Motion Deadline and Speedy-Trial Calculator

Calculate Your Speedy-Trial and Motion Deadlines

Enter the key dates from your case and choose the jurisdiction. The calculator returns each statutory deadline as a date beside the rule that sets it. Every result is an estimate, because excludable and tolled time can move these dates.

How the Federal Speedy Trial Act Clocks Work

The federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, runs two independent clocks in every case, and this calculator applies both.

• Arrest to charge — 30 days. An information or indictment must be filed within 30 days of arrest or service of a summons on the federal charge. Section 3161(b). If no grand jury has been in session during that window, the period may be extended by 30 more days.
• Charge to trial — 70 days. Trial must begin within 70 days of the later of the filing of the indictment or information or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending. Section 3161(c)(1).
• A 30-day floor before trial. Unless the defendant consents, trial may not start fewer than 30 days after the defendant first appears through counsel or elects self-representation. Section 3161(c)(2).

If the government misses either deadline, the remedy is a defense motion to dismiss under Section 3162. The court decides whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, weighing the seriousness of the offense, the facts behind the delay, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Act.

Excludable Time That Moves the Federal Clock

The 70-day clock is not a simple countdown. Section 3161(h) lists categories of delay that do not count, so the real trial deadline is almost always later than 70 raw calendar days.

Common exclusions include:

• delay from any pretrial motion, from filing through the hearing or other prompt disposition;
• delay for competency or other mental-health examinations;
• delay from interlocutory appeals;
• reasonable delay attributable to a co-defendant when no severance has been granted;
• delay while the defendant is absent or otherwise unavailable; and
• an “ends-of-justice” continuance under Section 3161(h)(7), where the judge finds on the record that the interests of justice outweigh the public’s and the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial.

The Supreme Court polices how those continuances are granted. In Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Court held that a defendant cannot prospectively waive the Act, and that an ends-of-justice continuance excludes time only if the judge puts the required findings on the record — a failure that cannot be excused as harmless error. Because excludable time is fact-specific, treat the tool’s 70-day date as the earliest possible trial deadline, not the final one.

The Constitutional Speedy-Trial Right and the Barker Factors

Separate from any statute, the Sixth Amendment secures the right to a speedy trial, and Texas mirrors it in article I, section 10 of its constitution. Neither sets a number of days. Instead, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), directs courts to balance four factors:

1. Length of the delay — the triggering factor; until the delay is “presumptively prejudicial” (courts often treat roughly a year as the trigger), the inquiry stops here.
2. Reason for the delay — deliberate stalling weighs heavily against the State, negligence weighs less, and valid reasons are neutral.
3. Assertion of the right — a timely, repeated demand strengthens the claim.
4. Prejudice — oppressive pretrial jail, anxiety, and, most seriously, impairment of the defense.

No single factor is necessary or sufficient; the court weighs them together, and the remedy for a violation is dismissal with prejudice, which is why the analysis is demanding. One boundary matters for this calculator: in Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016), the Court held that the speedy-trial right stops at conviction, so delay between a guilty verdict and sentencing is measured under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.

Why Texas Has No Speedy-Trial Statute

Texas once had a Speedy Trial Act, but it is gone. In Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Act (former articles 32A.02 and 28.061) violated the separation-of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution because it intruded on the prosecutor’s exclusive discretion to prepare a case for trial. The Act was declared void.

The practical result is that Texas has no 70-day statutory trial clock. A defendant’s speedy-trial protection comes only from the federal and state constitutions, analyzed under the Barker factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed that framework in Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), where a four-year delay in an ordinary DWI case — caused largely by the State’s failure to evaluate a Spanish-language video — violated the right even though the defense was never specifically impaired.

That is why the calculator’s Texas mode does not output a trial-date deadline. It focuses on the deadlines Texas law does fix by number: the charging window, the custody-release checkpoint, and the post-trial motion clocks.

The Texas Charging Deadline for Indictment

Article 32.01 fixes how long the State may hold an accused before a grand jury acts. When a defendant is in custody or on bail to answer a charge, the indictment or information must be presented by the later of:

• the last day of the next term of the court held after commitment or admission to bail; or
• the 180th day after commitment or admission to bail.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 32.01. If the State misses that window without good cause shown by affidavit, the charge is dismissed and the bail discharged. Because court terms vary by county, this calculator computes the fixed 180-day date and flags that the next-term prong can push the true deadline later.

Two cautions. First, an article 32.01 dismissal is not an acquittal or a bar to prosecution — the State may re-present the charge to a grand jury and re-indict within the statute of limitations. Second, article 32.01 is separate from the custody-release rule in article 17.151, which requires a jailed felony defendant to be released on personal bond or reduced bail if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. The calculator surfaces the 90-day custody checkpoint alongside the 180-day charging deadline.

Post-Verdict and Pretrial Motion Deadlines

Once a case moves past trial, new clocks start, and they are short. In Texas:

• Motion for new trial — 30 days. A motion for new trial must be filed no later than 30 days after the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open court. Tex. R. App. P. 21.4. Any amended motion must also be filed inside that 30-day window and before the court rules.
• Notice of appeal — 30 or 90 days. A defendant must file notice of appeal within 30 days after sentencing, or within 90 days if a timely motion for new trial is filed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2.

In federal court, the post-verdict motions run from the verdict, not the sentence: a motion for a new trial on non-newly-discovered grounds and a motion for judgment of acquittal are each due within 14 days of the guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c).

Pretrial, Texas courts may set a hearing under article 28.01. When they do, preliminary matters and motions generally must be raised at least seven days before that hearing, or they are waived absent good cause. The calculator flags this cutoff so a motion to suppress or to quash is not lost to the clock.

Which Motion Each Deadline Feeds

A deadline only matters if it is tied to the right filing. Here is how each output maps to a motion:

Enter your dates above to see each deadline, then pair it with the matching motion in our motions library. These outputs are calendar estimates only; the controlling deadline in your case depends on excludable time, court terms, and tolling that a lawyer must verify.

The Case Law Behind This Tool

The controlling decisions this tool is built on—each verified against the published opinion. Holdings are neutral summaries of the law, not predictions about any case.