The Texas FSRA framework — § 550.021 and the grade ladder
Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 imposes a five-part duty on any driver involved in an accident causing personal injury or death. The grade ladder runs from Class B misdemeanor (injury short of SBI) through 3rd-degree felony (serious bodily injury or death), with damage-only accidents falling under the separate § 550.023 framework.
- § 550.021(c)(1)(A) — Death (3rd-degree felony, 5-year minimum)
- Where the accident at issue caused the death of a person, the FSRA charge is a 3rd-degree felony under § 550.021(c)(1)(A). The general 3rd-degree felony range under Penal Code § 12.34 is 2 to 10 years in TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000 — but § 550.021(c)(1)(A) imposes a 5-year statutory minimum where death occurs, raising the effective floor to 5 years. The State must prove (1) the defendant operated a vehicle, (2) involved in an accident, (3) producing the death of a person, (4) and the defendant failed to satisfy one or more of the five statutory duties. Knowledge of the accident is the universally contested element.
- § 550.021(c)(1)(B) — Serious bodily injury (3rd-degree felony, no minimum)
- Where the accident caused serious bodily injury (as defined by Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46) — substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ), the FSRA charge is a 3rd-degree felony under § 550.021(c)(1)(B). The range is 2 to 10 years TDCJ plus a fine up to $10,000, without the death-tier statutory minimum. The SBI determination is itself contested in nearly every case — the defense routinely retains a forensic-medicine expert to challenge the State's characterization of the injury as meeting the § 1.07(a)(46) definition. A successful SBI challenge moves the case from felony exposure (2-10 years) to Class B misdemeanor exposure (up to 180 days county jail) under § 550.022.
- § 550.022 — Injury without SBI (Class B misdemeanor)
- Where the accident caused personal injury but the injury does not meet the Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46) "serious bodily injury" definition, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor under § 550.022 — up to 180 days county jail plus a fine up to $2,000. The duties under § 550.022 parallel those imposed by § 550.021: immediately stop, return, remain, exchange information. Section 550.022 operates as the principal lesser-included framework for any § 550.021 prosecution where the SBI characterization is contestable. A successful downward shift from § 550.021 to § 550.022 reduces TDCJ exposure to county-jail exposure and converts a felony conviction into a misdemeanor conviction.
- § 550.023 — Damage-only accidents (Class C or B misdemeanor)
- Where the accident caused damage to a vehicle but no personal injury or death, the duties shift to § 550.023. The grade falls to a Class C misdemeanor (fine only, no jail) if the damage is under $200, or a Class B misdemeanor if damage is $200 or more. The duties — immediately stop, return, remain, exchange information — track those of § 550.021 and § 550.022. Section 550.023 represents the lowest rung on the FSRA grade ladder and the principal charge-bargaining destination when the defense can demonstrate that no personal injury occurred. The damage-only framework operates outside the criminal-felony exposure entirely and produces fine-only outcomes in routine cases.
The Texas FSRA framework is structured as a tier of duties, each imposed on the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, and a parallel tier of grades calibrated to the severity of resulting injury. The statutory architecture in Transportation Code §§ 550.021-550.024 represents one of the more carefully graded offense structures in Texas criminal law — the legislature has built explicit grade tiers (Class C misdemeanor through 3rd-degree felony with mandatory minimum) that map directly to specific injury severities (no injury, minor damage, injury short of SBI, SBI, death).
The first-stage analysis in any FSRA case is grade identification. Was there personal injury? Was the injury severe enough to meet the Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46) "serious bodily injury" definition? Did any person die at the scene or in subsequent medical treatment? These threshold questions drive grade and therefore drive sentencing exposure — and they are routinely contested. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decisions defining "serious bodily injury" require a fact-specific analysis: temporary cuts and bruises do not constitute SBI; broken bones requiring surgery often do; permanent scarring on a visible body part may; concussions of varying severity raise close questions. Defense-retained forensic-medicine experts evaluate the medical records, surgical reports, and treatment course to determine whether the SBI characterization can be challenged.
The five statutory duties under § 550.021
Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 imposes five distinct duties on any driver involved in an accident producing personal injury or death. Breach of any single duty is sufficient to support a § 550.021 charge — but the State must prove knowledge of the accident as a precondition.
The first duty is to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible. The duty is "immediately" — meaning the driver must stop as soon as it is safe and practical to do so. Where stopping in the lane of traffic would create additional hazards, the driver may move the vehicle to the shoulder or to a nearby safe location, but must stop at the first available opportunity. A delayed stop, even by minutes, can supply the basis for a § 550.021 charge where the State can prove the delay was unjustified by safety considerations. The "stop" requirement is generally non-controversial when the defendant's vehicle is itself drivable; it becomes more nuanced when the vehicle is disabled, when the impact was severe enough that the driver may have been injured, or when the location is inherently dangerous.
The second duty is to return to and remain at the scene of the accident. A driver who initially stops and then leaves before satisfying the other duties has breached this requirement and is subject to FSRA prosecution. The "return" component covers cases where the initial stop was at some distance from the scene — the driver must return to the scene itself, not just stop somewhere nearby. The "remain" component requires the driver to stay at the scene until they have satisfied the other duties (determining who needs aid, exchanging information, rendering reasonable assistance). Brief departures for justified safety reasons (moving to call 911 where cell service is unavailable, retrieving emergency equipment) generally do not breach the duty if the driver returns promptly.
The third duty is to determine whether anyone involved in the accident requires aid. This requires the driver to make a reasonable assessment of the condition of other persons at the scene — not to perform a medical evaluation, but to ascertain whether visible injury or distress suggests the need for medical attention. The duty is calibrated to what a reasonable layperson can assess: visible bleeding, loss of consciousness, complaints of pain, inability to move, slurred speech, or other signs of significant injury all trigger the obligation to summon medical help. The duty does not require the driver to physically examine the injured person — visual observation from a safe distance is sufficient where physical proximity is impractical or dangerous.
The fourth duty is to give name, address, vehicle registration information, and the name of the driver's motor vehicle liability insurer (under § 550.023 the same information must be given) to any person injured in the accident, the operator or occupant of any vehicle involved, and any investigating law enforcement officer. The exchange of information is a documentation requirement — names, addresses, license plate numbers, and insurance carrier names must be communicated, either orally or in writing. A driver who provides this information but fails to perform other duties remains in breach; a driver who satisfies the stop, return, and remain duties but fails to exchange information likewise remains in breach. The duty extends to investigating officers — failure to provide information when asked by responding law enforcement is itself a basis for FSRA charges.
The fifth duty is to render reasonable assistance under Transp. Code § 550.024 to any person injured in the accident, including making arrangements to transport that person to a physician or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent treatment is necessary or if the injured person requests it. The duty is reasonable assistance — not heroic intervention. Calling 911, waiting for first responders, flagging down other motorists, providing basic comfort and reassurance — all qualify as reasonable assistance under § 550.024. The duty does not require the driver to perform medical procedures, render first aid beyond their training, or place themselves at risk of physical harm. The defense routinely demonstrates that the driver satisfied the reasonable-assistance duty even where the driver did not physically touch the injured person — the duty is calibrated to the circumstances faced, not to a standardized first-aid protocol.
The knowledge-of-accident element — Jeffley and the mens-rea floor
Texas FSRA prosecutions require proof that the defendant knew an accident had occurred. The knowledge element is not statutorily expressed but has been read into the offense by appellate courts since Beard v. State (1970) and Jeffley v. State (1997). Circumstantial proof is permitted, but the State must show actual knowledge.
Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 does not, on its face, contain an explicit mens-rea element. The statute reads in terms of a driver who is "involved in an accident" and is then required to perform the five duties — there is no statutory word like "knowingly," "intentionally," or "with knowledge that an accident occurred." But Texas appellate courts have long read a knowledge element into the offense, reasoning that the duties cannot logically be imposed on a driver who is unaware that an accident occurred. Beard v. State, 458 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), is the foundational Texas decision establishing that knowledge of the accident is required for an FSRA conviction. Jeffley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997), refined the analysis: the State must prove the defendant had actual knowledge that an accident occurred. Allen v. State, 971 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998), confirmed that circumstantial proof can supply the inference of knowledge where direct evidence is unavailable.
The State proves knowledge through some combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence — admissions to police, statements to friends or family, social media posts — is rare and often disputed. Circumstantial proof is the more common route: the impact was severe enough that any driver would have heard or felt it; the vehicle damage is consistent with substantial force; the defendant was seen swerving or driving erratically immediately after the impact; the defendant did not stop despite physical sensation of impact; the defendant returned home and concealed the damaged vehicle; the defendant disposed of evidence of the accident. Each of these is a fact-bound inference that the jury weighs against the defense theory.
The defense in nearly every FSRA case develops a counter-theory on knowledge. Did the impact actually produce a sensation the driver would have noticed? Was the driver distracted by something inside the vehicle (a child, a phone call, conversation with a passenger)? Was the road condition (rough pavement, expansion joints, potholes) the kind that would mask the sensation of impact? Was visibility limited by darkness, weather, or sun glare? Was the driver fatigued, ill, or under the influence of prescribed medication that would have dulled awareness? Each of these can support a defense argument that the driver did not in fact know an accident had occurred — and therefore cannot be found criminally liable for failing to perform the statutory duties.
Accident-reconstruction expert work is often dispositive. A defense-retained reconstruction expert can analyze the vehicle damage, the impact geometry, the speed and direction of travel, and the physical evidence at the scene to assess whether the impact would have produced a sensation the driver could not reasonably have missed. Where the reconstruction supports an argument that the impact was glancing, low-speed, or otherwise unlikely to produce noticeable sensation, the defense theory on knowledge becomes credible. Where the reconstruction confirms a significant impact, the knowledge defense becomes much harder to maintain. The reconstruction work begins early in the case — physical evidence at the scene degrades quickly, and the defense must act promptly to preserve and analyze what is available.
The § 550.022 lesser-included framework — SBI challenges
Texas Transportation Code § 550.022 operates as the principal lesser-included offense framework for § 550.021 prosecutions. Where the State characterizes an injury as serious bodily injury, the defense routinely challenges the characterization — a successful challenge collapses the felony into a Class B misdemeanor.
The SBI characterization is the dispositive fact distinguishing § 550.021 (3rd-degree felony) from § 550.022 (Class B misdemeanor). Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46) defines "serious bodily injury" as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, causes serious permanent disfigurement, or causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. The definition has been interpreted in extensive Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case law. Williams v. State, 696 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), addresses the substantial-risk-of-death prong. Hernandez v. State, 946 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.), addresses serious permanent disfigurement. Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), addresses protracted loss or impairment.
In FSRA prosecutions, the SBI determination is rarely binary. Many injuries fall in a contested middle range — broken bones that heal completely; concussions of varying severity; cuts requiring stitches but not surgery; soft-tissue injuries causing pain but no permanent impairment. The defense routinely retains a forensic-medicine expert to evaluate the medical records, surgical reports, and treatment course and to opine on whether the injury meets the § 1.07(a)(46) definition. Where the expert concludes the injury does not meet SBI, the defense moves to challenge the indictment, to seek a lesser-included instruction on § 550.022 at the charge conference, or to negotiate a downward charge revision with the prosecutor.
The downward shift from § 550.021 to § 550.022 collapses 2-10 years TDCJ exposure into up to 180 days county jail exposure. It also converts a felony conviction (with all the collateral consequences — voting rights, firearm rights, professional licenses, employment background checks) into a Class B misdemeanor conviction with significantly fewer collateral consequences. The negotiation leverage in any contested SBI case is the strength of the defense forensic-medicine work and the credibility of the alternative-characterization theory. Prosecutors routinely accept downward charge revisions where the defense forensic medicine is solid and the trial risk is non-trivial.
The further downward shift to § 550.023 — damage-only with no personal injury — is available only where the defense can demonstrate that no personal injury occurred at all. This is the rarer scenario in FSRA cases (because by definition the State is prosecuting because someone was injured), but it arises occasionally where the alleged injuries are highly disputed or where the medical evidence is thin. A § 550.023 outcome converts the charge to fine-only (Class C) or misdemeanor county jail (Class B) and effectively eliminates the criminal-record consequences of the prosecution.
Defense strategies — knowledge, identification, and lesser-included
FSRA defense strategy centers on three pillars: negating the knowledge-of-accident element under Jeffley/Beard, contesting the SBI characterization to push to § 550.022, and challenging the identification of the defendant as the driver. Voluntariness, alternative-driver theory, and § 38.23 suppression of identification methods all play supporting roles.
Knowledge negation is the first-priority defense strategy in any FSRA case. The State must prove the defendant actually knew an accident had occurred — and circumstantial proof, while permitted, is rarely overwhelming. The defense develops the record on distractions, road conditions, vehicle characteristics, weather, time of day, and any other factor supporting the inference that the driver did not perceive the impact. Defense-retained accident-reconstruction experts analyze the impact geometry and the physical evidence to assess whether the sensation of impact was such that the driver could plausibly have missed it. Jeffley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997), and Beard v. State, 458 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), supply the legal framework, and Allen v. State, 971 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998), confirms that the defense need only raise reasonable doubt on knowledge.
Insufficient-injury challenges drive the SBI-versus-misdemeanor analysis. Where the State has indicted under § 550.021 (3rd-degree felony, SBI or death), the defense challenges the SBI characterization to push the case down to § 550.022 (Class B misdemeanor, injury without SBI) or even to § 550.023 (damage-only). Defense forensic-medicine experts evaluate the injury records and develop alternative-characterization theories. Successful SBI challenges produce charge revisions, jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, and significant reductions in sentencing exposure. The case-law foundation under Williams v. State, 696 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), provides the analytical framework.
Voluntariness-of-leaving defenses arise where the driver had a compelling reason not to remain at the scene. Medical emergency — the driver themselves was injured or in shock, or had a passenger requiring urgent medical attention — can negate the volitional element of leaving. Fear of attack — where the driver reasonably believed remaining at the scene would expose them to threats of violence — has supported defense theories in cases involving road-rage incidents or accidents in high-crime areas. Necessity under Penal Code § 9.22 (the immediate availability of which is debated for traffic offenses) and duress under § 8.05 (also debated in this context) provide secondary statutory grounds. The voluntariness defense is fact-intensive but can be powerful where the underlying circumstances are documented.
Identification challenges target the State's proof that this particular defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. In FSRA cases the defendant typically is not present at the scene when police arrive — they have left, by definition, in the prosecuted scenario. Identification of the defendant as the driver therefore relies on witness identification (often partial or limited), vehicle registration (which proves ownership, not operation), traffic-camera or surveillance footage (variable quality), and circumstantial inferences (the defendant was seen near the accident scene; the defendant had access to the vehicle). The defense challenges the reliability of eyewitness identifications under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and Texas-specific frameworks like Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), regarding suggestive identification procedures.
Alternative-driver theories require the defense to develop affirmative evidence that someone other than the defendant was operating the vehicle. Family members, friends, employees, or borrowers may have had access to the vehicle. Where the defense can establish a credible alternative-driver theory — supported by alibi evidence, third-party statements, or physical evidence pointing away from the defendant — the State's burden on the identification element becomes much harder to meet. The alternative-driver theory is most effective where the State's identification evidence is weak (no witnesses to the actual driver, no clear footage, only vehicle-registration circumstantial proof).
Article 38.23 suppression motions target the methods by which the State developed identification evidence. Suggestive show-up procedures, improperly conducted photo lineups, custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings producing identification admissions, and warrantless searches producing vehicle-link evidence are all subject to suppression. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), addresses the application of the exclusionary rule under art. 38.23 to identification evidence. Successful suppression of key identification evidence collapses the State's case on the identity element and often produces favorable plea-negotiation outcomes.
Charge bargaining to misdemeanor damage-only resolution is the practical endpoint in many cases. Even where the State has solid evidence of knowledge and identification, the SBI characterization and the precise scope of duties breached are routinely contested. Plea negotiations frequently produce a § 550.022 (Class B misdemeanor) or § 550.023 (Class C or B misdemeanor) outcome where the defense has developed credible challenges to the felony characterization. The end-result conviction is dramatically lower in severity and avoids the collateral consequences of a 3rd-degree felony — voting rights, firearm rights, professional licenses, immigration status.
Companion DWI and homicide charges — § 49.07, § 49.08, manslaughter
FSRA prosecutions frequently arrive bundled with companion charges — intoxication assault (§ 49.07), intoxication manslaughter (§ 49.08), criminally negligent homicide (§ 19.05), or manslaughter (§ 19.04). The companion-charge structure dramatically increases sentencing exposure and complicates plea negotiation.
Texas FSRA cases involving death rarely arrive as standalone § 550.021 prosecutions. The State typically files § 550.021 alongside one or more companion charges — most commonly § 49.08 intoxication manslaughter (where intoxication is alleged), § 19.04 manslaughter (where recklessness is alleged), or § 19.05 criminally negligent homicide. Each companion charge carries its own sentencing exposure, its own mens-rea element, and its own defense strategy. The aggregate exposure can range from 5-10 years (FSRA alone) up to 20+ years (FSRA stacked with manslaughter or intoxication manslaughter) or beyond.
Intoxication manslaughter under Penal Code § 49.08 is the most common companion charge in fatal FSRA cases. It is a 2nd-degree felony (2-20 years TDCJ) and is enumerated as a 3g aggravated offense under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b)(7) — restricting community supervision and lengthening parole eligibility to the lesser of one-half the sentence or 30 calendar years with no good-conduct credit. Where the State can prove both intoxication manslaughter and FSRA, the cumulative exposure is significant and the available defenses must address both charges in parallel. Defense work on the intoxication element — blood-draw chain of custody, instrument calibration, retrograde-extrapolation challenges — proceeds alongside the FSRA-specific knowledge and SBI work.
Intoxication assault under § 49.07 plays the parallel role in non-fatal FSRA cases where the State alleges intoxication caused serious bodily injury. It is a 3rd-degree felony (2-10 years TDCJ) and arrives stacked with the § 550.021 FSRA charge in many cases. The combined exposure is significant. The defense work on intoxication assault tracks the DWI defense framework (blood-draw challenges, ALR proceedings, intoxication-element challenges) and the FSRA defense work proceeds on its own track.
Manslaughter under Penal Code § 19.04 is a 2nd-degree felony (2-20 years TDCJ) that can arrive as a companion charge in non-intoxication FSRA fatalities. The mens-rea element is recklessness under Penal Code § 6.03(c) — subjective awareness of and conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The State must prove that the defendant's driving conduct (not the act of leaving the scene) was reckless and caused the death. Defense work on manslaughter focuses on the recklessness element, accident-reconstruction expert work, and lesser-included instruction strategy on § 19.05 criminally negligent homicide.
Criminally negligent homicide under § 19.05 is a state-jail felony (180 days to 2 years in state jail) — substantially lower exposure than manslaughter. Where the State has alleged manslaughter, the defense routinely seeks a § 19.05 lesser-included instruction under the Hall/Royster framework. A jury that finds criminal negligence rather than recklessness shifts the case from 2-20 years (manslaughter) to 180 days to 2 years (criminally negligent homicide). When stacked with FSRA, the combined exposure remains significant but the manslaughter-tier reduction is meaningful.
Local DFW practice in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties
Local DFW practice in FSRA cases varies by county. Collin and Denton county prosecutors apply graduated charging policies that frequently produce § 550.022 misdemeanor outcomes where the SBI characterization is contestable. Dallas County and Tarrant County prosecute more aggressively but accept downward charge revisions where the defense work is strong.
Collin County (Frisco, Plano, McKinney, Allen, Frisco-area justice courts and the 199th, 366th, 380th, 416th, and 417th Judicial District Courts) handles FSRA cases through the Criminal District Attorney's Office. Prosecutorial policy in Collin County generally favors graduated charging — the SBI characterization is reviewed carefully, and felony charges are filed only where the SBI evidence is strong. Defense forensic-medicine work has high leverage in Collin County prosecutions, and plea negotiations frequently produce § 550.022 misdemeanor outcomes where the felony characterization is contestable. The Collin County District Courts handle felony FSRA cases; the County Courts at Law handle misdemeanor FSRA cases. Bond posture is generally moderate ($5,000-$25,000 for typical 3rd-degree felony FSRA cases, lower for misdemeanor).
Dallas County (the criminal district courts numbered 1 through 7 and the Criminal District Attorney's Office) handles a higher case volume than Collin County and applies somewhat more aggressive prosecutorial policy. Felony FSRA cases are routinely indicted and prosecuted to verdict where the defense does not develop substantive challenges. Defense work on the knowledge element and the SBI characterization remains the principal lever; identification challenges and alternative-driver theories play substantial supporting roles. The Dallas County Magistrate Court handles initial bond proceedings; the criminal district courts handle indicted felony cases. Bond posture in Dallas County is somewhat higher than in Collin County for comparable cases.
Denton County (Denton, Frisco-overlap area, Lewisville, Flower Mound) handles FSRA cases through the Criminal District Attorney's Office. The Denton County District Attorney's Office maintains an active vehicular-crimes unit that handles fatal and serious-injury FSRA cases. Local practice is broadly similar to Collin County in graduated charging policy — felony FSRA filings track the SBI evidence carefully, and misdemeanor outcomes are common where the defense forensic medicine challenges the SBI characterization. Bond posture is moderate.
Tarrant County (Fort Worth, Arlington, North Richland Hills) is the most populous county in the DFW area and handles a substantial FSRA caseload. The Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's Office prosecutes through specialized units that handle vehicular crimes and homicide. Bond posture in Tarrant County is moderate to high depending on the severity of the alleged injury and any companion intoxication or homicide charges. Plea-negotiation practice in Tarrant County is responsive to substantive defense work — successful knowledge-of-accident challenges and SBI characterization challenges routinely produce downward charge revisions.
When to retain counsel — the first 72 hours
FSRA defense work begins in the first 72 hours after the accident. Scene evidence degrades quickly, witness recollections fade, and law enforcement investigative steps proceed regardless of whether the driver has retained counsel. Early counsel retention is essential to preserve evidence, structure interactions with police, and develop defense theory.
The first 72 hours after a Texas FSRA-charged accident are the most critical for defense work. Scene evidence — skid marks, debris patterns, vehicle position — degrades within hours under weather and traffic conditions. Witness recollections fade within days. Law enforcement investigative steps proceed regardless of whether the driver has retained counsel — interviews are conducted, search warrants are obtained, vehicles are seized, and evidence is processed. A driver who delays retaining counsel risks losing the opportunity to preserve favorable evidence, structure interactions with police, and develop a coherent defense theory.
The first call to counsel should occur as soon as the driver knows (or suspects) that an accident-involving-injury investigation is underway. This may be at the time the driver discovers vehicle damage suggesting an accident, when law enforcement first contacts the driver, or when the driver receives notice of a pending criminal complaint. Even where the driver is uncertain whether an accident occurred, early consultation with experienced FSRA counsel provides protection — counsel can advise on whether to make voluntary statements, whether to consent to vehicle searches, and how to respond to law enforcement contact.
Counsel's immediate priorities in the first 72 hours: invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege; structure any necessary interactions with law enforcement through counsel; preserve scene evidence via written demands to law enforcement and any private custodians; identify and document alibi witnesses; locate any traffic-camera, surveillance, or dashcam footage covering the relevant area and time; document the defendant's vehicle condition before any aftermarket changes are made; arrange for accident-reconstruction expert retention if the case is likely to involve contested impact analysis. The 72-hour period is a workflow sprint that establishes the foundation for the entire subsequent defense.
Retaining experienced FSRA counsel — counsel with specific Transportation Code § 550 experience, not generalist DUI or felony defense — is essential. The interaction of the Transportation Code framework, the Penal Code mens-rea elements read in by Texas appellate courts, the companion charge structure (intoxication manslaughter, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide), and the local prosecutorial-policy variations across Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties is sufficiently complex that generalist defense work routinely misses meaningful defense opportunities. The choice of counsel matters as much in FSRA cases as in any felony defense decision.
