Texas concealed carry defense

The Texas concealed-carry framework after HB 1927

Texas concealed-carry law operates through three intersecting statutory tracks — § 46.02 unlawful carrying (narrowed by Constitutional Carry), § 46.03 prohibited places (felony regardless of license status), and § 46.035 license-holder restrictions (Class A or felony depending on location). Each track has different mens-rea, defense, and licensing-consequence implications.

Section 46.035(a)-(b) license-holder violations

A Texas LTC holder commits a Class A misdemeanor under § 46.035 by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carrying a handgun in any of the enumerated prohibited locations or conditions. The most-common variants are § 46.035(b)(1) intoxication while carrying, § 46.035(b)(2) premises serving alcohol as a 51%-or-more revenue source (TABC 30.07 signage), and § 46.035(c) campus-carry exclusion zones. The base Class A punishment under § 12.21 is up to 1 year in county jail plus a fine up to $4,000. Section 46.035 applies only to LTC holders — non-licensed individuals carrying in these same locations face the broader § 46.03 framework.

Section 46.035(c)-(g) felony elevations

The Class A baseline elevates to a 3rd-degree felony — 2 to 10 years in TDCJ and a fine up to $10,000 under § 12.34 — when the carry occurs at a hospital or nursing facility (§ 46.035(b)(4)), an amusement park (§ 46.035(b)(5)), a place of religious worship that has notified by sign (§ 46.035(b)(6)), a polling place on election day or during early voting (§ 46.035(c)), a court or court office (§ 46.035(c)), a racetrack (§ 46.035(c)), or the secured area of an airport (§ 46.035(c)). The felony elevation makes these offenses among the most consequential license-holder violations in Texas law — a single conviction triggers a federal firearm disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 46.03 prohibited-places strict regime

Separate from the license-holder framework, § 46.03 creates a strict 3rd-degree felony for any person who knowingly possesses or goes with a firearm onto the premises of a school or educational institution, a polling place on election day or during early voting, a court or court office, a racetrack, a secured airport area, a jail or correctional facility, or an execution chamber on an execution day. Section 46.03 applies regardless of license status — a LTC holder carrying into a school or court faces both § 46.03 and § 46.035 exposure simultaneously, but the practical charge typically lodges under § 46.03 because of its broader application. The "knowingly" mens rea under § 6.03(b) is the defensible element.

Section 46.02 post-HB 1927

Section 46.02 (Unlawful Carrying of Weapons) was substantially narrowed by HB 1927 (2021) Constitutional Carry. The offense now applies primarily to individuals under 21, persons federally prohibited from firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), persons subject to protective orders, individuals engaged in criminal activity beyond a Class C traffic violation, and intoxicated persons carrying in public. The base offense remains a Class A misdemeanor with felony elevations under § 46.02(a-1) for carry on premises licensed or permitted to sell alcohol. The interaction between § 46.02 (everyone) and § 46.035 (license holders) creates frequent charging-decision questions for prosecutors — and frequent charge-bargaining opportunities for the defense.

Texas concealed-carry law in 2026 is the product of three overlapping statutory regimes that operate together to define when, where, and by whom a handgun may be carried. The 2021 enactment of HB 1927 — Constitutional Carry — reorganized but did not eliminate the framework. Adults 21 and older who are not federally prohibited may now carry without an LTC, but they remain subject to § 46.03 prohibited-place restrictions and to whatever location-specific rules the legislature has enacted. LTC holders gain reciprocity, school-zone exemptions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), and certain location exemptions in exchange for accepting the more detailed § 46.035 license-holder restrictions. The choice of which statutory framework applies to any given carrying incident is a charging-decision question that prosecutors make based on the defendant's license status and the circumstances of the carry.

The most-charged variants in DFW practice are not the dramatic ones. Schools, courts, and polling places generate news coverage but produce relatively few cases. The everyday concealed-carry prosecution involves three patterns: (1) an LTC holder consumes alcohol at a restaurant whose revenue from on-premises alcohol sales exceeds 51%, triggering § 46.035(b)(2); (2) an LTC holder is observed carrying after consuming alcohol or while showing intoxication signs at a traffic stop or other police contact, triggering § 46.035(b)(1); or (3) a LTC holder enters a property posted with a § 30.06 or § 30.07 sign and either does not notice or contests the sufficiency of the signage. Each of these has defensible elements and meaningful licensing consequences regardless of the criminal outcome.

Section 46.03 prohibited places — the felony strict liability regime

Section 46.03 creates 3rd-degree felony exposure for knowingly going with a firearm into a school, court, polling place, racetrack, secured airport area, jail, or execution chamber. The "knowingly" mens rea is the defensible element — actual awareness of the prohibited-place status, not constructive knowledge.

Texas Penal Code § 46.03 enumerates seven categories of prohibited places where carrying a firearm is a 3rd-degree felony regardless of license status: (1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, on any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being conducted, or in a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution; (2) on the premises of a polling place on the day of an election or while early voting is in progress; (3) on the premises of any government court or offices used by the court, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the court; (4) on the premises of a racetrack; (5) in or into a secured area of an airport; (6) within 1,000 feet of premises designated by the Department of Criminal Justice as a place of execution on a day when a sentence of death is set to be imposed; and (7) on the premises of a place of execution.

The mens-rea requirement is "knowingly" under § 6.03(b) — the actor must be aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. This is the defensible element. A defendant who genuinely did not know he was entering a court annex, did not realize the building housed a polling place, or did not understand that the leased commercial space was contained within a "school premises" as that term is statutorily defined has a viable mens-rea defense. The defense routinely investigates the actual physical signage, the property layout, the defendant's familiarity with the location, and any contemporaneous statements that bear on awareness.

The school-premises definition is broader than many defendants realize. Under § 46.03(a)(1) the prohibition reaches not just the main school building but the grounds, parking lots, school-sponsored activities (including off-site athletic events and academic competitions), and school-transportation vehicles. A parent attending an evening PTA meeting, a contractor working on summer-break maintenance, and a passerby cutting across a school lot can all fall within the statute. Sub-section (g) provides limited exceptions for peace officers, military members on duty, and certain licensed school-security personnel — but the exceptions are narrow and do not cover ordinary LTC holders who have not been individually designated.

The court-premises framework includes both the courtroom itself and the offices used by the court — judge's chambers, court-clerk offices, jury rooms, court-reporter offices, probation-officer offices co-located with the court, and similar adjacent spaces. Mixed-use government buildings present recurring confusion: an LTC holder may legally carry into a county administration building but commit a felony by stepping through a door that opens into the court-clerk's public-counter area in the same building. Defense investigation of the building layout, signage, and the defendant's actual path through the facility regularly produces mens-rea defenses where the State's narrative assumes awareness the defendant did not actually have.

Intoxication while carrying under § 46.035(b)(1)

Section 46.035(b)(1) makes it a Class A misdemeanor for a Texas LTC holder to carry a handgun while intoxicated. The intoxication standard is the same as DWI under § 49.01(2) — loss of normal mental or physical faculties or BAC ≥0.08. No threatening conduct, no operating a vehicle, no specific risk is required.

Section 46.035(b)(1) is among the most-charged concealed-carry violations in Texas practice — and one of the most-misunderstood by license holders. The statute makes it a Class A misdemeanor for an LTC holder to carry a handgun while intoxicated. Intoxication under § 49.01(2) means either (A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body, or (B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The defining feature of § 46.035(b)(1) is what it does not require: no threatening conduct, no brandishing of the weapon, no operating a vehicle, no specific risk to anyone — the offense is the simultaneous combination of intoxication and carrying.

The typical fact pattern is a traffic stop or other public encounter with police where the officer detects alcohol on the LTC holder's breath, observes performance impairment, or learns of recent consumption. The LTC holder informs the officer of the handgun pursuant to the disclosure obligation in 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 6.42, and the officer then arrests for § 46.035(b)(1) on the basis of suspected intoxication. The arrest can occur even in the absence of an underlying DWI charge — the defendant need not have been operating a vehicle, need not have been driving impaired, need not have committed any traffic violation. The defense routinely investigates the intoxication evidence with the same rigor applied to a contested DWI prosecution: standardized field sobriety test administration, breath or blood specimen reliability, scope of stop, probable cause for arrest.

Allen v. State, 605 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020), is the modern Texas appellate decision on sufficiency review under § 46.035(b)(1). The Court held that the State must prove both that the defendant was carrying a handgun and that he was intoxicated at the time of the carry — the elements are independent and each must satisfy the standard of review under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Where the State proved possession at one time and intoxication at another time, but failed to prove their contemporaneity, the conviction did not stand. This timing element is the most contested factual question in many cases — did the defendant become intoxicated only after returning to his car or his home, when he was no longer "carrying" in the statutory sense?

The licensing consequence of a § 46.035(b)(1) conviction is severe. 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 6.81 requires mandatory revocation of the LTC on a conviction of any § 46.035 offense, including this one. The revocation is independent of the criminal sentence — even a deferred-adjudication plea that produces no formal "conviction" for many purposes is treated by the Texas Department of Public Safety as a triggering event for license revocation. The combined criminal-and-licensing exposure is one reason that experienced defense counsel pursues vigorous pretrial motion practice in § 46.035(b)(1) cases even where the State's offer on the criminal charge appears facially reasonable.

§ 30.06 and § 30.07 sign-based trespass by license holder

Sections 30.06 (concealed carry) and 30.07 (open carry) prohibit license-holder entry where the property owner has posted statutorily-compliant signage. The signs must satisfy specific formatting requirements — Spanish and English, contrasting colors, one-inch block letters, conspicuous entry placement. Sign-sufficiency challenges are the defense workhorse.

Texas Penal Code § 30.06 prohibits an LTC holder from carrying a concealed handgun on property where the property owner has given notice that the holder may not enter with a concealed handgun. Notice may be given by (1) oral communication from a property owner or someone acting with apparent authority, (2) written communication, or (3) the statutorily-prescribed sign. The sign must satisfy specific formatting requirements: a posted card or sign that includes the prescribed statutory language in English and Spanish, in contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height, and conspicuously displayed clearly visible to the public at each entrance to the property. The parallel § 30.07 statute covers openly-carried handguns with substantially identical requirements.

A first-time violation of § 30.06 (entering with a concealed handgun where notice was given) is a Class C misdemeanor — a fine up to $200 with no jail exposure. The offense elevates to a Class A misdemeanor (up to 1 year in county jail and a $4,000 fine) if the LTC holder receives notice that entry with a concealed handgun was prohibited and the holder fails to leave. The two-tier structure means that an LTC holder who enters a § 30.06-posted property unaware of the sign and immediately departs when informed faces minimal exposure — but a holder who refuses to leave, argues with the property owner, or returns after notice faces meaningful criminal liability.

Texas v. Heinrich, 478 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015), is the leading Texas case on § 30.06 sign sufficiency. The Court addressed whether a sign that omitted certain statutory language or that used non-conforming formatting could support a § 30.06 conviction. The decision and subsequent cases require strict compliance with the statutory specifications — a sign that lacks the Spanish translation, that uses letters smaller than one inch, that omits any portion of the prescribed text, or that is not conspicuously placed at each entrance fails to give the statutorily-required notice. The defense routinely photographs the actual signage, measures letter heights, documents placement relative to entrances, and challenges sufficiency on each of these grounds.

The interaction between § 30.06 and § 46.035(b)(2) creates a recurring source of confusion. Section 46.035(b)(2) prohibits LTC-holder carry on the premises of a business that derives 51 percent or more of its income from the sale or service of alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption — the "51% sign" regime under TABC 30.07. This is a separate statute from § 30.06/30.07 trespass-by-license-holder, with separate signage requirements (red circle with diagonal bar, "51%" designation), separate mens-rea requirements, and separate punishment. An LTC holder entering a restaurant that posts only a § 30.06 sign (not a 51% sign) faces § 30.06 trespass exposure but not § 46.035(b)(2) exposure. An LTC holder entering a bar with a 51% TABC sign faces § 46.035(b)(2) felony exposure (the statute elevates to a 3rd-degree felony for premises with the TABC 51% designation). Defense work on these cases begins with identifying which sign was actually posted, in what location, and with what statutory compliance.

Defense strategies for concealed-carry violations

Defense strategies in concealed-carry cases focus on the "knowingly" mens-rea element, sign-sufficiency challenges, intoxication-element contests, campus-carry rule navigation, and charge-bargaining between § 46.035 and § 46.02 frameworks. Each fact pattern produces different defensible elements.

The first-line defense in most § 46.03 prohibited-places prosecutions is the mens-rea attack. The statute requires that the defendant "knowingly" possessed or went with a firearm into the prohibited location. The State must prove that the defendant was actually aware of the location's status as a prohibited place — not merely that he was physically present there with a firearm. Defense investigation focuses on the building signage, the defendant's familiarity with the property, contemporaneous statements suggesting awareness or unawareness, and the actual physical layout of the facility. In a mixed-use government building, an LTC holder may have entered through a door he had used many times for non-court purposes, with no signage suggesting he was now in court-office space — and the State's ability to prove "knowingly" collapses.

In § 30.06/30.07 trespass cases, the defense workhorse is sign-sufficiency challenge under Heinrich and its progeny. The statute prescribes exact formatting — Spanish and English text, specific language ("Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with a concealed handgun)..."), contrasting colors, one-inch block letters, conspicuous placement at each entrance. The defense photographs every sign at every entrance, measures letter heights with a ruler, compares the actual text to the statutory language word-by-word, and identifies any deficiency. A single deficient sign defeats the notice element and produces an acquittal or dismissal. In a multi-entrance property where some signs comply and others do not, the defense narrows the State's proof to the specific entrance the defendant used — which may or may not have had a compliant sign.

In § 46.035(b)(1) intoxication cases, the defense applies DWI-defense rigor to the intoxication evidence. Standardized field sobriety tests must be administered consistent with NHTSA standards; deviations undermine the officer's probable-cause determination. Breath specimens require properly calibrated instruments, qualified operators, and observation-period compliance. Blood specimens require valid chain of custody, court-ordered warrants where applicable, and laboratory testing within the legal limits of detection accuracy. The contemporaneity element — was the defendant intoxicated AT THE TIME he was carrying — is independently contested where the defendant's consumption pattern, observed conduct, and circumstances of the police contact create timing ambiguity.

Campus-carry cases under § 46.035(c) turn on the institutional exclusion-zone designations. Texas public universities are required to publish their exclusion zones — specific areas where LTC-holder carry remains prohibited even after the general campus-carry authorization. Common exclusion zones include residence halls, athletic facilities, certain laboratories, mental-health and patient-care areas, and faculty-only spaces. The defense obtains the institution's current published exclusion-zone map, confirms the location of the alleged carry against that map, and tests whether the institution complied with statutory notice requirements. An LTC holder who entered an area that was not properly designated as an exclusion zone has a complete defense to § 46.035(c).

Charge-bargaining between § 46.035 (license-holder) and § 46.02 (general unlawful-carry) is a recurring negotiation. Where the State has charged the more-restrictive § 46.035 framework but the underlying facts also support a § 46.02 charge (intoxication, prohibited person, prohibited place under § 46.02), the defense may negotiate a plea to the § 46.02 charge instead. The criminal penalties may be similar, but the licensing consequence under 37 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 6.11-6.61 may differ — and the federal-firearm-disability calculus under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) may differ. Experienced defense counsel evaluates the long-term licensing and federal-disability consequences of each potential plea and structures the negotiation accordingly.

HB 1927 Constitutional Carry — what changed and what didn't

HB 1927 (2021) created permitless carry for adults 21+ who are not federally prohibited. It narrowed § 46.02 but did NOT eliminate § 46.03 prohibited places, § 46.035 license-holder restrictions, or § 30.06/30.07 trespass-by-sign liability. Defendants regularly misunderstand the scope of the change.

HB 1927, effective September 1, 2021, fundamentally restructured Texas baseline carry law without eliminating the location-specific and conduct-specific restrictions that govern concealed-carry violations. The headline change: adults 21 and older who are not federally prohibited from firearm possession, not subject to a protective order, and not engaged in criminal activity beyond a Class C traffic violation may now carry a handgun without an LTC. Section 46.02 was narrowed accordingly — the offense now applies primarily to individuals under 21, federally prohibited persons, individuals subject to active protective orders, intoxicated persons carrying in public, and persons engaged in concurrent criminal activity.

What HB 1927 did not change is at least as important as what it did. Section 46.03 prohibited places remain enforceable — schools, courts, polling places, racetracks, secured airport areas, jails, and execution chambers continue to produce 3rd-degree felony exposure for anyone (licensed or not) who knowingly carries into them. Section 46.035 license-holder restrictions remain enforceable against LTC holders — the intoxication restriction, the alcohol-premises restriction, the hospital/polling-place/school/government-meeting felony elevations, and the campus-carry framework all continue to apply. Sections 30.06 and 30.07 trespass-by-license-holder liability remains enforceable — and importantly, applies only to LTC holders, not to non-licensed Constitutional Carriers, who can be prosecuted under § 30.05 ordinary criminal trespass for the same conduct.

The Bruen-era constitutional context — NYSRPA v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) — provides additional Second Amendment scrutiny for any restriction on firearm carry. Under Bruen, a regulation that burdens Second Amendment-protected conduct must be consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Several lower-court decisions have considered whether specific Texas prohibited-place restrictions survive Bruen analysis, with mixed results. The doctrine is evolving rapidly, and Texas defense counsel routinely preserve Bruen-based constitutional challenges for appellate review, particularly in cases involving novel prohibited-place applications or signage-based restrictions.

Retroactivity issues from the 2021 enactment continue to surface. Conduct that occurred before September 1, 2021 is governed by the prior § 46.02 framework — which required an LTC for most public carry. A defendant whose alleged conduct straddles the effective-date boundary, or whose case was indicted before September 2021 but tried after, raises retroactivity questions that the defense routinely briefs. The general rule is that the statute in effect at the time of the conduct governs — but where the new statute is more lenient and the legislature did not specify retroactive application, defendants regularly argue for the benefit of the post-HB 1927 framework under Holcomb v. State and similar Texas decisions on statutory ameliorations.

Local DFW practice — parking lots, restaurants, and campus carry

DFW concealed-carry defense practice concentrates on three recurring patterns: parking-lot exposure adjacent to prohibited places, restaurant carry where 51% TABC signs are improperly posted, and campus-carry exclusion-zone confusion at UT-Dallas, UNT, SMU, and the community college system.

The parking-lot question under § 46.03 is one of the most-litigated practical issues in DFW concealed-carry practice. Texas Penal Code § 46.03 prohibits carry on the "premises" of a school, court, polling place, or other listed location. The definition of "premises" under § 46.035(f)(3) is "a building or a portion of a building" — explicitly excluding parking lots, parking garages, driveways, streets, sidewalks, walkways, or other passageways. The result: an LTC holder generally may store a handgun in a vehicle in a school parking lot, court parking garage, or other listed-location adjacent area, provided the firearm is not removed from the vehicle and brought into the prohibited "premises" itself. This rule has narrow exceptions — secured airport areas (where vehicle-storage is also prohibited), correctional-facility parking areas (where institutional regulations may apply), and certain college residence-hall parking — but the general parking-lot exclusion is broad and has produced acquittals in cases where defendants assumed they had violated the statute.

Restaurant carry under § 46.035(b)(2) and TABC 30.07 produces frequent prosecutions in DFW. The "51% sign" requirement triggers when a business derives 51% or more of its gross receipts from the on-premises sale or service of alcoholic beverages — typically full-service bars, certain dance clubs, and some upscale restaurants where alcohol service is the primary revenue source. A standard restaurant that serves alcohol incidentally to food service does not require the 51% sign and does not produce § 46.035(b)(2) exposure for an LTC holder who carries inside. The defense investigation begins with TABC public records on the establishment's permit class and revenue mix — many establishments post 51% signs out of caution that the statute does not actually require, and an LTC holder who carried into such an establishment has a viable defense based on the absence of the statutory predicate.

Campus carry in the DFW region operates across several institutional contexts: the University of Texas at Dallas (public, full campus-carry authority subject to published exclusion zones), the University of North Texas (Denton — public, similar framework), Southern Methodist University (private, may opt out — and has), Texas Christian University in nearby Fort Worth (private), Dallas College community college system (public, multi-campus framework), and Collin College (public, multi-campus). Each institution publishes its own exclusion-zone policy, and the boundaries change periodically. An LTC holder who carried in what was an authorized area three years ago may now be in a designated exclusion zone — and vice versa. The defense routinely obtains the institution's current published exclusion-zone map, dated to the time of the alleged conduct, and tests the State's evidence against that documentation.

Government-meeting carry under § 46.035(c) produces occasional prosecutions related to city-council meetings, school-board meetings, county-commission meetings, and similar deliberative bodies. The statute requires that the meeting be one of the categories enumerated by the legislature — generally, meetings of a governmental entity that has been given notice by sign at each entrance. The defense investigation focuses on whether the specific meeting was statutorily covered, whether proper notice was posted, and whether the carry occurred during the meeting itself or only in adjacent spaces. Frisco, Plano, McKinney, and other DFW suburban municipalities produce occasional cases in this category — the defense work is similar in structure to the prohibited-places investigation under § 46.03.

When to retain counsel — licensing consequences make early representation critical

The licensing consequence of any § 46.035 conviction — mandatory LTC revocation under 37 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 6.11-6.61, plus potential federal firearm disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — makes early defense representation critical. Plea decisions that look reasonable on the criminal record carry licensing consequences that endure for years.

The licensing consequence of a concealed-carry conviction is what separates these prosecutions from most other misdemeanor cases. 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 6.81 requires mandatory revocation of the Texas LTC on a conviction of any § 46.035 offense, on any felony conviction, and on any conviction for an offense involving the use of force against another. The revocation is administrative — it operates independently of the criminal sentence, and it triggers even on a deferred-adjudication plea that the criminal court may treat as something less than a conviction. Reinstatement after revocation is not automatic; the holder must wait the statutory period and reapply, with no guarantee of reissuance.

The federal firearm-disability calculus under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is the second consequence that often surprises defendants and their families. A conviction for any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment — which includes felony charges under § 46.03 prohibited places (3rd-degree felony, 2-10 years), elevated § 46.035 offenses (3rd-degree felony at hospital, polling place, school, or government meeting), and § 46.035(b)(2) on TABC 51% premises (3rd-degree felony under specified conditions) — triggers a federal prohibition on possessing firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce. The federal disability is lifetime, with limited restoration pathways. A defendant who pleads to a felony concealed-carry charge thinking the criminal-sentence consequences are manageable may discover after the fact that he has lost his right to possess any firearm under federal law.

Early defense representation matters because the cases that resolve favorably typically resolve favorably because of work done in the first 30-90 days. Mens-rea evidence (defendant's knowledge of the prohibited-place status, knowledge of the signage, knowledge of the 51% premises) must be preserved while memories are fresh and contemporaneous documentation is accessible. Intoxication evidence in § 46.035(b)(1) cases requires immediate preservation of body-worn camera footage, breath/blood specimen retesting where applicable, and witness identification. Sign-sufficiency evidence under § 30.06/30.07 requires photography of the actual signage as it existed at the time of the alleged conduct — signs change, and a sign-sufficiency defense based on a photograph taken six months after the incident may be defeated by State evidence that the property owner replaced the sign in the interim.

The plea negotiation posture is also shaped by early work. Prosecutors evaluate the strength of the State's case based on the discovery they receive and the defense theory they perceive — a defense that has invested in sign-sufficiency photography, mens-rea investigation, and intoxication-evidence challenge presents a different negotiating posture than a defense that simply waits for the State's offer. Charge-bargaining opportunities — § 46.035 reduced to § 46.02, § 46.03 reduced to a Class A misdemeanor under a different statute, deferred adjudication on a misdemeanor framework with eligibility for non-disclosure — are most available when defense counsel has positioned the case with thorough pretrial investigation.