense (not the original charge) controls the exclusion analysis. Counsel files the indictment-equivalent, the adjudication order, and the disposition order to nail down exactly what was adjudicated.
Third, waiting-period objections. The State sometimes objects that the two-year waiting period under § 58.256(a) has not run because the petitioner is still under some form of continuing obligation — restitution payments, community-service hours, conditions of release. The doctrinal response: the waiting period runs from the date of the last act required under the disposition. Continuing obligations under the disposition (active probation supervision, pending restitution balance, uncompleted community service) suspend the waiting period; completed dispositions with only collateral consequences remaining (a juvenile-probation file kept open for administrative purposes after the supervision period ended) do not. Counsel documents the actual completion date with probation department records.
Fourth, rehabilitation-evidence sufficiency. The State sometimes objects that the petitioner's rehabilitation evidence is thin — limited employment history, no formal education completion, no community involvement. The doctrinal response: § 58.256 does not require any specific rehabilitation showing. The statute requires the absence of disqualifying conduct, not the affirmative presence of rehabilitation milestones. Where the State raises rehabilitation as a contested issue, the petitioner provides what is available — a regular job is sufficient, supportive family-member testimony is sufficient, sustained sobriety is sufficient. The court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard, and a moderate rehabilitation showing combined with absence of disqualifiers typically supports sealing.
Fifth, agency-notice issues. The State sometimes objects that notice was not properly served on a victim, on a prior probation supervisor, or on another stakeholder. The doctrinal response: § 58.256 specifies the notice requirements (prosecuting attorney, and certain victims for specific offense categories). Notice to other stakeholders is not required and the State cannot use voluntary additional notice as a procedural defect. Where statutory notice was given correctly, the court can proceed regardless of additional-stakeholder positions.
Sixth, multi-county complications. Where the petitioner has juvenile adjudications across multiple Texas counties, the sealing petition is filed in each county's juvenile court of original jurisdiction. Counsel coordinates filings, sometimes timing them to maximize the chance of approval (filing in a more favorable county first to build a track record). Section 58.256 does not authorize consolidation across counties, but practical coordination is essential — and a sealing order in one county supports the petition in another.
Common prosecution errors in sealing proceedings
The State's typical errors in juvenile sealing proceedings: misclassification of the adjudicated offense as excluded; overcounting waiting-period interruptions; conflation of arrest with conviction; reliance on stale information for objections; failure to acknowledge § 58.253 automatic sealing already in effect.
First, offense misclassification. Prosecutors sometimes object that an adjudication falls within the excluded-offense list under § 58.253(b)(2) or § 58.256(a)(2) when, on a literal reading, it does not. The lists are statutory and narrow — "aggravated assault" is included, ordinary "assault" is not; "indecency with a child" is included, simple "indecent exposure" is not; certain controlled-substance felonies are included by name, others are not. Defense counsel responds with a side-by-side comparison of the adjudication record and the exclusion list, and the dispute usually resolves on the papers. Where the prosecutor maintains the objection at hearing, the burden of demonstrating that the adjudication actually falls within the exclusion list is the State's.
Second, waiting-period overcount. Prosecutors sometimes calculate the § 58.256 two-year waiting period from the wrong date — from the date of adjudication rather than the date of final disposition, or treating continued administrative file-keeping after supervision ended as continuing disposition. The statute is clear: the waiting period runs from the date the disposition order's requirements were completed (last day of probation, payment of last restitution dollar, completion of last community-service hour). Counsel documents the completion date with probation-department records or the petitioner's payment receipts and resolves the objection with a paper trail.
Third, arrest-versus-conviction conflation. Prosecutors sometimes treat subsequent arrests during the waiting period as the equivalent of subsequent convictions, supporting an objection that the petitioner has not stayed clean. Section 58.256(a) requires the absence of conviction, not the absence of arrest. Arrests dismissed, no-billed, or resulting in acquittal do not disqualify the petition. Class C citations with limited exceptions also do not disqualify. Defense counsel pulls the disposition of each post-disposition contact and presents the clean-disposition pattern as supporting evidence rather than defending against the objection.
Fourth, stale-information reliance. Prosecutors with high caseloads sometimes rely on old DPS reports or old probation files that have not been updated to reflect favorable post-disposition events (dismissals, acquittals, completed deferrals, expunged adult cases). The defense response is to provide current DPS records and current court records contemporaneously with the sealing petition. Pulling fresh records is inexpensive and frequently resolves objections that would otherwise generate hearings.
Fifth, missing § 58.253 automatic sealing. Prosecutors sometimes oppose a § 58.256 application without realizing that the petitioner already qualifies for § 58.253 automatic sealing. The petitioner may have been incorrectly told by DPS or the courthouse clerk that an application was required, or the petitioner may have missed the automatic-sealing trigger because of an implementation gap. Defense counsel may either (a) drop the § 58.256 application and verify that § 58.253 automatic sealing has actually occurred, or (b) maintain both pathways in parallel — automatic sealing as the primary remedy and § 58.256 as the backup if automatic sealing did not execute. Either approach is procedurally sound; the choice depends on what the DPS record actually shows.
Sixth, expunction-and-sealing confusion. Prosecutors sometimes apply adult-expunction analysis under CCP Chapter 55 (or adult-non-disclosure analysis under Government Code § 411.072) to juvenile sealing petitions. The frameworks are different — juvenile sealing under Family Code Chapter 58 has different eligibility criteria, different waiting periods, different excluded-offense lists, and different legal-denial rules under § 58.258. Counsel highlights the regime difference in any briefing and at hearing; misapplied adult-framework analysis is reversible on appeal.
What to do if you have a juvenile record in Texas
Six-step path: (1) audit DPS for current record status; (2) verify whether § 58.253 automatic sealing has executed; (3) identify excluded offenses requiring § 58.256 application; (4) calculate waiting periods accurately; (5) gather rehabilitation documentation; (6) file petition or compel sealing execution.
First, audit the DPS record for current status. The Texas Department of Public Safety maintains the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) and the petitioner can request a personal record review under Government Code Chapter 411. The petitioner submits fingerprints and the appropriate request form; DPS returns the record within several weeks. The audit confirms what is actually showing in the state-level criminal-history system, identifies any juvenile records that are or should have been sealed, and surfaces implementation gaps where automatic sealing under § 58.253 did not execute. A clean DPS audit is the predicate to every other step.
Second, verify § 58.253 automatic sealing execution. For petitioners who reached age 19 after September 1, 2017, automatic sealing should have happened by operation of law. If the DPS audit shows juvenile records that meet the eligibility criteria but have not been sealed, counsel writes to DPS's record-management division to compel execution. The remedy is typically administrative — DPS reviews the record, confirms eligibility, and executes sealing — but if administrative remedy fails, counsel may file a mandamus action or, more commonly, file a § 58.256 application to obtain a court order that compels DPS to seal.
Third, identify excluded offenses. Where the DPS audit shows a juvenile record that does not appear to qualify for automatic sealing, counsel reviews the adjudication papers to determine whether the offense falls within an exclusion list. Many petitioners assume an offense is excluded based on the original charge rather than the adjudicated offense — and the adjudicated offense (which is often a lesser-included or differently-classified offense after plea negotiation) controls the exclusion analysis. The actual adjudication order is the operative document.
Fourth, calculate waiting periods. For § 58.256 application cases, the two-year waiting period runs from the date the disposition order was completed — typically the last day of probation, the last day of community service, or the date of final restitution payment, whichever came last. Counsel obtains certified documentation from the juvenile probation department and from any restitution-coordinating clerk's office to fix the completion date with paper support. The waiting-period calculation is the first thing the State will scrutinize at petition review.
Fifth, gather rehabilitation documentation. Even though § 58.256 does not formally require a rehabilitation showing, presenting one strengthens the petition and supports the petitioner at any contested hearing. Documentation includes employment letters or pay stubs covering the waiting period, education completion records (high school diploma, GED, college enrollment, college transcripts, vocational certificates), community-involvement records (volunteer hours, church involvement, mentoring programs), and treatment-completion records (drug or alcohol treatment, mental-health treatment, anger-management program). The packet should be 5–15 pages, organized chronologically, and provided to the court with the petition rather than reserved for hearing.
Sixth, file the petition or compel execution. For § 58.256 applications, counsel drafts the petition with full identifying information, case numbers, offense descriptions, dispositions, eligibility statement, and proposed order. The petition is filed in the juvenile court of original jurisdiction; the filing fee in DFW counties is typically $30–$75 (some counties charge per case if multiple adjudications are involved). Notice goes to the prosecuting attorney under § 58.256(c). Many courts will sign an uncontested petition on the papers without hearing; contested petitions are set for hearing in 30–90 days depending on docket. After grant, counsel follows through on transmission and verifies execution with a follow-up DPS audit at 3–6 months post-order.
Seventh, plan for federal disclosure exposure. State sealing does not reach federal databases. For petitioners pursuing federal employment, security clearance, federal professional licensure (FAA pilot, federal law enforcement, federal medical practice), or immigration relief, counsel explains the federal-disclosure gap and discusses what additional steps (if any) are available. There is no federal juvenile-sealing analog to Texas § 58.253; federal records are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 5038 with much narrower sealing options. Counsel coordinates with federal counsel where the petitioner has cross-jurisdictional needs.
DFW context and cost expectations for sealing petitions
DFW juvenile courts handle sealing petitions consistently in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant — most petitions resolve in 90–180 days; attorney fees run $2,500–$5,000 for single-county uncontested petitions, $5,000–$10,000+ for contested or multi-county matters.
Collin County handles sealing petitions through the Collin County Juvenile Probation Department in McKinney, with petitions filed in the juvenile court of original jurisdiction (typically the 199th or 416th District Court sitting as juvenile court). The Collin County District Attorney's juvenile division reviews petitions within 30–45 days of service and typically files written responses (concurrence or objection) rather than appearing only at hearing. Collin's automatic-sealing implementation under § 58.253 has been reasonably reliable; petitioners reaching age 19 after September 2017 typically find that their records have sealed without intervention. Where § 58.256 application is required, the average time from petition to written order is 60–120 days for uncontested matters.
Denton County operates the Denton County Juvenile Justice Center on Loop 288, with the 211th or 367th District Court acting as juvenile court for sealing-petition purposes. Denton's case volume is moderate and the docket moves predictably. The Denton County District Attorney's juvenile division reviews petitions thoroughly — a fact that makes preparation important on the front end but reduces the chance of surprise objections at hearing. Most Denton sealing petitions resolve within 90 days from filing.
Dallas County handles the highest volume of juvenile sealing petitions in DFW through the Henry Wade Juvenile Justice Center on Riverfront Boulevard. Dallas operates multiple juvenile courts and dedicated juvenile prosecutors. The volume produces a longer average resolution time — 120–180 days from filing to order in uncontested matters, longer if hearing is contested. The Dallas District Attorney's juvenile division has historically been objection-prone on certain offense categories (drug-felony adjudications, family-violence adjudications) and counsel comes prepared with full waiting-period documentation, rehabilitation packet, and offense-classification analysis.
Tarrant County operates the Lynn W. Ross Juvenile Justice Center in Fort Worth with the 323rd District Court acting as juvenile court. Tarrant's sealing-petition practice is mature and predictable; most uncontested petitions resolve within 60–90 days. The Tarrant County District Attorney's juvenile division is generally cooperative on sealing matters, particularly where the petitioner has clean post-disposition status and a meaningful rehabilitation showing. Hearing practice in Tarrant is efficient — judges typically grant orders from the bench rather than requiring written-order entry post-hearing.
Defense fees track case complexity. A straightforward single-county § 58.256 petition for one adjudication, uncontested by the State, runs $2,500–$3,500 flat. Adding a complex offense-classification analysis (excluded-offense dispute), a contested hearing, or rehabilitation-evidence development moves the range to $3,500–$5,000. A multi-county sealing project involving petitions in two or three Texas counties typically runs $5,000–$8,000 for the combined effort. Contested hearings with full briefing and live testimony run $5,000–$10,000+ depending on hearing length and post-hearing motion practice. Appeals of denied sealing petitions add $10,000–$20,000 on top of the trial-court work. Most firms quote flat fees in writing after a free consultation.
Timeline: counsel typically needs 2–4 weeks from engagement to file — time for the DPS audit, document collection, petitioner interview, and petition drafting. Filing-to-decision time runs 60–180 days depending on county and contestedness. Post-grant verification (DPS audit, county-record check, school-record check, federal-record check) runs another 60–120 days as counsel confirms execution across the various agency systems. Total elapsed time from engagement to verified sealing is typically 6–9 months in DFW counties — somewhat faster in Tarrant and Denton, somewhat slower in Dallas, comparable in Collin.
Collateral costs and follow-through. Filing fees in DFW juvenile courts run $30–$75 per case. DPS personal-record-review fees are $25 (currently). FBI personal-record-review fees (Identity History Summary Check) are $18 (currently). Restitution-balance certification from probation departments is typically free but requires written request. Some counties charge for certified copies of orders ($1–$5 per page) and counsel orders certified copies for the petitioner's files. The total out-of-pocket cost of court fees and record fees, separate from attorney work, typically runs $150–$400 for a single-county petition.
