How the Speedy Trial Act clock works
Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 to put hard numbers behind the Sixth Amendment's promise of a prompt trial. Before the Act, whether a trial was “speedy” turned on a vague balancing test. The Act replaced part of that uncertainty with counted days: two firm deadlines, a detailed list of periods that stop the count, and a mandatory dismissal remedy when the government misses one.
The counting is where cases are won and lost. The raw calendar gap between arrest and trial almost always looks long, because months pass in nearly every federal prosecution. The controlling question is how many of those days are non-excludable — the days that actually count against the 70. Most Speedy Trial Act litigation is a fight over whether a particular stretch of time was properly excluded under § 3161(h).
This calculator does that arithmetic for you. Enter the triggering dates and each excludable interval, and it returns the running non-excludable day count, the days remaining, and a projected deadline for each clock, with the governing subsection printed under every figure. It is an educational estimate, not a substitute for a lawyer's day-by-day review of your docket.
The 30-day indictment clock
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), once a person is arrested or served with a summons in connection with a federal charge, the government has 30 days to file an indictment or information. If the charge is a felony and no grand jury has been in session in the district during that window, the period extends to 60 days.
The clock is triggered by a federal arrest on the offense that is later charged. An arrest on separate state charges, or a civil immigration detention, generally does not start the § 3161(b) clock. If the government misses the deadline, the remedy under § 3162(a)(1) is dismissal of the complaint as to the offense charged — and, as with the trial clock, the court decides whether that dismissal is with or without prejudice.
The 70-day trial clock
The central deadline is in § 3161(c)(1): trial must begin within 70 days from the later of (1) the date the indictment or information is filed and made public, or (2) the date the defendant first appears before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending. The Fifth Circuit stated the rule directly in United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009): the 70 days run from whichever of those two events “last occurs.”
Because the trigger is the later of two events, both dates matter. A defendant indicted on one date but not arraigned until two weeks later starts the count from the arraignment. The calculator above takes both dates and uses whichever is later as the start of the 70-day clock, then subtracts the excludable intervals you enter.
Excludable time under § 3161(h)
Section 3161(h) is the engine of the Act. It lists categories of delay that are automatically excluded from both the 30-day and 70-day counts. A recodification effective October 2008 renumbered these provisions, so older opinions cite the former letters — the pretrial-motion exclusion was § 3161(h)(1)(F) and is now § 3161(h)(1)(D). The most common exclusions appear below.
| Exclusion | Statute | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| Pretrial motions | § 3161(h)(1)(D) | From the filing of a motion through the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, the motion |
| Under advisement | § 3161(h)(1)(H) | Up to 30 days while the court holds a fully submitted motion under advisement |
| Competency / capacity exam | § 3161(h)(1)(A) | Delay from any proceeding to determine the defendant's mental competency or physical capacity |
| Plea-agreement consideration | § 3161(h)(1)(G) | Delay while the court considers a proposed plea agreement |
| Transportation | § 3161(h)(1)(F) | Transport to and from exams or another district; time over 10 days is presumed unreasonable |
| Absence or unavailability | § 3161(h)(3)(A) | Absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness |
| Codefendant joinder | § 3161(h)(6) | Reasonable delay when joined with a codefendant whose clock has not run and no severance is granted |
| Ends-of-justice continuance | § 3161(h)(7)(A) | Continuance supported by on-the-record ends-of-justice findings |
Two rules trip people up. First, under § 3161(h)(1)(D) the entire life of a pretrial motion is excluded — from the day it is filed through the hearing or “prompt disposition.” Second, once a motion is fully briefed and needs no hearing, § 3161(h)(1)(H) gives the court only 30 excludable days to hold it “under advisement”; after that, the clock resumes even if the judge has not yet ruled.
The ends-of-justice continuance
The broadest and most litigated exclusion is the ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7)(A). A judge may exclude time by granting a continuance after finding that the ends of justice served by the delay outweigh the public's and the defendant's interest in a speedy trial — for instance, to give newly retained counsel time to prepare an unusually complex case.
That flexibility comes with a strict procedure. The court must actually make the ends-of-justice finding and set forth its reasons on the record. A continuance granted without the required finding does not stop the clock, and the days it was supposed to exclude snap back into the count. The Supreme Court has described the design as substantive open-endedness deliberately checked by procedural strictness.
- Non-excludable day
- A calendar day that counts toward the 30-day or 70-day limit because no § 3161(h) exclusion applies to it. Only non-excludable days are tallied when a court rules on a motion to dismiss.
- Excludable time
- A period that § 3161(h) removes from the count, such as the pendency of a pretrial motion or a properly supported ends-of-justice continuance.
- Initial appearance
- The defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending — one of the two events that can start the 70-day trial clock under § 3161(c)(1).
How courts apply the Speedy Trial Act
Three decisions show the counting rules in action.
In Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Supreme Court held that a defendant may not prospectively waive the Act — a blanket waiver “for all time” is unenforceable, because § 3161(h) contains no exclusion for waived time. The Court also held that to exclude an ends-of-justice continuance the district court must set its findings on the record, and that failing to do so cannot be excused as harmless error. Without those findings, the delay counts, and if the 70 days are exceeded the indictment must be dismissed.
United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 1994), shows the mechanics of the motion exclusions. The Fifth Circuit explained that once a motion is under advisement the court has up to 30 excludable days to rule; after that, the clock resumes “regardless of when the trial court ultimately rules on the motion.” The court also confirmed the Act “does not prefer one remedy over the other” — it ordered dismissal, but without prejudice, given the seriousness of the drug charges and the absence of government bad faith.
United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009), applied the codefendant-joinder exclusion of § 3161(h)(6): because the defendant was joined for trial with a codefendant whose clock had not run, the codefendant's excludable delay was attributed to him. The court also held that a finding on the record that a case is “complex” can satisfy the ends-of-justice requirement, and that a defendant who consents to a continuance cannot later use it to attack his conviction.
The remedy: dismissal under § 3162
When the government misses a deadline, 18 U.S.C. § 3162 supplies the remedy. A blown 30-day indictment clock leads to dismissal of the complaint under § 3162(a)(1); a blown 70-day trial clock leads to dismissal of the indictment or information under § 3162(a)(2). Dismissal is not automatic — the defendant must move for it before trial or before entering a guilty plea, or the statutory objection is treated as waived.
The decisive question is usually whether the dismissal bars re-prosecution. The court chooses between dismissal with prejudice (the case cannot be refiled) and without prejudice (the government may seek a new indictment) by weighing three statutory factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances that led to the dismissal; and the impact of re-prosecution on the administration of the Act and of justice. A dismissal without prejudice still matters — it forces a fresh indictment and can expose the case to a statute-of-limitations bar.
Speedy Trial Act vs. the Sixth Amendment
The statutory clock and the constitutional right are two different things. The Speedy Trial Act is a statute with fixed day counts and a specific dismissal remedy. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is analyzed under the four-factor balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): the length of the delay, the reason for it, whether and when the defendant asserted the right, and prejudice to the defense. The Supreme Court there found “no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.”
The two can diverge. A case can comply with the Act — because most of the delay was excluded — yet still support a constitutional claim if the overall delay was extreme and prejudicial; the reverse is also possible. A defendant with a potential speedy-trial issue should evaluate both theories. This calculator addresses only the statutory clocks under § 3161.
Speedy-trial math is unforgiving and fact-specific, and a single mischaracterized interval can change the result. If you believe your 30-day or 70-day clock may have run, talk to a federal criminal-defense lawyer before your window to move for dismissal closes. Call L and L Law Group at (972) 370-5060 for a free case evaluation.