New Trial for Jury Misconduct and Outside Influence

The Rule 606(b) Bar and Its Narrow Exception

Texas law starts from a strong rule of secrecy: jurors generally cannot testify to impeach their own verdict. Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars testimony about deliberations or the effect of anything on a juror’s mind. The rule then opens two narrow doors, and the important one for a new trial is proof of an improper outside influence.

Under Rule 606(b), a juror may not testify about any statement made during deliberations or about how anything affected any juror’s mental processes or vote. That protects the finality of verdicts and the privacy of the jury room. The rule permits testimony on only two subjects: whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on a juror, and whether a juror was qualified to serve. Everything else — second thoughts, arguments among jurors, a juror’s misunderstanding of the law — is off limits.

That framework shapes every jury-misconduct motion. The defense cannot win by showing that a juror later regretted the verdict or felt rushed. It must identify something that came from outside the jury and improperly reached a juror. The rest of this page explains what the courts count as an outside influence, how they measure prejudice without invading deliberations, and how the ground fits with the new-trial deadlines and the older device of the mistrial.

What Is (and Is Not) an Outside Influence?

An outside influence is something that originates from a source outside the jury room and other than the jurors themselves, and that is improperly brought to bear with the effect of pushing a verdict one way or the other. Neutral events, personal pressures, and a juror’s own life experience do not qualify, even when they affect how fast a jury moves.

The Court of Criminal Appeals defined the term in McQuarrie v. State and refined it in Colyer v. State. Colyer held that a 606(b) inquiry is limited to what occurs outside the jury room and outside the jurors’ personal knowledge and experience, and that an outside influence is problematic only if it is improperly brought to bear so as to affect the verdict for or against a party. Personal pressures unrelated to the trial — a storm forecast, a sick relative, a wish to get home — are not outside influences at all.

The line is not whether the information affected the pace of deliberations but whether it was extraneous to the trial and improperly reached the jury. That distinction, drawn in Colyer, is where many motions succeed or fail.

Jurors Who Research the Case on Their Own

The most common modern outside influence is a juror who investigates the case privately — searching the internet, consulting a dictionary, or visiting the scene — and then shares what he found with the panel. Texas treats this kind of self-help research as an outside influence because the information comes from a source other than the jurors themselves.

In McQuarrie v. State, a juror in a sexual-assault case researched the effects of a date-rape drug online during an overnight recess and reported her findings the next morning. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the research was an outside influence under Rule 606(b), reversing a ruling that had refused to let jurors testify about it. A court of appeals reached the same conclusion in Ryser v. State, where a juror looked up a dictionary definition of a charged term and shared it during deliberations; the court held the definition was an outside influence, though on those facts it found the error harmless.

This kind of misconduct also fits the enumerated new-trial grounds. Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3(f) requires a new trial when, after retiring to deliberate, the jury has received other evidence, and Rule 21.3(g) covers misconduct that denied the defendant a fair trial. Because jurors are instructed to decide the case only on the evidence admitted in court, a juror who imports outside facts violates that instruction, and the resulting information is exactly what Rule 606(b) allows the defense to prove.

Improper Contact: Outsiders, Bailiffs, and Article 36.22

A second category involves someone from outside the jury communicating with a juror about the case — a witness, a spectator, a bailiff, or a stranger. Texas statute forbids it, and an established violation can trigger a presumption of harm that shifts the burden to the State to show the contact was harmless.

Article 36.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no person may converse with a juror about the case on trial except in the court’s presence and with its permission. In Ocon v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that once a defendant proves a violation of the statute, a rebuttable presumption of injury arises and a new trial or mistrial may be warranted unless the State rebuts it. The federal rule is parallel: in Remmer v. United States, the Supreme Court held that any private communication with a juror during trial about the pending matter is presumptively prejudicial, with the burden resting heavily on the government to show the contact was harmless.

These cases share a lesson about procedure. When a possible contact comes to light, the proper response is a hearing at which the circumstances are developed and all parties can participate, not an ex parte guess about impact. Remmer requires that kind of hearing, and Ocon confirms that the trial court should explore what happened before deciding whether the presumption of injury has been rebutted. The defense preserves the issue by asking for that inquiry rather than staying silent.

Proving Prejudice Without Invading Deliberations

Even a genuine outside influence does not automatically win a new trial. The court must decide whether the influence probably caused harm, and it must do so without asking jurors how the information actually affected their votes. Texas uses an objective test built around a hypothetical average juror.

Under McQuarrie and Colyer, the court limits its questions to the nature of the outside information and then asks, objectively, whether there is a reasonable possibility that the information had a prejudicial effect on a hypothetical average juror. Jurors may describe what the outside information was, but they may not testify about the subjective effect it had on them; Colyer is explicit that testimony about a juror’s personal reaction is inadmissible even when an outside influence is established.

The content of the information drives the result. Ryser illustrates the point: a dictionary definition that is fairly innocuous and consistent with the jury charge is generally harmless, while a definition or fact that conflicts with the court’s instructions or bears directly on a contested issue is far more likely to be prejudicial. So the defense should show not only that an outside influence occurred but that its content could realistically have moved a reasonable juror on a disputed element of the case. A powerful but immaterial piece of outside information may not be enough.

Preserving the Issue: Mistrial, New Trial, and Deadlines

Timing determines the remedy. If misconduct surfaces during trial, the request is usually a mistrial; if it surfaces after the verdict, the vehicle is a motion for new trial with juror affidavits. Either way, the defense must act promptly and ask for the right relief, or it risks forfeiting the issue.

In Ocon v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals described a mistrial as a remedy of last resort for incurable, highly prejudicial error, available only when less drastic alternatives cannot cure the problem. The party seeking relief must request the lesser remedy first — for example, asking the court to question the jury — or it forfeits appellate review of what a lesser remedy could have fixed. That places a real burden on the defense to speak up the moment misconduct appears.

When misconduct is discovered only after the jury is discharged, the claim moves into a motion for new trial under Rule 21, filed within 30 days of sentencing. Because Rule 606(b) controls what jurors may say, the motion should be supported by affidavits confined to the existence and nature of the outside influence, not the jurors’ mental processes. The trial court, as sole judge of credibility at the hearing, then decides whether an outside influence occurred and whether it could have prejudiced a hypothetical average juror, and its ruling is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.

Where This Fits

This guide is one of four situations that arise under the Motion for New Trial. Start with the parent motion for the overall framework, or move to a related fact pattern:

What the Case Law Says

These decisions—verified against primary sources—control how this issue is litigated. Every case still turns on its own facts.

• McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) — A juror's private internet research during a recess is an outside influence under Rule 606(b), tested for prejudice by the hypothetical average juror.
• Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) — An outside influence must originate outside the jury and be improperly brought to bear; personal pressures unrelated to the trial do not qualify.
• Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) — A proven article 36.22 violation triggers a rebuttable presumption of injury; a mistrial is a last resort after less drastic remedies are explored.
• Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) — Any private communication with a juror during trial about the pending matter is presumptively prejudicial, with a heavy burden on the government to show harmlessness.
• Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) — A juror's dictionary research is an outside influence, but misconduct requires a showing that it was material and probably caused injury.

General summaries of published opinions for information only — not predictions about any specific case.