Bail Bond Company Defense Attorneys in Texas
When a defendant skips court, the surety — not the arrestee — faces the judgment. We represent Texas bail bond companies, sureties, and bondsmen against bond-forfeiture lawsuits, remittitur fights, exoneration claims, surrender disputes, and county bail bond board license actions. This is business defense for the people who write the bonds.
Legally reviewed by Reggie London, TX Bar #24043514.
Why do bail bond companies need their own defense lawyer?
A bail bond company is a business that signs a financial undertaking with the State. When a principal fails to appear, the surety — not the absent defendant — is the party sued and the party that pays. Defending that liability is civil-criminal hybrid litigation that a general business lawyer rarely handles.
Our bail bond company practice points the other direction from most criminal-defense work: we represent the surety — the corporate surety, the bail bond company, the individual bondsman, and the agency that posts the paper. When a bond is forfeited, the State files suit on the bond, and the named defendants are the principal and the sureties who stood behind the appearance. The arrestee may be in the wind; the company is in the courthouse, holding the bag for the full face amount.
That posture creates distinct work. A bond-forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is, in the words of the Court of Criminal Appeals, “in effect a suit upon the bond”3 — criminal-case caption and procedure, but functionally a debt-collection lawsuit against your company. Layered on top is Occupations Code Chapter 1704, which licenses bondsmen, empowers each county’s bail bond board, and can suspend or revoke the license that lets you do business at all. A company that treats a judgment nisi like junk mail, or a board complaint like a customer dispute, can lose money it never had to lose — and sometimes the license itself.
This practice gives bail bond operators a defense team that understands both halves — the forfeiture litigation and the licensing exposure — and treats the bonding company as the client. The sections below walk through each problem a Texas surety faces, what the statute says, and where the leverage is.
Who we represent
- Bail bond companies and agencies
- The licensed entity that writes the bond and is named as surety on the undertaking.
- Individual bondsmen and license holders
- The natural-person licensee whose Chapter 1704 license — and livelihood — is on the line in a board proceeding.
- Corporate sureties and their agents
- Insurers writing bail through local producing agents, and the agents themselves, in forfeiture and accounting disputes.
- Indemnitors brought into collateral fights
- Co-signers and collateral-pledgors caught in indemnity-agreement disputes after a forfeiture.
What is bond forfeiture and how does the judgment-nisi lawsuit work?
Bond forfeiture begins when the principal fails to appear and the court enters a judgment nisi — a conditional, interlocutory forfeiture under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.02. It is not final. The State must then cite the sureties to show cause, and only after that process can the court enter a final judgment on the bond.
Each step is a checkpoint where a surety’s defense can stop or shrink the loss. Forfeiture is a creature of statute, and Chapter 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is read strictly against the State.
The judgment nisi (art. 22.02)
When a defendant who is on bond fails to appear for a setting the bond required, the court declares the bond forfeited and enters a judgment nisi under article 22.02.1 “Nisi” is Latin for “unless”: the forfeiture is conditional and becomes final unless the surety appears and shows good cause why it should not. As the Court of Criminal Appeals put it, the judgment nisi “will be made final… unless good cause is shown why the defendant did not appear.”3 Critically, a judgment nisi is interlocutory — it is the start of the lawsuit, not the end of it. That single fact defeats the common assumption that forfeiture is automatic and unappealable.
Citation, scire facias, and the surety’s answer (art. 22.03–22.11)
After the nisi, the State must serve the sureties with citation under article 22.03 — the scire facias process — commanding them to show cause why the forfeiture should not be made final. Articles 22.04 through 22.11 govern how that citation is issued, served, and answered. Because the proceeding is “in effect a suit upon the bond,”3 the surety is a defendant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before any money judgment is entered. Defective citation, improper service, or a missing required allegation can each defeat or delay the final judgment.
The State’s prima facie case — and where the burden shifts
Texas courts have distilled the State’s initial burden to two documents. To make its prima facie case, the State must introduce the bond and the judgment nisi.4 Once those are in evidence, the burden shifts to the surety to prove a statutory cause of exoneration or undermine the bond’s validity. That is why the surety’s answer cannot be passive: the defense must affirmatively put on a recognized exoneration ground or attack the predicate documents.
| Stage | Authority | What happens | Surety’s opportunity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to appear | art. 22.02 | Court declares the bond forfeited; enters judgment nisi (conditional) | Confirm the setting actually required appearance; check the record |
| Citation / scire facias | art. 22.03–22.05 | State serves sureties to show cause | Challenge defective citation or service |
| Answer | art. 22.10–22.11 | Surety files responsive pleading; civil rules apply to trial of the issues | Plead exoneration causes and validity defenses |
| Final judgment | art. 22.14–22.15 | Court enters final judgment making forfeiture absolute, or sets it aside | Discretionary remittitur before judgment (art. 22.16(d)) |
| Post-judgment | art. 22.17 | Final judgment entered against surety | Special bill of review within two years |
For the deeper procedural playbook, see our satellite guide on defending a bail bond forfeiture lawsuit, and our existing pages on bond forfeiture defense and surety bond defense.
What are the only causes that will exonerate a Texas surety?
Texas law is unusually closed on this point. Article 22.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists four exclusive causes that “will exonerate the defendant and his sureties” — and adds “and no other.” Ordinary civil defenses do not apply to a bond forfeiture; the surety must fit one of the four.
A Houston court of appeals confirmed that article 22.13(a)’s causes are the sole grounds of exoneration and that civil affirmative defenses under Rule 94 do not apply in a forfeiture case.4 The defense is not about inventing equity arguments — it is about proving one of the four enumerated causes.
- 1. The bond is not a valid and binding undertaking
- If the bond is defective in law — missing an essential requisite, signed by someone without authority, or otherwise not a valid and binding undertaking against the principal and sureties — the forfeiture fails. Attacking the validity of the bond itself is frequently the strongest opening because it defeats the State’s prima facie predicate.
- 2. Death of the principal before forfeiture
- If the principal died before the day on which his appearance was required (before the forfeiture was taken), the surety is exonerated. This is a documentary defense — a death certificate predating the forfeiture date typically resolves it.
- 3. Sickness or uncontrollable circumstance preventing appearance
- The principal’s sickness, or some uncontrollable circumstance, that prevented his appearance — provided the failure to appear arose from no fault on his part — will exonerate, but only if the principal appears before final judgment is entered, or his failure is sufficiently explained to the court. This cause is conditional: it generally requires the principal to be produced or the absence to be excused before the final judgment closes the window.
- 4. Failure to present an indictment or information at the first term
- If the State fails to present an indictment or information against the defendant at the first term of court after he was admitted to bail, that failure exonerates the bond. This is a charging-instrument-timing defense unique to the forfeiture context.
Two things follow. First, incarceration of the principal in another case is not an article 22.13 cause — that situation is handled by the discharge-by-surrender mechanism of article 17.16, discussed below. Second, because the list is closed, the surety’s energy should go into proving the applicable cause with admissible evidence, not into arguing general fairness. Our detailed treatment lives at Texas bail bond surety exoneration.
How does a surety get bond money back through remittitur or a bill of review?
Even when exoneration is unavailable, a Texas surety has two money-back tools: discretionary remittitur before final judgment under art. 22.16(d), and a special bill of review filed within two years after final judgment under art. 22.17. Both ask the court to remit — give back — some or all of the forfeited amount.
Discretionary remittitur before judgment (art. 22.16(d)) — and the Lyles correction
Article 22.16 is captioned “Remittitur After Forfeiture.” An older version, subsection (a), once purported to require the court to remit — a mandatory remittitur. That mandatory provision is void. In Lyles v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the mandatory remittitur provisions of [22.16(a)] are no longer valid,” and that remittitur is instead discretionary with the trial court under subsection (d) before entry of final judgment.5 Any demand asserting a right to mandatory remittitur is built on a holding that no longer exists. The correct ask is that the trial court exercise its discretion to remit before final judgment, reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
The special bill of review (art. 22.17) — two-year window
After final judgment is entered, the surety’s remaining path is the special bill of review under article 22.17. The surety may file, within two years of the final judgment, a special bill of review asking the court for equitable remittitur of the amount forfeited.5 The surety bears the burden, and the decision rests in the trial court’s discretion.2 Article 22.17 sets a floor on what the court must keep: it may remit the forfeiture less (1) the costs of court, (2) the reasonable and necessary costs to the county for the return of the principal, and (3) the interest accrued on the bond amount from the date of forfeiture.
The McKenna equity factors
What guides the court’s discretion on a bill of review? In McKenna v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals identified six non-exclusive equitable factors a court weighs in deciding how much, if anything, to remit:2
- whether the principal’s nonappearance was willful;
- the degree of prejudice (if any) to the State or the public;
- whether the surety participated in re-arresting or returning the principal;
- the costs, expenses, and inconvenience the State incurred;
- the amount the surety was compensated for assuming the risk; and
- whether enforcing the full forfeiture would cause the surety extreme hardship.
The defense lawyer’s job is to build the record on these factors — documenting recovery efforts, the absence of prejudice, and hardship — because the bill of review is decided on equity, not a rigid formula.
| Feature | Remittitur — art. 22.16(d) | Special bill of review — art. 22.17 |
|---|---|---|
| Timing | Before entry of final judgment | Within two years after final judgment |
| Standard | Discretionary (Lyles: not mandatory) | Equitable; surety bears the burden (McKenna) |
| Who decides | Trial court; abuse-of-discretion review | Trial court; abuse-of-discretion review |
| Statutory deductions | Court’s discretion | Court costs + county return costs + interest from forfeiture date |
| Guiding factors | Equities of the case | McKenna six-factor analysis |
Full detail, including how the two-year clock is computed, is in our satellite on bail bond remittitur and the special bill of review.
How does a bondsman discharge liability by surrendering the principal?
A surety does not have to wait to be sued. Before forfeiture, a bondsman can end exposure by surrendering the principal or proving the principal is already incarcerated — under arts. 17.16 and 17.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 1704.207 of the Occupations Code. Going “off the bond” the right way stops liability from ever attaching.
Discharge by surrender or incarceration (art. 17.16)
Article 17.16 lets a surety discharge its liability before forfeiture by surrendering the principal into custody, or by filing an affidavit showing the principal is already incarcerated. The mechanism is documentary: the surety files the required affidavit, the sheriff verifies the principal’s custody status, and the magistrate is notified so the bond can be discharged. A surety that papers this correctly is released from the undertaking.
Obtaining a warrant to surrender (art. 17.19)
If the principal will not come in voluntarily, article 17.19 — “Surety May Obtain a Warrant” — supplies the tool. The surety files an affidavit stating its intent to surrender the principal, after first notifying the principal’s attorney as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a (and, in a felony case, also notifying the State). On a finding of cause, the court or magistrate issues a capias so the surety can surrender him. An El Paso court of appeals confirmed this framework: a surety ends its liability by surrender, by proof of incarceration, or by the affidavit-of-cause route under arts. 17.16 and 17.19.6
The fee-refund question (Occ. § 1704.207)
Occupations Code section 1704.207 governs a license holder’s surrender of a principal by affidavit — the affidavit must identify the defendant, the case, and the bond, and state the reason for surrender. Subsection (c) is the one that bites the bondsman: if the surrender is made without reasonable cause, the court may order the bondsman to return all or part of the fee the principal paid.6 So a surety that goes off a bond for no good reason can be ordered to refund the premium — which is why documenting a legitimate reason for surrender is part of the defense.
| Route | Authority | Key requirement | Risk to watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary surrender into custody | art. 17.16 | Affidavit + sheriff verification + magistrate notice | Surrender without reasonable cause → fee refund |
| Proof of existing incarceration | art. 17.16 | Affidavit showing principal already in custody | Must predate forfeiture |
| Warrant to compel surrender | art. 17.19 | Affidavit of intent + TRCP 21a notice (and notice to State in felonies) | Court must find cause to issue capias |
| License-holder surrender | Occ. § 1704.207 | Affidavit identifying defendant, case, bond, reason | § 1704.207(c) fee-refund exposure |
Step-by-step surrender procedure and the fee-refund analysis are covered in surrendering a defendant and going off the bond.
How do we defend a bondsman’s license before the County Bail Bond Board?
A bondsman’s license is governed by Occupations Code Chapter 1704 and administered by each county’s Bail Bond Board. The board can discipline a license under § 1704.252, must suspend in certain security-failure situations under § 1704.253, and its decisions are subject to due process and de novo appeal to district court.
The county bail bond board and its powers
Chapter 1704 — the recodification of the former Bail Bond Act (article 2372p-3), carried forward without substantive change — creates a Bail Bond Board in each affected county (§ 1704.051 and following). The board supervises and regulates each phase of the bonding business, adopts local rules, and requires a license to act as a bondsman (§ 1704.151). Because the board’s authority is statutory, it cannot lawfully impose requirements the Legislature did not authorize — a limit with real teeth, discussed below.
Grounds for disciplinary action (§ 1704.252)
Section 1704.252 sets out the grounds on which a board may take disciplinary action — discretionary suspension or revocation after notice and a hearing. They include violations of the chapter or board rules, fraud in obtaining a license, false statements in connection with bonding, refusing to answer the board’s questions, a final conviction for a misdemeanor of moral turpitude or any felony, acting under a suspended or expired license, and failing to maintain required security, among others. Because these are grounds for disciplinary action — not automatic penalties — the board must afford notice and a hearing, and the defense can contest both whether a ground exists and what sanction is warranted.
Mandatory suspension for security failure (§ 1704.253)
Section 1704.253 is different in kind: it directs the board to suspend a license when the licensee fails to maintain the security required under § 1704.160. This mandatory-suspension situation does not carry the same notice-and-hearing posture as the discretionary grounds, because it turns on the objective fact of whether required security is in place. The defense here is usually about curing or documenting the security rather than litigating fault.
Due process and de novo appeal
A bondsman facing board action is entitled to procedural due process — notice of the charges and a meaningful hearing — and to de novo appeal of an adverse decision to the district court, where the matter is tried anew. The leading authority is Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces County Bail Bond Board, which establishes two principles a bondsman’s defense leans on: a board cannot impose license requirements beyond what the statute authorizes (an ultra vires act a district court may enjoin), and a bondsman challenging a board decision must first exhaust administrative remedies, including the statutory de novo appeal.7 It was decided under the former Bail Bond Act, now recodified as Chapter 1704, and the principle carries forward.
Our complete treatment of board complaints, hearings, and appeals is at bail bondsman license defense.
How are indemnitor and collateral disputes handled?
When a forfeiture or premium dispute spills onto the people who co-signed or pledged collateral, the governing law shifts largely to contract and common-law indemnity — the indemnity agreement the indemnitor signed — rather than the forfeiture statutes. Collateral-return obligations and indemnity rights turn on the agreement’s terms and general Texas contract principles.
This is the one cluster where the statutory map runs thin, and it is worth saying so plainly rather than overstating the law. The Code of Criminal Procedure governs the State–surety relationship; it does not comprehensively regulate the private relationship between a bail bond company and the indemnitor or collateral-pledgor who backs the bond. That relationship is created by the indemnity agreement — the contract a defendant’s family member or friend signs promising to repay the bondsman if the principal absconds and the bond is forfeited.
- Indemnity agreements
- A private contract in which the indemnitor agrees to make the bondsman whole for losses arising from the bond — the forfeited amount, recovery costs, and often attorney’s fees. Disputes over enforceability, scope, and amount owed are litigated under ordinary Texas contract and common-law indemnity principles, not Chapter 22.
- Collateral
- Cash, vehicle titles, real-property liens, or other security a bondsman holds against the bond. The bondsman’s right to apply collateral after a forfeiture, and the duty to return collateral when the bond is exonerated or the case ends without loss, are governed by the collateral agreement’s terms and general principles of Texas law.
- Premium / fee
- The bond fee is generally earned when the bond is posted and is treated differently from collateral. Note the surrender-without-reasonable-cause exception in Occ. § 1704.207(c), under which a court may order a fee returned.6
A caution on the law here: Texas does not have a comprehensive collateral-specific statute resolving most indemnitor and collateral disputes, and any page that cites one should be viewed skeptically. We handle these as contract and indemnity litigation, read against the Chapter 1704 licensing backdrop, and tell clients candidly where the governing rule is the agreement they signed rather than a code section. See bail bond indemnitor and collateral disputes for the fuller discussion.
How to respond to a bail-bond judgment nisi
If your company has been served with a judgment nisi and citation, the response window is short and the steps are sequential. The judgment nisi is conditional — it becomes a final money judgment unless the surety acts. Here is the orderly path a Texas surety should follow.
- Calendar every deadline immediately. Note the citation’s answer date and any appearance setting. A missed answer date risks a default final judgment on the full face amount.
- Pull and verify the predicate documents. Obtain the bond and the judgment nisi — the State’s prima facie case.4 Confirm the bond is valid and binding and that the missed setting actually required the principal’s appearance.
- Screen for an article 22.13 exoneration cause. Test the facts against the four exclusive causes — invalid bond, death of the principal, sickness/uncontrollable circumstance, or failure to indict at the first term.4
- Evaluate surrender or proof of incarceration. If the principal can be surrendered or shown to be in custody, arts. 17.16 and 17.19 may discharge or mitigate liability.6 Document a reasonable cause to avoid the § 1704.207(c) fee-refund risk.
- File a responsive answer that pleads your defenses. Plead any validity attack and exoneration cause. Silence forfeits once the State’s two documents are in.
- Seek discretionary remittitur before final judgment. Ask the trial court to exercise its discretion to remit under art. 22.16(d) — never as a “mandatory” right, which Lyles abolished.5
- If final judgment is entered, preserve the two-year bill of review. A special bill of review under art. 22.17 remains available for two years, with the McKenna factors guiding equitable remittitur.2
This is a general sequence, not legal advice for your specific case. The deadlines are unforgiving — engage counsel as soon as the citation arrives.
Where do you defend bail bond businesses?
We represent sureties, bail bond companies, and bondsmen throughout North Texas, with a base in Frisco and regular practice in the courts and bail bond boards of Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties, and surrounding jurisdictions.
Bond-forfeiture suits are filed in the court where the criminal case sits, and license matters proceed before the bail bond board of the county that issued the license. Our firm appears across the DFW metroplex — Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, Rockwall, Kaufman, Ellis, Johnson, and Hunt counties — and coordinates with corporate sureties and their producing agents wherever the paper was written. From our office at 5899 Preston Rd, Suite 101, Frisco, TX 75034, we handle forfeiture litigation, remittitur and bill-of-review practice, surrender procedure, and board defense as one integrated practice.
Bail bond company defense FAQ
Common questions from Texas bail bond companies, sureties, and bondsmen about forfeiture, exoneration, remittitur, surrender, and licensing. These answers are general information, not legal advice for your case.
Is a judgment nisi a final judgment against my bail bond company?
No. A judgment nisi under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.02 is a conditional, interlocutory declaration of forfeiture — not a final money judgment. “Nisi” means “unless,” and the forfeiture becomes final only if the surety fails to appear and show good cause after being cited. The Court of Criminal Appeals has described the judgment nisi as the beginning of a proceeding that is “in effect a suit upon the bond.” Treating it as the end of the matter, rather than the start, is the most common and costly mistake a surety makes.
What does the State have to prove to win a bond forfeiture in Texas?
The State’s prima facie case is narrow: it must introduce the bail bond and the judgment nisi. Once those two documents are in evidence, the burden shifts to the surety to prove a statutory cause of exoneration or to defeat the bond’s validity. Because the burden shifts, a surety cannot win by sitting back — the defense has to affirmatively plead and prove a recognized ground, such as an article 22.13 exoneration cause or a defect that makes the bond not a valid and binding undertaking.
What are the only grounds that exonerate a surety on a forfeited bond?
Article 22.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists four exclusive causes that will exonerate the surety, and states “and no other”: (1) the bond is not a valid and binding undertaking; (2) the principal died before the forfeiture; (3) the principal’s sickness or some uncontrollable circumstance prevented his appearance through no fault of his own, and he appears before final judgment or sufficiently explains the absence; and (4) the State failed to present an indictment or information at the first term of court after the defendant was admitted to bail. Ordinary civil affirmative defenses do not apply to a forfeiture.
Does it exonerate the bond if my principal is in jail somewhere else?
Not under article 22.13 — incarceration in another case is not one of the four exoneration causes. Instead, the surety addresses that situation through the discharge-by-surrender mechanism of article 17.16, which lets a surety discharge liability before forfeiture by surrendering the principal or filing an affidavit showing the principal is already incarcerated, verified by the sheriff. Getting the documentation and timing right is what makes incarceration useful to the bondsman.
Is mandatory remittitur available to get my bond money back?
No — the mandatory remittitur once written into article 22.16(a) is void. In Lyles v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the mandatory remittitur provisions of 22.16(a) are no longer valid, and that remittitur is instead discretionary with the trial court under subsection (d) before final judgment. Any demand asserting a right to mandatory remittitur is based on a holding that no longer exists. The correct request is that the court exercise its discretion to remit, reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
How long do I have to file a special bill of review after a final forfeiture judgment?
Two years. Under article 22.17, a surety may file a special bill of review within two years after the final judgment, asking the court for equitable remittitur of the forfeited amount. The surety bears the burden, and the decision is committed to the trial court’s discretion. By statute the court may remit the forfeiture less the costs of court, the reasonable and necessary costs to the county for returning the principal, and the interest accrued from the date of forfeiture.
What factors does a court weigh on a bill of review for remittitur?
In McKenna v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals set out six non-exclusive equitable factors: whether the principal’s nonappearance was willful; the prejudice (if any) to the State or public; whether the surety participated in re-arresting the principal; the costs and inconvenience to the State; the amount the surety was compensated for the risk; and whether full enforcement would impose extreme hardship on the surety. The defense builds the record on these factors — documenting recovery efforts, lack of prejudice, and hardship — because the bill of review is an equity decision.
How does a bondsman surrender a defendant and get off the bond?
Before forfeiture, a surety can discharge liability under article 17.16 by surrendering the principal into custody or proving he is already incarcerated, supported by the required affidavit and the sheriff’s verification. If the principal will not appear voluntarily, article 17.19 lets the surety file an affidavit of intent to surrender — after notifying the principal’s attorney under TRCP 21a (and, in felonies, the State) — and, on a finding of cause, the court issues a warrant. The license-holder surrender mechanism in Occ. § 1704.207 requires an affidavit identifying the defendant, case, bond, and reason.
Can I be ordered to refund the bond fee if I surrender the defendant?
Possibly. Occupations Code § 1704.207(c) provides that if a license holder surrenders a principal without reasonable cause, the court may order the bondsman to return all or part of the fee the principal paid for the bond. Surrender is a legitimate tool to cut off liability, but doing it for no good reason carries fee-refund risk. That is why documenting a reasonable cause for the surrender — before you go off the bond — is part of protecting the company.
On what grounds can a county bail bond board suspend or revoke my license?
Occupations Code § 1704.252 lists the grounds for disciplinary action, which a board may pursue through discretionary suspension or revocation after notice and a hearing. They include violating Chapter 1704 or board rules, obtaining a license by fraud, making false statements in connection with bonding, refusing to answer the board’s questions, a final conviction for a misdemeanor of moral turpitude or a felony, acting under a suspended or expired license, and failing to maintain required security. Separately, § 1704.253 directs the board to suspend a license when the licensee fails to maintain the security required under § 1704.160.
Can I appeal a bail bond board decision, and do I have to exhaust board remedies first?
Yes to both, in sequence. A bondsman is entitled to procedural due process before the board and to a de novo appeal of an adverse decision to the district court, where the matter is tried anew. Under Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces County Bail Bond Board, a bondsman challenging a particular board decision must generally exhaust administrative remedies — including the statutory appeal — before pursuing other relief. That same case holds that a board cannot impose license requirements beyond what the statute authorizes, and a district court may enjoin such ultra vires board action.
Are indemnitor and collateral disputes governed by the forfeiture statutes?
Largely no. The relationship between a bail bond company and an indemnitor or collateral-pledgor is created by the indemnity and collateral agreements they signed, and disputes over those obligations are litigated under ordinary Texas contract and common-law indemnity principles — read against the Chapter 1704 licensing backdrop — rather than under Chapter 22. Texas does not have a comprehensive collateral-specific statute resolving most of these disputes, so be cautious of any source that cites one. We handle these as contract and indemnity matters and are candid about where the governing rule is the agreement rather than a code section.
Talk to a lawyer about defending your bond business
If your company has been served with a forfeiture, is fighting a remittitur, needs to surrender a principal, or is facing a bail bond board complaint, tell us what is happening. Consultations are confidential and there is no charge to evaluate your matter.
Prefer to call?
(972) 370-5060Speak directly with a Co-Founding Partner. Available 24/7 for time-sensitive forfeiture and surrender matters.
info@landllawgroup.com
5899 Preston Rd, Suite 101
Frisco, TX 75034
Statutes & cases cited
Statutory citations link to the official Texas Constitution and Statutes site. Case citations are provided in Bluebook form.
Statutes
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.02 (entry of judgment nisi on failure to appear). statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/CR/htm/CR.22.htm.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 22.03–22.11 (citation / scire facias, service, and answer). CR ch. 22.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.13 (“Causes Which Will Exonerate” — the four exclusive causes). CR ch. 22.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.16 (“Remittitur After Forfeiture” — discretionary under (d)). CR ch. 22.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 22.17 (“Special Bill of Review” — two-year equitable remittitur; deductions for court costs, county return costs, interest). CR ch. 22.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.16 (discharge of liability by surrender or proof of incarceration). statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/CR/htm/CR.17.htm.
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.19 (“Surety May Obtain a Warrant”). CR ch. 17.
- Tex. Occ. Code ch. 1704 (“Regulation of Bail Bond Sureties” — county bail bond board §§ 1704.051+, license requirement § 1704.151, board powers § 1704.101, surrender § 1704.207 incl. (c) fee refund, disciplinary grounds § 1704.252, mandatory suspension § 1704.253, security § 1704.160). statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/OC/htm/OC.1704.htm.
Cases
- McKenna v. State, 247 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (six non-exclusive equity factors on a special bill of review; surety bears the burden).
- Hokr v. State, 545 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (judgment nisi is interlocutory; forfeiture “made final unless good cause is shown”; scire facias is “in effect a suit upon the bond”).
- Kubosh v. State, 177 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005) (art. 22.13(a)’s four causes are the sole exoneration grounds; civil Rule 94 defenses do not apply; State’s prima facie case is the bond plus the judgment nisi).
- Lyles v. State, 850 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (mandatory remittitur of art. 22.16(a) is void; remittitur discretionary under 22.16(d) pre-judgment and via 22.17 post-judgment; abuse-of-discretion review).
- Seneca Surety Co. v. Ross, 507 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015) (surety ends liability by surrender, proof of incarceration, or affidavit of cause under arts. 17.16, 17.19; Occ. § 1704.207 affidavit; § 1704.207(c) fee refund if surrender without reasonable cause).
- Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces County Bail Bond Board, 1 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999) (board cannot impose license requirements beyond statute; district court may enjoin ultra vires board action; bondsman must exhaust administrative remedies, including de novo appeal; decided under the former Bail Bond Act, now Occ. ch. 1704).
About your attorneys
L and L Law Group, PLLC is a Frisco, Texas criminal-defense firm led by two Co-Founding Partners. Bail bond company defense sits at the intersection of criminal procedure and business litigation — the core of what we do.
Reggie London represents sureties and bondsmen in bond-forfeiture litigation, remittitur and bill-of-review practice, and bail bond board defense across North Texas. He maintains both state and federal practices and is the author and reviewer of record for this guide.
Njeri London handles criminal-defense and bond-related matters for the firm’s clients, including the contract and indemnity questions that arise when a forfeiture reaches indemnitors and collateral-pledgors. She practices throughout the Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant county courts.
Attorney advertising. This page is for general information about Texas bail-bond and surety law and is not legal advice. No attorney–client relationship is formed by reading it or by sending us a message. Outcomes depend on the specific facts and applicable law of each matter; nothing here is a prediction or assurance of any result. Do not send confidential information before a written engagement is in place. L and L Law Group, PLLC · 5899 Preston Rd, Suite 101, Frisco, TX 75034 · (972) 370-5060 · info@landllawgroup.com.