Recusing or Disqualifying a Judge for a Financial or Family Relationship

Two Distinct Conflicts: Money and Kinship

This page covers two different conflicts that share a rule: a judge may not sit where the judge has a financial interest in the outcome, and a judge may not sit where the judge is closely related to a party. Both are grounds to remove the judge, and the strongest versions are constitutional.

The financial branch appears in several places. Article V, § 11 disqualifies a judge who “may be interested” in the case; Rule 18b(a)(2) disqualifies a judge who knows of an interest in the subject matter; and Rule 18b(b)(5) requires recusal where the judge, the judge’s spouse, or a minor child in the household has a financial interest in the subject matter or a party, or any interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome.

The relationship branch is equally concrete. Article V, § 11 and Article 30.01 bar a judge who is connected to a party or the injured party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, and Rule 18b(a)(3) and 18b(b)(6) carry the same idea into the recusal rules, extending to close relatives who are parties, have a stake, or are likely to be material witnesses. The sections that follow take each branch in turn.

A Direct Financial Stake in the Outcome

The clearest financial conflict is a judge who personally gains from a particular result. The Supreme Court has held for nearly a century that a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in convicting or ruling against a party is a due-process violation, no matter how honorable the individual judge.

The foundational case is Tumey v. Ohio. There, a village mayor sat as judge and received court costs only when he convicted the defendant. The Court held it “violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him.” The test looks at the “average man” in the judge’s position, not at whether a person of the highest honor could resist the temptation.

Tumey’s standard is objective and prophylactic. The point is not to prove that a particular judge was in fact swayed by money; it is that a system offering the judge a personal financial reason to rule one way cannot deliver the impartial tribunal due process guarantees. For a Texas defendant, a judge with a genuine, case-specific financial stake in the outcome presents both a due-process claim and a disqualifying “interest” under Article V, § 11.

Indirect, Institutional, and Contingent Interests

Not every financial interest is a direct fee tied to conviction. Courts also recognize institutional interests, where the judge has responsibility for finances that benefit from rulings, and interests that enhance the judge’s own separate litigation. But remote or speculative interests do not disqualify.

In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, the Supreme Court extended Tumey to a mayor-judge who had no personal fee interest but was responsible for village finances substantially funded by his court’s fines. That institutional stake created the same “possible temptation,” and the Court held the defendant was entitled to a neutral judge in the first instance, regardless of a later trial de novo. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, the Court disqualified a justice whose ruling directly enhanced the value of his own pending lawsuit — a “direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary” interest.

Aetna also marks the outer limit. The Court declined to disqualify justices whose only possible interest was membership in a large, uncertified class in a separate case, calling that interest “highly speculative and contingent.” The line, then, is between an interest that is real and case-specific and one that is remote, trivial, or shared with the general public.

When a financial conflict is suspected, counsel should document the exact mechanism by which the outcome touches the judge’s finances — the more direct and substantial the link, the stronger the ground.

Extraordinary Outside Financial Support

Because Texas elects its trial judges, a distinct question arises when a party has poured extraordinary money into the judge’s campaign. The Supreme Court has held that, in exceptional cases, such support can create a probability of bias that due process will not tolerate.

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a litigant spent extraordinary sums to help elect a justice while the litigant’s case was pending or imminent. The Court held that due process required recusal because there was “a serious risk of actual bias” when a person with a stake in the case had “a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case.” The inquiry is objective and weighs the size of the support relative to the whole campaign and the timing among the support, the election, and the case.

Caperton is deliberately narrow — the Court stressed that not every campaign contribution requires recusal, and that it was an exceptional case. For a Texas litigant, ordinary lawful contributions rarely support removal, but a truly outsized, well-timed financial effort by an interested party is a recognized ground worth investigating, and the state’s own judicial-conduct standards may impose additional limits beyond the constitutional floor.

Relationship by Blood or Marriage Within the Third Degree

The kinship ground disqualifies a judge who is related within the third degree — by consanguinity (blood) or affinity (marriage) — to a party or the injured party. The degree of relationship is measured under a fixed statutory method, and the tie must be to someone who actually counts as a party.

Article V, § 11 and Article 30.01 both use the third-degree standard, computed under Chapter 573 of the Government Code. In Lyon v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied these provisions and explained the meaning of affinity: the tie between one spouse and the blood relatives of the other spouse. Because affinity is defined precisely, the court held that a judge whose daughter had married into the victim’s family was not, by that fact, related to the victim within the prohibited degree, and that the statute does not reach the broader notion of “secondary affinity.”

Lyon also draws a boundary that connects this branch to the bias page: where a judge is not constitutionally or statutorily disqualified, bias standing alone is not a jurisdictional defect. The relationship ground, in other words, is mechanical — it depends on counting degrees to an actual party — not on how the judge feels. The table sets out the degrees.

If a party, the injured party, or a spouse of the judge falls within these degrees, the disqualification applies; more distant connections generally do not, though they may still be argued as a reasonable-impartiality concern under the bias page.

Disqualification Versus Recusal, and How to Raise It

These grounds split between mandatory disqualification and discretionary recusal, and the difference controls the deadline and the remedy. A constitutional interest or a third-degree relationship is jurisdictional; a financial-interest recusal under the rules, or a more remote conflict, follows the ordinary recusal procedure.

Where the ground is a constitutional “interest” or a third-degree relationship under Article V, § 11 and Article 30.01, it is mandatory, cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time — the same jurisdictional footing as prior service as counsel. Where the ground is a rules-based financial interest under Rule 18b(b)(5) or a relationship covered by Rule 18b(b)(6), it proceeds as a recusal, subject to the verification and timing requirements that govern recusal motions generally.

Practically, a motion should identify precisely which basket the conflict falls into, because that determines whether the ten-day recusal deadline applies. Whatever the basket, the motion is filed and then handled through the same recuse-or-refer machinery: the challenged judge must recuse or refer the motion to the regional presiding judge. That procedure — timing, referral, and the consequences of ignoring a motion — is covered on the companion page devoted to it.

Where This Fits

This guide is one of four situations that arise under the Motion to Recuse or Disqualify the Judge. Start with the parent motion for the overall framework, or move to a related fact pattern:

What the Case Law Says

These decisions—verified against primary sources—control how this issue is litigated. Every case still turns on its own facts.

• Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) — A judge with a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant violates due process, judged by the temptation to the average judge.
• Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) — A mayor-judge responsible for municipal finances funded by his court's fines is disqualified, even without a direct personal pecuniary stake in the outcome.
• Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) — A judge whose ruling enhanced his own pending litigation had a disqualifying interest; a remote, speculative class-member interest did not.
• Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) — Extraordinary, disproportionate campaign support by a litigant with a pending case can create a probability of bias requiring recusal under due process.
• Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) — Disqualification requires a third-degree tie by consanguinity or affinity to a party; a child's marriage into the victim's family was outside that degree.

General summaries of published opinions for information only — not predictions about any specific case.