What post-conviction relief means in Texas
Post-conviction relief is the collateral attack on a final criminal judgment after the direct appeal closes. In Texas, the four primary vehicles are Article 11.07 habeas corpus for final felonies, Article 11.072 habeas for community-supervision sentences, Rule 21.3 motions for new trial, and nunc pro tunc judicial-clemency mechanisms.
Post-conviction relief is the legal process by which a person already convicted asks a court to set aside, vacate, modify, or otherwise alter a final judgment of conviction. It is fundamentally different from a direct appeal. A direct appeal challenges the trial court's rulings on the record that was made at trial; post-conviction review challenges the conviction on grounds that typically require evidence outside that trial record — ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct discovered later, newly available evidence, or constitutional violations that could not be litigated on direct appeal because the necessary facts were not yet known.
Texas law provides several procedural vehicles, and choosing the right one is the first strategic decision. Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs habeas corpus applications for people convicted of felony offenses and serving a sentence other than death. The application is filed in the convicting trial court but is ultimately decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's court of last resort in criminal matters. Article 11.072 covers writs by people serving community supervision — whether straight probation or deferred adjudication — for felony or misdemeanor offenses, and stays entirely in the trial court for final decision.
Beyond the two habeas vehicles, Texas also recognizes the motion for new trial under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3, available within thirty days of sentencing on enumerated grounds including jury misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel where the record permits resolution. Nunc pro tunc orders correct clerical errors in the judgment without altering the substance of the conviction. Judicial clemency under Code of Criminal Procedure article 42A.701 allows the trial court, upon early termination of community supervision, to release the defendant from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction.
The choice among these vehicles depends on five questions: (1) Is the conviction final? (2) What is the sentence — prison, community supervision, or unfilled? (3) What is the legal theory — trial-court error, ineffective assistance, Brady violation, actual innocence, retroactive change in law, illegal sentence? (4) What evidence is available outside the trial record? (5) Has the direct appeal concluded? Each vehicle has different timing, different burdens of proof, and different appellate review. Filing in the wrong vehicle can default the claim entirely. We make this assessment in the first consultation.
Article 11.07 writ of habeas corpus
Article 11.07 is the felony post-conviction vehicle. The application is filed in the convicting court, the State responds, the trial court enters proposed findings, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decides. Grounds include Strickland ineffective assistance, Brady violations, actual innocence, illegal sentence, and constitutional claims that require off-record evidence.
Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the workhorse statute of Texas post-conviction practice. It applies to any person convicted of a felony, sentenced to anything other than death, whose conviction is final. "Final" generally means the direct appeal has concluded or the time for direct appeal has expired without one being filed. Death-penalty cases proceed under a separate statute, Article 11.071, with different timing and procedural rules.
The application is filed in the trial court that entered the conviction. The State, represented by the district attorney's office that prosecuted the case, files a response within fifteen days. The trial judge then evaluates whether the application raises "controverted, previously unresolved facts which are material to the legality of the applicant's confinement," language drawn from Article 11.07 § 3(d). If yes, the court may resolve the dispute through additional affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or an evidentiary hearing. If no, the court forwards the application to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the existing record.
The Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) reviews the trial court's findings de novo on questions of law but with deference to factual determinations supported by the record. The CCA's options are: (1) deny relief; (2) grant relief and order a new trial, new sentencing, or release; (3) remand to the trial court for further fact development. The decision is final — there is no further state-court appeal — though federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains available for properly exhausted constitutional claims.
The recognized grounds for 11.07 relief are constitutional in nature and include: ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) suppression of exculpatory evidence; actual innocence (both Herrera-type freestanding claims and Schlup gateway claims); jury or juror misconduct; prosecutorial misconduct including perjured testimony under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); illegal sentence; coerced or involuntary plea; retroactive applications of new constitutional rules; and structural due-process violations. Each ground requires its own factual development and its own legal framework.
Article 11.072 habeas corpus for community supervision
Article 11.072 covers writ applications by people serving community supervision for felony or misdemeanor offenses. The trial court has final decision-making authority, the procedure is faster than 11.07, and a denial may still be appealed through the regular appellate route to the courts of appeals and then the CCA.
Article 11.072 occupies an important but often overlooked corner of Texas post-conviction practice. It applies to people convicted of any offense — felony or misdemeanor — who are serving a sentence of community supervision, whether traditional probation or deferred adjudication. Because the applicant is not in physical custody, traditional habeas vehicles do not fit cleanly; Article 11.072 fills that gap.
The procedure differs from 11.07 in three crucial ways. First, the application is filed and finally decided by the convicting trial court. There is no automatic CCA review. Second, the trial court must rule within sixty days of filing, with a possible thirty-day extension. The timeline is consequently faster than 11.07. Third, the trial court's denial may be appealed through the ordinary criminal-appellate route — first to the regional court of appeals, then by petition for discretionary review to the CCA — rather than landing automatically before the CCA on referral.
The substantive grounds for 11.072 relief mirror 11.07: ineffective assistance, Brady violations, actual innocence, illegal sentence, coerced plea, and retroactive new law. The Strickland framework applies in the same way. The burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence for non-actual-innocence claims and the higher Elizondo standard for actual-innocence claims (clear and convincing evidence that no rational juror would have convicted).
Strategically, 11.072 has significant advantages over post-final 11.07 in certain situations. The applicant remains on community supervision rather than in TDCJ custody during the writ. The trial judge who supervised the case and (often) accepted the plea may have direct knowledge of the proceedings, which can cut either way. The faster timeline preserves evidentiary memory. And a successful 11.072 outcome can include early termination of supervision, withdrawal of an adjudicated felony, or vacatur of a deferred adjudication, each of which has distinct downstream consequences for expunction, non-disclosure, and collateral rights including firearms eligibility and professional licensing.
Motion for new trial under Rule 21.3
The motion for new trial is the first available post-trial vehicle and has the shortest window. It must be filed within thirty days of sentencing under TRAP 21.4, and it can secure trial-court relief without any appellate involvement on grounds including jury misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, newly discovered material evidence, and ineffective trial counsel where the record permits.
The motion for new trial under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3 is the first available post-judgment vehicle, and the timing is unforgiving. Under TRAP 21.4(a), the motion must be filed within thirty days of imposition of sentence in open court or within thirty days of the date sentence is suspended. The trial court has seventy-five days from sentencing to rule, or the motion is overruled by operation of law under TRAP 21.8(c).
The grounds enumerated in TRAP 21.3 are precise. They include: (a) the defendant has been denied counsel; (b) the verdict has been decided by lot or in any manner other than a fair expression of the jurors' opinion; (c) the court has misdirected the jury; (d) the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence; (e) the State has used perjured testimony with knowledge of the perjury, or has knowingly withheld material exculpatory evidence; (f) any juror has been guilty of misconduct or improper communication; (g) the verdict has been substantially or materially affected by an action of any third party; and (h) "any other ground upon which the law allows a new trial."
The catchall provision (h) is the doorway through which most ineffective-assistance and newly-discovered-evidence claims travel when the necessary off-record evidence is already in hand. The Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) confirmed that ineffective assistance of trial counsel is cognizable on motion for new trial when the record permits resolution. Similarly, newly discovered evidence may support a motion for new trial under TRAP 21.3 even though the same evidence could also be presented later in an 11.07 writ.
The strategic value of a motion for new trial is enormous. A trial-court grant of new trial vacates the conviction without any appellate proceeding. The defendant is restored to the position immediately before trial; the State may retry or dismiss. There is no de novo CCA review of factual findings — the trial judge's call sticks unless the State successfully appeals under Article 44.01. When the trial judge has expressed reservations, when new misconduct evidence has surfaced, or when trial counsel has effectively admitted prejudicial deficiency, a 21.3 motion can secure relief in months rather than the years required by 11.07.
Grounds we win on
The most successful post-conviction claims fall into recurring patterns: ineffective assistance under Strickland, Brady suppression by the State, actual innocence under the Schlup gateway, illegal sentences, retroactive constitutional rules, and coerced or unknowing pleas. Each pattern requires its own evidence-development plan from day one.
Ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The two-prong test requires deficient performance and prejudice. The deficiency prong measures counsel's conduct against an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms. The prejudice prong requires a reasonable probability — a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome — that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. We have litigated Strickland claims based on failure to investigate, failure to retain experts, failure to communicate plea offers, failure to object to inadmissible evidence, and failure to preserve appellate issues.
Actual innocence under the Schlup gateway and the Elizondo freestanding claim. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) created a procedural gateway: if an applicant shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of new evidence, otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims may be heard on the merits. In Texas, Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) established the freestanding actual-innocence claim under the due-process clause, with the applicant's burden being clear and convincing evidence that no rational juror would have convicted. Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) refined the analysis.
Brady violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The State has a constitutional obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment. Suppression of material exculpatory or impeaching evidence violates due process whether the suppression was intentional or inadvertent. A successful Brady claim requires (1) suppression by the State, (2) favorability to the defense, and (3) materiality. The materiality analysis under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) considers the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence.
Illegal sentence under the Eighth Amendment and Texas Penal Code § 12.04. A sentence outside the statutory range, a sentence based on improperly enhanced offense classifications, or a sentence imposed without procedural compliance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny may be vacated on collateral review. Improper stacking under Penal Code § 3.03, miscalculated good-time credit, and unauthorized fines can all support relief.
Retroactive constitutional rules. Some Supreme Court decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure or substantive constitutional law apply retroactively on collateral review under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). Notable retroactive rules include Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requiring counsel to advise of immigration consequences (though Padilla itself was held non-retroactive by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), it remains argued in state-court contexts), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) on juvenile life without parole, and Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016) on residual-clause vagueness.
Plea coercion and involuntary plea under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). A guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent. Coercion can take the form of threats, false representations by counsel, inadequate explanation of the consequences (including immigration, registration, and collateral civil consequences), or off-record promises that were never honored. The applicant must show that, but for the deficiency, the plea would not have been entered — the prejudice standard for plea-related Strickland claims is set out in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
What the timeline really looks like
Post-conviction work runs on long horizons. Motion-for-new-trial windows close at 30 days. Article 11.07 applications typically resolve 9 to 24 months after filing. Federal habeas under AEDPA must be filed within one year of final state denial. Plan the calendar before the conviction is final, not after.
Seven strategies we use in post-conviction practice
The mechanics of a successful writ are the same whether the conviction is from McKinney, Dallas, Fort Worth, or Denton. Strong applications are built from the same building blocks: a reconstructed factual record, a clear constitutional theory, supporting affidavits, expert testimony where needed, and disciplined exhaustion strategy. Here are the seven we rely on most.
- Evidentiary record reconstruction — The first task is rebuilding the case from outside the trial transcript. We obtain pretrial discovery, body-camera footage, dispatch recordings, lab reports, witness statements, the prosecutor's case file (where available), and any defense investigator's notes. The 11.07 record lives outside the four walls of the trial; off-record evidence drives the outcome.
- Strickland prejudice modeling — Deficient performance alone is not enough. We build a parallel case-in-chief showing what trial counsel should have done, the evidence that would have come in, and the realistic probability that a properly defended trial would have produced a different verdict or a meaningfully lower sentence. Mock-trial frameworks, jury-research consultants, and expert affidavits underwrite the prejudice showing.
- Brady discovery audit — We file open-records and discovery motions to identify suppressed exculpatory or impeaching evidence. Police personnel files, prior-inconsistent statements, deals and cooperation agreements with State witnesses, forensic-lab dispute records, and prosecutor handover notes are common Brady categories. The materiality showing under Kyles considers cumulative effect, so partial Brady cases can succeed if the body of suppressed evidence is collectively dispositive.
- Schlup gateway packaging — When the procedural posture would otherwise bar a constitutional claim — successive writ, procedurally defaulted issue, untimely federal filing — we package newly discovered evidence under the Schlup gateway. The standard (more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have convicted) is lower than the freestanding actual-innocence standard, and a successful gateway showing reopens otherwise barred claims for merits review.
- Plea-coercion plus IAC combination — Many of our strongest 11.072 applications combine a Boykin/Hill v. Lockhart involuntary-plea theory with a Strickland claim that counsel failed to advise on a collateral consequence (immigration, sex-offender registration, professional license, firearms eligibility). The combination shows that the plea decision was both legally infirm (constitutional) and factually different from what the client would have chosen with accurate advice (prejudice).
- Retroactive-law claims — New Supreme Court decisions sometimes apply backward to final convictions. We track decisions from Padilla through Miller and Welch, and we evaluate every existing client conviction against current case law for retroactivity windows. Texas-specific retroactivity doctrine from Ex parte Lave, 257 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) and successor cases governs whether a state-court rule applies on collateral review.
- Cumulative-error doctrine — When no single error meets the prejudice threshold, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may. The CCA recognized cumulative-error analysis in Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Building a case under this theory requires careful identification of every preserved and unpreserved error, with realistic prejudice modeling for each, then a structured argument that the combined effect denied a fair trial.
Key terms in post-conviction practice
The vocabulary of writ practice is technical. These six definitions cover the terms that appear repeatedly in every application, ruling, and brief.
- Writ of Habeas Corpus
- A judicial order requiring an official holding a person in custody to bring the person before the court and justify the detention. In post-conviction practice, the writ is the procedural device used to challenge the legality of a final criminal judgment. Texas habeas is governed by Chapter 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Brady Violation
- A constitutional violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), occurring when the State suppresses evidence favorable to the accused that is material to either guilt or punishment. The defendant need not show bad faith by the prosecution; inadvertent suppression also violates due process if the evidence is material.
- Strickland Standard
- The two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) for ineffective-assistance claims. The defendant must show (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
- Court of Criminal Appeals
- The court of last resort in criminal matters in Texas, sitting in Austin. The CCA reviews Article 11.07 habeas applications, decides petitions for discretionary review from the regional courts of appeals, and handles direct appeals in capital cases. Its decisions are binding on all Texas courts in criminal matters and are reviewable only by the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Actual Innocence
- A claim that the applicant did not commit the offense of conviction. Texas recognizes both a Schlup-gateway claim (more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have convicted, used to reach otherwise barred constitutional claims) and a freestanding Elizondo claim under the due-process clause (clear and convincing evidence that no rational juror would have convicted).
- Subsequent Writ
- An Article 11.07 habeas application filed after an earlier application has been resolved. Subsequent writs face the strict abuse-of-the-writ limits of Article 11.07 § 4, which permits filing only if the factual or legal basis was unavailable at the time of the prior application or if no rational juror would have convicted but for a constitutional violation.
Key case law in Texas post-conviction practice
Six cases anchor most Texas post-conviction litigation. Four are U.S. Supreme Court decisions; two are Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decisions interpreting state habeas practice.
Anchor citations
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) — the foundational ineffective-assistance standard. Two prongs: deficient performance and prejudice. Applied identically in state and federal collateral review.
- Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) — refined the framework for actual-innocence claims in Texas habeas practice. Confirmed that newly discovered evidence must meet the unavailable-at-trial and probative-impact prongs to support relief.
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) — created the actual-innocence gateway permitting otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims to be heard on the merits if the applicant shows it is more likely than not no reasonable juror would have convicted.
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) — the constitutional foundation of the prosecution's disclosure obligation. Suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process irrespective of good faith.
- Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) — reaffirmed the CCA's gatekeeping function on subsequent writs and the analytical structure for evaluating newly available scientific evidence under Article 11.073.
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) — held that defense counsel has a Sixth Amendment duty to advise non-citizen clients about the deportation risk of a plea. The decision remains central to plea-vacatur litigation for immigration consequences.
DFW counties we file in
Post-conviction applications are filed in the convicting court regardless of where the applicant is currently held. We file across the nine DFW counties our practice covers, each with its own local rules, prosecutor offices, and judicial preferences.
Collin County — Applications are filed in the originating district court at the Russell A. Steindam Courts Building in McKinney. The district attorney's appellate-and-writs division handles the State's response. Collin County district judges are generally exacting on procedural compliance; affidavits and exhibits must be filed with the application or the court will deem them waived.
Dallas County — Applications are filed at the Frank Crowley Courts Building in downtown Dallas. The Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit reviews actual-innocence and Brady claims independently of the trial-level appellate response, and CIU referrals can substantially accelerate evaluation in cases meeting the criteria.
Denton County — Applications are filed at the Mary & Jim Horn Government Center in Denton. The DA's office maintains a dedicated post-conviction unit that reviews 11.07 and 11.072 filings.
Tarrant County — Applications are filed at the Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center in Fort Worth. The Tarrant County Conviction Integrity Unit operates with one of the broadest review charters in the state and has produced multiple exonerations.
Rockwall, Kaufman, Ellis, Johnson, and Hunt counties — Each smaller county has only one or two district courts that handle felony post-conviction applications. We file in the appropriate district court directly. Local prosecutor familiarity and judicial calendaring matter more in these jurisdictions than in the larger metro counties, and our nine-county footprint includes the working relationships that move applications efficiently.
Across all nine counties, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive final authority on Article 11.07 applications. The convicting court forwards the record once findings are entered; the CCA decides on a uniform statewide standard. Knowing the local pathway to the CCA — what each trial court will and will not order, how the local DA's appellate division responds, which judges hold hearings versus decide on the papers — is what separates effective filing from blind filing.
Why L&L for post-conviction
Co-Founding Partners Reggie and Njeri London personally handle every post-conviction retainer. Texas Bar verification, federal court admissions in TXND, TXED, and the Fifth Circuit, and combined post-conviction caseload across the nine DFW counties.
Direct-to-attorney post-conviction practice
L and L Law Group, PLLC is led by husband-and-wife criminal defense attorneys Njeri London (Texas Bar No. 24043266) and Reggie London (Texas Bar No. 24043514). Both are Co-Founding Partners; both personally handle every case. Combined, the practice has 40+ years of criminal-law experience across trial, appellate, and post-conviction work.
Reggie's former service as a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney gives the practice direct working knowledge of how the State builds, tries, and defends convictions on collateral attack — the same playbook that 11.07 and 11.072 applications must dismantle. Njeri's focus on Fourth Amendment motion practice and federal habeas means the legal-theory work that wins applications gets done at the partner level.
Both partners are admitted in TXND, TXED, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, so the state-to-federal habeas handoff under AEDPA happens in-house with the same counsel from filing through Section 2254.
Recent developments in Texas post-conviction law
The post-conviction landscape changes constantly. Six developments from the last several terms shape current practice in DFW courts and the CCA.
Six developments shaping current practice
- Article 11.073 junk-science writs — Texas's "junk science" statute allows applicants to seek relief when scientific evidence relied on at trial has been undermined by changes in the underlying science. Forensic disciplines like bite-mark analysis, hair-comparison microscopy, and certain arson-investigation theories have produced multiple recent 11.073 grants.
- Conviction Integrity Units expanded — Dallas, Tarrant, and (more recently) Collin and Denton counties have built CIUs with varying scope. CIU partnerships with applicant counsel can accelerate Brady and actual-innocence review by months when the case fits the unit's intake criteria.
- CCA tightening on subsequent writs — Recent CCA opinions have reinforced the Article 11.07 § 4 abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. Applicants who hold back ground in a first writ face severe restrictions on later filing; the first application must be claim-stacked.
- Padilla-derivative claims in 11.072 supervision cases — A wave of supervision-stage applications by non-citizens who received deficient immigration advice has tested the procedural reach of 11.072. The CCA has accepted that 11.072 is the correct vehicle while supervision remains active.
- AEDPA timing tolling — Federal courts have refined the tolling rules for AEDPA's one-year clock during properly filed state post-conviction proceedings. State-court counsel must monitor the federal clock from filing.
- DNA-testing motions under Chapter 64 — Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64 motions for post-conviction DNA testing remain a critical companion to actual-innocence 11.07 work. The chapter-64 standard for ordering testing differs from the standard for ultimate habeas relief, but a successful test result frequently becomes the centerpiece of the subsequent writ.
Frequently asked questions
Twelve questions we get most often from clients evaluating Texas post-conviction relief. Each answer reflects current Texas practice as of May 2026.
How long do I have to file post-conviction relief after sentencing in Texas?
A motion for new trial under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.4 must be filed within 30 days of sentencing. An Article 11.07 writ of habeas corpus has no statutory filing deadline once the conviction is final, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applies a laches doctrine and the federal AEDPA one-year clock under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) runs in parallel for any future federal § 2254 petition.
Article 11.072 writs for community-supervision sentences likewise have no statutory deadline. Move quickly: evidence degrades, memories fade, witnesses move.
Can I file post-conviction relief after my direct appeal lost?
Yes, and most habeas filings happen after a direct appeal concludes. Article 11.07 is specifically designed for collateral review of issues that either could not be raised on direct appeal (ineffective assistance of trial counsel typically requires an evidentiary record built outside the trial transcript) or were procedurally defaulted.
The CCA generally requires that record-based claims appropriate for direct appeal be raised there; off-record claims, newly discovered evidence, and constitutional claims requiring extra-record proof belong in habeas.
What is the difference between Article 11.07 and Article 11.072 habeas corpus?
Article 11.07 governs felony post-conviction writs after final conviction with a sentence other than death; it is filed in the convicting court but ultimately decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Article 11.072 governs writs by people serving community supervision (probation or deferred adjudication) for felony or misdemeanor offenses and stays in the trial court for final decision. 11.072 is faster, lower cost, and does not exhaust your CCA shot.
Do I get a hearing on a writ application or is it just paperwork?
It depends on whether the application raises a controverted, previously unresolved fact issue. Under Article 11.07 § 3(d), the convicting court reviews the application, the State's answer, and any affidavits to decide whether there are controverted issues of fact. If there are, the court orders an evidentiary hearing or affidavit-based fact development.
Many strong claims (ineffective assistance, Brady, juror misconduct) require live testimony. Many record-only claims are decided on the papers.
My trial lawyer was bad. Is that enough for a writ?
Not by itself. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), you must prove both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different).
"Bad" is not the test; "objectively unreasonable plus outcome-altering" is the test. We build the record with affidavits, expert testimony, and the missing-but-available evidence trial counsel did not develop.
What if I find new evidence years after my conviction?
Newly discovered evidence is a recognized ground for post-conviction relief, particularly under the actual-innocence gateway recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) and applied in Texas through cases like Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The evidence must be reliable, unavailable at trial through no fault of the defense, and probative enough that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of it. DNA results, recanting witnesses, and exculpatory documents obtained after trial are the typical fact patterns.
Will my sentence be stayed while my writ is pending?
Generally no. Filing an Article 11.07 application does not automatically stay execution of sentence; the applicant remains in TDCJ custody (or on supervision) during the months or years the application takes. The CCA may grant a stay in extraordinary circumstances.
Article 11.072 applicants on community supervision continue under supervision unless the court grants specific relief. Plan financially and personally for the long horizon — typical filed-to-disposition timeline runs 9 to 24 months.
How much does post-conviction relief cost?
Flat-fee retainers vary by complexity. A straightforward Article 11.072 application with a clean record runs lower than a fully contested Article 11.07 application requiring expert affidavits, evidentiary hearings, and CCA briefing.
Costs include investigator time, expert witnesses (forensic, mental-health, eyewitness-identification), and transcript and record preparation. We provide a written engagement scope after a free initial consultation and identify which costs are fixed versus contingent on what the application uncovers.
What happens if my writ is denied?
Denial closes the state-court door for that claim. The next step depends on whether the claim is preserved for federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. If properly exhausted in state court, you have one year from the denial under AEDPA to file a federal habeas petition.
Successive state writs face strict abuse-of-the-writ limits under Article 11.07 § 4 and require new factual or legal grounds. Plan the state-federal sequence at the start, not after the state denial.
Can I refile a writ after it is denied?
Subsequent applications under Article 11.07 § 4 are sharply restricted. The applicant must show either (1) the factual or legal basis was unavailable at the time of the prior application or (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, no rational juror would have convicted but for a constitutional violation. Both standards are difficult.
The lesson is that the first application must be the strongest application — claim-stacked, fully developed, and supported by every available affidavit and exhibit.
What is actual innocence and how do I prove it?
Texas recognizes two actual-innocence claims under Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A "bare" actual-innocence claim requires newly discovered evidence so compelling that no rational juror would have convicted; a Herrera claim is a stand-alone constitutional claim under the due-process clause.
A Schlup gateway claim under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, allows otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims to be heard if the applicant shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.
If my writ is granted, can I expunge the record?
It depends on the form of relief. If the writ results in a complete reversal and the State drops the case or you are acquitted on retrial, expunction under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01 becomes available.
If the writ results only in a new sentencing or a partial remand, the underlying conviction remains on the record and expunction is generally unavailable. Non-disclosure relief under Tex. Gov't Code Ch. 411 may apply to certain post-writ outcomes. The expunction analysis is part of the writ strategy from day one.
Related practice areas
Post-conviction matters often connect to other areas of our practice. Four cross-links to companion frameworks and the federal-defense compendium.
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