What is an emergency protective order under CCP Art. 17.292
A Magistrate's Order of Emergency Protection is a criminal-side order issued at magistration under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292 after any arrest for family-violence assault, sexual assault, stalking, or trafficking. It operates separately from the criminal bond, runs 31, 61, or 91 days depending on offense aggravators, and is issued on a probable-cause finding without a separate adversarial hearing.
- Issuance posture — magistration under Art. 15.17
- The MOEP is issued at the same magistration hearing that follows any arrest under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 15.17 — typically within 48 hours of arrest. The magistrate has already made the probable-cause finding for the underlying offense; under Art. 17.292(a), the magistrate may issue the MOEP on the same record without a separate adversarial hearing. In Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties, the MOEP is effectively automatic on a family-violence arrest — issued as part of the standard magistration packet alongside the bond determination, the no-bond Art. 17.292(e) firearm-surrender directive, and any conditions of release under Art. 17.40.
- Triggering offenses under Art. 17.292(a)
- The MOEP is available for any offense involving family violence as defined in Family Code § 71.004 — which covers assault under Penal Code § 22.01, aggravated assault under § 22.02, deadly conduct under § 22.05, and any other Title 5 offense where a household or family relationship exists. The MOEP is also available for sexual assault under § 22.011, aggravated sexual assault under § 22.021, indecent assault under § 22.012, stalking under § 42.072, and trafficking under §§ 20A.02 and 20A.03. The triggering-offense list is broader than many practitioners assume; the order can issue in any case where the magistrate finds a family-violence, sexual-violence, or stalking nexus.
- No separate hearing required
- Unlike a Family Code Chapter 85 protective order — which requires an adversarial hearing under § 85.006 within 14 days of the temporary ex parte order — the MOEP is issued ex parte on the magistrate's probable-cause finding without any defense participation. The defendant has no notice, no right to be heard, and no ability to present evidence at issuance. The first opportunity for defense input is the modification motion under Art. 17.292(j) — which is filed days or weeks after the order is in effect. This ex parte structure is the single most important procedural distinction between the criminal-side MOEP and the civil-side Chapter 85 protective order.
- Duration tiers — 31, 61, or 91 days
- Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292(j) sets three duration tiers. The default is 31 days for any qualifying family-violence offense without aggravators — applying to most misdemeanor assault FV cases under Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). The 61-day tier applies when the underlying offense involved the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon under § 22.02(a)(2) or any other Title 5 offense with a deadly-weapon element. The 91-day tier applies in cases involving sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, trafficking of persons, or continuous trafficking of persons under § 20A.03. The duration is set at issuance and runs from the date the magistrate signs the order — not from the date the defendant is served.
- Independent of bond
- The MOEP is procedurally independent of the criminal bond. Posting bond and securing pretrial release does not modify or terminate the MOEP — the order continues to operate as long as its statutory term runs. A defendant out on bond is still bound by the MOEP's no-contact, residence-exclusion, and firearm-prohibition provisions. The MOEP also operates independently of bond conditions imposed under Art. 17.40 — though the magistrate often imposes parallel conditions of release that mirror the MOEP. Counsel must read both the MOEP and the bond conditions to identify the full set of restrictions in force.
The Magistrate's Order of Emergency Protection is the criminal-side counterpart to the civil-side Family Code Chapter 85 protective order — but it operates on a different procedural track, with different judicial officers, different evidentiary standards, and different defense pathways. Understanding the structural separation is the foundation of effective defense work. The MOEP is issued by a criminal magistrate (typically a JP, municipal judge, or county-court-at-law judge sitting as magistrate) at magistration; the Chapter 85 order is issued by a district court or county court at law after an adversarial hearing under § 85.006. The MOEP runs 31-91 days as a fixed-duration interim measure; the Chapter 85 order runs up to two years or in some cases for life under § 85.025. The MOEP requires only the magistrate's probable-cause finding on the underlying offense; the Chapter 85 order requires a preponderance-of-evidence finding under § 85.001 that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future.
Prohibited acts under Art. 17.292(c) — the substantive restrictions
Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292(c) lists six categories of prohibited acts a magistrate may impose: no acts of family violence, no threatening communications, no direct communication with the protected person, no proximity to the residence/workplace/school, no firearm possession, and suspension of the license to carry. Each restriction is checked or specified on the order — the four-corners of the document define the universe of prohibitions.
The first category — prohibiting acts of family violence, threats, harassment, and communications likely to result in family violence — is the substantive heart of the MOEP. It restates the underlying criminal prohibition (assault FV is independently a crime under Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)) but elevates the consequence: any prohibited act becomes a separate crime under Penal Code § 25.07 even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of assault. A defendant who sends a hostile text message to the protected person — without ever touching her — has committed a § 25.07 Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in county jail. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Wagner v. State, 539 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), addressed the constitutionality of similar restrictions on threatening communications; the controlling principle is that the prohibition reaches threats and harassment but cannot be construed to reach constitutionally protected speech.
The second category — prohibiting direct or indirect communication with the protected person in a threatening or harassing manner — and the third category — prohibiting any communication except through an attorney or designated person — overlap in many MOEPs. When the magistrate checks the broader "no contact except through attorney" box, the order operates as a categorical no-contact provision: no calls, no texts, no emails, no social-media interaction, no in-person contact, no third-party message-passing through a mutual friend or family member. The "indirect communication" prohibition reaches communications routed through children, mutual friends, social-media posts visible to the protected person, and any other intermediated channel. Counsel must counsel the defendant explicitly: do not call, do not text, do not email, do not post on social media in any way the protected person could view, do not ask anyone to convey a message. Every channel is closed except through defense counsel.
The fourth category — prohibiting going to or near the residence, place of employment or business, place of education, or child-care facility of the protected person — is the residence-and-stay-away prohibition. The defendant cannot return to a shared residence even to retrieve personal property; counsel arranges a civil-standby retrieval through the local sheriff or police department, with the alleged victim absent. The defendant cannot be present at the protected person's workplace; if both parties work at the same location, the defendant must arrange leave or alternate scheduling. The defendant cannot pick up children at the protected person's school or daycare unless the order specifically carves out child-exchange exceptions. The residence-exclusion provision is the single most disruptive practical restriction in most MOEPs — it forces the defendant into emergency housing arrangements, often with family members in a different city or in a short-term rental.
The fifth category — prohibiting possession of a firearm — is the trigger for both the state-court firearm-surrender requirement under Art. 17.292(c)(5) and the federal Lautenberg consequence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The defendant must surrender all firearms in his possession to a non-prohibited third party (a family member without a disqualifying criminal record, a licensed FFL dealer, or law enforcement) within the time specified by the order — typically 24 hours of issuance. The sixth category — suspension of the license to carry under Government Code § 411.187 — is automatic on issuance of an MOEP with a firearm prohibition. The defendant's LTC is suspended for the duration of the MOEP; the suspension is reported to the Department of Public Safety, and any subsequent traffic stop or other law-enforcement encounter will reflect the suspended status.
Issuance criteria and duration tiers
The magistrate issues a MOEP on a probable-cause finding that the underlying offense involves family violence, sexual violence, stalking, or trafficking. The 31-day default applies to most misdemeanor assault FV cases; the 61-day tier triggers on deadly-weapon use; the 91-day tier triggers on sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, or trafficking. The duration is fixed at issuance and not subject to defense input.
The probable-cause standard governs issuance. The magistrate has already made a probable-cause finding under Art. 15.17 to support continued detention pending bond; the MOEP issues on the same record. Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292(a) does not require a separate evidentiary finding — the order can issue on the magistrate's own motion, on the request of the alleged victim, on the request of a peace officer, on the request of an attorney for the State, or on the request of any other family or household member. In practice in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties, the MOEP is generated through the standard magistration packet — the arresting officer's probable-cause affidavit, the booking-in paperwork, and any victim-impact statement from the alleged victim or her advocate. The magistrate reviews the packet, makes the probable-cause finding for the underlying offense, and signs the MOEP as part of the same magistration order.
The 31-day default tier applies to any qualifying offense without aggravators. This is the most common posture: a misdemeanor Class A assault FV under Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) with a Family Code § 71.004 family-violence finding, no deadly weapon, no sexual-assault overlay, no prior MOEP or protective-order history. The 31-day clock runs from the magistrate's signature — typically Day 0 or Day 1 post-arrest depending on magistration timing. The order terminates automatically at the end of the 31st day unless extended under Art. 17.292(j) or unless the criminal case proceeds in a way that triggers a Chapter 85 conversion proceeding.
The 61-day tier triggers when the underlying offense involved the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. Under Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17), a deadly weapon includes a firearm, a knife or other object specifically designed to inflict death or serious bodily injury, and anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury — which can include a vehicle, a baseball bat, or a household object used as a weapon. The "use or exhibition" element under Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2) is interpreted broadly under Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Where the arrest paperwork alleges any use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, the 61-day tier applies even before formal charging.
The 91-day tier triggers in cases involving sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011, aggravated sexual assault under § 22.021, aggravated kidnapping under § 20.04, trafficking of persons under § 20A.02, or continuous trafficking of persons under § 20A.03. These offenses carry both the longest MOEP duration and the most restrictive prohibition menu — typically including no-contact, residence-exclusion, workplace-exclusion, school-exclusion, firearm-prohibition, and license-to-carry suspension. The 91-day clock provides a longer interim window for the State to convert the criminal MOEP into a permanent Chapter 85 protective order through the civil-court process.
Modification of MOEP under Art. 17.292(j)
Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292(j) provides the limited modification mechanism. The defendant cannot vacate the order outright, but can move to modify specific terms — typically to carve out exceptions for child exchanges, retrieval of essential personal property, or workplace overlap. The modification motion is filed in the issuing court and heard on the trial court's docket.
The modification motion is the defendant's primary procedural lever under the MOEP framework. Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 17.292(j) does not authorize the trial court to vacate the order — the order continues for its statutory duration regardless of any motion. But the trial court can modify specific terms on the defendant's motion, the State's motion, or the protected person's motion. The most common modification targets are: (1) child-exchange exceptions allowing the defendant to pick up and drop off children at a neutral location with no contact between the parties; (2) residence-retrieval exceptions allowing the defendant to retrieve essential personal property from the shared residence with law-enforcement standby and the protected person absent; (3) workplace-overlap exceptions where both parties work at the same location and one party cannot reasonably relocate; and (4) communication exceptions allowing limited communication on specific topics (joint property, shared business interests, dependent-care logistics) through a designated channel.
The modification motion is filed in the court of original disposition — the magistrate's court or county-court-at-law magistrate for pre-indictment cases, the impaneled district court or county criminal court for post-indictment cases. The motion is captioned "Defendant's Motion to Modify Magistrate's Order of Emergency Protection" and recites (1) the current MOEP terms, (2) the specific modifications requested, (3) the factual and legal basis for each modification, (4) any agreed terms the protected person has accepted (where the protected person's position is favorable or where she is represented by counsel willing to engage), and (5) any post-arrest mitigation supporting the modification (counseling enrollment, BIPP completion, alcohol abstinence verification, mental-health treatment). The State responds; the protected person may also appear and be heard. The hearing is contested but typically less formal than a Chapter 85 protective-order hearing.
The evidentiary record at modification is narrower than at issuance. The magistrate at issuance made a probable-cause finding on the underlying offense; the trial court at modification does not revisit the underlying probable-cause finding. The court instead asks whether the requested modification is consistent with the safety of the protected person and the protected children, and whether the documented changed circumstances or post-arrest mitigation justify the modification. The defense develops evidence on (1) the specific necessity of the modification (e.g., the defendant cannot retrieve work tools or business records without entering the residence), (2) the proposed structural safeguards (law-enforcement standby, neutral-location exchange, GPS verification), (3) the post-arrest mitigation already in place (counseling enrollment, abstinence verification), and (4) the protected person's position if known.
Modification denial is not appealable in the same way a bond ruling is appealable. The MOEP modification ruling is incorporated in the trial court's docket sheet and may be revisited on a renewed motion if circumstances change — but there is no immediate appellate pathway parallel to the bond-habeas mechanism under CCP Arts. 11.08 and 11.24. Defense counsel must therefore develop the strongest possible record at the trial-court hearing. Counsel may also pursue parallel relief through cooperation with the State on dismissal or reduction of the underlying charge — a dismissal of the underlying assault terminates the MOEP at the end of its statutory term and prevents conversion to a Chapter 85 order.
Federal firearm consequence — 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)
The federal Lautenberg Amendment at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) makes it a federal crime — up to 10 years in federal prison — to possess any firearm or ammunition while subject to a qualifying domestic-violence protective order. The MOEP qualifies on three statutory conditions: actual notice, restraint on harassment of an intimate partner, and a credible-threat finding or explicit force-prohibition.
The Lautenberg Amendment was added to the federal firearm-prohibition statute in 1996 to address the gap between state-court protective-order law and federal firearm law. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), it is a federal crime — punishable by up to 10 years in federal prison and a $250,000 fine under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) — for any person subject to a qualifying domestic-violence protective order to possess, ship, transport, or receive any firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce. The "in or affecting interstate commerce" jurisdictional element is universally satisfied because virtually all firearms manufactured in the United States cross state lines at some point in the supply chain; the federal jurisdictional element is not a meaningful defense.
The MOEP qualifies as a § 922(g)(8) predicate if three statutory conditions are met. First, the order must have been issued after a hearing of which the defendant received actual notice and at which the defendant had an opportunity to participate. The Texas MOEP arguably presents a constitutional question on this point: the order is issued ex parte at magistration without defense notice or participation. But the Supreme Court in United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), upheld § 922(g)(8) against a Second Amendment challenge, and federal courts have generally treated the magistration-with-counsel-appointment posture as sufficient "actual notice" under the statute. Second, the order must restrain the defendant from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner — which the Art. 17.292(c)(1) prohibition on family-violence acts and threats clearly does. Third, the order must include either (a) a finding that the defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the intimate partner or (b) an explicit prohibition on the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the intimate partner. Most Texas MOEPs satisfy the third condition through the (c)(1) family-violence prohibition.
The federal consequence is therefore active throughout the MOEP's 31-91 day duration. The defendant must surrender all firearms — not just the firearm allegedly used in the underlying offense, but every firearm in his possession — within 24 hours of issuance under the typical MOEP. Defense counsel coordinates the transfer to a non-prohibited third party with documented chain-of-custody: a family member without a disqualifying criminal record, a licensed FFL dealer who can hold the firearms commercially, or law enforcement under the local agency's evidence-retention protocol. The transfer must be complete — partial transfer leaves the defendant in possession of remaining firearms and exposes him to a separate federal § 922(g)(8) charge. The defendant must also avoid any constructive possession: storing a firearm in a shared home or vehicle accessible to the defendant qualifies as possession under federal law even if the defendant did not personally handle the firearm.
The Lautenberg consequence also reaches ammunition — every cartridge, every loaded magazine, every box of bulk ammunition. Counsel directs the defendant to surrender or transfer all ammunition along with the firearms. Reloading components — primers, powder, brass — that are not yet assembled into cartridges are not within the statutory scope, but completed cartridges are. The duration of the federal prohibition tracks the MOEP's duration: the prohibition terminates when the MOEP terminates, either by running its statutory course or by being vacated on modification (which, under Art. 17.292(j), the trial court generally cannot do — the order runs its course). If the MOEP is replaced by a Family Code Chapter 85 protective order, the federal prohibition continues under § 922(g)(8) for the duration of the Chapter 85 order.
Conversion to a permanent protective order under Family Code Ch. 85
The State or the protected person may convert the criminal-side MOEP into a civil-side Family Code Chapter 85 protective order — typically running up to two years under § 85.025, with lifetime orders available in specific cases. The conversion proceeds through a separate civil-court action with an adversarial hearing within 14 days of any temporary ex parte order under § 85.006.
The MOEP under Art. 17.292 is a fixed-duration interim measure — it terminates at the end of its 31-, 61-, or 91-day window unless converted to a permanent order. The conversion is a civil-court proceeding under Family Code Chapter 85, brought by the protected person, by the protected person's representative (often a domestic-violence shelter's legal-services counsel), by the attorney for the State, or by the county or district attorney's family-violence unit. The conversion application is filed in district court or county court at law — the civil-jurisdiction court that handles family-law matters in the county. The application is typically filed in the same county where the MOEP was issued, though Family Code § 82.003 also permits filing in the county of the applicant's residence.
The procedural sequence is: (1) the protected person or her counsel files a verified application for a protective order under Family Code §§ 82.041-82.043; (2) the court may issue a temporary ex parte order under § 83.001 effective immediately and lasting up to 20 days, on a finding of clear and present danger of family violence; (3) the court schedules an adversarial hearing under § 85.006 within 14 days of the ex parte order; (4) at the adversarial hearing, the protected person bears the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence under § 85.001 that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future; (5) if the burden is met, the court issues a Chapter 85 protective order with terms drawn from §§ 85.021-85.026. The Chapter 85 order can run up to two years under § 85.025; lifetime orders are available under § 85.025(a-1) in cases involving serious bodily injury, the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, prior protective-order violations, or prior family-violence convictions.
The adversarial hearing under § 85.006 is the defendant's primary opportunity to contest the protective order. Unlike the MOEP, the Chapter 85 hearing is fully adversarial — the defendant has notice, counsel can appear, witnesses can be called, documentary evidence can be introduced, and the protected person bears the burden of proof. The evidentiary record at the § 85.006 hearing typically includes (1) the underlying criminal arrest paperwork and any subsequent indictment, (2) the protected person's testimony about the underlying incident, (3) any testimony from witnesses present at the incident or in a position to corroborate, (4) photographic or medical evidence of any injuries, (5) prior incident history if any (911 calls, prior arrests, prior protective orders), and (6) the defendant's response — denials, alternative narratives, witness testimony, character evidence, and post-arrest mitigation. Defense counsel develops the record actively; the § 85.006 hearing often resolves the practical question of whether the no-contact framework will continue beyond the MOEP's statutory term.
A no-contest Chapter 85 order — agreed by the defendant without contest — has the same legal force as a contested Chapter 85 order. It triggers the same federal Lautenberg prohibition under § 922(g)(8), the same Penal Code § 25.07 criminal liability for violation, and the same impact on collateral matters such as professional licensing, immigration status, and child-custody proceedings. Defense counsel must therefore counsel the defendant carefully: even where the protected person and the State are willing to accept a no-contest order to avoid a contested hearing, the defendant's long-term interests may favor contesting the order at § 85.006. The decision is fact-specific — turning on the strength of the underlying criminal case, the protected person's likely testimony, the defendant's firearm-ownership posture, professional-licensing considerations, and the prospects of dismissal or reduction of the underlying assault charge.
Violation under Penal Code § 25.07 — a separate criminal charge
Any violation of the MOEP is a separate crime under Penal Code § 25.07 — a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense (up to 1 year county jail) and a third-degree felony for repeat violations or violations involving family violence, stalking, or trafficking (2-10 years TDCJ). The § 25.07 charge is independent of the underlying assault and can be prosecuted consecutively under Penal Code § 3.03(b).
Penal Code § 25.07 is the enforcement teeth of the MOEP framework. The substantive elements are: (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally; (2) commits an act prohibited by an MOEP under Art. 17.292, a temporary ex parte order under Family Code § 83.001, or a Chapter 85 protective order; (3) where the prohibition applies to the specific act committed; and (4) where the defendant had notice of the order at the time of the act. The "notice" element is typically satisfied through the magistrate's service of the MOEP at magistration — the defendant signs the order or acknowledges receipt, and the acknowledgment is documented in the magistration record. Even absent personal service, constructive notice through the defendant's presence at magistration generally satisfies the notice element under Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The base offense is a Class A misdemeanor — punishable by up to 1 year in county jail and a $4,000 fine under Penal Code § 12.21. Even seemingly minor violations carry the Class A punishment range: a single hostile text message to the protected person, a single drive-by of the protected person's residence, a single Facebook post visible to the protected person, a single voicemail. The Class A punishment range is significant — it carries jail time, a permanent criminal record, and (in family-violence cases) potential immigration consequences for non-citizens. The misdemeanor also carries collateral consequences in professional licensing (TEA, SBEC, nursing, real estate, others) and in any future protective-order or family-violence proceedings as evidence of pattern.
The third-degree felony elevation applies in two scenarios. First, where the defendant has two or more prior § 25.07 convictions — the violation becomes a felony regardless of the substantive nature of the current violation. Second, where the current violation involves an act of family violence as defined in Family Code § 71.004, stalking under Penal Code § 42.072, or trafficking under §§ 20A.02 or 20A.03. The third-degree felony range is 2-10 years TDCJ and a $10,000 fine under § 12.34. The felony elevation produces a permanent felony conviction, federal firearm prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on top of the § 922(g)(8) prohibition, deportability for non-citizens under INA § 237(a)(2)(E), and substantial collateral consequences in employment, housing, and professional licensing.
Consecutive sentencing with the underlying offense is authorized under Penal Code § 3.03(b)(1). A defendant convicted of both the underlying assault FV under § 22.01(b)(2) and a § 25.07 violation arising from the same MOEP can be sentenced consecutively — the trial court has discretion to stack the sentences rather than impose concurrent terms. This consecutive-sentencing exposure is the practical reason the § 25.07 charge is so dangerous: a Class A assault FV (up to 1 year) plus a Class A § 25.07 violation (up to 1 year) becomes up to 2 years jail time if stacked, even though both are misdemeanors. Counsel develops the case strategy with full awareness of the consecutive-sentencing exposure and counsels the defendant explicitly on compliance.
Strategic considerations — consent, contest, and underlying-case interaction
Defense strategy on the MOEP and any subsequent Chapter 85 conversion intersects with the underlying assault defense. A contested MOEP modification or Chapter 85 proceeding generates a sworn record that affects the criminal case; a no-contest posture may preserve criminal-case flexibility but locks in long-term collateral consequences. The decision turns on case strength, firearm posture, professional licensing, and the protected person's likely position.
The most consequential strategic decision is whether to contest the Chapter 85 conversion proceeding at the § 85.006 adversarial hearing. Contesting generates discovery: the protected person testifies under oath, witnesses appear, evidence is introduced. The transcript and exhibits from the § 85.006 hearing become discoverable in the criminal case under Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A protected person who testifies inconsistently at the § 85.006 hearing creates impeachment material for the criminal trial; conversely, a protected person who testifies consistently and credibly at § 85.006 strengthens the State's position in the underlying assault case. Defense counsel must assess the protected person's likely testimony and the consequent strategic balance before deciding to contest.
The defendant's firearm posture is a major variable. A defendant who depends on firearms for occupation (peace officer, military, security professional, FFL dealer, professional hunter, gunsmith) faces career-ending consequences from any Chapter 85 protective order — the federal § 922(g)(8) prohibition runs for the order's full duration and can extend permanently if the order becomes lifetime under § 85.025(a-1). For these defendants, contesting the Chapter 85 proceeding is often essential even where the underlying criminal case might otherwise resolve quickly. For defendants without significant firearm-related career interests, the firearm consequence is less acute, and the strategic balance may favor a no-contest posture if it positions the criminal case for dismissal or reduction.
Professional licensing creates additional pressure points. The Texas Education Agency and SBEC under 19 T.A.C. §§ 247.2 and 249.15 treat any family-violence finding as a serious-misconduct trigger requiring SBEC investigation and potential certificate suspension or revocation. The Texas Board of Nursing under Occupations Code §§ 301.452 and 301.4521 reviews any family-violence finding for fitness-to-practice implications. The State Bar of Texas reviews family-violence findings for character-and-fitness implications under Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4. Real-estate, medical, dental, accounting, and other professional licensing boards have similar review obligations. A Chapter 85 protective order — even agreed without contest — produces a finding of family violence that licensing boards treat as substantive even where no criminal conviction follows.
The interaction with bond conditions matters. The magistrate at magistration typically imposes bond conditions under CCP Art. 17.40 that parallel the MOEP terms: no contact, residence exclusion, firearm surrender, drug-and-alcohol abstinence. A violation of bond conditions does not become a § 25.07 charge — instead it triggers bond revocation under Art. 17.43 or bond forfeiture under Art. 22.01-22.18. But a violation of the MOEP simultaneously violates the parallel bond conditions, generating both criminal liability under § 25.07 and bond-revocation liability. The compounding exposure means the defendant must comply with the strictest reading of both the MOEP and the bond conditions — and counsel must keep both documents in active reference throughout the pretrial period.
The dismissal or reduction of the underlying assault charge terminates the MOEP at the end of its statutory term and generally prevents Chapter 85 conversion. The State's leverage to convert depends on the criminal-case posture: a dismissed or reduced assault rarely supports a contested § 85.006 finding of family violence and future risk. Defense counsel therefore pursues criminal-case dismissal or reduction in parallel with MOEP modification work — the two tracks reinforce each other, and a favorable resolution on the criminal case often resolves the protective-order question by attrition. Where the criminal case proceeds to trial, the MOEP and any Chapter 85 order remain in effect through trial; an acquittal does not retroactively vacate the orders, though it strengthens any subsequent modification or expiration argument.
