Missing a required court date after release on bond is its own crime in Texas. Penal Code § 38.10 grades the new charge by the case you missed — Class A misdemeanor for misdemeanors, third-degree felony for felonies — and a documented reasonable excuse is a statutory defense. Below: the statute, penalties, defenses, and next steps in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant County.
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Texas Penal Code § 38.10(a) defines the offense in one sentence: a person “lawfully released from custody, with or without bail, on condition that he subsequently appear commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly fails to appear in accordance with the terms of his release.” The statute's full name — Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear — matters, because it is one offense, not two. Whether the paperwork says FTA or bail jumping, the State files under the same section and must prove the same elements.
Look closely at the phrase “with or without bail.” The statute reaches people released on surety bonds, cash bonds, attorney bonds, and personal-recognizance releases alike — no bondsman needs to be in the picture. The appearance duty also attaches to every required setting on the docket: announcements, pretrial conferences, docket calls, and trial. Whether you failed to appear “in accordance with the terms of his release” is measured against what the bond and the court's settings actually required of you.
The Legislature wrote two escape valves directly into the text. Under § 38.10(b), it is a defense that the required appearance “was incident to community supervision, parole, or an intermittent sentence” — so a missed probation report date is not bail jumping. Under § 38.10(c), it is a defense that the person “had a reasonable excuse” for failing to appear. Both are true statutory defenses governed by Penal Code § 2.03: once the defense puts some supporting evidence before the jury, the State must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden allocation is among the most defense-friendly features anywhere in Chapter 38.
One piece of statutory history pays off in research: the offense dates to the 1974 Penal Code (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 399) and lived at former § 38.11 until the 1993 recodification moved it to § 38.10, effective September 1, 1994. Opinions from the 1970s and 1980s — including the leading notice cases — cite “§ 38.11” for exactly the same offense, which routinely confuses anyone running a fast statute search.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals laid out the proof template in Johnson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013): to convict under § 38.10(a), the State must prove the defendant (1) was lawfully released from custody, with or without bail; (2) on condition that he subsequently appear; and (3) intentionally or knowingly failed to appear in accordance with the terms of his release.
Because the mental state must attach to the failure itself, evidence that the defendant never learned of the setting strikes at the heart of the State's case. That is exactly where the instanter-bond doctrine, covered next, does the State's heavy lifting — and where the defense usually pushes back.
Section 38.10 carries no punishment range of its own. Subsections (d), (e), and (f) borrow the grade of the case you missed: the default is a Class A misdemeanor; the charge drops to a Class C misdemeanor if the missed case was punishable by fine only; and it rises to a third-degree felony if the missed case was “classified as a felony.” Miss a routine announcement setting in a felony theft case and the new charge carries two to ten years — entirely independent of how the theft case ends.
| Classification | When it applies | Confinement | Maximum fine |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class C misdemeanor | The missed case was punishable by fine only — § 38.10(e) | None | $500 (Penal Code § 12.23) |
| Class A misdemeanor | Any other missed case, including Class A and B misdemeanors — § 38.10(d) | Up to 1 year in county jail | $4,000 (Penal Code § 12.21) |
| Third-degree felony | The missed case was classified as a felony — § 38.10(f) | 2–10 years TDCJ | $10,000 (Penal Code § 12.34) |
Prior felony convictions can push the felony version higher under Penal Code § 12.42 — one prior sequential felony raises the range to that of a second-degree felony, and habitual allegations go further. A § 38.10 conviction is also its own judgment: under Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.08, the judge chooses whether its sentence runs concurrently with or consecutively to the underlying case. The quieter penalty is what the charge does to your bond posture. Judges raise bonds, add conditions, or refuse personal-recognizance release for someone with an FTA history, and sureties price that history into every bond they write afterward. Try our Texas Bond Estimator to see how counties typically set amounts.
Most § 38.10 trials are paper trials: the State offers the bond, the clerk's record showing the setting, and the docket sheet showing the no-show. The legal engine that makes that thin stack sufficient is the instanter-bond doctrine. In Euziere v. State, 648 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a bond directing the defendant to appear “instanter” provides sufficient and proper notice of the court setting — and that notice plus the absence of any reasonable excuse is enough for a rational jury to find the failure to appear was intentional and knowing.
Johnson supplies the burden mechanics that follow from Euziere. Proof that the accused was free under an instanter bond is prima facie proof of notice to appear; the bond alone satisfies the State's burden on the mental state unless the defense establishes evidence to the contrary. If the defendant offers evidence that he did not have notice, the State must then produce evidence sufficient to show he had actual notice — or that he engaged in a course of conduct designed to avoid receiving notice. Johnson also marks the doctrine's limit: the instanter wording supplies notice of when to appear provided the bond states where. A bond that never names the court leaves a hole the presumption cannot fill.
A charging-pattern observation from the DFW counties: prosecutors rarely rest on the bond alone anymore. In Johnson itself, the State added an order appointing counsel that contained the next court date and the defendant's signature. That is the modern template — intake screens look for a signed reset form, a signed appointment order, or bond paperwork with the setting handwritten on it before a § 38.10 count gets filed, because a signature converts a notice fight into an authentication formality.
Reasonable excuse — § 38.10(c). The statute never defines “reasonable excuse,” which makes it a jury question, and juries judge it through two lenses: documentation and promptness. Hospitalization records, a crash report from the morning of court, proof of custody in another county or state, a funeral program — paper carries the defense. Once some excuse evidence is admitted, Penal Code § 2.03 requires the State to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury charge says so.
No notice. Because the State's mental-state case usually rides on the instanter presumption, the defense can rebut it: a bond that omits the court or location, a reset notice mailed to a stale address, notification sent to prior counsel after a substitution, or clerk records showing the setting moved after the last appearance. Under Johnson, once the defense offers no-notice evidence, the State must come forward with actual-notice or notice-avoidance proof — not just the bond.
Wrong appearance type — § 38.10(b). Appearances incident to community supervision, parole, or an intermittent (weekend) sentence are statutorily excluded. Cases occasionally get filed over a missed probation-related setting; the (b) defense ends them.
Element attacks. The release must be lawful and tied to the right cause number; a bond filed in one cause does not automatically prove a duty to appear in a different re-filed cause unless the paperwork connects them. And the State must prove the defendant — not just his lawyer — bore the obligation for the specific setting missed.
Hypothetical (for illustration only): a Denton County client on a felony bond is admitted for emergency surgery two days before a pretrial conference and remains inpatient through the setting. He calls counsel on discharge, files the hospital records, and appears at the reset. That is the paradigm § 38.10(c) defense — a verifiable excuse paired with an immediate voluntary reappearance. Contrast the client who learns of the warrant and stays gone six months: the gap itself becomes the State's strongest mental-state evidence.
Dismissals happen, and they usually come through one of three doors. First, a documented excuse the prosecutor credits — often paired with proof the underlying case has resolved. Second, a notice defect that guts the instanter presumption before trial. Third, negotiation: § 38.10 counts are frequently filed as leverage and dismissed when the underlying case pleads. Bail jumping is not on the article 42A.054 list, so deferred adjudication and judge-ordered community supervision are both legally available dispositions, including for the felony grade.
Record relief follows the standard Texas map. An acquittal, or a dismissal once the limitations period runs, supports expunction under Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 55A. Successfully completed deferred adjudication can support an order of nondisclosure under Government Code chapter 411, subchapter E-1, after the applicable waiting period. A conviction of any grade — including the Class C version — forecloses expunction of that charge. Our guide to expunction versus nondisclosure walks through the eligibility tree.
Missing court also detonates the bond itself, on a separate civil track governed by Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 22. When the defendant's name is called and no one answers, the trial court declares the bond forfeited and signs a judgment nisi — a provisional judgment against the principal and the sureties that becomes final unless they show cause. In the forfeiture suit, the State's proof consists of the bond and the judgment nisi; the judgment nisi is treated as prima facie proof that the statutory requirements were satisfied, and the burden shifts to the defense side to show otherwise.
Article 22.13 then supplies the only causes that exonerate. The list is short: among them, that the bond was not a valid and binding undertaking in law; that the principal died before final judgment; and the workhorse — sickness or some uncontrollable circumstance that prevented appearance, provided the failure arose through no fault of the principal and he appeared before final judgment on the bond. That last clause is the trap: the excuse alone is not enough; the reappearance must come before the nisi judgment goes final. Article 22.16 separately allows remittitur of part of the forfeiture in defined circumstances, and chapter 17 lets a surety who has lost confidence surrender the principal and ask off the bond.
The two tracks do not resolve each other. Beating the criminal § 38.10 count does not vacate the civil forfeiture judgment, and paying the forfeiture does not settle the criminal charge. Cash-bond families feel this most — the county holds the cash while the criminal case plays out, and surety companies pursue the relatives who signed indemnity agreements. Our bond forfeiture defense page covers the civil-side playbook in detail.
Court level follows grade. Class A bail jumping is filed by information in the county courts at law; the felony version goes through a grand jury to a district court — almost always in the same building, and frequently the same court, as the underlying case.
Felony and misdemeanor FTA cases are heard at the Collin County Courthouse, 2100 Bloomdale Road in McKinney, home to the district courts and county courts at law. Class C failures to appear from Frisco, Plano, and McKinney municipal dockets stay in the municipal and justice courts but feed license holds. After a missed setting, district courts here typically issue a capias quickly and forfeit the bond the same day; counsel who move fast on a Collin County bond reinstatement often resolve the episode without a new charge.
Felony and misdemeanor criminal dockets sit at the Frank Crowley Courts Building on Riverfront Boulevard, with bond forfeiture suits processed through the district clerk's bond forfeiture section. Walk-through surrenders — arranged in advance so a new Dallas County bond is ready before booking — are an established practice and dramatically shorten custody time on FTA warrants.
The district courts and county criminal courts sit at the Denton County Courts Building on East McKinney Street in Denton. FTA episodes here commonly surface during unrelated traffic stops once the capias hits the statewide systems; addressing the warrant proactively through a scheduled surrender and a Denton County bond keeps the defendant out of a multi-day hold.
Criminal cases run through the Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center in downtown Fort Worth. As elsewhere, the felony FTA count is usually presented to the same grand jury term handling the underlying case, and prosecutors commonly treat the § 38.10 count as plea leverage. A prompt voluntary appearance with a new Tarrant County bond in place is the most reliable way to blunt that leverage.
Hypothetical (for illustration only): a Frisco client with a Class B case set in a Collin County court at law moves apartments mid-case; the reset notice goes to the old address, and the first hint of trouble is a denied driver's license renewal months later. Counsel confirms the capias, schedules a walk-through surrender in McKinney, posts the replacement bond the same morning, and moves on the forfeiture; the State never files a § 38.10 count. Speed, paper, and a voluntary appearance did the work.
Driver's license holds. Fine-only failures to appear feed the DPS Failure to Appear / Failure to Pay program under Transportation Code chapter 706 — the OmniBase hold. DPS denies renewal until the underlying court clears the hold and the program fees are paid, and many people first learn about a years-old FTA at the renewal counter.
Firearms. A felony bail jumping conviction triggers the Texas felon-in-possession rule, Penal Code § 46.04, and the federal prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) — consequences that outlast the sentence itself.
Future bail and background checks. An FTA history follows you through every later bond decision: judges deviate upward from schedules, conditions multiply, and sureties charge more or decline outright. Employers and landlords running background checks see a bail jumping entry as a reliability signal, which is part of why pursuing every available record remedy matters. Immigration adjudicators likewise weigh an FTA record when exercising discretion on bond and relief — anyone with status concerns should have immigration counsel in the loop early.
Licensing. Texas licensing agencies reviewing fitness or moral character treat court-avoidance offenses with particular skepticism, and some boards require self-reporting of new charges within fixed windows. A Class A or felony § 38.10 case deserves the same licensing triage as the underlying charge.
Versus bond-condition violations. Skipping court is § 38.10. Breaking a bond condition — no-contact orders, ignition interlock, GPS curfews — is enforced through bond revocation and forfeiture instead, and in family-violence, stalking, and trafficking cases the separate crime of violating bond conditions under Penal Code § 25.07 can apply. See our guides to Texas bond conditions and protective order violation.
Versus § 38.112 — tampering with an electronic monitor. Senate Bill 1004 (2023) added Penal Code § 38.112, making it a state jail felony to knowingly remove or disable a tracking device worn as a condition of bail, community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision. Before September 1, 2023, cutting off an ankle monitor was usually just a bond problem; now it is its own felony — and if the person also misses court, § 38.10 stacks on top as a second new charge.
Versus escape and evading. Escape under § 38.06 punishes leaving custody; bail jumping punishes a person who was lawfully out of custody and simply failed to return. Evading arrest under § 38.04 requires physical flight from an officer attempting a lawful detention — a missed setting involves no officer at all. The distinctions matter because the grades and defenses differ sharply; see escape, evading arrest, and resisting arrest.
Adjacent process crimes. Giving a false name during the arrest that follows an FTA warrant adds a failure-to-identify count under § 38.02, and anyone who hides a person with an active capias risks hindering apprehension under § 38.05. See failure to identify and hindering apprehension, or browse the full Texas charges encyclopedia.
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043514
Reggie London co-founded L and L Law Group with a focus on federal criminal defense, complex felony defense, and TEA/SBEC matters. Licensed in Texas, admitted to TXND and TXED.
Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043266
Njeri London co-founded L and L Law Group with a focus on DWI defense, family violence cases, and juvenile defense. Licensed in Texas, admitted to TXND and TXED.
Co-founding partners Reggie London and Njeri London personally handle every case. Free consultation. Frisco, Texas.
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