Statutory Elements
Section summary§33.07 has two main subsections: (a) creating accounts and posting; (b) sending messages with intent to harm. Both require use of another's name or persona without consent.
Elements:
- Creates account or sends message.
- Using name or persona of another person.
- Without consent of that person.
- With intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten.
Subsection Comparison
Section summarySubsection (a) covers account creation and posting; subsection (b) covers messaging.
Subsection comparison:
- (a) — Account creation/posting: 3rd-degree felony with intent.
- (b) — Messaging: Class A misdemeanor base.
- Different grades reflect the persistence and reach of each conduct type.
Intent Element
Section summarySpecific intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten required. Pure impersonation without these intents typically not within the statute.
Intent options:
- Intent to harm.
- Intent to defraud.
- Intent to intimidate.
- Intent to threaten.
- Pattern of conduct supports intent.
Defenses
Section summaryDefenses include consent (impersonated person agreed), lack of intent, identity (someone else did the impersonation), and First Amendment for protected parody.
Defenses:
- Consent of impersonated person.
- Lack of harmful intent.
- Identity (you weren't the actor).
- First Amendment for parody or satire.
Sentencing
Section summary3rd-degree felony (2-10 years) for (a); Class A misdemeanor (up to 1 year) for (b). Enhancements available with prior convictions.
Sentencing:
- §33.07(a): 3rd-degree felony, 2-10 years.
- §33.07(b): Class A misdemeanor, up to 1 year.
- Enhancements for repeat offenses.
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Call (972) 370-5060 →Forensic Foundation
Texas Online Impersonation §33.07 cases turn on digital-forensic evidence: device images, file metadata, network logs, cloud-account records, malware reverse engineering, and attribution analysis. Counsel handling a §33.07 prosecution must engage with the forensic record at a technical level, not just legal level.
The defense's threshold task is review of the government's forensic methodology. Was the device imaged using accepted procedures? Was the image hash-verified against the original? Did the examiner have appropriate certifications? Did the analysis follow the examiner's lab's standard operating procedures? Each step in the chain produces potential challenges at hearing and trial.
Where the case turns on contested forensic findings, the defense should retain an independent examiner. The defense expert reviews the government's work, performs parallel analysis where possible, and is available to testify if needed. Funding for defense experts is available in federal cases under the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. §3006A) and in Texas indigent cases under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.05.
Van Buren and Authorization Screen
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021), reshaped the CFAA "exceeds authorized access" analysis. The Court held that the statute applies only where the defendant accessed an area of a computer system they were not entitled to enter at all — not where they had credentials but used them for an improper purpose. The "gates-up-or-down" inquiry asks whether the user could or could not access the specific area, not why they accessed it.
For a §33.07 prosecution (where authorization is in issue), the defense must screen the indictment against the post-Van Buren framework. Cases built on theories that the defendant misused authorized access — rather than entering a system they had no right to enter — should be evaluated for dismissal under Van Buren. Many CFAA charges filed before 2021 survived only because the law had not yet been clarified; charges filed since must satisfy the gates-up-or-down standard.
The defense should also consider whether parallel state charges (Texas Penal Code §33.02) provide the same protection. Texas "effective consent" analysis under Chapter 1 of the Penal Code is broad. A defendant who had colorable authorization — an unrevoked password, a shared account, an implied license — has a defense to the access element under state law that runs parallel to the federal Van Buren analysis.
The Texas online impersonation statute
Texas Penal Code Section 33.07 criminalizes online impersonation, which involves using the name or persona of another person without consent in an online context. The statute has two distinct subsections that address different forms of impersonation conduct. Section 33.07(a) reaches the use of another person name or persona to create a webpage or to post messages on a social networking site without consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person. Section 33.07(b) reaches sending electronic communications that reference another person without consent and with the intent to cause the recipient to reasonably believe the other person sent the communication, and with the additional intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person.
The base offense under Section 33.07(a) is a third-degree felony, which carries up to ten years of imprisonment and a fine up to $10,000. The base offense under Section 33.07(b) is a Class A misdemeanor, which carries up to one year of incarceration and a fine up to $4,000. The substantial penalty differential reflects the legislative judgment that creating a webpage or social media account in another person name is a more serious form of impersonation than sending a single message in another person name.
The statute was enacted in 2009 and has been amended multiple times to address evolving online conduct patterns. The current version reflects substantial consideration of First Amendment concerns and includes specific intent elements designed to address protected speech that involves references to other persons. The constitutional analysis remains a substantial area of defense practice because the statute reaches conduct that may involve protected expression.
The intent elements and the harm requirements
The intent elements under Section 33.07 require proof that the defendant acted with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person. The intent must accompany the impersonation conduct rather than being a separate motivation. The defense in many cases focuses on whether the alleged conduct was actually accompanied by the required intent, considering whether the conduct could have been motivated by other purposes such as satire, criticism, education, or commercial purpose.
The harm requirement does not require actual harm to occur but does require the intent to cause harm. The defense can challenge the harm element by showing that the alleged conduct was not directed at any specific person, that the alleged conduct was protected speech with legitimate purpose, or that the alleged conduct could not reasonably be expected to cause the kind of harm contemplated by the statute. The harm element provides substantial scope for defense argument.
The First Amendment defense applies to Section 33.07 prosecutions in cases involving political speech, parody, criticism, or commentary that uses another person identity. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not directly addressed the constitutional limits on Section 33.07, but lower court decisions have recognized that the statute must be applied consistent with First Amendment protections. The defense should preserve constitutional issues through pretrial motions and should develop the factual record needed to support as-applied challenges.
The consent element and the social media context
The consent element under Section 33.07 requires the absence of consent from the impersonated person. The defense in some cases focuses on whether consent was actually obtained or whether the defendant reasonably believed consent had been given. Consent can be express or implied, and the question of whether implied consent existed can be complex in the social media context.
The social media context raises specific questions about the meaning of impersonation. Some social media platforms permit pseudonymous accounts, satirical accounts that reference other persons, and other forms of identity play that may not constitute impersonation under the statute. The defense should consider the specific platform conventions and policies as part of the case analysis. The platform conventions can affect whether the alleged conduct constitutes impersonation as understood in the relevant community.
The fan account and tribute account cases are common areas of dispute. A social media account dedicated to a public figure that uses the figure name and image to share information about the figure may not constitute impersonation if the account does not purport to be authored by the figure. A satirical account that obviously parodies a public figure may not constitute impersonation if the satirical nature is apparent. The defense should examine the specific account content and presentation to evaluate whether the impersonation element is met.
Defense theories and parallel federal exposure
The defense theories in Section 33.07 cases include factual challenges to the alleged impersonation, consent-based defenses, First Amendment challenges, and challenges to the specific intent elements. Each theory can be developed depending on the case facts and the strategic posture. The defense should consider the full range of theories and develop the strongest available defense.
The parallel federal exposure in some Section 33.07 cases includes wire fraud charges if the conduct involved deception for financial gain, identity theft charges if the conduct involved use of another person identifying information, and CFAA charges if the conduct involved unauthorized access to systems. The federal exposure can substantially exceed the state exposure and can complicate the defense strategy.
The negotiated disposition options in Section 33.07 cases include reduction to lesser-included offenses, deferred adjudication for first-time defendants with limited harm, and pretrial diversion programs in some jurisdictions. The defense should evaluate the disposition options against the realistic litigation outcomes and the longer-term consequences of conviction. A Section 33.07 conviction can have substantial collateral consequences including employment effects and professional licensing implications, and the disposition decisions should consider these factors carefully.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is parody of a public figure illegal under §33.07?
Can §33.07 apply to using someone's photo?
Does the impersonated person need to be a public figure?
Is "catfishing" criminal under §33.07?
Read the full Texas Computer Crimes Defense Guide
This article is one section of our comprehensive Texas Computer Crimes Defense Guide. The pillar guide covers recent developments, official resources, and the complete framework with deeper analysis.
Read the Pillar Guide →Practical Checklist
- Document everything early. Communications, records, and witness contact information lose value as time passes. Preserve them at the start of the case.
- Identify all parallel proceedings. Criminal, administrative, civil, and regulatory tracks often run in parallel. A statement in one becomes evidence in another. Map the full picture before any disclosure.
- Calendar every deadline. Filing deadlines, response deadlines, discovery deadlines, and hearing dates all have consequences. Missing a deadline can foreclose defenses that the facts otherwise support.
- Build the mitigation package early. Witness letters, treatment records, employment verification, and character references take time to gather. Counsel should begin building the package at the first consultation, not as the hearing approaches.
- Coordinate counsel across forums. Where the matter implicates multiple proceedings, having coordinated counsel (whether one firm or multiple firms in close communication) avoids the strategic errors that inconsistent representation creates.
- Understand the public-record dimension. Many dispositions create searchable records that follow the licensee, defendant, or respondent for years. The decision to contest versus resolve must account for the public visibility of each path.
For a confidential evaluation of your matter, call L&L Law Group at (972) 370-5060 or email info@landllawgroup.com. Initial consultations are free.
Next Steps
If you are facing a situation described here, consult counsel promptly. Many issues in this area run on strict deadlines.
- Call (972) 370-5060
- Email info@landllawgroup.com
Cite this guide
Bluebook: Reggie London & Njeri London, Texas Online Impersonation §33.07, L&L Law Group (May 30, 2026), https://landllawgroup.com/insights/texas-online-impersonation-33-07/.
APA: London, R., & London, N. (2026, May 30). Texas Online Impersonation §33.07. L&L Law Group.