Texas electronic access interference — Penal Code § 33.022

Electronic access interference under Texas Penal Code § 33.022 makes it a third-degree felony to intentionally interrupt or suspend another person’s access to a computer system or computer network without the owner’s effective consent. It targets lockouts and denial of service — a distinct lane from breaking in (§ 33.02) or altering data (§ 33.023). Below: the controlling text, the punishment range, how the Chapter 33 cluster differs, the case law on its shared elements, and defense strategy in Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant County.

The controlling statute

Section 33.022 lives in Chapter 33 of the Texas Penal Code — Computer Crimes — next to breach of computer security (§ 33.02) and electronic data tampering (§ 33.023). The Legislature added it through House Bill 9 in 2017 to reach a gap the older statutes missed: shutting someone out of a system they are entitled to reach. It reads:

“(a) A person, other than a network provider or online service provider acting for a legitimate business purpose, commits an offense if the person intentionally interrupts or suspends access to a computer system or computer network without the effective consent of the owner. (b) An offense under this section is a third degree felony. (c) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person acted with the intent to facilitate a lawful seizure or search of, or lawful access to, a computer, computer network, or computer system for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” — Tex. Penal Code § 33.022

Every operative word is a term of art. “Computer network” and “computer system” are defined in § 33.01; “effective consent” and “owner” are defined there too. The statute does not define “interrupt” or “suspend,” so a jury applies the ordinary meaning of those words — and that undefined edge is where many of these cases are actually won or lost.

What conduct does § 33.022 criminalize?

Section 33.022 punishes cutting off access, not gaining it. The typical fact patterns are a departing employee who changes shared credentials on the way out, a business dispute in which one partner locks the other out of a cloud account, a contractor who disables a client’s system over an unpaid invoice, or someone who triggers a denial-of-service condition. The common thread is a system or network the owner was entitled to reach going dark.

Because the offense is complete when access is intentionally interrupted or suspended, the State does not have to prove financial loss, data theft, or that the actor ever “broke in.” What it must prove is that the person on trial made the choice to sever access and did so without the owner’s effective consent. That is why so many § 33.022 investigations turn on ordinary workplace facts — who held the administrator password, whose account it was, and whether the person was still authorized when the lockout happened.

The statute has two built-in limits that matter from day one. A network provider or online service provider “acting for a legitimate business purpose” is carved out of subsection (a) entirely — a hosting company that suspends a delinquent account has not committed this offense. And subsection (c) supplies a defense for a person who acted to facilitate a lawful seizure, search, or access for a legitimate law-enforcement purpose.

Classification & punishment range

Grading here is refreshingly simple compared with the loss-tiered offenses around it. Section 33.022 has a single grade: a third-degree felony, no matter the dollar figure or how long access was down. That is a heavier baseline than breach of computer security, which starts as a Class B misdemeanor. The table below sets out the grade and the two statutory off-ramps.

Elements the State must prove

Every element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Read against the § 33.01 definitions, § 33.022 breaks into five discrete parts — and each one is a place the defense can force the State to do real work.

1. A prohibited act — interrupting or suspending access

The accused must have interrupted or suspended access. Neither word is defined in the Penal Code, so jurors apply the ordinary meaning. A brief slowdown, a single failed login, or a change that never actually cut anyone off may fall short of “interrupt” or “suspend.”

2. The object — access to a computer system or computer network

The target must be access to a computer system or computer network as § 33.01(5) and (8) define those terms — the interconnection of two or more computers, or a computer/network plus its supporting software and facilities. A single stand-alone device may not fit the “system or network” language.

3. Without the effective consent of the owner

The State must prove the act was without the effective consent of the owner. “Owner” (§ 33.01(15)) reaches anyone with a greater right to possession or the right to restrict access; “effective consent” (§ 33.01(12)) includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner.

4. Culpable mental state — intentionally

Section 33.022 requires the highest culpable mental state: the person must have acted intentionally, with the conscious objective or desire to interrupt or suspend access (§ 6.03(a)). Accidental lockouts, misconfigurations, and automated processes are not enough.

5. Not within the provider carve-out

The offense excludes a network provider or online service provider acting for a legitimate business purpose. Where the accused was operating a service and acting for a legitimate business reason, the conduct sits outside subsection (a) altogether.

How is § 33.022 different from breach of computer security or data tampering?

Chapter 33 draws its lines by what the actor does, not just whether a computer is involved. Section 33.02 punishes getting in; § 33.022 punishes shutting others out; § 33.023 punishes changing what is inside. The three overlap in fact but not in elements, and prosecutors sometimes stack them from one episode. The comparison below keeps the lanes straight.

The practical upshot: the same person can be charged with § 33.02 for logging into an account they were no longer allowed to use, then with § 33.022 for locking the rightful owner out of it, and with § 33.023 if data was altered or ransomware planted along the way. Keeping the counts separate — and holding the State to the distinct elements of each — is a first-order defense task, because the interference count carries the heaviest single grade of the three.

How Texas courts have interpreted § 33.022

Because § 33.022 was added only in 2017 and is charged infrequently, no published Texas opinion has yet construed the section directly. But its operative terms are not new. “Access,” “owner,” and “effective consent” are defined in § 33.01 and § 1.07 and have been construed in a developed line of Chapter 33 cases — principally under § 33.02 — that govern the same words § 33.022 uses. The four decisions below are the closest controlling authority on the elements the State must prove.

The owner’s consent is the fulcrum — and “consent” can be apparent. In Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), the Court of Criminal Appeals construed the Penal Code definition of consent — “assent in fact, whether express or apparent” — in a case about accessing another person’s computer.^[1] The Court held that “apparent” consent means assent that is “clear and manifest to the understanding” even when it is not spoken aloud, and found apparent consent where an owner invited someone to “help yourself to anything,” left the computer powered on, and did not password-protect it. For a § 33.022 defense this cuts to the core: because the State must disprove effective consent, an owner’s broad or apparent authorization to reach a system undercuts the charge.

The State must prove the accused knew there was no consent. In Muhammed v. State, 331 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011), the court held that to convict under § 33.02 the State must prove the defendant acted “knowing that this act was without the effective consent of the owner” — that is, the culpable mental state attaches to both the conduct and the lack of consent.^[2] Section 33.022 sets the bar higher still, requiring that the interruption be intentional. A genuine, reasonable belief that one was authorized — a former administrator who thought the credentials were still his to use — is therefore a live defense to intent, not a technicality.

“Access” is defined broadly, and private-party evidence is testable. In Thomas v. State, 586 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d), the court applied the § 33.01(1) definition of “access” — approaching, communicating with, retrieving data from, or “otherwise making use of any resource” of a computer — and reaffirmed that the knowing/effective-consent rule reaches both elements.^[3] Thomas also confirmed that Texas’s statutory exclusionary rule, Article 38.23, reaches evidence a private person obtained in violation of law — important when a § 33.022 case is built on screenshots or logs a co-worker or ex-partner pulled from a device.

Who counts as the “owner” is contested ground. In State v. Holloway, No. 03-23-00423-CR (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2024), the court read § 33.01(15)’s definition of “owner” — a person with a greater right to possession or the right to restrict access — and held the breach-of-computer-security statute creates no automatic exception for a spouse, community property, or a co-owner with a lesser possessory right.^[4] The court also confirmed that on a motion to suppress, the burden of persuasion rests on the moving party. In shared-account and family disputes — where § 33.022 lockout cases so often arise — the ownership question is frequently the whole case.

None of these cases is the last word on § 33.022 itself. They are cited here for the Chapter 33 definitions and consent framework the section incorporates — the operative language a prosecutor still has to satisfy, and a defense can still contest, on an electronic access interference charge.

Defense strategies

L and L Law Group builds § 33.022 defenses around the statute’s own limits and definitions. Because the offense turns on consent, authorization, and whether access was truly severed, the strongest defenses are usually element-based rather than after-the-fact excuses.

• Effective consent or authorization. The accused had the owner’s actual or apparent consent to act on the system, or was a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Baird makes clear apparent consent is enough to defeat the consent element.
• No interruption or suspension. The system or network stayed reachable. A slowdown, a bounced login, or a password change that did not actually cut off access may not meet the ordinary meaning of “interrupt” or “suspend.”
• No intent. “Intentionally” is the highest mental state. Accidental lockouts, expired credentials, automated jobs, and good-faith account changes negate the conscious objective the State must prove — and a reasonable belief in authorization goes to the same point (Muhammed).
• Ownership and the right to restrict access. The “owner” element requires someone with a greater right to possession or the right to restrict access (Holloway). In partner, spousal, and shared-account disputes, the person charged may have had equal or greater rights to the very system at issue.
• The provider carve-out. A network provider or online service provider acting for a legitimate business purpose is outside § 33.022(a) entirely.
• The § 33.022(c) law-enforcement defense. Where the act was to facilitate a lawful seizure, search, or access for a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, the statute supplies a defense.
• Attribution and forensics. These cases ride on logs, IP records, and account credentials. Who actually performed the act, from what device, under whose login — all of it is contestable with forensic examination and cross-examination.
• Suppression of privately obtained evidence. Under Article 38.23 and Thomas, evidence a private party gathered in violation of law can be challenged before it ever reaches a jury.

For the framework we apply across offenses, see our criminal defense strategies hub and our felony defense practice area.

Enhancements & collateral consequences

Section 33.022 carries no internal escalators — it is a flat third-degree felony — but a conviction still triggers the standard felony cascade, and the same keystrokes can spawn other counts. The collateral consequences often matter more to a client’s future than the sentence range itself.

A felony conviction means the loss of firearm rights under Tex. Penal Code § 46.04 and federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), immigration exposure for non-citizens, and — because this is a technology offense — serious professional fallout for anyone in an IT, security, or engineering role, where a computer-crime felony can end a career and bar industry certifications. The same conduct can also draw a separate federal charge under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, which reaches damage to protected computers, and can be stacked with Texas counts under § 33.02 or § 33.023. Probation and deferred adjudication remain available in many § 33.022 cases, and steering a case toward supervision — or a reduction that avoids the felony — is frequently the realistic objective.

What happens after an electronic access interference arrest in Collin, Dallas, Denton, or Tarrant County?

The procedural spine is the same across Texas: arrest, magistration (the Article 15.17 appearance where a magistrate sets bond and conditions), grand-jury indictment for a felony grade, then pretrial settings and either resolution or trial. Computer-crime counts are often filed weeks after the underlying dispute, once forensic images and account logs are reviewed, so a person can be indicted long after the lockout itself.

Where the case lands depends on the county. Collin County felonies — including Frisco arrests — are heard in the district courts at the Collin County Courthouse in McKinney. Dallas County cases run through the Frank Crowley Courts Building, Denton County cases at the Denton County Courts Building, and Tarrant County prosecutions at the Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center in Fort Worth. Our office defends Chapter 33 cases in all four from Frisco, and because these prosecutions are so document-heavy, early work on preserving and examining the forensic record often shapes the outcome before an indictment is even returned.