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Motion for Mistrial in a Texas Criminal Trial

A motion for mistrial asks the trial judge to stop a criminal trial and discharge the jury because something has gone so wrong that a fair verdict is no longer possible. Texas treats it as a remedy of last resort, reserved for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.

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Governing law: Texas has no single mistrial statute. The remedy rests on a judge-made standard that permits a mistrial only for highly prejudicial, incurable error (Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)), backstopped by the double-jeopardy bar (U.S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.10) and the juror-communication rule (art. 36.22).

What a Motion for Mistrial Is

A motion for mistrial is a request that the trial judge halt a criminal trial already underway and discharge the jury without reaching a verdict. It is not a pretrial motion and it is not an appeal; it is an emergency remedy invoked in the middle of proceedings when a specific event has damaged the fairness of the trial beyond repair.

Texas courts describe the mistrial as a device "used to halt trial proceedings when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile." Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Because ending a trial in progress is a drastic step, the Court of Criminal Appeals has confined it to "a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors." Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The key word is incurable. Most trial problems can be fixed with a lesser tool, usually an instruction telling the jury to disregard what it just heard. A mistrial is appropriate only when no such instruction, and no other lesser measure, can leave the jury "in an acceptable state to continue the trial." Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). If the harm can be neutralized, the trial goes forward; if it cannot, the case is stopped and, ordinarily, tried again later before a new jury.

No Texas statute creates the motion for mistrial or lists its grounds. The remedy is judge-made, built from decades of decisions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and, on the constitutional side, the Supreme Court of the United States. That case law supplies both the standard, incurable prejudice, and the method courts use to measure it.

When the complained-of event is improper jury argument, Texas appellate courts weigh three considerations often called the Mosley factors, applied in Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The court balances the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken, and the certainty of the conviction or punishment absent the misconduct:

FactorQuestion the court asks
Severity of the misconductHow great was the prejudicial effect of what the jury heard or saw?
Curative measuresDid an instruction to disregard, or another step, reduce or remove the prejudice?
Certainty of conviction or punishmentHow likely was the same result even without the misconduct?

Hawkins makes two points that matter in practice. First, prejudice is the touchstone: the source of the rule that was broken, whether statute, rule, or common law, does not by itself make an argument severe or incurable. 135 S.W.3d at 77. Second, the harm is always measured in light of the trial court's curative instruction, so a prompt instruction to disregard weighs heavily against the need for a mistrial. Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is truly incurable, will a mistrial be required.

Common Triggers for a Mistrial

Motions for mistrial arise from a recurring set of trial events. Most are curable; the motion succeeds only when the particular facts show the damage cannot be undone. Common categories include:

Improper or incurable jury argument
A prosecutor who strikes at the defendant over the shoulders of counsel, injects personal opinion, or asks the jury to consider matters outside the record may cross the line. Most improper argument is cured by an instruction to disregard; a mistrial is reserved for remarks so inflammatory that no instruction can withdraw the impression from the jurors' minds. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77.
Inadmissible evidence blurted before the jury
A witness may volunteer an extraneous offense, a suppressed statement, or other matter the jury was never supposed to hear. Texas applies an "appellate presumption that an instruction to disregard the evidence will be obeyed," which cures the harm "except in extreme cases where ... the evidence is clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury." Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 568.
Outside influence or juror misconduct
Contact between a juror and an outsider about the case, exposure to media, or independent investigation can taint deliberations. Texas law forbids anyone from conversing with a juror about the case on trial except in the court's presence and with permission. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.22.

A fourth trigger, a jury that cannot reach a verdict, is treated separately below because it carries different consequences for any retrial.

The Manifestly Hung or Deadlocked Jury

Not every mistrial follows misconduct. The most common and least controversial ground is a jury that is genuinely unable to agree on a verdict. Texas codifies this in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.31, which lets the trial court discharge the jury when it cannot agree and both parties consent, or "in its discretion discharge it where it has been kept together for such time as to render it altogether improbable that it can agree."

The Supreme Court has long treated the deadlocked jury as "the classic basis for a proper mistrial." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). Because a genuine deadlock does not favor either side, discharging the jury and retrying the case ordinarily does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the trial judge's assessment that the jury is hung is entitled to great deference on review. Id. at 510.

Before declaring a deadlock, a Texas court often gives the jury additional time and may deliver a supplemental instruction encouraging continued deliberation. Timing matters: how long a jury has deliberated relative to the complexity of the case informs whether discharge is proper. A mistrial declared too hastily, without a real deadlock, can create a double-jeopardy problem for any second trial.

Outside Influence and Juror Misconduct During Trial

When something reaches the jury from outside the courtroom, a mistrial motion may follow. Article 36.22 exists to keep the jury's decision based only on the evidence and argument presented in court. A violation, once the defendant proves it, "triggers a rebuttable presumption of injury to the accused, and a mistrial may be warranted." Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

That presumption is not the end of the analysis. The State may rebut it by showing the contact did not affect the verdict, and the trial court decides the question on the particular facts. Importantly, the defense carries a procedural burden too: if jurors should be questioned about the suspected misconduct, "it is incumbent upon the party moving for a mistrial to request an inquiry of the jurors." Id. A defendant who never asks the court to question the jurors, and instead demands only the most drastic remedy, may lose the point on appeal.

Typical scenarios include a juror discussing the case with a family member, researching the defendant or the law online, visiting the scene, or being approached by an interested person. The cure often begins with a hearing: the judge questions the affected juror, decides whether the outside information created a reasonable probability of harm, and considers lesser options, such as an instruction or, where alternates are available, replacing the juror, before granting a mistrial.

The Preservation Sequence: Object, Instruct, Move

How and when the defense reacts often decides whether a mistrial issue survives for appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals has set out a preferred, escalating sequence: "(1) to object when it is possible, (2) to request an instruction to disregard if the prejudicial event has occurred, and (3) to move for a mistrial if a party thinks an instruction to disregard was not sufficient." Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

These remedies descend in desirability. An objection can prevent the harmful event entirely. An instruction to disregard can cure most events that slip through. A mistrial, the final step, is warranted only when the first two cannot fix the problem. The sequence itself is not mandatory to preserve error; "the essential requirement is a timely, specific request that the trial court refuses." Id. But skipping steps has a cost.

If the defense moves straight for a mistrial without first seeking a lesser remedy, an appellate court "will not reverse the court's judgment if the problem could have been cured by the less drastic alternative." Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885. In other words, when a curable error occurs, the failure to ask for an instruction can forfeit the complaint. Conversely, when the error is genuinely incurable, "a motion for a mistrial is the only essential prerequisite to presenting the complaint on appeal." Young, 137 S.W.3d at 70. The motion should be made as soon as the ground is known, and it should state the specific reason a fair trial is no longer possible.

Manifest Necessity and the Double-Jeopardy Consequence

Whether a defendant can be retried after a mistrial depends heavily on who asked for it. The Double Jeopardy Clause (U.S. Const. amend. V) and its Texas counterpart (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.10) protect the defendant's interest in finishing the trial before the jury already seated.

Who sought the mistrialStandard for a retrial
Defendant moved for or consented to the mistrialRetrial is ordinarily allowed. The defendant's motion is "a deliberate election ... to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).
Court declared a mistrial over the defendant's objectionRetrial is barred unless there was "manifest necessity" for the mistrial; the prosecution carries a heavy burden. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).

There is an important exception on the defense-motion side. If the prosecutor's misconduct was "intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial," double jeopardy bars the retrial even though the defense asked to end the trial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. Ordinary error, or even overreaching, is not enough; the exception turns on the prosecutor's specific intent to provoke the motion.

On the court-declared side, "manifest necessity" does not mean literal necessity, but it does require a "high degree" of necessity before a judge ends a trial without the defendant's agreement. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506. A defendant who believes the trial is going well may therefore choose to object to a mistrial, preserving a possible double-jeopardy bar to any second prosecution. This strategic dimension is why the decision to seek, oppose, or consent to a mistrial is significant and fact-specific.

The Abuse-of-Discretion Standard of Review

A trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The appellate court views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling" and will uphold the decision if it falls "within the zone of reasonable disagreement." Id.

This deferential standard cuts both ways. When a judge denies a mistrial, the ruling stands unless no reasonable view of the record supports it, which is why a curative instruction so often defeats the motion. When a judge grants a mistrial over the defendant's objection, the same deference applies, but it is judged by the manifest-necessity standard. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 (1978).

Deference also explains the emphasis on building a record. The reviewing court considers "only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling." Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884. Counsel who wants a mistrial should make the specific grounds clear on the record; counsel opposing one should ensure the reasons for and against are stated. A well-developed record is what allows the ruling, either way, to be meaningfully reviewed.

Where the Motion for Mistrial Fits

The motion for mistrial sits at the end of a family of trial objections and near the beginning of the post-trial remedies. During trial, it is the most serious response available when an objection and an instruction to disregard are not enough. After a conviction, some of the same grounds, jury misconduct or outside influence for example, can reappear in a motion for new trial under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Understanding that placement helps a defendant see why courts guard the remedy so carefully. A mistrial discards the time, expense, and emotional toll of the trial already held, and it usually means doing the whole thing again. Courts therefore ask not merely whether an error occurred, but whether the error was curable. The answer decides everything that follows.

Because the analysis is intensely fact-specific and unfolds in real time, decisions about whether to seek, oppose, or consent to a mistrial are best made with the guidance of a licensed Texas criminal-defense attorney who knows the record. This article is general information about Texas law and procedure, not legal advice about any particular case.

L and L Law Group, PLLC, handles criminal defense in Frisco and the surrounding Collin, Denton, Dallas, and Rockwall County courts. To discuss a pending case, call (972) 370-5060 or email info@landllawgroup.com.

Common Situations & Variations

This motion comes up in several recurring situations. Each guide below walks through a specific fact pattern, the governing standard, and how Texas courts have handled it.

Improper / Incurable Jury ArgumentInadmissible Evidence Blurted Before the JuryA Manifestly Hung or Deadlocked JuryOutside Influence or Juror Misconduct During Trial

What the Case Law Says

These decisions—verified against primary sources—control how this motion is litigated. Every case still turns on its own facts.

  • Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) — A mistrial is an extreme remedy for a narrow class of highly prejudicial, incurable errors, granted only when residual prejudice remains after less drastic alternatives.
  • Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) — A mistrial halts trial only where error is so prejudicial that further proceedings would be wasteful and futile; the particular facts control.
  • Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) — Courts balance the Mosley factors, severity of misconduct, curative measures, and certainty of conviction, when reviewing a mistrial denial for improper argument.
  • Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) — The preferred sequence is objection, request to instruct the jury to disregard, then motion for mistrial; mistrial fits only incurable prejudice.
  • Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) — A mistrial declared over the defendant's objection permits retrial only on manifest necessity; the trial judge's assessment receives great deference.
  • Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) — Double jeopardy bars retrial after a defense mistrial motion only where the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving.

General summaries of published opinions for information only — not predictions about any specific case.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a motion for mistrial in a Texas criminal case?
It is a request, made during trial, for the judge to stop the proceedings and discharge the jury before a verdict because an incurable error has made a fair trial impossible. Texas treats it as a last resort for a narrow class of highly prejudicial errors that an instruction to disregard cannot fix.
When will a Texas judge grant a mistrial?
Only when the error is so prejudicial that further proceedings would be wasteful and futile and no lesser remedy can cure the harm. If an instruction to disregard can leave the jury able to continue fairly, the judge will deny the mistrial and the trial goes on.
What is the difference between an objection, an instruction to disregard, and a mistrial?
They are escalating remedies. An objection tries to prevent the harmful event; an instruction to disregard tries to cure it after it happens; a mistrial ends the trial when neither is enough. Texas courts prefer counsel to pursue them in that order.
Can I be retried after a mistrial?
Usually yes if you asked for or agreed to the mistrial, because you chose to end the trial. If the judge declared the mistrial over your objection, a retrial is barred unless the State shows manifest necessity. A hung jury is the classic example of manifest necessity.
Does a hung jury count as a mistrial?
Yes. When a jury genuinely cannot agree, the court may discharge it under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.31. A deadlock is considered the classic, proper basis for a mistrial, and the State may ordinarily retry the case without violating double jeopardy.
What are the Hawkins or Mosley factors?
For improper jury argument, Texas courts balance three things to decide whether a mistrial was required: the severity of the misconduct, the curative steps taken, and the certainty of the same result without the misconduct. The analysis is set out in Hawkins v. State.
What happens if a juror talks to someone about the case?
Texas law bars anyone from conversing with a juror about the case except in court. If a violation is proven, it raises a rebuttable presumption of harm and may support a mistrial. The defense should ask the judge to question the jurors, because that request is the moving party's responsibility.
Is a mistrial the same as a dismissal or an acquittal?
No. A dismissal ends the charge, and an acquittal is a finding of not guilty that bars retrial. A mistrial simply stops the current trial without a verdict; in most situations the State may bring the case again before a new jury.
Do I have to request a lesser remedy before moving for a mistrial?
Not always, but it usually matters. If the error could have been cured by an instruction to disregard and you did not ask for one, an appellate court will not reverse for the denial of a mistrial. When the error is truly incurable, the motion for mistrial alone preserves the issue.
Can the prosecutor's misconduct bar a retrial even if I asked for the mistrial?
Yes, in a narrow situation. If the prosecutor's conduct was intended to goad you into moving for a mistrial, double jeopardy bars a second trial. Ordinary error or overreaching is not enough; the exception requires proof of that specific intent.
How does an appeals court review a mistrial ruling?
For abuse of discretion. The appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and upholds it if the decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. It considers only the arguments that were before the trial judge when the ruling was made.

Sources & Authorities

  1. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.10 (Jeopardy)
  2. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.22 (Conversing With Jury)
  3. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.31 (Disagreement of Jury)
  4. U.S. Const. amend. V (Double Jeopardy Clause)
  5. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
  6. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
  7. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
  8. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978)
  9. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
  10. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
  11. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
  12. Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
  13. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978)
  14. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)

About the Authors

Reggie London

Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043514

Reggie London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC, defending clients across the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex in Texas state and federal criminal matters, including pretrial motion practice, suppression hearings, and trial.

Njeri London

Co-Founding Partner · Texas Bar No. 24043266

Njeri London is a co-founding partner of L and L Law Group, PLLC. She represents clients throughout North Texas in criminal defense, from pre-charge investigation through appeal, with a focus on motion strategy and courtroom advocacy.

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