Who is a juvenile in Texas? (Family Code § 51.02)
Texas Family Code § 51.02 defines a "child" as a person 10 through 16 years old at the time of the conduct. A 17-year-old is treated as an adult — a boundary unique to Texas and a small handful of states. Status offenses (CINS) cover narrower conduct.
- Age 10 to 16 for delinquent conduct
- Texas Family Code § 51.02(2)(A) sets the lower bound at age 10 — a child under 10 is conclusively presumed incapable of committing an offense and is outside juvenile-court jurisdiction entirely. The upper bound for "delinquent conduct" jurisdiction runs through age 16 (i.e., until the child's 17th birthday). A 17-year-old who commits the same act is prosecuted as an adult. This Texas-specific boundary has been criticized but remains current law and controls every threshold analysis.
- Delinquent conduct under § 51.03
- Defined at § 51.03(a)(1) as conduct that violates a penal law of the State of Texas or the United States, other than a fine-only Class C misdemeanor, and that is punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail. Subsection (a)(2) extends jurisdiction to conduct that violates a juvenile-court order; subsection (a)(3) covers certain enumerated status-adjacent offenses (DUI by a minor under Alcoholic Beverage Code § 106.041, criminal contempt of a magistrate's order).
- Conduct Indicating a Need for Supervision (CINS)
- Section 51.03(b) defines CINS — a narrower jurisdictional category covering truancy (no longer prosecuted criminally for school-age children after 2015 reforms), running away, fine-only Class C offenses other than traffic, inhalant abuse, expulsion from public school, and certain conduct on school property. CINS proceedings differ procedurally and result in less restrictive dispositions than delinquent-conduct adjudications.
- Time of conduct controls
- Jurisdiction is fixed by the child's age at the time of the alleged conduct, not at the time of arrest or referral. A 16-year-old arrested at age 18 for an act committed at 16 remains within juvenile jurisdiction (subject to a transfer analysis under § 54.02(j) for cases referred after age 18). Conversely, a child who turns 17 after the offense but before referral is still within juvenile jurisdiction. In re D.W.M., 562 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. 1978), confirms the age-at-conduct rule.
The two most common threshold disputes are (1) whether the child was under 10 at the time of conduct (defeating jurisdiction entirely) and (2) whether the conduct properly falls within § 51.03(a) delinquent conduct or only § 51.03(b) CINS. A misclassification by intake can produce a disposition far more restrictive than the conduct warrants. Defense counsel routinely audits the referral paperwork at first appearance, because re-classifying a referral from "delinquent conduct" to "CINS" can mean the difference between probation supervision and informal handling under § 53.03.
Family Code Title 3 is a self-contained code — it pulls in penal-code definitions for the underlying conduct but operates with its own rules on procedure, burden of proof, jury trials (available on demand under § 54.03(c)), and disposition. Counsel handling juvenile matters must be fluent in both bodies of law; treating a juvenile case as a "smaller version of adult criminal court" misses how aggressively the juvenile court can intervene under the rehabilitation rationale.
Juvenile-court procedure — detention, intake, and the four hearings
A Texas juvenile case moves through up to four distinct hearings — detention under § 54.01, transfer under § 54.02 (if certification is sought), adjudication under § 54.03, and disposition under § 54.04 — each with its own burden, evidentiary rules, and timeline.
Detention under Family Code § 54.01 happens within 48 hours of being taken into custody (excluding weekends and holidays). The court must find at least one of five statutory grounds (likely to abscond, no adequate supervision, no parental return, danger to self/others, prior delinquency record) before continued detention is authorized. Detention hearings repeat every 10 working days under § 54.01(h) — counsel's first defense move is usually to seek release at the initial detention hearing with a credible supervision plan from the parent or guardian.
Intake under § 53.01 is the gatekeeping step run by the probation department. Intake can resolve the matter informally under § 53.03 (deferred prosecution, supervisory caution, dismissal), can refer to the prosecutor for petition, or can refer to the court for adjudication. Roughly half of Texas referrals are resolved informally at intake — a major leverage point for defense counsel to engage early. A pre-petition negotiation can result in a deferred-prosecution agreement under § 53.03(c), which avoids any formal adjudication record if the child completes the agreement's conditions.
The adjudication hearing under § 54.03 is the equivalent of a criminal trial — the State must prove delinquent conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. The child is entitled to all adult constitutional protections that apply at trial: counsel, confrontation, compulsory process, privilege against self-incrimination, jury trial on demand. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), is the foundational due-process case — it ended the "informal" star-chamber juvenile system that operated before 1967 and put the modern procedural framework in place. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), set the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Disposition under § 54.04 follows adjudication and is a separate proceeding with its own evidentiary rules — the rules of evidence are relaxed under § 54.04(b), and the court considers a broad range of information including the child's social history, school records, family circumstances, psychological evaluations, and probation recommendations. The court must find that the child needs rehabilitation, or that the protection of the public or the child requires the disposition. Disposition options span in-home probation, residential treatment, TJJD commitment, and determinate-sentence commitment — each with cascading consequences.
Adjudication vs. conviction — the critical distinction
A juvenile is not "convicted" — they are "adjudicated delinquent." Family Code § 51.13 explicitly states the adjudication is not a conviction and does not impose civil disability. But the practical consequences (background checks, immigration, future enhancement) are real and require strategic handling.
Family Code § 51.13(a) is the controlling statement: "An order of adjudication or disposition in a proceeding under this title is not a conviction of crime, and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment." This is not cosmetic. The juvenile record sits in a separate confidentiality regime under Chapter 58, is not visible on most employment background checks once sealed under § 58.253 or § 58.256, and does not trigger the firearm disqualifications under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) that follow an adult felony conviction.
But "not a conviction" does not mean "no consequence." A juvenile adjudication for a felony-grade offense is admissible at sentencing in a later adult prosecution under Penal Code § 12.42(f) — that is, it can enhance a future adult sentence even though it was never a "conviction." For Texas firearm-prohibition purposes, a juvenile adjudication can trigger the same five-year purchase ban under Penal Code § 46.04(b) if the underlying conduct would have been a felony for an adult. Federal SORNA registration applies to juvenile sex-offense adjudications under specific tier criteria. And immigration consequences depend on the federal classification of the underlying conduct — a juvenile adjudication is generally not a "conviction" for INA purposes under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000), but the law is contested and case-specific counsel is essential.
The strategic implication: defense counsel does not "win" by accepting an adjudication and trusting that confidentiality will protect the client downstream. The right outcome — whenever possible — is a pre-petition deferred prosecution under § 53.03 that produces no adjudication at all, or a dismissal-pathway that avoids any formal finding. Where adjudication is inevitable, counsel works to minimize the offense level (CINS rather than delinquent conduct, lower-grade rather than higher-grade) because the offense level controls every downstream consequence — sealing eligibility, future-case enhancement, immigration risk.
A common parent question is whether the child will "have a record" after a juvenile case. The accurate answer: the child has a juvenile record from the moment of referral; that record is governed by Chapter 58 confidentiality (which is stronger than adult expunction) and is generally sealable at age 19 under § 58.253 if the conditions are met. The record exists; whether it remains visible is a question for the sealing analysis post-disposition. Parents who assume "it goes away because he's a minor" misread the framework — sealing requires the child to complete conditions and, in some cases, file an application under § 58.256.
Dispositional options under Family Code § 54.04
Dispositional options range from in-home probation under § 54.041 to TJJD commitment under § 54.04(d)(2) to determinate sentence commitment for up to 40 years under § 54.04(d)(3). The court must find rehabilitation or protection requires the chosen level.
In-home probation under § 54.041 is the most common disposition for first-time non-serious adjudications. The child lives with the parent or guardian and reports to a juvenile probation officer; conditions typically include school attendance, drug testing, counseling, restitution, community service, and curfew. Probation runs until age 18 unless terminated earlier by the court under § 54.05. The probation conditions are imposed at disposition and can be modified later — both directions, more restrictive or less, on a motion under § 54.05.
Residential placement — secure facility or non-secure residential treatment — is the next step up. The court can order placement at a county-operated facility, a contracted residential treatment center, or (for substance abuse) a treatment program. Placement requires findings under § 54.04(c) that the child cannot be adequately supervised in the home or that the home placement does not provide quality of care and support necessary to meet the child's needs. Counsel can challenge placement on either prong.
TJJD commitment under § 54.04(d)(2) is the most restrictive non-determinate disposition. The Texas Juvenile Justice Department operates secure facilities in Brownwood, Mart, Gainesville, and Giddings, plus parole-like minimum-length-of-stay programs. TJJD commitment is reserved for felony adjudications and requires findings that the child requires the level of supervision and security TJJD provides. The minimum length of stay varies by offense category — generally 9 to 24 months for non-violent felony adjudications, longer for violent felonies. TJJD release decisions are made by the agency, not by the court, after the minimum length of stay is met.
Determinate-sentence commitment under § 54.04(d)(3) is the highest-stakes juvenile disposition. The juvenile court (or, on jury demand, the jury) can impose a sentence up to 40 years for an enumerated first-degree felony under § 53.045, 20 years for second-degree, 10 years for third-degree, and up to 99 years for capital murder. The child serves the term at TJJD until age 19, at which point an Article 152 (transfer to adult prison) hearing decides between release on adult parole and transfer to TDCJ for the balance of the sentence. In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.), and the related case law govern the standards for the Article 152 hearing — and create another high-leverage moment for defense work even years after the original adjudication.
Restitution under § 54.041 can be ordered as a stand-alone disposition or as a condition of probation. The amount is set by the court based on victim documentation and the child's ability to pay. Parents and guardians can be ordered to make restitution under § 54.041(b) for losses caused by the child — a unique feature of juvenile law that does not exist in adult criminal practice. Anger management, counseling, substance-abuse treatment, sex-offender treatment, school attendance, drug testing, GPS monitoring, and curfew are all available as ancillary conditions and are routinely combined.
Defenses we evaluate first
Seven defense doctrines drive most juvenile work — age threshold, transfer challenges, juvenile-specific Miranda under § 51.095, suppression, identification, competency, and coerced statement. Each maps to a discrete statutory or constitutional anchor.
Age challenges under § 51.02 are the first thing counsel checks. A child under 10 at the time of conduct is outside juvenile jurisdiction entirely — the petition fails as a matter of law. A child 17 or older at the time of conduct is outside juvenile jurisdiction and the case belongs in adult court (not necessarily a defense win, but a jurisdictional reset). For cases right at the age boundary, birth-certificate evidence, school-record evidence, and immigration-record evidence all become relevant. In re J.M.S., 280 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. 2008), confirms that age is a jurisdictional fact the State must prove.
Transfer (certification) challenges under § 54.02 are the highest-stakes defense work in juvenile practice. The State must prove (1) the child was 14+ for a capital, first-degree, or aggravated controlled-substance felony, or 15+ for other felonies; (2) probable cause to believe the child committed the offense; and (3) on consideration of the § 54.02(f) factors (seriousness of offense, sophistication and maturity, record and previous history, prospects of public protection and rehabilitation through use of services available to the juvenile court), the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), set the sufficiency standard — the transfer order must contain specific findings supported by the evidence, not boilerplate. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), is the federal due-process foundation; In re D.C., 49 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied), addresses the sufficiency of transfer findings under Texas law. A psychological evaluation showing maturity deficits, treatment amenability, and family-system support is central to defeating certification — we engage the expert at first appearance, not at the certification hearing.
Juvenile-specific Miranda under § 51.095 is stronger than adult Miranda. A child's statement is admissible only if (1) taken in the presence of, and signed in the presence of, a magistrate; (2) made on a written statement form that includes specific warnings; or (3) made spontaneously and not in response to interrogation. The magistrate-presence requirement is strict — a statement taken at the scene, in the patrol car, or at the police station outside the presence of a magistrate is inadmissible regardless of voluntariness, regardless of parental consent, and regardless of standard Miranda warnings. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011), separately holds that the child's age is relevant to the custody analysis at the federal Miranda level — a question Miranda warnings were required at all turns on age-aware custody.
Evidence suppression under Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23 (made applicable to juvenile proceedings by Family Code § 51.17) covers the same Fourth Amendment terrain as adult cases — search warrants, traffic stops, school searches, consent. School searches operate under New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), which applies a reasonableness-under-the-circumstances standard rather than probable cause; Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009), constrained strip searches in schools. A child's home search requires the same warrant analysis as an adult's; consent from a parent can supply authority to search common areas but not the child's exclusive-control spaces.
Identification challenges follow adult law — Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), control the reliability-vs-suggestiveness analysis. School-based show-up identifications, suggestive photo arrays, and victim-identification at school can all be challenged. The reliability inquiry asks about opportunity to view, attention, accuracy of prior description, certainty, and time between event and identification — each fact-specific.
Competency to stand trial in juvenile cases runs on a developmental-competency standard that overlaps with, but is broader than, adult mental-illness competency. Texas Family Code § 55.31 governs juvenile-court competency proceedings. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), and Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), set the constitutional floor. A 12-year-old with severe ADHD, a 14-year-old on the autism spectrum, or a child with a measurable IQ in the low range may not be able to assist counsel and rationally understand the proceedings even without a diagnosed mental illness. Pre-trial competency evaluation is a free defense tool we use aggressively where developmental factors are in play.
Coerced-statement / coerced-confession analysis combines § 51.095 (Texas juvenile Miranda), J.D.B. (age-aware custody), and the federal voluntariness doctrine under Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). Length of interrogation, parental absence, lack of food/sleep, false-evidence ploys, and developmental-pressure factors all weigh into the voluntariness analysis. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services has documented multiple false-confession cases involving juveniles, and the case-law trend is more protective of juvenile statements than ever — but the doctrine still requires affirmative defense work to suppress.
Common prosecution errors in juvenile cases
The State's typical errors in juvenile prosecutions are predictable: § 51.095 statement-taking violations, § 54.02 boilerplate transfer findings, school-search overreach, intake-classification mistakes, and CPS-record contamination. Each is an attack surface.
First, § 51.095 statement-taking violations. Police officers — particularly school resource officers and patrol officers untrained in juvenile procedure — routinely take statements from children in non-compliant settings. A statement taken in the principal's office, in the back of a patrol car, at the scene of the alleged offense, or at the station outside the magistrate's presence is inadmissible regardless of voluntariness. The fix is not "we read him his rights"; the statute requires actual magistrate presence and a magistrate-signed warning form. Body-cam footage and patrol-car video are the typical evidence of the violation — we order them at first appearance and frame-by-frame the statement-taking sequence.
Second, § 54.02 transfer-order findings. After Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), boilerplate transfer findings are insufficient. The court must make case-specific findings on each of the § 54.02(f) factors, supported by evidence in the record. Trial courts in jurisdictions that handle few transfer cases sometimes still issue conclusory orders that recite the statutory factors without case-specific support. Defense counsel preserves the issue at the hearing, and the certification order then becomes vulnerable on appeal under Moon, In re D.C., and progeny. A successful transfer-order reversal sends the case back to juvenile court — a substantial outcome.
Third, school-search overreach. Under T.L.O., school officials need only reasonable grounds (a lower standard than probable cause) for a search of a student's belongings on school grounds. But the standard is not "anything goes." The search must be (1) justified at its inception and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Redding made clear that intrusiveness matters — a strip search requires special justification. Many SRO-led searches exceed the T.L.O. reasonableness standard, and the evidence is suppressible on a motion under art. 38.23.
Fourth, intake-classification mistakes. Intake probation officers sometimes classify conduct as "delinquent conduct" when the proper classification is "CINS," or as a higher-grade offense when the underlying facts support only a lower grade. The misclassification can produce a more restrictive disposition and worse downstream consequences than the conduct warrants. Defense counsel audits the referral paperwork against the offense report and the penal-code definition; reclassification is sometimes available by motion or by pre-petition negotiation with the prosecutor.
Fifth, CPS-record contamination. The juvenile-justice and child-welfare (CPS / DFPS) systems are formally separate, but in practice they overlap heavily. A child with a CPS history sometimes has confidential CPS records improperly disclosed to the prosecutor or to the court in disposition. Family Code § 261.201 governs the confidentiality of DFPS records; their disclosure outside the statutory pathway is a violation. Counsel reviews disposition packets carefully for CPS-record inclusion and moves to strike improperly disclosed material — both to protect the immediate case and to preserve the child's broader confidentiality interest.
Sixth, dual-prosecution overreach. A juvenile case can move forward under Family Code Title 3 simultaneously with a related CPS case under Family Code Title 5 (Chapters 261–263). The two systems have different burdens, different evidentiary rules, and different counsel-appointment frameworks. Statements made in CPS proceedings can be used in the juvenile-justice case under specific circumstances; statements made in juvenile court can affect the CPS case. Coordinating across the two systems — and challenging improper cross-use — is a discrete area of juvenile-defense expertise.
What to do if your child is referred to juvenile court
The first 48 hours are decisive — detention hearings, intake decisions, and statement-taking happen in compressed windows. Engage counsel before intake, document everything, and never let the child give a statement without counsel and a magistrate present.
First, engage counsel before intake whenever possible. The intake process under § 53.01 is the single highest-leverage moment in a juvenile case — roughly half of Texas juvenile referrals are resolved informally at intake without ever generating a petition. A defense lawyer engaged before the intake interview can advocate for deferred prosecution under § 53.03(c), for an informal supervisory caution, or for outright dismissal. Parents who walk their child into intake without counsel — believing "we have nothing to hide" — often produce statements and admissions that lock the case into a petition path that could have been avoided.
Second, do not let the child give a statement. The juvenile-specific Miranda framework under § 51.095 is stronger than adult law, but it still requires affirmative invocation. A statement made spontaneously, made before counsel is engaged, made to a school resource officer in the principal's office, or made to a parent in earshot of a recording device is potentially admissible. The blanket rule for any case where charges are foreseeable: the child says nothing about the alleged conduct to anyone — police, school officials, social workers, friends, family — without counsel present. Family-call admissions ("yes I did it, but...") have lost more juvenile cases than weak State evidence.
Third, request a detention hearing if the child is in custody. Detention under § 54.01 happens within 48 hours; the court must find a statutory ground for continued detention. Counsel's first move at the detention hearing is to present a credible release plan — parent or guardian supervision, school attendance, GPS or curfew monitoring as alternatives to secure detention. The same hearing repeats every 10 working days under § 54.01(h), giving counsel multiple opportunities to seek release as the case develops.
Fourth, preserve school and medical records. School disciplinary records, IEP / 504 plan documentation, prior counseling and psychiatric evaluations, and any developmental or learning-disability documentation become central to disposition and to competency analysis. Texas school districts retain records for varying periods; a written preservation request to the district's legal department locks them in pending the juvenile case. Medical and psychiatric records require HIPAA-compliant authorization from the parent (or, in some cases, the child) — counsel handles the authorization paperwork.
Fifth, prepare for the long timeline. A contested juvenile case can run 6 to 12 months from referral to disposition, longer if certification is sought (transfer hearings add 2 to 4 months) or if competency is contested. During the pendency, the child may be in detention, in residential placement, or at home on conditions of release. Parents need a realistic timeline expectation — courts move at their own pace, and pressure to resolve quickly often produces worse outcomes than patient defense work. The intake-to-disposition arc is also a chance to build mitigation evidence: clean school attendance, good grades, voluntary counseling, community service, and family-system support during the pendency all bear directly on the § 54.04 disposition.
Sixth, plan for record sealing from the start. Sealing eligibility under § 58.003 / § 58.253 / § 58.256 depends on what disposition the child receives and what subsequent conduct (or lack of conduct) follows. A child who completes probation without violation, attends school, and stays out of further trouble through age 19 is in the strongest sealing posture. We discuss sealing strategy at the disposition stage — not years later — because dispositional choices today control sealing options tomorrow.
DFW context and cost expectations
Each DFW county runs its juvenile system differently — Collin and Denton handle juvenile dockets at dedicated juvenile courts; Dallas and Tarrant operate larger juvenile-justice centers with specialty dockets. Defense fees run $4,500–$12,000+ depending on case complexity.
Collin County operates the Collin County Juvenile Probation Department out of McKinney with juvenile dockets at the 199th and 416th District Courts (acting as juvenile court). The county runs in-home supervision, residential placement at the Collin County Juvenile Detention Facility, and contracts with private residential treatment centers for placement dispositions. Intake is responsive to pre-petition counsel engagement — a deferred-prosecution agreement under § 53.03(c) is often available for first-offense, non-violent referrals. Certification cases are heard at the same district courts and follow the standard § 54.02 protocol.
Denton County's juvenile system runs out of the Denton County Juvenile Justice Center on Loop 288 in Denton, with the 211th and 367th District Courts acting as juvenile court. Denton operates the Denton County Juvenile Post-Adjudication Facility for residential placements and contracts with multiple private residential providers for treatment dispositions. The county has a relatively well-developed mental-health diversion track for juveniles with documented mental-health conditions — counsel uses this aggressively where the diagnosis supports.
Dallas County runs the Henry Wade Juvenile Justice Center on Riverfront Boulevard — one of the largest juvenile-justice operations in Texas, with multiple juvenile courts, dedicated juvenile prosecutors, and an in-house probation department. The county operates the Dallas County Juvenile Detention Facility and the Letot Center for status-offender placements (truancy, runaway). Specialty courts under the Texas Specialty Courts framework (Government Code Chapter 124) include the Dallas County Juvenile Mental Health Court and the Juvenile Drug Court — both diversion-oriented tracks with treatment-based dispositions.
Tarrant County's juvenile system runs out of the Tim Curry Justice Center and the Lynn W. Ross Juvenile Detention Center, with dedicated juvenile courts (323rd District Court) handling the docket. The Tarrant County Juvenile Services operates secure and non-secure facilities, plus contracted residential treatment options. Tarrant has historically been more aggressive on certification petitions than the other three DFW counties; defense counsel comes prepared for full § 54.02 evidentiary hearings rather than expecting concessions.
Defense fees vary substantially. A straightforward juvenile referral resolved at intake under § 53.03 deferred prosecution typically runs $2,500–$4,500 flat. A petition-filed case resolved by negotiated adjudication and disposition runs $4,500–$8,000. A certification (§ 54.02) defense — including psychological expert, mitigation investigation, full evidentiary hearing, and potential appeal — runs $12,000–$25,000+ given the stakes. A determinate-sentence case at the high end (§ 53.045 enumerated offenses) runs $20,000–$40,000+ with experts and trial preparation. ALR-equivalent intake-only representation is occasionally available as a flat-fee carve-out for pre-petition work.
Timeline expectations: most juvenile referrals resolve in 60–180 days when handled with substantive intake and motion work. Contested cases with full discovery and motion practice run 6–9 months. Certification defenses run 4–8 months from petition to certification hearing, with appeal pendency adding another 6–12 months. Determinate-sentence cases can run 9–18 months from petition to disposition. Sealing-eligibility analysis runs from age 19 forward — the planning starts at disposition, but the actual sealing application waits for the statutory triggers under § 58.253 or § 58.256.
Collateral costs are real. Residential placement at a county facility is typically free to the family; private residential treatment centers can run $5,000–$15,000/month and the family may be required to contribute under § 54.061. Restitution to victims under § 54.041 is set by the court and ordered against the child and (under § 54.041(b)) the parents. School-attendance violations carry separate truancy consequences under Education Code Chapter 25. Driver's-license consequences for certain juvenile adjudications (drug, alcohol, weapon offenses on school property) apply under TC § 521.342. These collateral consequences are often more disruptive to the family than the formal disposition.
