What is manufacture or delivery under HSC § 481.112?
Texas HSC §§ 481.112–481.114 criminalize the manufacture or delivery of any controlled substance listed in Penalty Groups 1, 1-A, 2, 3, or 4. The State must prove a delivery act (actual, constructive, or offer), knowledge of the substance's identity, and an aggregate weight that fixes the punishment range.
- Delivery act
- The State must prove the defendant manufactured the substance or delivered it. Deliver (HSC § 481.002(8)) is defined broadly: actual transfer (hand-to-hand), constructive transfer (through an intermediary, with the defendant's knowledge and control), or offer to sell (a stated proposal to sell, with no completed transaction required). Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), held that an offer alone — corroborated under Rule 508 — supports a delivery conviction. This breadth is why "delivery" is charged in cases that, factually, look more like ordinary possession.
- Knowledge of substance identity
- The defendant must have known the substance was a controlled substance — not necessarily the precise drug or penalty group, but a controlled substance generally. Sandoval v. State, 35 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000), held that a mistake-of-fact defense (the defendant believed the substance was a non-controlled alternative) negates the mens rea where supported by the evidence. The State typically proves knowledge circumstantially through packaging, conduct, statements, and the defendant's relationship to the substance — each element of which is contestable on cross-examination.
- Aggregate weight and adulterants
- The punishment range turns on the weight of the substance "including adulterants and dilutants" under HSC § 481.002(49). This statutory definition means cutting agents, fillers, and contamination in the mixture all count toward the aggregate. Cases involving small percentages of active substance in a large bulk weight can land in higher punishment tiers than the actual controlled-substance content would suggest — making lab-report scrutiny and independent reweighing valuable defense tools.
- Penalty group classification
- Substances are classified into Penalty Groups 1, 1-A, 2, 2-A, 3, and 4 under HSC §§ 481.102–481.105. PG 1 covers heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and many opioids; PG 1-A covers LSD; PG 2 covers MDMA, hashish oil, and certain hallucinogens; PG 3 covers benzodiazepines and certain prescription opioids; PG 4 covers preparations with limited narcotic content. The penalty schedule attaches to the group, so misclassification by the lab — or by the prosecutor at charging — creates an early motion-practice target.
The doctrinal width of "delivery" matters enormously to defense strategy. Texas law treats constructive transfer as fully equivalent to a hand-to-hand sale, and a mere offer to sell — with no substance ever produced — can support a conviction under Stewart v. State, 718 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), as long as it is corroborated. The practical effect is that prosecutors often charge "delivery" on facts that, in another state, would be charged as simple possession with intent to distribute or even straight possession. Counsel's first task is to map the indictment onto the actual conduct and identify whether the State has proof of a transfer in the legal sense at all — if the only evidence is possession plus inferences (quantity, packaging, paraphernalia), the case may be properly chargeable only as possession, and the charge-reduction conversation begins immediately.
Two doctrines that usually decide the case — search-and-seizure + confidential informants
Almost every Texas manufacture/delivery prosecution rests on either a search (warrant or warrantless) or a controlled buy conducted through a confidential informant. Both doctrines have well-developed defense pathways under Fourth Amendment law and Texas Rule of Evidence 508.
The single most common attack surface in a Texas manufacture-or-delivery case is the search that produced the substance. Where the State relied on a warrant, the affidavit's four corners must establish probable cause under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and the Texas application in Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Affidavits built primarily on a CI's tip require independent corroboration of reliability and a basis-of-knowledge showing — conclusory recitations ("the CI has provided reliable information in the past") are scrutinized hard. Where the State relied on a warrantless search, the doctrinal landscape narrows: a vehicle search under the automobile exception requires probable cause arising from the totality of circumstances at the moment of the stop, and a dog-sniff that prolonged the stop beyond what was necessary to complete the original purpose is unconstitutional under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
The Texas exclusionary rule under Article 38.23 (Code of Criminal Procedure) is broader than the federal rule — it has no good-faith exception, meaning even reasonable reliance on a defective warrant does not save the evidence. State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), held that Article 38.23 requires suppression where the warrant lacked probable cause regardless of the officer's good-faith belief. This makes the warrant affidavit the defense's favorite target: every paragraph is parsed, every CI-reliability assertion is challenged, and every staleness gap (the time between the alleged criminal conduct and the warrant's execution) is litigated.
Confidential informant (CI) doctrine is the second pivot point. Texas Rule of Evidence 508(a) gives the State a qualified privilege to withhold the identity of an informant who furnished information about possible criminal conduct. The privilege is not absolute: Rule 508(c)(2) compels disclosure where the informant's identity or testimony is necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. The leading case is Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), which held that due process requires disclosure where the informant was an active participant or material witness. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied Roviaro in Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), holding that disclosure is required when the informant participated in the offense, was present at it, or was otherwise a material witness — and that the defendant's burden is only to make a plausible showing that the informant's testimony is necessary.
Defense counsel files a Bodin/Roviaro motion early — often before the grand jury concludes — and requests an in-camera hearing where the trial court reviews the informant's anticipated testimony to decide whether disclosure is required. The motion is not a fishing expedition; it must articulate a specific theory of materiality (the informant was the only witness to the alleged delivery; the informant may have planted the substance; the informant's prior criminal record bears on credibility; the informant's arrangement with the State creates an inducement issue tying to entrapment). Where the court orders disclosure and the State refuses to comply, the case is dismissed under Rule 508(c)(2)(B). Where the court denies disclosure, the issue is preserved for appeal — and a reviewing court applies de novo the question of materiality.
Penalty range by penalty group and weight
Texas manufacture or delivery penalties scale from state-jail felony to a 15-years-to-life first-degree felony with a $250,000 minimum fine. The punishment turns on penalty group classification, aggregate weight, and whether a drug-free zone enhancement applies.
Penalty Group 1 (heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl) drives most of Texas manufacture-or-delivery sentencing. Under HSC § 481.112: less than one gram is a state-jail felony (180 days to 2 years state-jail confinement and up to $10,000 fine);[1] 1 to 4 grams is a second-degree felony (2 to 20 years and up to $10,000); 4 to 200 grams is a first-degree felony (5 to 99 years or life and up to $10,000);[2] 200 to 400 grams is a first-degree felony with a 10-year minimum and a $100,000 minimum fine; and 400 grams or more carries a 15-years-to-life range with a $250,000 minimum fine.[3] The "or life" possibility means the upper bound is the same at every level above state-jail — the practical floor is what changes with weight.
Penalty Group 1-A (LSD) under HSC § 481.1121 scales by dosage units rather than grams: under 20 units is state-jail felony; 20–80 is second-degree; 80–4,000 is first-degree; 4,000–8,000 carries the 10-year minimum and $100,000 fine; over 8,000 carries 15-to-life with $250,000 minimum fine. Penalty Group 2 under HSC § 481.113 follows a similar but slightly shifted gram-based schedule, with thresholds at 1 gram, 4 grams, 400 grams, and the 15-to-life ceiling reached at 400 grams instead of PG 1's 400. Penalty Group 3 and Group 4 under HSC § 481.114 sit on a lower schedule that maxes at second-degree felony (20-year cap) rather than first-degree — making PG 3/4 cases substantially less exposed than PG 1/1-A/2 cases of comparable weight.
The single most consequential enhancement is the drug-free zone under HSC § 481.134.[5] Where the offense occurs in, on, or within 1,000 feet of school grounds, a public swimming pool, a video-arcade facility, or within 300 feet of a daycare, youth center, or playground, the offense is increased by one penalty degree (so a state-jail felony becomes a third-degree, a third-degree becomes a second-degree, and so on) and a minimum-confinement floor is imposed. The 1,000-foot measurement is litigable: surveyor evidence, GIS data, certified plats, and the precise definition of "school grounds" (boundary lines, not buildings) frequently allow counsel to defeat the enhancement. Removing the DFZ enhancement is often worth more than any single suppression argument because it both lowers the penalty grade and eliminates the minimum-sentence floor.
Collateral consequences extend beyond formal sentencing. Federal immigration law treats any drug-trafficking conviction as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), triggering mandatory removal for non-citizens — including lawful permanent residents — under Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). Federal student-aid eligibility is impacted under 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r), professional licensing boards uniformly impose discipline, public-housing tenancy under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) is at risk, and many private employers will not hire applicants with a drug-distribution conviction. The TXDPS sex-offender-registry analogy here is the conviction's permanent appearance on a Texas criminal-history record — there is no expunction remedy after conviction, only a long path through non-disclosure (where eligible) or a pardon application.
Defenses we evaluate first
Five defense doctrines do most of the work in manufacture-or-delivery cases: search-and-seizure suppression, entrapment, CI-identity disclosure, delivery-element challenges, and chain-of-custody attacks on the lab analysis. Each is fact-specific and time-sensitive.
The highest-leverage move is suppression of the search that produced the substance, under Article 38.23 and the Fourth Amendment. Where a warrant was used, counsel attacks the affidavit's probable-cause showing under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and the Texas application in Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) — particularly where the affidavit rested on a CI tip and lacked independent corroboration. Where the search was warrantless, the analysis runs through the automobile exception (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)), the Terry doctrine for protective frisks (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), and the consent doctrine (which Texas analyzes under both federal and state constitutional standards, with the state standard sometimes more protective per State v. Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Successful suppression typically collapses the entire case — no substance, no element of delivery.
Entrapment (PC § 8.06) is the second pivotal defense, especially in controlled-buy cases. Texas applies an objective test: the focus is on whether police conduct was likely to induce a hypothetical reasonable person — not on the defendant's predisposition. England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), set out the framework. Evidence supporting entrapment includes persistent badgering, exploitation of personal relationships or financial vulnerabilities, supplying the substance to be sold, repeated solicitation after refusals, and inducement through threats. Pure opportunity-providing is not entrapment, so the doctrine works best where the State's CI repeatedly pressured the defendant, supplied money or product, or exploited a known addiction. The defense is affirmative — the defendant must prove inducement by a preponderance — but once proven, it is a complete defense.
The confidential informant (CI) doctrine under Texas Rule of Evidence 508 and Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), is the third major tool. Counsel files a motion for disclosure of the informant's identity, supported by a specific theory of materiality (the informant was the only witness; the informant's credibility is impeachable; the informant's arrangement supports entrapment). If the court grants the motion and the State refuses to comply, the case is dismissed. Even where the motion is denied, the in-camera hearing produces information about the CI's background, history, and arrangement with the State that informs the cross-examination strategy and the negotiation posture.
Delivery-element challenges target the State's proof that an actual or constructive transfer (or offer) occurred. In many "delivery" prosecutions, the facts show possession plus inferences (quantity, packaging, currency, scales, ledgers) but no completed transfer to anyone. Where the State cannot tie the defendant to a specific delivery act, the proper charge is possession or possession with intent — not delivery. Cornet v. State, 359 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), illustrates how appellate courts scrutinize the sufficiency of a "delivery" verdict where the predicate conduct was really possessory. Counsel uses this analysis to push for charge reduction from delivery (a first- or second-degree felony at typical weights) to possession (typically one grade lower), which often produces a 5-to-10-year reduction in the punishment range.
Chain-of-custody and lab-testing challenges target the State's ability to prove the substance is what the indictment alleges. Counsel subpoenas the DPS lab's testing protocol, the analyst's notes, the instrument-calibration records, and the chain-of-custody documentation. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), establish the defendant's confrontation right to cross-examine the analyst who performed the testing — not a substitute analyst. A successful Melendez-Diaz challenge can prevent admission of the lab report if the State cannot produce the actual analyst, gutting the State's proof of substance identity. Independent re-testing, where weight is on the cusp of a higher punishment tier, often reveals percentages of cutting agents that change the punishment range or even the felony degree.
Common prosecution errors in delivery cases
The State's typical errors in manufacture-or-delivery cases are predictable: overcharging possession as delivery, CI credibility gaps, defective warrants, dog-sniff timing violations, broken chain-of-custody, and weight-measurement errors. Each is an attack surface.
A consistent pattern across DFW dockets — prosecutors err in six reliable categories on delivery prosecutions. First, overcharging: the State files "delivery" on facts that, on close inspection, show only possession plus inferences. The defendant was caught with a baggie and a scale; no one ever saw a hand-to-hand transfer; the CI's alleged buy is uncorroborated. The proper charge in that posture is possession or possession-with-intent (depending on the weight), not delivery. Counsel raises this in a motion to quash the indictment under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 27.09 or in a motion in limine, and frequently the prosecutor agrees to a charge reduction before trial — often pre-indictment if defense is engaged early enough.
Second, CI credibility problems. Almost every CI in a Texas drug case is working off either a pending charge or a payment arrangement. Their prior criminal history, their financial incentives, their inconsistencies between the initial report and the trial testimony, and any prior false statements all become impeachment ammunition. Where the State refuses to disclose the CI's identity under Bodin, the defense files for an in-camera hearing — and the State's reluctance to expose the CI to cross-examination is itself probative of weakness. Many DFW cases end with the State dismissing or substantially reducing the charge rather than burn a CI.
Third, defective warrants. Warrant affidavits in drug cases routinely lean heavily on CI tips with conclusory reliability assertions ("the CI has supplied information that has led to arrests and convictions in the past"). Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and Texas applications including Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), the affidavit must show both basis of knowledge and indicia of reliability under a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Staleness is a recurring defect: a CI tip from three weeks ago, without recent corroboration, will not support a present search. Particularity (the address described; the items to be seized) is another. The Texas Article 38.23 has no good-faith exception, so a defective warrant means suppression — full stop.
Fourth, dog-sniff and stop-prolongation violations. Under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), an officer may not extend a traffic stop — even momentarily — to conduct a dog sniff that is unrelated to the stop's original mission. Texas applied Rodriguez in State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Body-cam and dash-cam timestamps frame this analysis. Where the stop was for a traffic violation and the dog arrived four minutes after the ticket should have been completed, the prolongation is unconstitutional and the evidence is excluded.
Fifth, chain-of-custody breaks. Police evidence rooms log every transfer, but the documentation is sometimes incomplete — a missing seal, an unlogged transport, a gap between agency receipt and lab submission, an analyst who handled the substance but did not sign the chain. Each break is a foundation problem. Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), held that the State must show a reasonable assurance of identity and integrity — not perfection, but enough to overcome the doubt. Counsel subpoenas the entire chain at first opportunity and audits it line by line. A gap-riddled chain plus a credible defense expert can defeat the admission of the substance entirely.
Sixth, weight-measurement errors. The aggregate weight including adulterants drives the punishment tier. The DPS lab's measurement protocols, the calibration of the balance, and the inclusion or exclusion of packaging material all matter. Where the case sits on the cusp of a tier (e.g., 198 grams in a 4–200-gram tier, just below the 200-gram floor for the 10-year minimum), independent reweighing by a defense expert frequently produces a small but legally significant difference. Even a sub-gram difference can save five or ten years in the punishment range.
What to do if you're charged with manufacture or delivery
The first 30 days are decisive for a delivery case — but the rhythm is different from possession. Most delivery cases run on a 60–90 day grand-jury clock, and the defense work is built before indictment whenever possible.
Manufacture-or-delivery cases follow a different cadence than possession cases. After a delivery arrest, the State typically presents the case to a grand jury within 60–90 days, seeking a true bill on a first- or second-degree indictment. The window between arrest and indictment is the highest-leverage period in the case: the prosecutor has not yet committed publicly to the charge, the CI's testimony has not been locked in, and pre-charge advocacy can sometimes change the indictment itself. The first 15 days post-arrest should focus on engaging counsel, posting bond, and preserving digital evidence before the State can secure deletion or before retention policies expire.
Digital-evidence preservation is critical and time-sensitive. Drug-delivery prosecutions increasingly rest on text messages, social-media DMs, encrypted-messaging metadata, payment-app records (Cash App, Venmo, Zelle), and call-detail records. The defense's ability to access these records depends on whether the platforms still hold them — Facebook retains messages indefinitely but deletes them on user request; Cash App keeps transaction records for seven years; Snapchat's default retention is 30 days. Counsel sends preservation letters to every platform identified in the discovery within the first week of representation, and where the State has obtained warrant-based access to a particular account, counsel files for the defense's access to the same data set under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 39.14.
Do not contact suspected CIs. In every delivery case there is at least one suspected confidential informant — usually the person who introduced the defendant to the buyer, or the person the defendant believes called the police. Texas law treats CI contact as serious: communicating with a CI to discuss the case can support a witness-tampering charge under Penal Code § 36.05 (a felony in its own right) and will almost certainly produce a bond revocation. Defense investigation of the CI proceeds entirely through counsel and licensed investigators, and the State's identity-disclosure obligations are litigated formally through Rule 508 motions — not informally through direct contact.
Do not give a statement. Manufacture-or-delivery prosecutions live on the defendant's own words. Recorded jail-cell calls, post-arrest interviews, casual booking-room conversations, and post-bond social-media posts are routinely the State's most damaging evidence. Every Texas county jail records outgoing calls and admits them as party-opponent admissions under Rule 801(e)(2). Invoke counsel explicitly ("I want a lawyer; I will not answer questions") and maintain silence — not "no comment," not "I don't know," not nervous hedging. The Fifth Amendment privilege only protects what you don't say.
Begin parallel asset-forfeiture defense. CCP Chapter 59 forfeiture actions move on their own clock independent of the criminal case. If cash, vehicles, real property, or electronics were seized at the time of arrest, the State will typically file a notice of seizure within 30 days and serve the owner with a forfeiture proceeding. The owner has 30 days to file an answer; missing the deadline means default judgment and permanent loss of the property regardless of the criminal-case outcome. Counsel files the answer, contests probable cause for the seizure, and asserts any innocent-owner defenses (CCP § 59.02(c)). Many forfeiture actions are quietly resolved in favor of the owner where the State's probable-cause showing is thin — but the recovery requires active defense, not waiting.
DFW-specific context (Collin, Denton, Dallas, Tarrant)
Each DFW county handles delivery cases differently — but a common thread is that drug-court diversion is rarely available for delivery, plea offers tend to be firmer than for possession, and the CI-disclosure posture varies meaningfully by district court.
Collin County District Attorneys typically push delivery cases toward conviction-tier pleas. The county does not operate a meaningful drug-court diversion for delivery charges (drug-court tracks are largely reserved for possession-only cases), and first-time defendants with felony delivery indictments face hard plea offers that include actual confinement, even at the low end of the weight schedule. Counsel's pre-indictment advocacy work is critical here: where the grand-jury package is presented late, the prosecutor's commitment to the delivery charge becomes harder to walk back. McKinney district courts respond to substantive motion practice, particularly Bodin/Roviaro motions filed before the first plea offer, by reopening the charge-reduction conversation.
Denton County follows a similar pattern with slightly more flexibility on first-time delivery defendants. Denton's district courts in Denton and the Justice Center in Lewisville handle most felony delivery cases. Bond conditions tend to be aggressive (cash or surety bonds in the $5,000–$25,000 range for state-jail-level delivery; $25,000–$100,000 for first-degree weights) but the district attorney's office historically has been more open to charge-reduction negotiations where the underlying CI case is thin. Drug-court diversion is technically available for some second-degree delivery cases under § 469.001 of the Health & Safety Code, but eligibility is narrow.
Dallas County tends to be more forgiving on the front end — pretrial diversion, deferred adjudication, and structured pleas to lesser-included possession are more common than in Collin or Denton. Dallas operates a specialized drug-court program (the DIVERT program) but, as elsewhere, delivery charges are typically excluded. The county's Specialty Courts Division handles structured supervision tracks where eligible, and the volume of cases on the docket means individual cases sometimes receive less attention than in smaller-county dockets — which can cut both ways for the defense. Counsel's job is to make the case visible to the senior prosecutor on the file, usually through a written charge-reduction memo with case-law support.
Tarrant County combines aspects of all three — firm on first-pass plea offers (similar to Collin) but more willing to negotiate when the defense has built a record (similar to Dallas). The Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's office runs a dedicated narcotics division with specialized prosecutors who handle every delivery indictment. The Fort Worth district courts respond to motion practice as Tarrant's docket allows, with Bodin/Roviaro hearings typically set within 60–90 days of filing. The county's asset-forfeiture program is particularly aggressive — vehicles, cash, and real-property seizures move quickly, often outpacing the criminal case itself, making parallel forfeiture defense a frequent feature of Tarrant delivery representations.
Cost and outcome expectations
A realistic Texas manufacture-or-delivery defense costs $8,000–$25,000+ in attorney fees, plus expert and forfeiture costs. Cases resolve in 6–18 months on average. The most common favorable outcome is plea to a lesser-included possession where the delivery element is unproven.
Defense fees scale steeply with weight and charge severity. A state-jail-level delivery (under 1 gram PG 1) with no aggravators typically runs $8,000–$12,000 flat-fee for trial-ready defense. Second-degree delivery (1–4 grams PG 1) runs $12,000–$18,000. First-degree delivery (4 grams and up, including 200-gram and 400-gram tier cases) runs $18,000–$30,000+ depending on complexity, expert needs, and projected trial preparation. Federal-forum delivery cases (where the U.S. Attorney has indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841) sit in a separate fee range, typically $25,000–$75,000 for trial-ready representation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and possible cooperation analysis. ALR or possession-only matters running in parallel may carry additional flat fees.
Expert and investigation costs are substantial in delivery cases. An independent forensic chemist for lab-report scrutiny and re-testing typically runs $3,000–$8,000. A licensed investigator for CI background and witness work runs $75–$150/hour, with delivery-case investigations frequently consuming $5,000–$15,000 in investigative time. GIS / surveyor experts for drug-free-zone measurement challenges run $1,500–$3,500 per challenge. Federal cases add U.S. Sentencing Guidelines specialists, mitigation specialists for sentencing memoranda, and sometimes mental-health or addiction experts for downward-departure arguments under USSG § 5H1.4.
Asset-forfeiture exposure is the cost most clients underestimate. CCP Chapter 59 forfeiture actions can take cash, vehicles, electronics, and real property used in the offense — and the in-rem standard (preponderance, against the property) is lower than the criminal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt, against the person). Properties that are not even targeted at indictment frequently end up in forfeiture proceedings filed weeks after arrest. Defense work on the forfeiture side often runs in parallel with the criminal case for the first 90 days, with $3,500–$10,000 in additional fees common where significant assets are at stake. Where the criminal case is later dismissed or reduced, the forfeiture action does not automatically follow — a separate disposition is required.
Timeline expectations: most Texas manufacture-or-delivery cases resolve in 6–18 months from arrest to disposition with substantive motion practice. State-jail-tier cases tend to resolve faster (6–9 months), first-degree cases extend longer (12–18 months), and federal-forum cases routinely take 18–36 months. Bodin/Roviaro hearings typically occur 60–120 days post-indictment. Suppression hearings tend to be set after CI disclosure rulings, often 4–8 months post-indictment. Trials are scheduled 12–18 months post-indictment in state cases and 18–24 months in federal cases.
Outcome distribution varies sharply with the underlying facts, but the most common favorable disposition is a plea to a lesser-included possession charge where the State cannot prove the delivery element. This typically reduces the punishment range by one or two felony grades — for example, a 4-to-200-gram first-degree delivery (5-to-99-year range) reduced to a 4-to-200-gram first-degree possession with intent (still serious, but with more sentencing flexibility and probation eligibility under Article 42A.054). Outright dismissals occur where suppression succeeds or where the State refuses to disclose a CI ordered disclosed. Probation outcomes on delivery convictions are rare at the first-degree level but more common at state-jail and second-degree levels with strong mitigation. Trial outcomes vary widely — but the strongest cases for trial are those where the State's evidence rests on a single CI, the defendant has no significant prior, and the underlying search has a credible suppression argument that the trial court has denied.
